III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John W. Bloch, III, appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior incident of domestic battery against the same victim. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of August 12, 2024, a bystander called 911 to report that a black male wearing a black shirt was “beating the sh*t out of” a white female wearing a tie-dye shirt outside room 251 at the Daylight Inn in Elkhart. Ex. 1. When the first responding officer, Elkhart Police Department Officer Tyler Koeppel, arrived, he didn't see anyone being battered outside so he knocked on the door to room 251. Bloch asked who was knocking and peeked out the window. Bloch then opened the door—wearing a black shirt—and stood in the doorway. Officer Koeppel told Bloch why he was there, and Bloch positioned himself in the doorway so that he was blocking M.N., who was wearing a tie-dye shirt. Officer Koeppel asked to speak with M.N., and Bloch responded, “She's fine. She's fine.” Ex. 4R. Bloch also stated that M.N. was his wife and that she didn't have to speak with him. M.N., however, agreed to speak to Officer Koeppel and exited the motel room.

[3] Officer Koeppel spoke with M.N. while a second officer, Officer Cody Vicary, spoke with Bloch. As Officer Koeppel spoke with M.N., he observed a “fresh” scratch on her neck and back area and that her shirt was stretched in the neck area. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 32; Ex. 5. In addition, M.N. was running her fingers through her hair and removing clumps of hair. Officer Koeppel saw more hair the same color as M.N.’s on the ground outside room 251.

[4] Meanwhile, Officer Vicary spoke with Bloch, who stated that M.N., his wife of 15 years, had been having a “Type 1 diabetic episode” and that they were having a verbal argument about her medical issues. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 167. Officer Vicary noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from Bloch.

[5] After speaking to Bloch, Officer Vicary spoke to M.N., who was “crying” and “timid.” Id. at 168. Like Officer Koeppel, Officer Vicary noted that as M.N. was running her fingers through her hair, she was removing clumps and that there was more hair on the ground outside room 251. Officer Vicary also observed red marks on the right side of M.N.’s neck about five inches long. M.N. told him that the scratches were the result of a seizure she had earlier in the day. When Officer Vicary attempted to confirm M.N.’s story with Bloch, Bloch said M.N. had not had a seizure that day.

[6] Bloch was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony domestic battery, which was elevated from a Class A misdemeanor based on a 2004 conviction for domestic battery.¹ Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to present evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) that Bloch had battered M.N. a year before this incident, on August 13, 2023. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 21; Cause No. 20D01-2308-F5-197 (Bloch found guilty of Level 6 felony domestic battery following a December 2024 jury trial). The State sought to admit evidence of the prior incident to establish that the “hostility [in their relationship] [w]as a motive for [Bloch] to act violently” toward M.N. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 24. The trial court said it would rule on the issue at trial.

[7] At the January 2025 jury trial, Officers Koeppel and Vicary testified as detailed above. When Detective Jason Runyan started to testify about the August 2023 incident, Bloch objected under Evidence Rules 404(b) and 403. The State said it was offering this testimony “for motive reasonings to show the hostility of the relationship.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 13. The trial court agreed that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) for this purpose. It also found that the evidence wasn't unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because (1) it was “just one incident” that occurred “almost exactly a year” before this incident and (2) it would give the jury a limiting instruction, which “sufficiently protect[ed]” Bloch. Id. at 13-14. Detective Runyan then testified that he wasn't involved in this case, but he investigated the August 2023 incident. Detective Runyan explained that during that investigation, M.N. wasn't cooperative and told him that she was a Type 1 diabetic and that she had fallen and hit her head.

[8] Corporal Casey Ianigro also testified about the August 2023 incident. Bloch objected on the same grounds as before, and the trial court overruled his objection. Like Detective Runyan, Corporal Ianigro was not involved in this case. He explained that in August 2023, he responded to a 911 call regarding a domestic disturbance and that the 911 caller stated that “she had heard some gun shots, which drew her attention outside where she saw a black male in a red shirt actively battering a white female.” Id. at 49. When Corporal Ianigro arrived on the scene, he observed Bloch near the front porch of a house and M.N. lying in the front yard with a bleeding cut on her forehead. Corporal Ianigro testified that Bloch, who appeared to be intoxicated, stated that M.N. had fallen because of her diabetes, and M.N. stated that she had fallen and hit her head on a counter.

[9] M.N. testified for the defense that she and Bloch (who was her fiancé, not her husband) had gotten into a verbal argument on August 12, 2024, and that “[a]bsolutely” nothing physical took place between them. Id. at 60. She claimed that the scratches on her were from picking at herself, which she does when she's nervous. M.N. acknowledged that Bloch had been convicted of domestic battery for the August 2023 incident.

[10] During final instructions, the trial court told the jury:

Evidence has been introduced that the defendant was involved in a crime other than those charged in the information. This evidence has been received solely on the issue of defendant's motive as it relates to the hostility in the relationship between him and [M.N.]. This evidence should be considered by you only for that limited purpose.

Id. at 102-03. Bloch was convicted of Level 6 felony domestic battery. The trial court sentenced him to 2.5 years and ordered this sentence to be served consecutive to his sentence in the 2023 case.

[11] Bloch now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Bloch contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the August 2023 domestic-battery incident against M.N. under Evidence Rule 404(b). We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021).

[13] Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” but it “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” When a trial court assesses the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, it must (1) determine whether the evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect under Evidence Rule 403. Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ind. 2012); Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). Evidence Rule 403 provides, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[14] Here, the State argues that the August 2023 incident was relevant to a matter at issue other than Bloch's propensity to commit this crime, that is, it “show[ed] the nature of the contentious relationship between the parties and Bloch's motive for committing the crime.” Appellee's Br. p. 11. As the State notes, we have previously found this type of evidence to be admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). Citing our Supreme Court's decision in Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 1997), we highlighted in Iqbal v. State that “[n]umerous cases have held that where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant's prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In Iqbal, the defendant shot and killed his wife in July 2002. When the police interviewed the defendant after the shooting, he “emphatically denied” arguing with his wife that day and claimed that everything was okay between them. Id. At trial, evidence was admitted that in March 2002, four months before the shooting, the defendant argued with his wife, put a gun to her head, and threatened to kill her. The police were called, and the defendant denied that anything had happened. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the March 2002 incident. We found that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) on several grounds, including that it was “indicative of [the defendant's] relationship with [his wife] and highly relevant for his motive to shoot her.” Id. Bloch doesn't claim that Iqbal was wrongly decided; he claims that it is distinguishable. While the facts in Iqbal are no doubt distinguishable, the general rule remains.

[15] The State cites a more recent case, Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. There, the defendant was charged with the domestic battery of his girlfriend for a July 2020 incident. At trial, the State sought to admit evidence of another incident of domestic battery that occurred between the defendant and his girlfriend five months later, in December 2020. The trial court found that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) to show “the parties’ hostile relationship” and the defendant's “motive, intent, and state of mind.” Id. at 1209. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b). We affirmed the trial court, finding that the subsequent incident “demonstrated [the defendant's] hostile relationship with [his girlfriend] and was germane to prove his motive,” which is “always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Id. at 1212 (quotation omitted). The State also cites Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, which cites to a treatise that provides:

When the uncharged acts of domestic violence are directed against the same spouse or partner alleged in the pending charge, there is little or no need to invoke character reasoning in order to justify the admission of the evidence. In that situation, ․ the trial judge can readily admit the evidence on a noncharacter motive theory; the uncharged acts evidence hostility toward the victim, and in turn that hostility may be the motive for the charged act of domestic violence.

1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 4.19 (Dec. 2024 update). Notably, Bloch didn't file a reply brief to address Davis or Embry.

[16] Applying these principles here, we find that evidence that Bloch had battered M.N. a year earlier was relevant to prove the hostile nature of their relationship and a motive for Bloch to commit the crime. In both cases, Bloch denied to police that he had battered M.N. and claimed that her injuries were caused by a medical condition.²

[17] We therefore proceed to the second step: whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403. As the trial court explained when it overruled Bloch's objection, it was only admitting evidence of one other incident between Bloch and M.N. Moreover, the court instructed the jury that it could only consider the August 2023 incident for the “limited” purpose of Bloch's motive as it related to the hostility in his relationship with M.N. See Davis, 186 N.E.3d at 1212 (finding that the probative value of the subsequent incident was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in part because the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the August 2023 incident.³

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Bloch with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, but the jury acquitted him of that count.

2.   In Bloch's appeal of his domestic-battery conviction for the August 2023 incident, we held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of this incident (August 2024) under Evidence Rule 404(b). See Bloch v. State, No. 25A-CR-192 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2025) (“For its part, the State asserts that the challenged evidence was relevant to show the relationship between the parties. In both instances, Bloch and M.N. denied that any domestic violence had occurred, with both blaming M.N.’s injuries on a medical condition that caused her to suffer seizures and fall.”).

3.   Bloch also argues that the trial court erred in admitting Corporal Ianigro's testimony about what the 911 caller in the 2023 case said because it was inadmissible hearsay. Bloch acknowledges that no hearsay objection was made below and that he must establish fundamental error on appeal. Even assuming the 911 caller's statements constituted hearsay, the admission of those statements did not make a fair trial impossible given that other evidence of the August 2023 incident was properly admitted.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, J., concurs. Felix, J., concurs in result without opinion.