Robert Peacher, Appellant v. Officer Davis, Appellee (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Robert Peacher appeals the trial court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Officer Davis.¹ We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 19, 2024, Peacher filed a Civil Complaint alleging that he was transferred from the Westville Correctional Facility to the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility on January 24, 2024, and that he filed a Notice of Loss of Property on January 29, 2024. Peacher alleged that there were “personal items missing from his property” as well as “legal materials” and that “[t]his action had been taken by” Westville Correctional Officer Davis, who was “an employee and/or subcontract worker at Westville” and “named in his individual and official capacities.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 9-10. He asserted that on or about June 4, 2024, he “received an order from the Court to respond to the Motion to set aside judgment and Motion for Leave to file Belated Answer to Plaintiff's complaint in another case,” Peacher v. Lt. Jones, et al., cause number 46D04-2310-PL-1990, but he “did not receive any such motion and had not been given a copy from the Defendants.” Id. at 10.

[3] Peacher alleged that Officer Davis “had taken this action to withhold [his] property and legal materials to help his friends and co-workers in defeating [him] in his litigation in the other case.” Id. He asserted that Officer Davis “willfully and with wanton disregard, withheld or wrongfully disposed of [his] property to interfere and assist his friends and co-workers in a different court case ․ by attempting to take [his] evidence against them so Peacher could not litigate the case against them.” Id. He alleged that Officer Davis “is responsible for handling Peacher's property and having the property transferred with Peacher,” and “[i]t is outside the scope of [Officer] Davis’ employment for him to withhold a prisoner's property in an effort to assist his colleagues in a case where they were the defendants.” Id. at 10-11. He alleged that Officer Davis's actions “were calculated to cause [him] to lose the other case, cause him distress and injury because [he] exercised [his] right to file a complaint against staff for their bad acts.” Id. at 11. He alleged that Officer Davis “maliciously committed this act.” Id. He sought a jury trial, a formal admission and apology, and $700,000. Officer Davis filed an answer which asserted in part that Peacher's claim was barred pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1 because he is immune from liability.

[4] On April 29, 2025, Officer Davis filed a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” requesting that the court dismiss the matter “pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C).” Id. at 18. He asserted that Peacher failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the claim is barred by Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c), and the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 2, 2025, the court granted the motion and dismissed Peacher's complaint without prejudice.

[5] On May 15, 2025, Peacher filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order” alleging that he did not receive a copy of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings until May 9, 2025, and received the court's order on May 12, 2025. Id. at 22 (capitalization omitted). He asserted that the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) did not bar his claim and that his claim had nothing to do with a civil rights issue and he made no claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court did not rule on this motion.

[6] On June 6, 2025, Peacher filed a “Motion to Correct Error” alleging that the face of his complaint was clear that he could succeed, the court did not afford him any time to respond to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a civil rights violation is not required to proceed on a tort lawsuit. Id. at 31 (capitalization omitted). The trial court did not rule on this motion. On July 22, 2025, Peacher filed a notice of appeal of the May 2, 2025 order.

Discussion

[7] Peacher phrases the issue as whether the trial court “abuse[d] its authority and discretion when it granted [Officer Davis's] Motion for Judgment on the pleadings violating Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and Indiana Statute.” Appellant's Brief at 4. He asserts that he “clearly complied with all requirements of the” ITCA. Id. at 7. He argues that he claimed Officer Davis “willfully and with wanton disregard withheld or wrongfully disposed of [his] property to interfere and assist his friends/co workers in the other Peacher case.” Id. at 10. He contends that Officer Davis's act was “clearly outside the scope of [his] employment and potentially criminal despite [Peacher] not citing such claim.” Id. at 11. He contends that the trial court “abused its discretion and authority when it granted [Officer Davis's] motion without [him] being served with the motion.” Id. at 7-8. He also contends that his complaint “is not a civil rights complaint so there is no need for [him] to address such matters” and that “[a]t no time has [he] claimed any issue in his complaint is a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 8, 15.

[8] Officer Davis argues that the trial court did not err in immediately addressing the motion for judgment on the pleadings. He asserts that he is entitled to immunity from liability under the ITCA because “even if he packed but withheld property for the transfer from Westville to Wabash Valley, he was acting within the scope of his employment and because there is no ‘reasonable factual basis’ in the complaint for concluding that the act of packing Peacher's property was criminal, malicious, or wanton.” Appellee's Brief at 9-10. He asserts that “there are no facts at all, merely bald assertions and unsupported conclusions.” Id. at 10. He contends that “the complaint is about the manner in which [he] performed his job while he was acting within the scope of his employment in handling and transferring the property.” Id. at 12.

[9] We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ind. 2010). We accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and base our ruling solely on the pleadings. Id. A Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted “only when it is clear from the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff cannot in any way succeed under the operative facts and allegations made therein.” Bayer Corp. v. Leach, 147 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. 2020). When, as here, a 12(C) motion essentially argues the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we treat it as a 12(B)(6) motion. KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, not the facts supporting it. Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017).

[10] The ITCA “governs lawsuits against political subdivisions and their employees.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003); and citing Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq.). “The statute sets forth certain parameters to determine liability for negligent acts or omissions on the part of government employees and ‘provides substantial immunity for conduct within the scope of the employee's employment.’ ” Id. (quoting Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 472). “The purpose of immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.” Id. (quoting Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted)).

[11] “Generally speaking, ‘whether an employee's actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.’ ” Id. (quoting Knighten v. East Chicago Housing Authority, 45 N.E.3d 788, 794 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted)). “When the facts are undisputed and ‘would not allow a jury to find that the tortious acts were within the scope of employment,’ however, a court may conclude as a matter of law that the acts were not in the scope of employment.” Id. (quoting Cox v. Evansville Police Dep't, 107 N.E.3d 453, 460 (Ind. 2018)).

[12] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employee's act or omission falls within the scope of employment if the injurious behavior is incidental to authorized conduct or furthers the employer's business to an appreciable extent. Id. (citing Knighten, 45 N.E.3d at 792 (citation omitted)). Conversely, an employee's act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer. Id. “But an employee's wrongful act may still fall within the scope of his employment if his purpose was, to an appreciable extent, to further his employer's business, even if the act was predominantly motivated by an intention to benefit the employee himself.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Id. Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court has found that the scope of employment encompasses the activities that the employer delegates to employees or authorizes employees to do, plus employees’ acts that naturally or predictably arise from those activities. Id.

[13] “A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c). Further, “[t]he complaint must contain a reasonable factual basis supporting the allegations.” Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “the scope of employment ‘may include acts that the employer expressly forbids’ or ‘that violate the employer's rules, orders, or instruction.’ ” Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 853 (quoting Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 461).

[14] In his complaint, Peacher alleged that there were “personal items missing from his property” as well as “legal materials” and that “[t]his action had been taken by” Westville Correctional Officer Davis. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 9-10. His complaint also met the requirements of Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c). Specifically, Peacher alleged that “[i]t is outside the scope of [Officer] Davis’ employment for him to withhold a prisoner's property in an effort to assist his colleagues in a case where they were the defendants”; Officer Davis “maliciously committed this act”; and Officer Davis “willfully and with wanton disregard, withheld or wrongfully disposed of [his] property to interfere and assist his friends and co-workers in a different court case ․ by attempting to take [his] evidence against them so Peacher could not litigate the case against them.”² Id. at 10-11. In light of our de novo standard of review, and mindful that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted “only when it is clear from the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff cannot in any way succeed under the operative facts and allegations made therein,” Bayer Corp., 147 N.E.3d at 315, we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted Officer Davis's motion for judgment on the pleadings.³

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.

[16] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Peacher's complaint, Officer Davis's answer, and the appellate briefs do not identify Officer Davis's first name.

2.   To the extent Officer Davis cites Higgason v. State, 789 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we find that case distinguishable. In that case, we observed that “while Higgason's complaint uses the words ‘steal,’ and ‘retaliation,’ the facts alleged in the complaint do not suggest Defendants were acting criminally or maliciously when they adopted policies, removed prohibited items from Higgason's possession, placed Higgason on strip-cell status, erroneously logged Higgason's items, and accidentally misplaced items.” 789 N.E.2d at 32. Unlike in Higgason where Higgason's allegation that an officer was following the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction was not sufficient to show malicious conduct, Peacher alleged that Officer Davis maliciously withheld his property and legal materials “to help his friends and co-workers in defeating [him] in his litigation in the other case.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 10.

3.   Because we resolve this case on this issue, we need not address Peacher's claim that the trial court erred when it granted Officer Davis's motion prior to service of the motion on Peacher.

Brown, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.