RECKELHOFF v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kevin Reckelhoff appeals following his convictions and corresponding aggregate sentence for one count of sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Level 4 felony, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, as Level 6 felonies. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Reckelhoff raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2023, fourteen-year-old J.T. lived at home with his mother, Lisa Chirabusya, and her long-time boyfriend, John Johnson. Reckelhoff, who is Johnson's brother, would often visit the home. Reckelhoff and J.T. would spend time together and have “deep talks,” and Reckelhoff became “kind of like a mentor” to J.T. Tr. Vol. 3 at 40-41.

[4] On April 27, Chirabusya had outpatient abdominal surgery. The next day, Johnson went on a fishing trip, and Reckelhoff went to Chirabusya's house to check on her. Shortly thereafter, J.T. returned from school. After he got off the school bus, J.T. went to his room to play video games and scroll on his phone. Later, he and Reckelhoff left the house to pick up J.T.’s best friend, H.R. Reckelhoff also stopped at a liquor store.

[5] After they returned to the house, Reckelhoff ordered pizza for dinner. When it arrived, the three took the pizza and a case of beer to a game room upstairs. J.T. and H.R. asked Reckelhoff if they could have some beers, and Reckelhoff agreed. J.T. and H.R. then drank “[m]ultiple” beers, which was enough “to get [J.T.] sick.” Id. at 46. Reckelhoff also drank liquor, which he shared with J.T. and H.R.

[6] At one point, J.T. vomited. Then, H.R. helped J.T. walk to his bedroom, and J.T. fell asleep in his bed. Sometime later, J.T. woke up and noticed that H.R. was in the bed with him and that Reckelhoff was on the floor. Reckelhoff asked J.T. if he could get into J.T.’s bed “because his back hurt.” Id. at 53. J.T. “thought it was a weird remark,” but agreed anyway. Id. J.T. fell back asleep.

[7] When J.T. next woke up, Reckelhoff was “touching” him. Id. at 53. Reckelhoff used his hand and “rubbed” J.T.’s genitals outside of his pajama pants. Id. at 54. Things then “escalated,” and Reckelhoff pulled down J.T.’s pajama pants and put his hands directly on J.T.’s genitals. Id. at 54. J.T. felt “frozen” and did not move. Id. J.T. then felt “the warmth and the wetness” of Reckelhoff's “mouth on [his] genitals,” and he heard “a slurp type of a sound.” Id. at 54-55. J.T. felt “afraid,” and he “didn't know what to do[.]” Id. at 55. Around five to fifteen minutes later, H.R. “stood up,” and Reckelhoff quickly pulled J.T.’s pants up then “got up very fast and walked out of the room.” Id. at 55-56.

[8] After Reckelhoff left the room, J.T. went downstairs to get a drink. Reckelhoff followed J.T. to the kitchen and told him: “if you don't want to sleep in your room, you know you can come sleep with me[.]” Id. at 57. J.T. ran upstairs back to his room, and he ultimately went back to sleep.

[9] The next day, after everyone awoke, Reckelhoff, J.T., and H.R. went to a gas station to get snacks. Johnson returned home and, later, J.T.’s cousin, M.T., came over. At some point, J.T., H.R., and M.T. all went to Chirabusya's room. Chirabusya noticed that J.T. was “off,” and J.T. ultimately disclosed the offense to her. Id. at 17. Chirabusya arranged for H.R.’s mother to take all three kids away from the house. As the kids were leaving, Reckelhoff, who had spent the day drinking with Johnson, looked at Chirabusya and the kids and said that “[he] wish[ed] all of [them] were dead.” Id. at 20. After the kids had left, Chirabusya called the police. Approximately one week later, J.T. submitted to a forensic interview.

[10] The State charged Reckelhoff with one count of sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Level 4 felony, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, as Level 6 felonies. The court held a jury trial on Reckelhoff's charges. During the trial, J.T. testified about the offense. In addition, H.R. testified that, after he had taken J.T. to his room, he went to the bathroom to vomit and noticed that Reckelhoff was in J.T.’s room. He also testified that, while he did not see Reckelhoff touch J.T., he had been intoxicated enough that he “blacked out” and did not “remember anything.” Id. at 129.

[11] Chirabusya testified that, in the early hours of April 29, she had seen J.T. and Reckelhoff in the kitchen and had heard Reckelhoff tell J.T: “if you don't want to go sleep up in your room, you can sleep down in mine.” Id. at 12. She further testified that, after everyone was awake the next day, Reckelhoff asked J.T. and H.R. if they remembered “much of anything last night[.]” Id. at 13. And she testified that Reckelhoff was “[a]wkward” that day. Id at 16.

[12] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Reckelhoff guilty as charged. Thereafter, the court held a sentencing hearing. During the hearing, the State presented as evidence the testimony of three individuals, who each testified that Reckelhoff had been in a position of trust over them and had fondled them and/or performed oral sex on them. Chirabusya testified that the “magic” in J.T. had left as a result of Reckelhoff's actions. Tr. Vol. 4 at 24. And J.T. testified that he now suffers from anxiety and depression and does not feel safe.

[13] In imposing its sentence, the court identified as aggravating Reckelhoff's “history of criminal behavior,” as evidenced by the three individuals who had testified to Reckelhoff's previous actions of inappropriate touching. Id. at 35. And the court found that that aggravator was “the biggest, most important” aggravating factor. Id. The court also identified as aggravating that the offense was committed in or near a person under the age of eighteen, that he provided alcohol to J.T. “in an attempt to incapacitate” him, that anything other than a maximum sentence would reduce the seriousness of the crime, and that Reckelhoff had “exhibited classic signs of grooming for the last 40 years[.]” Id. The court then identified as a mitigator the fact that incarceration would be an undue hardship on Reckelhoff. Accordingly, the court sentenced Reckelhoff to consecutive terms of twelve years on the Level 4 felony, all executed, and 545 days on each of the Level 6 felony convictions, all suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[14] Reckelhoff first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[15] To demonstrate that Reckelhoff committed sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Level 4 felony, the State was required to prove that he, who was at least twenty-one years of age, knowingly or intentionally performed other sexual conduct with J.T., who was less than sixteen years old. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1). As relevant here, other sexual conduct is defined as an act involving a sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another person. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5.

[16] Reckelhoff contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because it was based solely on the testimony of J.T., which he contends was incredibly dubious. Under the incredible dubiosity rule, “a court will impinge on the jury's responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when it has confronted ‘inherently improbable’ testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of ‘incredible dubiosity.’ ” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994)). “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of” the fact-finder. Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015). For the incredible dubiosity rule to apply, there must be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756.

[17] Here, Reckelhoff contends that J.T.’s testimony was incredibly dubious because “there is no circumstantial evidence whatsoever that supports the allegations,” H.R. “provides no corroborating account” of J.T.’s claims despite being in the “very same bed during the alleged encounter,” and “J.T.’s initial account provided in his forensic interview differed drastically from the testimony he provided at trial.” Appellant's Br. at 15, 18. However, we hold that the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here for several reasons.

[18] First, there was not a sole testifying witness. Rather, in addition to J.T., Chirabusya and H.R. also testified. And, while neither of them witnessed the offense, they each at least partially corroborated J.T.’s account. In particular, Chirabusya testified that Reckelhoff, J.T., and H.R. were upstairs and that she heard someone vomiting. She also testified that she saw Reckelhoff in the kitchen with J.T. and that she heard Reckelhoff tell J.T. that he could sleep with Reckelhoff if he wanted. And she testified that, after everyone woke up the next morning, Reckelhoff was awkward and asked J.T. and H.R. if they remembered anything. Moreover, H.R. testified that Reckelhoff provided him and J.T. with alcohol to the point of intoxication and that he saw Reckelhoff in J.T.’s room.

[19] Second, J.T.’s testimony was not inherently contradictory. During trial, J.T. consistently testified that he woke up to Reckelhoff touching his genitals followed by Reckelhoff placing his mouth on J.T.’s genitals. While there may have been slight inconsistencies between that testimony and statements J.T. had made during the forensic interview, the “fact that a witness gives trial testimony that contradicts earlier pre-trial statements does not necessarily render the trial testimony incredibly dubious.” Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002). The jury was presented with the conflicting statements, and it was the jury's role as trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See id.

[20] Finally, there was not a complete absence of circumstantial evidence. Rather, the State presented as evidence a photograph of J.T.’s room taken from the day after the offense that shows a pillow on the floor next to the bed and a carton of Reckelhoff's preferred brand of cigarettes. That is evidence that Reckelhoff was in J.T.’s room.

[21] Because there was more than one testifying witness who offered support for J.T.’s testimony, because J.T.’s testimony was not inherently contradictory, and because there was not a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply. Reckelhoff's arguments on appeal are merely requests for this Court to reassess the weight and credibility of the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Reckelhoff's conviction.

Issue Two: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[22] Reckelhoff next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[23] The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two years to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. And the sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Because the most serious crime for which Reckelhoff was convicted was a Level 4 felony, the total consecutive terms of imprisonment could not exceed fifteen years. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(6). Following a sentencing hearing, the court identified as aggravators Reckelhoff's history of criminal behavior, that the offense happened in the presence of someone under eighteen years of age, that Reckelhoff provided alcohol to J.T. to get him intoxicated, and that he had a history of grooming. As mitigating, the court identified the undue hardship that incarceration would place on Reckelhoff. The court apparently concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Reckelhoff to an aggregate term of twelve years in the Department of Correction followed by three years on probation.

[24] On appeal, Reckelhoff contends that the court abused its discretion when it identified certain aggravators. In particular, he asserts that the court improperly identified as aggravators that a less-than-maximum sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, that the offense was committed near a person under eighteen years of age, and that he provided alcohol to J.T. in an attempt to incapacitate him.¹

[25] However, we need not decide whether any of those aggravators are improper. It is well settled that a court's reliance on an improper aggravator is harmless unless the defendant can show that the trial court would have imposed a different sentence absent the aggravator. See Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, Reckelhoff does not challenge two of the court's aggravators: his history of criminal behavior and his history of grooming. The court found that Reckelhoff's history of criminal behavior was the “biggest, most important” aggravating factor. Tr. Vol. 4 at 35. And the court found that Reckelhoff has “exhibited classic signs of grooming for the last 40 years[.]” Id. Based on those unchallenged aggravators, to which the court clearly gave substantial weight, we are confident that the court would have rendered the same sentence irrespective of the other aggravators. The court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Reckelhoff.

Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[26] Finally, Reckelhoff contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer[, 868 N.E.2d at 494].

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[27] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[28] As discussed above, Reckelhoff faced a total possible sentence of fifteen years. And, following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of twelve years in the Department of Correction followed by three years on probation.

[29] On appeal, Reckelhoff contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because none of the offenses “caused or threatened physical harm to either J.T. or H.R.,” he did not “force J.T. to submit to any sexual touching,” J.T. was “fourteen months shy of the age of sixteen,” and “both J.T. and H.R. testified that they asked Reckelhoff for his alcohol.” Appellant's Br. at 28-29. And he argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because the present offenses are his “first felony convictions,” he “suffers from a variety of medical conditions,” and he has been a “contributing member of society” for “the vast majority” of his life. Id. at 27-28.

[30] However, Reckelhoff has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. With regard to the nature of the offenses, Reckelhoff provided alcohol to two fourteen-year-old boys, allowing them to get so intoxicated that they both vomited and that H.R. blacked out. He then took advantage of his position of trust he had gained after years of being J.T.’s mentor, invited himself into J.T.’s bed with the excuse of back pain, and then proceeded to fondle and perform oral sex on J.T. Reckelhoff ended the abuse only after H.R. started to wake, but he then followed J.T. to the kitchen and offered to let J.T. sleep in the guest room with him. Then, the next day, after Chirabusya arranged for H.R.’s mother to pick up the children, Reckelhoff looked at Chirabusya and the children and said that he wished they were all dead. Reckelhoff has not presented compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offenses in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[31] As for his character, we acknowledge that Reckelhoff has only a minor criminal history. However, Reckelhoff was a mentor to J.T., and he took advantage of that position and molested him. In addition, the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing demonstrates that Reckelhoff has a history of placing himself in a position of trust over young boys and then molesting them, which reflects poorly on his character. While Reckelhoff may have been educated and employed, he has not presented compelling evidence of substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. See id. Reckelhoff's sentence is not inappropriate.

Conclusion

[32] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Reckelhoff's conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced him. And Reckelhoff's sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During sentencing, the court stated that its “preferred sentence” would be longer than fifteen years. Tr. Vol. 4 at 34. Reckelhoff briefly contends that that statement “indicates that a maximum sentence was already predetermined” and that “the hearing was nothing more than a formality.” Appellant's Br. at 24. However, the court made that statement only after hearing all of the evidence and right before it pronounced its sentence. See Tr. Vol. 4 at 34. As such, there is no indication in the record that the court had decided on a maximum sentence prior to the hearing.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.