RODRIGUEZ v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Josue Rodriguez appeals his conviction and sentence for battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss and that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Rodriguez raises two issues, which we restate as:

I.  Whether the trial court erred by denying Rodriguez's motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B).

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Rodriguez.

Facts

[3] Rodriguez, his wife, Kelly Gerbig, and Gerbig's four children lived next door to Shawn Ginder. On April 21, 2024, Ginder returned to his residence, backed a trailer up to the residence, and placed his car in park to unhitch the trailer. Gerbig confronted Ginder regarding Gerbig's cat, which Ginder had neutered, and Rodriguez was outside during the confrontation. Ginder attempted to deescalate the situation, but Gerbig threatened him. Gerbig then accused Ginder of spying on her daughter. When Ginder attempted to respond to that claim, Rodriguez “got behind [Ginder], and reached in front, and struck [his] face multiple times.” Suppl. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Ginder had a bloody nose, scratches, and broken glasses as a result. According to Ginder, he did not touch Gerbig, he was trying to walk away, and he was on his own property.

[4] Audio of the incident was recorded on Ginder's dashcam. When law enforcement arrived, Rodriguez claimed that he was inside the residence and heard yelling, went outside to find Ginder standing over Gerbig, who was on the ground, and pushed Ginder to “get him off” of Gerbig. Id. at 26. The officers listened to the audio of the dashcam, determined the audio was consistent with Ginder's explanation of the incident, and arrested Rodriguez.

[5] The State charged Rodriguez with battery, a Class A misdemeanor. A bench trial was held in November 2024. After the State rested, Rodriguez moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B). Rodriguez argued that “a person is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against any person, and does not have a duty to retreat if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry on their property.” Id. at 38. The trial court denied the motion, and Rodriguez presented evidence. The trial court found Rodriguez guilty as charged.

[6] At sentencing, the trial court found Rodriguez's criminal history ¹ as an aggravating factor and found no mitigating factors. The State asked that Rodriguez receive a sentence of one year in work release, and Rodriguez requested a sentence of 360 days in the Knox County Jail suspended to probation. The trial court then sentenced Rodriguez to 360 days in the Knox County Jail suspended to supervised probation, as requested by Rodriguez. Rodriguez now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Denial of Motion to Dismiss

[7] Rodriguez challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss. After the State presented its case-in-chief, Rodriguez moved for involuntary dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 41(B), which the trial court denied. Rodriguez then presented evidence. Because Rodriguez presented evidence after the trial court denied his motion, he cannot challenge the denial on appeal.² McGee v. State, 252 N.E.3d 467, 474 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We, therefore, address this issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Id.

[8] Rodriguez argues that he was acting in defense of his “property and curtilage.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. We recently addressed a defense of property claim and held:

A claim of defense of property is analogous to a claim of self-defense. Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of [defense of property or] self-defense is the same standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). Under this “deferential standard of review ․ we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, “we respect a fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence [․ and] consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person could say the State overcame the [defense of property or] self-defense claim[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021).

Norton v. State, 261 N.E.3d 794, 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[9] Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) governs self-defense and the defense of property and provides:

A person:

(1) is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against any other person; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.

A person, however, “is not justified in using force if ․ the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3).

[10] Here, Rodriguez contends that his actions were reasonable because he was protecting his property from Ginder's imminent threat. According to Rodriguez, he came outside and found Ginder standing over Gerbig, who was on the ground. Ginder, however, testified that he was on his own property during the incident and that he did not touch Gerbig. The audio recording of the incident was consistent with Ginder's testimony. The State, thus, presented evidence that Ginder was not on Rodriguez's property and that Rodriguez was the initial aggressor. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Rodriguez's defense of property claim.

II. Sentencing

[11] Next, Rodriguez challenges his sentence. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1197. “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[12] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91). Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023).

[13] The trial court “ ‘is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.’ ” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 690 (Ind. 2009)). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)).

[14] Rodriguez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find hardship on his stepchildren as a mitigating factor. During sentencing, Rodriguez argued that he was helping to care for his four stepchildren. Rodriguez requested 360 days of probation so that he could continue working and caring for his family. The trial court imposed the exact sentence that Rodriguez requested, and this sentence took into account Rodriguez's continuing ability to support his family. Even if the trial court had identified hardship on Rodriguez's stepchildren as a mitigating factor, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Rodriguez.³

Conclusion

[15] Rodriguez's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rodriguez received pretrial diversion in 2021 for possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. In 2021, he was charged with auto theft, a Level 6 felony, and counterfeiting, a Level 6 felony, and he pleaded guilty to auto theft, a Level 6 felony. In 2022, he was charged with criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony; intimidation, a Level 5 felony; strangulation, a Level 6 felony; two counts of domestic battery, Class A misdemeanors; and three counts of criminal mischief, Class B misdemeanors. He pleaded guilty to one count of domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.

2.   “Indiana Trial Rule 50 governing directed verdicts, otherwise known as judgments on the evidence, is not applicable to bench trials.” Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ind. 1999). Rather, a Trial Rule 41(B) motion for involuntary dismissal applies to bench trials. Id. Our Supreme Court has held that, when a defendant presents evidence following the trial court's denial of a Trial Rule 50 motion, “we will not review that ruling but rather will treat the issue as one of general insufficiency of the evidence.” Farris v. State, 753 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. 2001); Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Ind. 2011) (“The hornbook law of Indiana Trial Rule 50(A)(6) holds that a party waives any error of the trial court's in denying a motion for judgment on the evidence whenever the party subsequently presents her own evidence.”). Similarly, when a defendant's Trial Rule 41(B) motion is denied and the defendant later presents evidence, we will address the issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See McGee, 252 N.E.3d at 474 n.4 (“Because McGee presented evidence after the court denied his motion, he can't challenge the denial on appeal. We therefore address this issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.”) (internal citation omitted).

3.   Although Rodriguez briefly mentions Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), he makes no argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or the character of the offender.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur