S.S., Appellant-Respondent v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.S. (Mother) appeals following the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her two minor children, G.S. and L.S. (collectively, the Children). Mother does not challenge any of the findings or conclusions of the trial court supporting the termination order. She contends only that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to permit her remote attendance at the fact-finding hearing.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] After the Children were adjudicated CHINS, a dispositional hearing was held in June 2022. In the dispositional order, Mother was ordered to complete domestic violence and substance abuse evaluations and follow any recommended treatment, participate in individual therapy, properly care for her own physical and mental health needs, and engage in supervised visitation. In January 2023, the court added a requirement that Mother comply with random drug screens.

[4] Mother initially complied with some services, but she did not follow the treatment recommended by the domestic violence assessment, she tested positive for methamphetamine and other drugs through January 2024, and she regularly failed to comply with random drug screens (totally non-compliant since June 2024). More importantly, Mother neglected to properly care for her own significant mental health needs. Her primary diagnosis was bipolar disorder with psychotic features, which required consistent medical management. Mother's failure to take necessary medications led to “pretty extreme behaviors” and multiple police reports resulting in escorts to emergency rooms for mental health evaluations and sometimes involuntary commitments for inpatient acute mental health treatment (including in October 2022, January 2025, and February 2025). Transcript at 20. Due to Mother's mental instability and aggressive behavior during visits, the trial court in the CHINS matter suspended her visits with the Children in July 2024. Mother moved to Pennsylvania around this same time, and she has not seen the Children since.

[5] On July 10, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights to Children. Mother appeared with appointed counsel at hearings in November 2024, February 2025, and March 2025. In addition to being properly served with notice of the fact-finding hearing scheduled for April 24, 2025, she was notified of the date in open court on March 12, 2025.

[6] Mother failed to appear for the fact-finding hearing. Her absence was addressed at the beginning of the hearing, which was delayed for about thirty minutes to see if she would arrive. The court noted that Mother had proper notice and had been “advised multiple times that being out of state would require her still to appear in person for these hearings.” Id. at 11. Mother's attorney then indicated that he had not heard from Mother despite having sent her an email reminder the previous day. Her attorney also noted that he had not had contact with Mother in two or three weeks. Neither the court-appointed special advocate (the CASA) nor DCS had heard from Mother either, though Stephanie Miller, the family case manager (FCM), noted that DCS was aware that Mother had been in town earlier that week.

[7] The fact-finding hearing proceeded in Mother's absence without objection. DCS presented into evidence certified records from the underlying CHINS case, certified records from a prior CHINS case involving the same parties, and certified records regarding Mother's drug screens. FCM Miller and the CASA also testified and recommended termination of parental rights. Of particular note, FCM Miller testified that Mother had not remedied the reasons for DCS's involvement and that conditions had deteriorated since the CHINS case began. She explained:

I think we're actually worse off today than we were three years ago. She has had -- when I first met [Mother], she explained to me that over her life, she has required acute mental health treatment at least once a year. That caused a lot of concern for all the members of the child and family team. We wanted to proceed with caution because we knew that these children had already been through so much trauma. You know we did see the annual [m]ental health inpatient stay in October of 2022, but in the last -- just it's April so we're four months into this year. She has had two over ten days stays in acute mental health treatment[. I]n addition to the actual stays, she has had six calls where she has been out in the community being disturbing, disruptive, belligerent, threatening, where police and EMS have actually transported her to the hospital for an evaluation. Half of those times, she was able to calm herself enough to where she did not get that 72-hour mandatory hold. But every time it's noted that she is aggressive, she is homicidal, she is just acting in violent and very paranoid and unpredictable ways. And so the speed of her mental illness cycle has quadrupled at this time.

Id. at 25.

[8] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the termination of Mother's parental rights. A written order followed on May 5, 2025, with specific findings of fact and conclusions supporting the termination.

[9] Mother now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[10] As set forth above, Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights. She argues only that the trial court “committed fundamental error in failing to permit [her] remote attendance at the hearing in this matter.” Appellant's Brief at 2.

[11] An error is fundamental only if it “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). A fundamental error is “so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id.

[12] In her exceedingly short appellate argument, Mother fails to establish error, let alone fundamental error. Mother cites no authority to support her implicit claim that she was entitled to appear remotely, and she does not show that she even asked to appear at the fact-finding hearing remotely. Further, there is no indication in the record that Mother's lack of appearance at the hearing had anything to do with the requirement of in-person attendance, as she was able to be present for the three prior hearings in November, February, and March. And FCM Miller indicated that Mother was in town on April 20, 2025 – four days before the fact-finding hearing. Despite being in town, she failed to contact her attorney or respond to his reminder regarding the hearing, of which Mother had ample notice.

[13] “The right of a parent ․ to be present at any hearing concerning the person's child is waived by the person's failure to appear after lawful notice.” Ind. Code § 31-32-5-7; see also Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (observing that parents “do not have a constitutional right to be present at a termination of parental rights hearing”). Here, there is no dispute that Mother received proper notice and that she failed to provide any explanation for her absence at the fact-finding hearing. Despite her absence, Mother was represented by counsel at the hearing, with counsel cross-examining FCM Miller, which provided due process protections to Mother. See C.C., 170 N.E.3d at 676 (“We find that counsel's representation of Mother's interests at the fact-finding hearing vastly reduced the risk of error, which was minimal.”).

[14] In sum, Mother has not established that proceeding in her absence made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652.

[15] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.