Bruce A. Campbell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bruce Campbell appeals his twelve-year sentence following a guilty plea for four counts of child exploitation, Level 4 felonies. On appeal, Campbell argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion when considering two aggravating factors; (2) his sentence is inappropriate; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing a lifetime sex offender registration requirement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Campbell raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Campbell.

II. Whether Campbell's twelve-year sentence is inappropriate.

III. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a lifetime sex offender registration requirement.

Facts

[3] In May 2024, Detective Austin McCloskey with the Boone County Child Abuse and Sexual Exploitation (“CASE”) Task Force received a tip from X, formerly known as Twitter, that a user had uploaded a file containing child pornography. Detective McCloskey learned that the file contained “a prepubescent adolescent minor engaging in oral sex with an adult male.” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Detective McCloskey also identified the user as Campbell. On May 10, 2024, Detective McCloskey executed a search warrant of Campbell's residence and seized his electronics.

[4] Officers discovered 340 files with images and videos of child pornography, including “minors engaging in sex acts such as oral sex, anal sex, vaginal sex,” “bondage where the minors would be hands ․ tied behind his back or hands tied to their feet,” and “a male peeing on the minor as well.” Id. at 13. The files were in a locked photo album on Campbell's phone. In addition to transmitting files on X, Campbell had also transmitted files on the apps Telegram and Grindr. When Campbell sent the files, he would follow up with a message describing the content of the files, i.e., “four year old fat juicy p***y,” “man what a luck [sic] dad,” and “the boy was only eight years old.” Id. at 14. Some of the files contained child pornography of very young children, including an infant. In Campbell's messages, Detective McCloskey found a message describing that Campbell had an eight-year-old cousin “give him oral sex and how it felt incredible.” Id. at 15.

[5] Detective McCloskey interviewed Campbell, who admitted to sending child pornography. Campbell said that “he preferred ages from five to thirteen.” Id. Detective McCloskey was unable to determine where the files originated, but determined that Campbell was not producing the content.

[6] In May 2024, the State charged Campbell with child exploitation, a Level 4 felony, but the State later added an additional twelve charges of child exploitation, Level 4 felonies. In April 2025, Campbell entered into a plea agreement. Campbell agreed to plead guilty to four counts of child exploitation, Level 4 felonies, with the sentences to run concurrently, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining nine counts.

[7] The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Campbell to twelve years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) with two years suspended to probation. The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) the victim was less than twelve years of age; (2) the Indiana Risk Assessment System (“IRAS”) score identified the risk of reoffending as high; and (3) a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. As mitigating factors, the trial court found: (1) Campbell cooperated with law enforcement; (2) Campbell's lack of a criminal history; and (3) Campbell was remorseful, but the trial court felt Campbell was “remorseful because [he] got caught.” Tr. Vol. II p. 51; see also Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 93. The trial court emphasized that Campbell received a very favorable plea agreement and the seriousness of the offenses. The trial court also ordered that Campbell was required to register under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19 as a lifetime sex offender. Campbell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

[8] Campbell first challenges two of the aggravators found by the trial court. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[9] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91).

[10] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 905. Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023), cert. denied.

[11] Campbell first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering the age of the victims as an aggravating factor. “Generally, where the age of the victim is a material element of the crime, the age of the victim may not be used as an aggravating circumstance.” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied). The trial court, however, “may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the material elements of the crime” to be an aggravating factor. Id. A trial court, thus, “may properly consider as aggravating the age of the victim when the trial court considers that the victim was of a ‘tender age.’ ” Id. (quoting Kien, 782 N.E.2d at 414). “[W]e have held that a trial court may properly consider the victim's age as an aggravating factor where ‘the youth of the victim is extreme.’ ” Id. (quoting Reyes v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[12] Here, the offense of child exploitation is elevated to a Level 4 felony where the child depicted in the material is less than twelve years of age. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4. Here, several of the victims depicted in the materials disseminated by Campbell included very young children, including an infant and a four-year-old child. Given the tender age of the victims here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the age of the victims as an aggravating factor.

[13] Next, Campbell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering his IRAS score as an aggravating factor. Our Supreme Court has held that such “offender assessment instruments are appropriate supplemental tools for judicial consideration at sentencing.” Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 2010). “These evaluations and their scores are not intended to serve as aggravating or mitigating circumstances nor to determine the gross length of sentence, but a trial court may employ such results in formulating the manner in which a sentence is to be served.” Id. (emphasis added).

[14] The trial court here used Campbell's IRAS score as an aggravating factor, which was an abuse of discretion. The trial court, however, found two other valid aggravating factors and heavily emphasized during the sentencing statement that Campbell received a very favorable plea agreement and the seriousness of the offenses. Under these circumstances, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not considered Campbell's IRAS score as an aggravating factor.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[15] Next, Campbell challenges his twelve-year sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[16] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[17] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). Here, the sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. Campbell pleaded guilty to four Level 4 felonies, and the plea agreement required concurrent sentencing. Thus, the maximum sentence the trial court could have imposed was twelve years. The trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence with two years suspended to probation.

Nature of the Offense

[18] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. See Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). We will defer to the trial court's sentencing decision unless the defendant presents “ ‘compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)[.]’ ” Correa v. State, 224 N.E.3d 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[19] The nature of the offense here is that Campbell shared child pornography files through social media accounts with other users. Campbell came to law enforcement's attention for sharing a file that contained “a prepubescent adolescent minor engaging in oral sex with an adult male.” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. A search of Campbell's electronics and accounts, however, revealed 340 files with images and videos of child pornography, including “minors engaging in sex acts such as oral sex, anal sex, vaginal sex,” “bondage where the minors would be hands ․ tied behind his back or hands tied to their feet,” and “a male peeing on the minor as well.” Id. at 13. The files had been placed in a locked photo album on Campbell's phone. When Campbell sent the files to others on social media apps, he would follow up with a message describing the content of the files, i.e., “four year old fat juicy p***y,” “man what a luck [sic] dad,” and “the boy was only eight years old.” Id. at 14. Some of the files contained child pornography of very young children, including an infant. Moreover, in Campbell's messages, law enforcement found a message describing that Campbell had an eight-year-old cousin “give him oral sex and how it felt incredible.” Id. at 15. When law enforcement interviewed Campbell, he admitted to sending child pornography and said that “he preferred ages from five to thirteen.” Id. Nothing in the nature of the offense warrants a reduction in Campbell's twelve-year sentence.

Character of the Offender

[20] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). Campbell has no criminal history before this matter, he pleaded guilty, and he has had a long and successful career as a professional dancer and choreographer. Multiple letters submitted during sentencing mentioned Campbell's good character, career of working with children, generosity toward his family and others, and remorse for his offenses.

[21] We must note, however, that Campbell's guilty plea resulted in the dismissal of nine other Level 4 felony charges, and Campbell received a substantial benefit from pleading guilty. Further, Campbell's lack of a criminal history is tempered by his statement that he had an eight-year-old cousin give him oral sex. This is not a case where the defendant lived a law-abiding life and had one error in judgment. Campbell repeatedly sent child pornography to others through social media. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Campbell's character warrants a reduction in his sentence.

III. Sex Offender Registration

[22] Next, Campbell argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex offender for life. This argument requires that we interpret the sex offender registry statutes. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” Vandenberg v. Ind. Dep't of Correction, 153 N.E.3d 1122, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “We presume that the General Assembly intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policies and goals.” Id. “If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense.” Id. “But if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and must be construed to determine legislative intent.” Id. “We also keep in mind that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State.” Id. “But this does not mean that a statute should be interpreted in an overly narrow manner so as to exclude cases fairly covered by it; we should instead interpret the statute so as to give efficient operation to the expressed intent of the legislature.” Id.

[23] In general, sex offenders must register for ten years. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(a). Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(c), however, provides:

A sex or violent offender who is convicted of at least one (1) offense under [Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-5(a)]:

(1) when the person was at least eighteen (18) years of age; and

(2) against a victim who was less than twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crime;

is required to register for life.

(emphasis added). Indiana Code Chapter 11-8-8-5(a)(4) includes child exploitation under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-4(b) and (c).

[24] According to Campbell, his “crime” was disseminating child pornography that depicted children under the age of twelve. Campbell, however, contends there is no evidence that, at the time of his crime, i.e., the dissemination, the children depicted were still under the age of twelve. Campbell, thus, argues that Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19(c) does not apply.

[25] The State points out that Campbell pleaded guilty to disseminating child pornography depicting children under the age of twelve; that the lifetime registration requirement was imposed under similar circumstances in Cundiff v. State, 66 N.E.3d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); and that Campbell's argument would result in illogical results. The State notes that it would be required “to find and bring to court the children who were victimized in every case, even where, as here, a defendant pled guilty to exploitation of children under the age of [twelve].” Appellee's Br. pp. 21-22. “In most, if not all cases, this would be impossible, as many of the victims of child sex trafficking are not even in the United States.” Id. at 22. This would allow a defendant to avoid lifetime registration by disseminating “old images.” Id.

[26] Campbell's argument would create a loophole in the lifetime sex offender registration requirements and would result in an absurd and illogical interpretation of the sex offender registry statute and the child exploitation statute. Under Campbell's argument, the State would need to demonstrate the age of the victim at the time of creation of the image and the age of the victim at the time of dissemination for the lifetime registration requirement to apply. We do not believe this was the legislature's intent. In many of these cases, the identity of the victim is unknown and the age of the victim is estimated. Campbell admitted that the victims shown in the files were under the age of twelve, and we are unaware of any actual contact that Campbell had with the victims. The victims’ ages are frozen at the time of the creation of the files, and the victims’ ages at the time of later dissemination are not relevant to whether the defendant disseminated child pornography or whether the defendant is subject to a lifetime sex offender registration. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered that Campbell is subject to a lifetime sex offender registration requirement.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the victims’ young ages as an aggravator. Although the trial court abused its discretion by considering Campbell's IRAS score as an aggravating factor, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not considered Campbell's IRAS score as an aggravating factor. Campbell's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense or his character. Finally, the trial court did not err by imposing a lifetime sex offender registration requirement on Campbell. Accordingly, we affirm.

[28] Affirmed.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.