Seth Lee Hunt, Appellant-Petitioner v. Coreen Marie Radjevic, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Seth Lee Hunt (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order granting custody of the parties’ child, E.H. (“Child”), to Coreen Marie Radjevic (“Mother”), and parenting time to Father. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises the following three restated issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded physical custody of Child to Mother.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed Mother and Child to continue living in Wisconsin without providing a notice of relocation pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-2.5.

3. Whether the trial court erred when it amended the custody and parenting time order without giving Father notice and an opportunity to be heard on the amendment.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother have never married, but they lived together in Father's home in Ridgeville, Indiana, from April 2016 to September 2024. During the eight-year relationship, Mother and Father often fought, and Father sought to evict Mother from his home several times. However, the parties planned to have a child together, and, on July 17, 2024, Child was born to the parties. Mother and Father did not dispute that Father is the biological father of Child

[4] Mother and Child lived with Father in his house until September 15, 2024, at which time Father “forc[ibly]” evicted Mother from the home. May 8, 2025, Appealed Order at 2. Mother, who had been “the primary caretaker” of Child while residing with Father, took Child with her when she moved out. Id. Mother has no family in Indiana; all of her family reside in Chicago, Illinois, or Oshkosh, Wisconsin. After Father evicted Mother from his home, on September 19 Mother and Child “took up residence” in Wisconsin with Mother's sister and brother-in-law. Id.

[5] On September 27, Father filed his “Verified Petition to Establish Paternity of Child and to Provide for Custody, Support[,] and Parenting Time.” Appellant's App. at 19. The Petition alleged that “[a] paternity affidavit was executed by the parties[,] and a DNA test was obtained by the parties.” Id. A purported copy of the DNA test as “reported on 9/17/2024” was attached as Exhibit A. Id. at 21.

[6] On October 16, Mother filed a motion for a change of venue from Randolph County, Indiana, to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. Father filed an objection, and the court conducted a hearing on the motion on October 24. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court verbally denied Mother's motion for change of venue.

[7] The court held a two-day hearing on Father's paternity petition on December 12, 2024, and January 10, 2025. Following the hearing, each party submitted written arguments as permitted by the court. Father's “Final Argument and Request for Relief” included an assertion that Mother had failed to file a notice of relocation as required by law and that Mother's relocation to Wisconsin was not made in good faith or for a legitimate reason. Id. at 28.

[8] On February 19, the court issued its Order in which it granted legal and physical custody of Child to Mother, parenting time to Father, and child support to Mother. Among others, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

• Both Mother and Father are employed.

• Mother intends to purchase a home of her own in Wisconsin.

• Father “often drinks alcohol in the evenings while he is working in the garage or barn.” February 19, 2025, Appealed Order at 2.

• Mother “was the primary caretaker of the child while the child and parents resided together.” Id.

• “Father is also capable of taking care of the child when the child is with him.” Id.

• “The parties do not communicate well[ ] and have explosive fights/arguments when they are together.” Id.

• “Father has made few inquiries of Mother regarding the child since Mother's move to Wisconsin.” Id.

The trial court concluded that, “[a]fter consideration of the ․ factors” located in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8, Mother should have custody of Child and Father should have parenting time. Id. at 3. In Conclusion 3(D), the court ordered that Father would receive a minimum of four hours of parenting time on certain holidays, including both “Father's Day and Mother's Day.” Id. at 4. Father subsequently filed a Motion to Correct Error, in part raising the issue of Mother's relocation to Wisconsin. On April 28, the court denied Father's motion.

[9] On May 8, 2025, Mother submitted a letter to the trial court in which she asked for “clarification” about whether the court intended to give Father parenting time on Mother's Day. Appellant's App. at 55. That same day, the court ordered the clerk to “forward” a copy of Mother's letter to all parties of record and their counsel, and the court issued the May 8, 2025, “Amended Order on Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time and Related Issues.” Id. at 7. The amended order was identical to the February 19 order except that it modified Conclusion 3(D) to remove the language that Father shall receive parenting time on Mother's Day, and it added Conclusion 3(E), which states: “If Mother's Day would fall on Father's normal weekend, Father shall have parenting time on the 2nd weekend of May, rather than Mother's Day weekend.” May 8, 2025, Appealed Order at 4. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Custody

[10] Our standard of review when a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte in a child custody matter is well-settled.

Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), the reviewing court will “not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Where a trial court enters findings sua sponte, the appellate court reviews issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

Additionally, there is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123-24 (Ind. 2016); see also Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“The trial court's decisions on child custody are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.”), trans. denied.

[11] Father asserts that the trial court erred in granting Mother physical custody of Child. As an initial matter, we note that, although Father makes a general allegation that “[t]he trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence[,]” he fails to point to any specific finding allegedly lacking such support. Appellant's Br. at 10. We accept the trial court's unchallenged findings as true. See, e.g., Geels v. Morrow, 182 N.E.3d 237, 245-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[12] An initial custody determination in a paternity action must be made by taking into consideration the best interests of the child. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.¹ In determining the best interests of the child, “[t]he court shall consider all relevant factors,” including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, ․

Id.

[13] In finding that an award of physical custody to Mother was in Child's best interests, the trial court stated that it had considered the statutory factors, “including but not limited to” several of the factors listed above. May 8, 2025, Appealed Order at 3. Despite this statement, Father asserts that the “trial court erred in not considering all the relevant factors in making the custody determination.” Appellant's Br. at 18. However, a trial court is “not required to enter a finding as to each statutory factor it considered in making its custody determination.” Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Moreover, we “generally presume trial courts know and follow the applicable law.” Ramsey v. Ramsey, 863 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ind. 2007). That presumption “can be overcome if the trial court's findings lead us to conclude that an unjustifiable risk exists that the trial court did not follow the applicable law.” Id.

[14] Father points to no findings of the court that would overcome our presumption that the trial court followed the law by considering all relevant statutory factors, and we find none. The trial court found that Mother has employment and the support of her family in Wisconsin, Mother has always been Child's primary caregiver, Father works long hours and frequently consumes alcohol in the evenings, the parties are unable to communicate well and have explosive fights, and Father had made only limited inquiries about Child since Mother moved to Wisconsin. Those findings support the order granting physical custody of Child to Mother. Father's arguments to the contrary are simply requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. The evidence supports the trial court's findings, and its findings support the custody order; the trial court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it granted physical custody of Child to Mother.

Relocation

[15] Father challenges the court order to the extent it failed to address the issue of Mother's alleged “relocation” with Child to Wisconsin. Appellant's Br. at 18. The relevant definition of a relocating individual is one who “has or is seeking” custody of a child, “whether by court order or paternity affidavit.” I.C. § 31-9-2-107.5. When such an individual wishes to relocate with the child, he or she “must file a notice of the intent to move with the clerk of the court that ․ issued the custody order ․ or ․ has jurisdiction over the legal proceedings concerning the custody of ․ a child.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(a).

[16] As the biological mother of Child, who was “born out of wedlock,” Mother had sole legal custody of Child by operation of law. See I.C. § 31-14-13-1. Mother moved to Wisconsin on September 17, 2024, and Father did not file this paternity action until September 27. Thus, at the time Mother moved with Child to Wisconsin, there were no custody proceedings or orders in place and no court with “jurisdiction over legal proceedings concerning the custody” of Child. I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(a). Therefore, the relocation statute and its notice requirements were not applicable to Mother.

[17] Father contends that there was a paternity affidavit in place which gave him parental rights—including a right to notice of relocation—at the time Mother moved with Child, but no such affidavit was filed or otherwise entered into the record. As this Court noted in Young v. Davis, a trial court cannot consider an alleged paternity affidavit that was not part of the record before it. 139 N.E.3d 1099, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. And our appellate rules “do not permit material to be included in a party's appendix that was not presented to the trial court.” In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Ind. Appellate Rules 27 and 50(A)(1)). An appellant may not attempt to build a new record on appeal to support his position with evidence that was never admitted in the trial court. See, e.g., Herron v. State, 808 N.E.2d 172, 177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, even assuming without deciding that a properly executed paternity affidavit, alone, would trigger the relocation statutes, there was no such affidavit in the record.²

[18] The trial court did not err to the extent it found the relocation statutes inapplicable to Mother.

Amendment of Order

[19] Finally, Father maintains that the May 8, 2025, amended order was a “modification” of the February 19, 2025, order on paternity, custody, and parenting time and, as such, was issued without prior notice to him and an opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights. Mother, on the other hand, contends that the May 8 order was merely a correction of a clerical mistake as permitted by Indiana Trial Rule 60(A) and, because the amendment was not substantive, it did not require notice and an opportunity to be heard. We agree with Mother.

[20] Indiana Trial Rule 60(A) provides, in full:

(A) Clerical Mistakes. Of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders, clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the trial court at any time before the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record is filed under Appellate Rule 8. After filing of the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record and during an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected with leave of the court on appeal.

[21] We review a trial court's Rule 60(A) order for an abuse of discretion. See Somerville Auto Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Auto. Fin. Corp., 12 N.E.3d 955, 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion when its judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. “We must affirm if there is any legal ground in the record supporting the judgment, even if the trial court provides erroneous reasons for its ruling.” Id.

[22] A clerical error to which Rule 60(A) applies is defined as “a mistake by a clerk, counsel, judge[,] or printer which is not a result of judicial function and cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion.” Ashley v. Ashley, 190 N.E.3d 353, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation modified), trans. denied. Such clerical mistakes may be corrected by the trial court at any time prior to the filing of the record on appeal. T.R. 60(A). The purpose of the rule “is to recognize that[,] in the case of clearly demonstrable mechanical errors[,] the interests of fairness outweigh the interests of finality which attend the prior adjudication.” Ashley, 190 N.E.3d at 357 (quotation and citation omitted). “On the other hand, where the mistake is one of substance the finality principle controls.” Id.

[23] Here, the only mistake that the court corrected was the February 19 order's erroneous addition of Mother's Day to the list of holidays on which Father is to receive parenting time. The inclusion of Mother's Day as one of Father's parenting time days was quite obviously an error that arose from an oversight. As Section II(F)(2) of the Parenting Time Guidelines notes, the model guideline for Mother's Day is that the child is “[w]ith the child's mother from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.” The same is true for Father's parenting time with the child on Father's Day. Id. The comment to this subsection notes in relevant part that the goal of a “holiday visitation schedule” is to “fairly divide[ ] the holidays ․ in as equal a manner as possible.” Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, Comment to Subrule F.2.

[24] It would be patently unfair and unequal to allow Father parenting time on both Father's Day and Mother's Day, with no such time to Mother. And, while the error may have the substantive impact of reducing Father's parenting time on Mother's Day, “the error itself was not an error in the exercise of the judicial function or attributable to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion.” Ashley, 190 N.E.3d at 358-59. Rather, the granting of parenting time to Father on Mother's Day was an obvious clerical error. Moreover, Father has provided no cogent, logical reason why he should be entitled to such unequal time on Mother's Day and no legal authority for his contention that the amendment of the order to correct a mistake should form the basis for a reversal of the trial court's custody and parenting time orders. In addition, we note that the trial court's amended order ensured that Father was given a different parenting time weekend when his usually scheduled weekend falls on Mother's Day.

[25] Father also contends that his due process rights were violated by the lack of notice and opportunity to respond to Mother's letter requesting clarification of the parenting time order. However, as the plain language of Rule 60(A) indicates,³ “the trial court was not required to give notice to the parties before correcting a clerical error or oversights and omissions in its judgment.” Waitt v. Waitt, 360 N.E.2d 268, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis added); see also 22A Ind. Prac., Civil Trial Practice § 37.5 (2d ed.), “Clerical mistakes,” n.18 (same).

[26] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it corrected a clerical mistake in the parenting time order without prior notice to the parties.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court's custody order is supported by the uncontested findings and was not clearly erroneous. Nor did the trial court err to the extent it found that the law regarding relocation was not applicable to Mother. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the May 8, 2025, amended order correcting a clerical mistake without prior notice to Father.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both the trial court and Father cite Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8, which applies in dissolution actions, as the applicable custody statute. Because this is a paternity action, the applicable custody statute is Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-2. See, e.g., In re Paternity of K.J.L., 725 N.E.2d 155, 157 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). However, we note that “the underlying principle behind both the paternity and dissolution statutes is the same: the best interest of the child.” Id.

2.   Concurrent with the issuance of this decision, we issue an order granting Mother's Motion to Strike portions of Father's briefs and appendix that refer to the alleged paternity affidavit.

3.   The rule plainly states that, “after such notice, if any, as the court orders,” it may correct the clerical mistake. T.R. 60(A) (emphasis added). That language obviously contemplates discretion on the part of the trial court regarding whether to give notice to the parties before issuing the corrected order.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.