IN RE: the Paternity of: Al.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] D.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order addressing child custody. N.C. (“Father”) requests appellate attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's order and deny Father's request for attorney fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are the parents of Al.C., Av.C., An.C., and Ad.C. (the “Children”). Mother and Father “lived as an intact household until ․ somewhere around 2020.” Transcript Volume II at 35. In 2020, Mother and Father separated. In 2021, Father moved from Indiana to New York. In 2021 and 2022, Father did not see the Children.¹ In 2022, Mother moved from Indiana to Rhode Island.²

[3] On February 4, 2022, Father filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support with respect to Al.C. in the Marion Superior Court under cause number 49D16-2202-JP-940 (“Cause No. 940”) and asserted that Mother lived at an address in Indianapolis, Indiana. On March 21, 2022, Father filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support in the Marion Superior Court relating to Ad.C. in cause number 49D09-2203-JP-2338 (“Cause No. 2338”), a petition related to An.C. in cause number 49D10-2203-JP-2339 (“Cause No. 2339”), and a petition relating to Av.C. in cause number 49D09-2203-JP-2340 (“Cause No. 2340”).

[4] On March 24, 2022, Father filed a Summons in Cause No. 940 which indicated that the manner of service of the summons was designated as “Registered or certified mail” and which listed Mother's residence as an address in Indianapolis, Indiana. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 41. On July 25, 2022, Father filed an Amended Praecipe for Service by Publication in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, and 2339, which asserted: “A Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support having been filed in the above cause, issuance of Summons by publication pursuant to the attached affidavit is requested.”³ Id. at 42-45. Also on July 25, 2022, Father's counsel filed an affidavit in Cause No. 940 alleging that the address known to her for Mother was an address on Harmon Drive in Indianapolis, Indiana, that she “does not know and with reasonable inquiry and diligence is unable to ascertain the residence of” Mother, and that she desired to serve Mother by publication.⁴ Id. at 42.

[5] In July 2022, the trial court entered Orders to Appear under Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340, which stated that the court “hereby GRANTS [Father's] Praecipe Service by Publication and hereby orders [Mother] to appear on 8/16/2022 at 11:00 a.m. via Webex. Parties shall refer to the CCS for meeting information for the hearing.” Id. at 45-48.

[6] On August 12, 2022, Father's counsel filed a Motion to Continue in Cause No. 940 alleging that he was “in the process of service by publication in the Indiana Business Journal to be completed on August 23, 2022,”⁵ and Mother had not responded, “warranting the service by publication.” Id. at 49. That same day, the court in Cause No. 940 entered an order granting the motion to continue and scheduled a hearing for September 28, 2022, via Webex. On September 28, 2022, the court held a hearing at which Mother failed to appear.⁶ A chronological case summary entry in Cause No. 940 related to the hearing indicates that the court found that Mother was properly served by publication.

[7] On October 3, 2022, the court entered an Order Establishing Paternity in Cause No. 940 finding that Father admitted that he was the biological father of the Children; the Children were born out of wedlock to Father and Mother; and Mother failed to appear and consent to the establishment of paternity. The court scheduled a preliminary hearing for custody, parenting time, and child support for November 16, 2022.

[8] On November 16, 2022, Father's counsel filed a Motion to Set a Hearing in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340, asserting that the matter was scheduled for a hearing at 11:00 a.m. on November 16, 2022, the matter was called by the court at 9:00 a.m. on November 16, 2022, and “Opposing Counsel has been unable to locate or contact the opposing party for the above-mentioned cause.” Id. at 84.

[9] On November 18, 2022, the court entered a Notice to Appear in Cause No. 940 which scheduled a preliminary hearing for January 17, 2023, and stated that Mother “is Ordered to Appear, as service has been previously perfected through publication, and failure to do so could open [Mother] to potential Contempt of Court determinations.” Id. at 90. On November 17, 2022, the court in Cause Nos. 2338 and 2339 entered orders scheduling a hearing for January 17, 2023. On December 22, 2022, the court in Cause No. 2340 entered a Notice to Appear which also scheduled a preliminary hearing for January 17, 2023, and which listed Mother's address in Indianapolis as well as an address for her in Rhode Island.

[10] On January 24, 2023, the court entered an order in Cause No. 940 which found that Father had established paternity, he had been involved in Al.C.’s life until Mother denied him the opportunity to interact with and parent the child, Mother's “current whereabouts are unknowing [sic], yet multiple potential locations for the children currently exist”; “[m]ultiple hearings have been held, and [Mother] has ignored the Court and the Courts [sic] Order to appear.” Id. at 103-104. The court granted Father sole physical and legal custody.⁷

[11] Father obtained the Children from Mother at her residence in Rhode Island. At some point after Father obtained the Children, Mother moved to Pocasset, Massachusetts.

[12] On March 7, 2023, Mother's counsel filed an Appearance in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340. That same day, Mother filed a Verified Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Hearing pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340.⁸ Mother alleged that the Children had lived with her for the entirety of their lives, the parties cohabitated in Indiana but separated in August 2020, Father exercised minimal parenting time after leaving her household, he relocated to the State of New York in September 2021, and he then attempted little to no contact with the Children. She alleged that she relocated with the Children to the State of Rhode Island for better housing in the spring of 2022; Father never personally served her with his petition; and, pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 86(B), Father was required to provide service to Mother upon receipt of the Summons from the Marion County Clerk. She alleged that Father failed to file a Certificate of Issuance of Summons or any other indication that he provided basic service pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 4.15. She asserted that she was contacted by law enforcement in Rhode Island to give the Children to Father on January 25, 2023, one day after the trial court's January 24, 2023 order. She asserted that, “[a]lthough Father previously stated to the Court that he could not locate [her] and required notice by publication, Father was miraculously able to discover [her] location within twenty-four (24) hours after receiving the Court's order granting him custody.” Id. at 108. She stated that she did not contest the establishment of paternity but asserted that the Children's best interests were not served by granting Father primary physical custody. She requested that the court set a hearing “to vacate the previous order on custody and parenting time and grant [her] sole legal and physical custody and provide for Father's parenting time pursuant to the IPTG where Distance is a Major Factor as he requested.” Id. at 109.

[13] On March 30, 2023, Mother filed a Verified Motion for Rule to Show Cause for Father's Denial of Parenting Time under Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340. That same day, Father filed a Motion for Stay of Proceedings in Cause No. 940 alleging that the State of New York was now his home state and “now the residence of the minor children in question.” Id. at 115.

[14] On April 2, 2023, the court entered an order in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340, indicating that it held a hearing on February 21, 2023, regarding Mother's February 1, 2023 “Stop Motion,” Father “strictly complied with the Indiana Trial Rules regarding service,” “Father and his legal counsel hired a skip tracer to identify Mother's location,” Mother failed to provide notice of her intent to move with the Children, Mother's actions suggest that she was actively preventing the Children from having contact with Father and that she was “intentionally attempting to allude [sic] this Court's jurisdiction,” and “the Order issued January 24, 2023 remains in full force.” Id. at 117-119.

[15] On April 6, 2023, Father filed a Motion to Transfer Court Order Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJA”) under Cause No. 940 asking that the court “stay the current proceedings filed after March 8, 2023, and transfer the Jurisdiction of this matter to New York state ․” Id. at 121. Father asserted that his current address was in New York, Al.C. resided with him, and Mother's suspected address was in Rhode Island. Father attached a March 8, 2023 filing in the Columbia County Family Court in New York in which he filed a Notice of Request for Registration of an Out-of-State Child Custody or Visitation Order.

[16] On April 10, 2023, the court entered an Order on April 10 Hearing in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340, which indicated that the court held a hearing and found that Father shall continue to have primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the children subject to Mother's right to parenting time. The court ordered the parties to “meet at an agreed-upon location in Palmer, Massachusetts, for all parenting time exchanges, unless the parties agree to a different location in writing.” Id. at 141.

[17] On March 4, 2024, Guardian ad Litem Katherine Rich (“GAL Rich”) filed a Summary Report in Cause No. 940. GAL Rich indicated that she interviewed Mother, Father, and the Children, and recommended that Father “should retain primary physical and sole legal custody.” Id. at 149.

[18] On August 29, 2024, the court held a consolidated hearing in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340 at which the parties, their attorneys, and GAL Rich were present. The court noted that paternity had been established and that it would consolidate all matters under Cause No. 940. The court heard testimony from GAL Rich and Father.⁹ On October 8, 2024, the court continued the hearing, which was “held virtually by Webex,” at which the parties appeared with counsel. Transcript Volume II at 104. The court heard testimony from Mother.

[19] On January 7, 2025, the court entered an eight-page Final Order which found that the Children's best interest was to remain in Father's sole legal and physical custody. On February 3, 2025, Mother filed a Verified Motion to Correct Error, which the court denied on March 20, 2025. On April 15, 2025, Mother filed a notice of appeal of the January 7, 2025 order and the March 20, 2025 order.

Discussion

[20] Mother argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her due to deficient service of process, the trial court denied her due process with respect to the notice of the January 23, 2023 hearing, and the January 23, 2023 order was void. She also argues that the trial court erred regarding its determination of custody.

[21] With respect to Mother's argument regarding personal jurisdiction, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that personal jurisdiction presents a question of law we review de novo. Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 508 (Ind. 2015). “[W]hether personal jurisdiction exists can depend upon factual determinations concerning a defendant's contacts with the forum state—in which case the challenger bears the burden of disproving personal jurisdiction.” Id. When the trial court issues findings of jurisdictional facts, we review those findings for clear error. Id. at 509. In so doing, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will reverse the trial court's factual findings only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or indirectly. Id.

[22] The Indiana Trial Rules provide a mechanism of notice or service of process by publication. See Ind. Trial Rule 4.13. “But the Due Process Clause demands a diligent search before attempting notice by publication.” In re Adoption of L.D., 938 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 2010). “[S]ervice by publication is inadequate when a diligent effort has not been made to ascertain a party's whereabouts.” Id. Ineffective service of process prohibits a trial court from having personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Grabowski v. Waters, 901 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Volunteers of Am. v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)), trans. denied. A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant violates due process and is void. Id. (citing Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998)). “A void judgment is a complete nullity and may be attacked at any time.” Id. (citing Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1154, 1156). However, “when a party either seeks affirmative relief from a court or fails to object in a timely manner to the jurisdiction of a court, he has voluntarily submitted his person to that court.” In re T.M.Y., 725 N.E.2d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Hoehn v. Hoehn, 716 N.E.2d 479, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Schneider v. Schneider, 555 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990))), reh'g denied, trans. denied. See also Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155 (holding that a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived). “Once that has been done, a party will not be allowed thereafter to challenge the court's personal jurisdiction.” In re T.M.Y., 725 N.E.2d at 1003. “Where a party has failed to object in a timely manner, that party is precluded on the theory of waiver from making the argument.” Id. “Where a party has requested affirmative relief, that party is prevented on the theory of estoppel from challenging personal jurisdiction.” Id.

[23] Here, Mother's counsel filed an appearance on March 7, 2023, and also filed a Verified Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Hearing pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). While Mother appeared to challenge the service, she also stated that she did not contest the establishment of paternity and also requested that the court set a hearing “to vacate the previous order on custody and parenting time and grant Mother sole legal and physical custody and provide for Father's parenting time pursuant to the IPTG where Distance is a Major Factor as he requested.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 109.

[24] Even assuming that Mother has neither waived nor is estopped from challenging the court's personal jurisdiction, reversal is unwarranted. Father's counsel filed an affidavit in Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340. Ind. Trial Rule 4.13 provides that “[t]he person seeking such service, or his attorney, shall submit his request therefor upon the praecipe for summons along with supporting affidavits that diligent search has been made that the defendant cannot be found, has concealed his whereabouts, or has left the state, and shall prepare the contents of the summons to be published.” (Emphasis added). In her affidavit, Father's counsel asserted that the address known to her for Mother was an address on Harmon Drive in Indianapolis, Indiana, and that she “does not know and with reasonable inquiry and diligence is unable to ascertain the residence of” Mother, and that she desired to serve Mother by publication. Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 42. We cannot say that Father failed to comport with the requirements of Ind. Trial Rule 4.13(A).¹⁰ See Grabowski, 901 N.E.2d at 564 (“We are unpersuaded that [plaintiffs] failed to comport with the requirements of Trial Rule 4.13(A), which requires only that the person seeking service by publication execute an affidavit, to accompany his praecipe for summons by publication, indicating that diligent efforts have been made that the defendants cannot be found. As evidenced by the terms in [one of the plaintiff's] affidavit, [plaintiffs] complied with the plain language of Trial Rule 4.13. See Harris v. Delaware County Div. of Family & Children Servs., 732 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding Rule 4.13 violation where neither praecipe nor affidavit was filed)[, reh'g denied]. Although [defendant] argues that the ‘diligent search’ requirement contemplates more specificity than an affirmation that a diligent search was made and proved fruitless, [defendant] provides no authority for, nor does the plain language of the rule support, that interpretation.”).

[25] To the extent Mother argues that the publication of the notice in the Indianapolis Business Journal was inadequate as it would reach only 5% of the population of Indianapolis, Ind. Trial Rule 4.13 requires that publication occur in “a newspaper authorized by law to publish notices.” Mother does not argue that the Indianapolis Business Journal was not authorized by law to publish notices. Ind. Trial Rule 4.13(C) provides that the summons shall be published “in the county where the complaint or action is filed, where the res is located, or where the defendant resides or where he was known last to reside.” The complaint was filed in Marion County and the affidavit of Father's counsel indicated that Mother was last known to reside in Marion County.

[26] “Regarding service by publication, the Due Process Clause requires that in order for constructive notice of a lawsuit to be sufficient, a party must exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a litigant's whereabouts.” Grabowski, 901 N.E.2d at 565 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Accordingly, in order for constructive service to be constitutionally effective there must be a showing by the plaintiff or party who sought such service that due diligence to ascertain the defendant's current whereabouts was exercised and service through publication was reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[27] As noted earlier, Mother's notice of appeal requested transcripts of only the hearings held on August 29 and October 8, 2024, and did not request a transcript of the September 28, 2022 hearing, following which the trial court found that Mother was properly served by publication. Mother's notice of appeal also did not request a transcript of the February 21, 2023 hearing, after which the trial court entered an order on April 2, 2023, in which it stated that it held a hearing on February 21, 2023, on Mother's February 1, 2023 motion, and found that “Mother refused to communicate with Father informally through all known methods of contact Father had previously used to communicate with Mother”; “Father properly served Mother by publishing in the Indianapolis Business Journal on August 5, 2022, August 12, 2022, and August 19, 2022”; “Father strictly complied with the Indiana Trial Rules regarding service”; “[t]hroughout the pendency of the cases, Father and his legal counsel took extensive measures and multiple avenues to attempt to locate Mother and the children”; “Father and his legal counsel hired a skip tracer to identify Mother's location”; and “Father and his legal counsel sent letters to several addresses and email addresses they identified for Mother, in addition to securing service by publication.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 118. Accordingly, we are unable to address any claims which rely on the evidence presented at the September 28, 2022 hearing or the February 21, 2023 hearing. See Fields v. Conforti, 868 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (any argument depending on the evidence presented at the trial was waived where appellants did not submit a transcript of the proceeding).

[28] To the extent Mother argues that the trial court erred in modifying custody of the Children, we review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion with a preference for granting latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002). “We may neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “We set aside judgments only when they are clearly erroneous, and will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307. The Indiana Supreme Court explained the reason for this deference in Kirk:

While we are not able to say the trial judge could not have found otherwise than he did upon the evidence introduced below, this Court as a court of review has heretofore held by a long line of decisions that we are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence, or that he should have found its preponderance or the inferences therefrom to be different from what he did.

Id. (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). Therefore, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id.

[29] The court's findings control as to the issues they cover and a general judgment will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). When a trial court has made findings of fact, we apply the following two-tier standard of review: whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions thereon. Id. Findings will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. To determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, our review of the evidence must leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

[30] The standard for an initial custody determination is set forth in Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2, which provides:

The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the child's best interests, there is not a presumption favoring either parent. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6 provides the court may not modify a child custody order unless modification is in the best interests of the child and there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors under Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2 and, if applicable, Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.5.¹¹

[31] In its January 7, 2025 order, the court found that, “[u]pon receiving the [Children] from Mother, the [Children] presented with several health concerns.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 21. The record reveals that GAL Rich testified that, when the Children arrived at Father's home, Al.C. had scoliosis and “quite a severe curve in her spine that had not been treated,” the “severity ․ of the scoliosis ․ was actually compressing some of her organs such that it could have affected ․ her life going forward,” and she subsequently had surgery. Transcript Volume II at 8-9. She indicated that Al.C. had not been to a doctor since 2018 and did not “have any vaccines ․ as well” and “was behind on those vaccines.” Id. at 8. She stated that An.C. “had not had some vaccines for a while,” and was having headaches, which Father learned from a doctor, were caused by poor eyesight. Id. She indicated that Ad.C. “had some hygiene issues” and was still wearing diapers at eight years old and had “to actually be put under to have [six caps] put on his teeth.” Id. at 9. She testified that the youngest child, Av.C., “had to have 8 caps put on her teeth” and “she had to be put under sedation to have that done.” Id. GAL Rich stated that she believed Father had appropriately addressed the Children's medical issues. When asked if the Children received any kind of dental care, Mother answered “not really no.” Id. at 127. When asked why, she answered, “Um, they just did not.” Id. She also testified that she did not have health insurance for the Children after Father left Indiana, the Children did not have a primary care physician while in Rhode Island, and she had applied for insurance and was on a waiting list.

[32] In her report filed on March 4, 2024, GAL Rich wrote:

I am concerned about the [Children's] medical condition when Father obtained custody, in particular as to [Al.C.’s] scoliosis. It was very clear from the pictures provided, from my observations of [Al.C.], and from the xray that a serious condition existed and Mother, when asked by me, did not seem to think it was a big deal and did not want surgery to occur. I am also concerned about the extensive dental work that the [Children] required after Father obtained custody and why that was not addressed previously by Mother.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 149. In her report, GAL Rich recommended that Father retain primary physical custody and sole legal custody. We conclude that Mother asks that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. We cannot say that the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous.

[33] Regarding Father's request for appellate attorney fees, this Court is authorized to assess damages if an appeal “is frivolous or in bad faith,” and such damages “shall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys’ fees.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E). A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious. Bessolo v. Rosario, 966 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To prevail on his request, Father must show that Mother's arguments on appeal are “utterly devoid of all plausibility.” See id. While we do not disturb the trial court's order, we cannot say that an award of appellate attorney fees is appropriate.

[34] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order and deny Father's request for appellate attorney fees.  ¹²

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the August 29, 2024 hearing, when asked if it was accurate that he did not see the Children from October 2021 until he received custody on January 23, 2023, Father answered, “Uh, sounds accurate.” Transcript Volume II at 84.

2.   At the October 8, 2024 hearing, when asked when she decided to move from Indiana, Mother indicated that “it was the end of March” 2022. Transcript Volume II at 112.

3.   While not included in either party's Appendix, Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System (“Odyssey”) indicates that Father filed a similar Amended Praecipe for Service by Publication in Cause No. 2340 on July 25, 2022.

4.   While not included in either party's Appendix, Odyssey indicates that Attorney Zeljkovic also filed similar affidavits on July 25, 2022, in Cause Nos. 2338, 2339, and 2340.

5.   While the August 12, 2022 filing referred to the “Indiana Business Journal,” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 49, it appears that counsel intended to refer to the Indianapolis Business Journal in which the summonses were published. The record contains a “Proof of Publication” related to the publication on August 5, 12 and 19, 2022, of a notice, which referenced Cause Nos. 940, 2338, 2339, and 2340, in the Indianapolis Business Journal. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 54.

6.   The record does not contain a transcript of the September 28, 2022 hearing. Mother's notice of appeal requested transcripts of only the hearings held on August 29, 2024, and October 8, 2024.

7.   While not included in the record, Odyssey indicates that the trial court entered similar orders on January 24, 2023, in Cause Nos. 2338, 2339, and 2340.

8.   In her brief, Mother asserts, without citation to the record, that she “filed a ‘Stop Motion’ on February 1, 2023 and that was set for hearing on February 21, 2023.” Appellant's Brief at 8. She asserts that “[t]here is no copy of that Motion on the Chronological Case Summary.” Id. (citing Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 7). Mother later asserts: “On February 1, 2023, Mother filed a ‘Stop Motion’ that is not preserved on the CCS other than by an entry.” Id. at 14 (citing Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 7). The chronological case summary for Cause No. 940 includes an entry dated February 1, 2023, which indicates that a “Stop Motion” was filed by Mother. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 7 (italics omitted). The tables of contents for the Appellant's Appendix and the Appellee's Appendix do not list a Stop Motion. Odyssey indicates that Mother filed a letter with the trial court which stated that she “found out about all of this Wednesday (1/25) late evening with the police showing up at my door, scaring myself and children, to tell us briefly what was going on,” and that Father showed up “unannounced at my door Friday (1/27) day for the children.”

9.   Father testified that he could not find Mother and the Children until he hired “the bounty hunter.” Transcript Volume II at 42.

10.   To the extent Mother cites In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights of A.B., 226 N.E.3d 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), we find that case distinguishable. In that case, we could not “find any indication that [the petitioner] filed an affidavit of a diligent search alongside its praecipe, as required by Rule 4.13, even though the praecipe references the filing of an affidavit”; “[p]roblematically, the trial court still granted [the petitioner] permission to serve [the respondent] by publication”; the petitioner “did not submit proof of published notice”; and the petitioner's “efforts fell well short of the requirements of Rule 4.13.” 226 N.E.3d at 797.

11.   In her reply brief, Mother asserts that “I.C. 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court may not modify an existing custody order unless (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child, and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more statutory factors that are outlined in Indiana Code 31-17-2-8.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 9. While Mother cites Article 31-17, which governs modification of custody in a dissolution action, we focus on Article 31-14, which is applicable in paternity proceedings.

12.   On October 16, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Strike portions of Mother's Reply Brief and asserted that Mother refers to facts and evidence that occurred after the March 20, 2025 order and after the notice of appeal, some of which address Father's actions in New York. In part, Father points to Mother's following statement in her reply brief: “March 30, 2025, Father filed a Motion asking that the court in Indiana stay all proceedings as he had applied to register the matter in the State of New York.” Motion to Strike at 2 (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief at 5). While Mother's reply brief erroneously used the date of March 30, 2025, she cited to pages 122-124 of Appellant's Appendix Volume II which contain Father's Notice of Request for Registration of an Out-of-State Child Custody or Visitation Order, which he filed in the Columbia Family Court in New York on March 8, 2023. We deny Father's Motion to Strike.

Brown, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.