M.H., Appellant-Respondent v. C.S., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a couple of incidents at their place of work, M.H. filed petitions for protective orders (POs) against C.S. and A.M. C.S. then filed for a PO against M.H. After a hearing at which both M.H. and C.S. appeared and testified, the trial court entered a PO for C.S. against M.H, and it denied M.H.’s petitions for POs against C.S. and A.M. M.H. now appeals, asserting the judgment is void for myriad reasons. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] M.H., C.S., and A.M. work at the same branch of the United States Postal Service (USPS) in downtown Indianapolis. On April 5, 2025, M.H. filed PO petitions against C.S. and A.M., and about two weeks later, C.S. filed a petition for a PO against M.H. An evidentiary hearing was held on all three petitions at the same time. M.H. and C.S. appeared in person, but A.M. did not appear.

[3] After the court informed the parties of the format of the hearing, M.H. and C.S. testified to their version of events. They both testified that M.H. was in a relationship with another worker at the post office, J.M., who C.S. also began dating at some point. This caused tension between the parties.

[4] Both parties agreed and testified about two incidents relevant to the PO—the first having occurred in February 2025. The first incident involved M.H. approaching C.S. in a part of the facility where C.S. worked and M.H. was not permitted to be. M.H. peppered C.S. with questions about what was going on between her and J.M., and C.S. told her she had met his family and they were “cool,” meaning she was friends with J.M. Transcript at 14. M.H. left after three to four minutes.

[5] Then one morning in April, M.H. went into her supervisor's office and found C.S. and J.M. sitting in there as well. She told J.M. that she was “sick of [him] and [his] bitch” and got into a shouting match with C.S. that only dissipated when the supervisor told everyone to go home. Id. at 29. That incident was still under investigation by management on the day of the hearing. C.S. introduced into evidence a document signed by their supervisor describing this incident. M.H. had no objection to its admission.

[6] M.H. testified about three other incidents involving C.S. C.S. denied these accusations. In August 2024, M.H.’s engine was ruined after someone shoved a candy bar inside her gas tank. M.H. testified that she believed it was C.S. who had done it. She introduced into evidence a photograph of a text message from C.S. sent to J.M.’s phone in which C.S. admitted damaging M.H.’s car. C.S. denied damaging M.H.’s car or sending any such texts.

[7] The next incident M.H. described involved both C.S. and A.M. She testified that the day before the shouting match in the supervisor's office, A.M., C.S., and an unnamed coworker sought out M.H. at her work trailer. She said the unnamed coworker approached her and began to call her “bitch[ ]” and “tr[ied] to antagonize” her. Tr. at 18. She saw the group laughing and joking about it afterward and informed a supervisor of the incident. C.S. testified that this incident never occurred. M.H. also accused C.S. of busting out someone's car windows believing it to be M.H.’s car,¹ but again C.S. denied doing so.

[8] After hearing all the evidence, the trial court denied both of M.H.’s PO petitions. The court granted C.S.’s petition for a PO against M.H., finding C.S. showed M.H. had harassed her on more than one occasion. M.H. subsequently filed a motion to vacate that PO for lack of due process based on insufficient service of process, and it was denied. She appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] To the extent M.H. has presented any cogent argument on appeal, she appears to contend the trial court's judgment is void for multiple reasons, including lack of service, consolidation of the cases without notice, improper judicial conduct, and the court's reliance on false evidence.

[10] As an initial matter, we note that C.S. did not file an appellee's brief. In such circumstances, we will not develop arguments on her behalf and will only reverse if the appellant's brief shows prima facie error. Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “Prima facie error means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). We also note that M.H. proceeds in this matter pro se. It is well established that pro se litigants do not receive special consideration by virtue of such status but rather “are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied).

[11] We must first address the procedural issues with M.H.’s appeal. The arguments she raises are not supported by relevant case law or any standards of review. A majority of the case law she cited in her brief is irrelevant to the legal assertions that precede it, and one case she cited simply does not exist. Despite being a pro se litigant, M.H. is required to adhere to the legal rules, including our appellate rules. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) requires that an appellant's arguments “be supported by citations to the authorities ․ relied on” and “concise statement[s] of the applicable standard[s] of review[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), (b). Because non-existent and irrelevant case law cannot support a party's contentions and her brief is devoid of any standards of review, M.H. has failed to adhere to our appellate rules. See Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“While failure to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure does not necessarily result in waiver of a claim, waiver is appropriate when ․ the violation of those rules substantially impedes our review of the issues alleged.”).

[12] Nonetheless, because her failure to adhere to the appellate rules has not so substantially impeded our review and “Indiana law strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits[,]” we turn to M.H.’s arguments. Coslett v. Weddle Brothers Constr. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003), reh'g denied. However, upon review, they are neither supported by the case law nor the record.

[13] First, M.H. asserts she was not properly served with C.S.’s petition for a PO and thus, the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, M.H. failed to timely raise this objection, and instead proceeded with the presentation of her evidence and the cross-examination of C.S.’s evidence. “An untimely defense of insufficient service of process is waived.” B.A. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 134, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (finding the appellant waived her insufficient service claim because she appeared in person, did not object at the commencement of the hearing, expressly told the court she was ready to proceed, and objected after both parties had presented evidence). Here, M.H. did not raise an issue with service until the end of the hearing after the evidence had been presented and the court had come to a decision. See Tr. at 52. Given her failure to timely object, M.H. did not preserve the issue below and thus waived it for appellate review.

[14] Similarly, M.H. asserts that the judgment was void because the trial court did not provide her with notice before consolidating the three PO cases for purposes of conducting the hearing. Similar to her first argument, M.H. never objected to addressing all three of the petitions at the same hearing, and arguments not preserved below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Hochstetler v. State, 215 N.E.3d 365, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“It is well-established that an appellant may not raise issues for the first time on appeal and that failure to raise an issue in the trial court results in waiver of an issue for our consideration.”), reh'g denied. Thus, M.H. has also waived this issue on appeal.²

[15] M.H. also contends the judge showed bias in violation of Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.3. As evidence of this bias, she points to the judge's statement at the beginning of the hearing that she “might want to pay attention to what [the court is] saying instead of looking at [her] phone,” and his statement that she “had a full opportunity to litigate” the claim against her when she voiced that she had not been properly served. Tr. at 7, 57. These unremarkable statements were made by the judge to ensure the parties followed courtroom procedures, the hearing produced a fruitful and complete record, and the pro se litigants understood the court's reasons for its decisions. These statements did not indicate the judge was biased or prejudiced against M.H. See Chappey v. Storey, 204 N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that to show prejudice or bias, “a party must show that the trial judge's action and demeanor crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced that party's case.” (quoting Harris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)), trans. denied.

[16] Lastly, M.H. contends that the judgment is void under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) because it was based on C.S.’s “materially false” evidence. Appellant's Brief at 9. However, M.H. did not seek relief from the trial court on that basis pursuant to Rule 60(B) and thus her last argument is nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh evidence. M.H.’s final argument fails, as it is not the role of appellate courts to review and weigh evidence, see P.D. v. D.V., 172 N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that appellate courts “do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of [ ] witnesses”).

Conclusion

[17] Because M.H. failed to prove the trial court's judgment is void, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M.H. intentionally listed the wrong address on her PO filing because she “didn't want [C.S. and A.M.] to know [her] physical address[.]” Tr. at 42. She alleged that C.S. and two other girls went to that address in April and busted out the windows of the car parked there, believing it was M.H.’s car. She claimed they were caught on camera but did not produce any such video or photographic evidence.

2.   M.H. claims she was not given the opportunity to present evidence against A.M., but this is not supported by the record. She was given the opportunity, and was in fact told, to present evidence supporting her claim against both C.S. and A.M. And although she claims that she did not present any such evidence as to A.M., the record shows otherwise. See Appellant's Brief at 8; see also Tr. at 8 (the trial court explaining to M.H. that she will present evidence first and that she “need[ed] to offer testimony as to why [she] believe[ed] [she] should have a protective order against [C.S.] and [A.M.]”); see also Tr. at 16-18 (M.H. testifying about A.M.’s actions).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.