BRISCOE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Seconds into an illicit firearm transaction, teenagers Jeremy Briscoe and Darrius Tolbert fired their handguns into Carlos Neri-Guzman's car, striking and ultimately killing him. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, and Briscoe was charged with and found guilty of murder. Briscoe now appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we restate as the following one issue: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Briscoe's claim of self-defense.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 5, 2024, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Briscoe and Tolbert arranged to meet on a trail in their neighborhood so they could walk together to the clubhouse parking lot to “meet[ ] up with somebody.” Tr. Vol. III at 118. Neri-Guzman's phone shows that he arranged to meet someone identified as “Von,” Tr. Vol. IV at 163, at Neri-Guzman's blue Honda car, outside the same clubhouse and at the same time. Neri-Guzman was meeting with “Von” to sell him a Glock handgun for $850. Neri-Guzman texted “Von” that he had arrived and parked his car in the clubhouse parking lot at approximately 4:36 p.m.; Briscoe and Tolbert walked directly to Neri-Guzman's car from the trail, reaching it at approximately 4:37 p.m. A.C., a neighborhood teen, walked over to Briscoe and Tolbert from the park to say hello, but they “didn't say anything back to [him].” Tr. Vol. II at 142. Instead, Briscoe continued walking straight to Neri-Guzman's car, and he immediately bent down at the front passenger side window. Within two seconds of bending down at the window, Briscoe drew his handgun and pointed it into the car. Tolbert joined him almost immediately with his own handgun and fired a shot. Neri-Guzman began to drive away six seconds into the encounter; Tolbert shot Neri-Guzman under his right armpit, through his chest, and Briscoe fired a second shot into the car while Neri-Guzman was driving away. Briscoe and Tolbert walked away from the clubhouse and did not call 911.

[4] After Briscoe and Tolbert walked away, A.C. returned to his companions at the clubhouse, saying “that's messed up ․ I don't understand why they did that to that adult.” Tr. Vol. II at 150. Neri-Guzman's car crashed into the back of a home shortly after leaving the clubhouse, and Neri-Guzman died at the scene from the gunshot wound he received. Law enforcement officers located an unloaded Glock handgun in Neri-Guzman's car.

[5] During the investigation, law enforcement officers spoke with A.C. about what he witnessed and learned where Briscoe lived. Officers also secured surveillance footage from the clubhouse and surrounding homes showing Tolbert looking at his phone around the time Neri-Guzman texted his arrival, the meeting, the shooting, and Briscoe's movements after the shooting. In the ensuing search of Briscoe's home, officers located a loaded handgun hidden behind the entertainment center in his bedroom, which they later matched to a bullet casing found in the clubhouse parking lot. The State charged Briscoe with murder,¹ aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony,² and dangerous possession of a firearm as a Class A misdemeanor,³ but it later dismissed the latter two charges.

[6] At trial, A.C. testified that he heard someone say “run,” but he did not know who said it. Tr. Vol. II at 148. Captain Jesse Fulwider testified that the clubhouse surveillance footage showing the coordinated meetup was “consistent with ․ an illicit transaction” but that in the “hundreds” of illicit transactions he's investigated, he's never seen a party to the transaction immediately pull a firearm. Tr. Vol. III at 52.

[7] Briscoe testified to the following: (1) he agreed to accompany Tolbert to meet “somebody” but did not know who they were meeting or why they were meeting that person, Tr. Vol. III at 118; however, on cross examination, he testified that he put his head in Neri-Guzman's window because Tolbert was meeting with him; (2) when he walked up to the car, he saw Neri-Guzman holding a handgun, and Neri-Guzman told Briscoe to “run it,” id. at 122; (3) Briscoe was not sure what “run it” meant, claiming, he did not “know like if [Neri-Guzman] was trying to rob [him] or do anything,” id.; and (4) when Briscoe heard “run it,” he “already had [his] hand in [his] jacket,” and when he saw Tolbert “lift[ ] out his firearm and ․ let off a shot,” Briscoe also “let off a shot,” Tr. Vol. III at 123. On cross examination, Briscoe claimed first, that Neri-Guzman was not just holding the handgun, but “raised” it up “a little bit.” Id. at 133. Briscoe later claimed that Neri-Guzman pointed the handgun at him. Later still, Briscoe claimed that Neri-Guzman's finger was on the trigger of the handgun that he pointed at Briscoe. Briscoe also claimed that Neri-Guzman's chest was facing him while Neri-Guzman pointed his gun at Briscoe despite Neri-Guzman being shot in his side, under his armpit. Briscoe claimed that he shot at Neri-Guzman after Neri-Guzman began driving away because Briscoe thought Neri-Guzman “was gonna [sic] stop the vehicle.” Id. at 141 (alteration in original). Despite previously testifying that he shot after Tolbert shot, he later agreed with defense counsel that he did not “actually even know that [Tolbert] got a shot off” when Neri-Guzman was shot. Id. at 154.

[8] The State argued that Tolbert was “Von,” and that he had lured Neri-Guzman to the clubhouse by claiming he wanted to buy Neri-Guzman's handgun while actually intending to rob him of it. Because Briscoe claimed that he was defending himself from a man who was pointing a gun at him at the time he shot his gun, the trial court gave the jury a self-defense instruction. The jury found Briscoe guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Briscoe to 45 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Negate Briscoe's Self-Defense Claim

[9] Briscoe contends that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“[W]hen a defendant challenges the State's sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense, the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). “[W]e do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility, and only look to the evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 667 (Ind. 2021) (quotations omitted). We will affirm the defendant's conviction if there is evidence, including reasonable inferences, that supports the judgment. Id. And we will reverse the defendant's conviction “only if no reasonable person could say that” the defendant's self-defense claim “was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002).

Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025) (second alteration in original).

[10] “Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, and it operates as a complete bar to conviction.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 534 (internal citations omitted). When self-defense is asserted, the defendant must prove (1) “the defendant acted without fault,” (2) he “was in a place where he had a legal right to be,” and (3) he “was in real danger of death or great bodily harm or was in such apparent danger as caused him in good faith to fear death or bodily injury.” Id. at 537 (emphasis removed) (quoting Spinks v. State, 437 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 1982)).

[11] “Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of the justification.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 534 (citing Hill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 1986)). When considering a claim of self-defense, it is “within the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility in arriving at its verdict.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 576 (Ind. 2018) (citing Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016)).

[12] Briscoe argues that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense because (1) the State failed to prove he was the initial aggressor or engaged in a robbery—in other words the State failed to rebut his claim that he acted without fault and (2) he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. First, “[a] person who provokes, instigates, or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-defense.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541 (quoting Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). Briscoe claimed at trial and reiterates on appeal that he did not know who he and Tolbert were meeting or why, and he denies any plan to rob Neri-Guzman. He further claims that he only drew his handgun because Neri-Guzman was holding a handgun and told him to “run it.” Tr. Vol. III at 122. Briscoe later added to his testimony, claiming that Neri-Guzman faced him and pointed his handgun at Briscoe before Briscoe drew his handgun. The jury heard Briscoe's testimony but clearly rejected Briscoe's self-defense claim. Briscoe's arguments on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 533 (quoting Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 667).

[13] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that (1) Neri-Guzman parked at the clubhouse intending to sell his handgun to Tolbert; (2) Tolbert was aware that Neri-Guzman had a handgun because he communicated with Neri-Guzman about buying it; (3) Briscoe knew Tolbert arranged to meet with Neri-Guzman and walked directly to Neri-Guzman's car, ignoring A.C. who tried to greet Briscoe and Tolbert; (4) Tolbert and Briscoe drew their firearms two seconds after bending down at Neri-Guzman's window; (5) Briscoe shot at Neri-Guzman while Neri-Guzman was attempting to flee; and (6) A.C., who was standing mere feet away from the shooting implied that Briscoe and Tolbert instigated the shooting—not that Neri-Guzman had. Even accepting that Neri-Guzman said “run” or “run it” or some version of that, Briscoe neither ran nor knew what “run it” meant; instead, he stayed at the passenger side of the car and shot in tandem with Tolbert. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Briscoe and Tolbert met with Neri-Guzman for the purpose of, at best, purchasing a Glock handgun, or at worst, of robbing Neri-Guzman. The jury was free to disbelieve Briscoe's self-serving testimony that he did not know Tolbert arranged to buy a handgun and that Neri-Guzman pointed a handgun at him, especially given the inconsistencies in his testimony, both internally and compared to the physical evidence.

[14] Further, even if Neri-Guzman actually had been the initial aggressor by facing Briscoe and pointing his unloaded handgun at him, the evidence shows that any immediate threat or concern was over by the time Briscoe shot at Neri-Guzman. Neri-Guzman was shot through his side, under his armpit—not his front—and Briscoe only fired at Neri-Guzman while Neri-Guzman was attempting to flee. From this, the jury could reasonably infer Briscoe was no longer in fear of death or bodily injury. See Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801 (continuing to fire at an alleged initial aggressor after he attempted to leave defeats a self-defense claim as the claimant “could not have been laboring under a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm”).

[15] For the foregoing reasons, there was substantial evidence of probative value that at the time Briscoe shot at Neri-Guzman he was not acting without fault and did not have a reasonable fear of death or bodily harm. Briscoe has not shown error regarding his claim of self-defense. Given these circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to reject Briscoe's self-defense claim. Accordingly, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to negate self-defense. We therefore affirm Briscoe's murder conviction.⁴

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.

3.   I.C. § 35-47-10-5(a).

4.   Briscoe also argues the charging information was defective for failing to include a copy of the juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction (the “Waiver Order”). Briscoe concedes this was a procedural error, that it was waived, and that the alleged error was harmless; he therefore only requests that we “remind the parties that the [Waiver Order] should be made a part of the record in the adult court prosecution.” Appellant's Br. at 15. During our review of this issue, we consulted the Odyssey case management system and located the Waiver Order, which was filed in the trial court along with the charging information as a “Proposed Order” despite having been signed by Judge Tanselle and labeled “Waiver Order.” Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of the Waiver Order. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27). Based on this, we are not persuaded the State erred at all; rather, this appears to be a clerical or computer coding error. We therefore decline to say more on this issue.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.