IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.B. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On October 25, 2023, A.B. (“Child”) was alleged to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that T.S. (“Mother”) had been arrested following an altercation with maternal grandmother, leaving no caretaker for Child. Child was found to be a CHINS on March 27, 2024, after Mother entered a partial admission. Mother failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services, and her whereabouts were unknown for large portions of the underlying CHINS proceedings. On January 14, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights and, following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. Mother also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in considering evidence that Mother had allegedly tested positive for drugs at some point after the evidentiary hearing but before the juvenile court had issued its order terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on October 28, 2021, to Mother and An.B. (“Father”). Father is deceased, having passed away on November 26, 2022. On October 23, 2023, Mother engaged in a physical altercation with J.S. (“Maternal Grandmother”), while Child was present, after Maternal Grandmother had refused to let Child leave with Mother because she had believed that Mother was under the influence of drugs. Mother was arrested as a result of the altercation, and DCS was called because Child was left without a caregiver.

[3] At the time of her arrest, Mother refused to allow Child to remain in Maternal Grandmother's care. DCS representatives also determined that the condition of Maternal Grandmother's home,¹ which was in disarray and contained potential safety hazards for a small child, was “cause of concern for a young child to reside in the home” and noted that Maternal Grandmother had admitted to having eaten a THC gummy earlier that day. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Child was removed from Mother's care due to Mother's inability to provide Child with a safe home free from domestic violence; an environment free from illegal substances; and the necessary care, basic needs, supervision, or support. As a result of the altercation, Mother was charged with two counts of Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, and a no-contact order was issued for Mother and Maternal Grandmother. Two days later, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.

[4] Child was initially placed in relative care with a paternal aunt in Michigan. Despite Mother's preference that Child not be placed with Maternal Grandmother, DCS investigated whether placement with Maternal Grandmother would be appropriate. DCS ultimately determined that it would not, due to a number of substantiated and unsubstantiated DCS assessments involving lack of supervision, neglect, and educational neglect of Child's siblings and her other grandchildren. In July of 2024, Child was placed in foster care in Indiana, where she has remained.

[5] Mother's whereabouts were mostly unknown between November of 2023 and May of 2024. Mother did appear at the CHINS fact-finding hearing on March 26, 2024, at which time she made a limited admission that Child is a CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Mother shall, inter alia, (1) contact the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) every week and notify the FCM of any changes in address, household composition, employment, or telephone number and of any arrests within five days; (2) allow the FCM and service providers to make announced visits to Mother's home; (3) successfully complete any programs recommended by the FCM or service providers; (4) maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; (5) maintain a legal and stable source of income; (6) ensure that Child is properly clothed, fed, and supervised; (7) refrain from using any illegal drugs; (8) obey the law; (9) complete parenting and substance-abuse assessments and successfully complete all recommended services; (10) submit to random drug screens; (11) attend all scheduled visitations with Child; and (12) attend individual therapy. Mother did not successfully complete these services.

[6] On January 14, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 15, 2025, at which it heard evidence relating to the conditions that had resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care, Mother's failure to successfully complete services, and Child's need for permanency. On May 19, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[7] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of her parental rights to Child. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[9] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[10] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). As is relevant to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a[CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).²

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[11] DCS alleged that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[12] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[13] The juvenile court found that Mother had testified to the following during the evidentiary hearing: that she (1) only participated in services from April 24, through June 6, 2024; (2) last saw Child on June 6, 2024; (3) “was living [on] the streets” from June 6 through December 2, 2024, when she was arrested in Allen County; (4) had been sober since her arrest in December of 2024; (5) had recently been released from incarceration on March 21, 2025; (6) was currently living at the YWCA on a DCS referral; (7) had reconciled with Maternal Grandmother despite being aware of the court order that she have no contact with Maternal Grandmother; (8) had not known she needed to complete substance-abuse group treatment, a parenting assessment, or a domestic-violence assessment; (9) did not have a valid driver's license; and (10) did not have a plan for Child if she were to relapse after being reunited with Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 19. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding regarding her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and we therefore accept it as true. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as true), trans. denied.

[14] Moreover, Mother acknowledged that she was not in a position to care for Child at the time of the evidentiary hearing, indicating that she wanted Maternal Grandmother “to have placement of” Child until she completed a nine-month program at the YWCA. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 19. However, there is no guarantee that Mother will complete the YWCA program in nine months or suggestion as to how soon after completion of the program Mother might be a position to provide the necessary care and stability for Child. “Simply stated, children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).

[15] The juvenile court's findings indicate that Mother has demonstrated a habitual pattern of drug use, unstable housing and employment, and criminal behavior. The juvenile court's findings outlined Mother's actions during the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings which, until the weeks immediately preceding the evidentiary hearing, were consistent with Mother's habitual patterns. Mother's whereabouts were unknown some of the time, she failed to maintain stable housing and employment, and she was incarcerated at times. She did not successfully complete the court-ordered services in that she failed to maintain contact with the FCM, to visit with Child, and to complete the court-ordered assessments and recommended services. Moreover, Mother was not in the position to care for Child at the time of the evidentiary hearing, having at least nine more months before she might even possibly be in a position to do so.

[16] While Mother points to claimed improvements since her release from incarceration approximately a month before the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court was under no obligation to find that Mother's recent and short-term improvements in her circumstances were likely to become permanent, especially given Mother's habitual patterns of neglect and inability to care for Child. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643–44 (providing that a juvenile court has the discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination and noting that requiring juvenile courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude the courts from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior). Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's determination that there was not a reasonable probability that the conditions for Child's continued placement outside Mother's care will not be remedied amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2)

[17] The juvenile court concluded that adoption of Child by foster parents was a suitable plan for Child's care. “Attempting to find suitable parents to adopt the [child] is clearly a satisfactory plan.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In challenging this conclusion, Mother does not challenge the suitability of Child's foster parents but argues that Child should have been placed with Maternal Grandmother, noting that DCS generally prefers relative placements when possible. The record reflects that DCS had investigated the possibility of placing Child with Maternal Grandmother, ultimately determining that placement with Maternal Grandmother was not appropriate given Maternal Grandmother's recent DCS history, which had included a number of substantiated and unsubstantiated DCS assessments involving lack of supervision, neglect, and educational neglect of Child's siblings and her other grandchildren.³ The juvenile court found that DCS's plan for Child to be adopted by foster parents was a suitable plan for Child's care. Mother's assertion to the contrary again amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

C. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[18] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[19] With respect to Child's best interests, evidence establishes that Child has been diagnosed with disinhibited social engagement disorder, which is defined as “being overly close with strangers, having no fear, going off with anyone.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. Child's therapist, Lisa Starkey, recommended that Child continue with individual psychotherapy and for foster parents to continue caregiver sessions. Foster parents “seem to have ․ a real understanding of the road ahead” and Child has made “rapid improvement” since she was placed with foster parents. Tr. Vol. II p. 88. In contrast, Child regressed some when her visits with Maternal Grandmother were increased to more than once a week. As such, Starkey further recommended that Maternal Grandmother's visits with Child be decreased to once a week and that Maternal Grandmother “seek out education on” disinhibited social engagement disorder to enable her to “[u]understand attachment strategies, how to use them, how to spot when one is needed to be used[,]” and “be willing to be part of [a] collaborative effort towards health for [Child] so she can grow into being a happy, health adult without a significant mental disorder.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84.

[20] Starkey further testified that “the amount of the regression [in Child] would be huge. It would be phenomenal” if the juvenile court were to grant Mother more time to complete services or to move Child from foster parents’ home. Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Mother has not seen Child since June 6, 2024, and Starkey indicated that Child “does not have a healthy attachment” with her. Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Starkey opined that to place Child with Mother would be to take “her from a place where she's starting to learn what safety looks like and structure and consistency and someone who is able to meet her needs and we're plucking her from that and putting her in at ground zero. Starting all over with someone new.” Tr. Vol. II p. 85. Starkey further opined that Child should “[h]ands down” continue in foster parents’ care. Tr. Vol. II p. 90.

[21] Mother has not worked with Starkey or inquired about how to create a healthy relationship with Child. As is outlined above, Mother has not demonstrated a historical ability to provide safe and stable housing and care for Child. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the parent's current inability to do the same, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[22] Moreover, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. FCM Alison McCoy noted Child's need for permanency and testified that DCS “would recommend adoption at this time as it's the most stable form of permanency.” Tr. Vol. II p. 120. FCM McCoy testified that in order for Mother to complete the necessary steps before DCS could even consider placing Child with her, “it could be another 12 to 15 months in addition to the 17” that had passed since the CHINS case had been opened. Tr. Vol. II p. 124.

[23] In addition, Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Emily Musi testified that adoption by foster parents was “the best permanent solution” for Child “[b]ecause she is getting her needs met there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 88. CASA Musi did not believe that Mother would be able to provide for Child's needs “at this time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 189. Given Child's need for permanency and stability, CASA Musi testified that she was “in favor of the termination” of Mother's parental rights to Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 190. The testimony of FCM McCoy and CASA Musi support the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). This is especially true given Child's need for permanency and Mother's historical pattern of instability. Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support this conclusion again effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

II. Consideration of Post-Evidentiary Hearing Positive Drug Screen

[24] Mother also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in considering evidence indicating that Mother tested positive for drugs at some point after the completion of the evidentiary hearing but prior to the juvenile court issuing its order terminating Mother's parental rights.

It is well-established that errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. To determine whether the admission of evidence affected a party's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the finder of fact. Likewise, reversible error cannot be predicated upon the erroneous admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has already been properly admitted.

Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotations omitted).

[25] Even if the juvenile court abused its discretion in considering and noting the fact that Mother had tested positive for illegal substances on April 18, 2025, the juvenile court's reference to the failed drug test is at most harmless given the overwhelming evidence supporting the juvenile court's determination that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care were not likely to be remedied, that DCS had a suitable plan for Child's care, and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Thus, given that any error in considering the positive drug test was at most harmless, Mother has failed to establish reversible error in this regard.

[26] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Maternal Grandmother blamed Mother for the condition of her home, claiming that while she had been away for the weekend, Mother had gone “through and toss[ed] it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 142.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended, effective March 11, 2024, and the amended statute applies to this case. We note that while the juvenile court appears to have cited to the prior version of the statute in its order, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's order on this basis and the factors relied on by the juvenile court are the same under both versions.

3.   Maternal Grandmother's substantiated assessments would typically remove her from consideration as an option for relative placement and such placement would only be available if DCS were to issue a waiver.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.