R.R., Appellant-Respondent v. Z.R., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.R. appeals the trial court's order prohibiting him from contact with Z.R., his wife, and A.R-R. (“Child”), his daughter. We affirm.

Issues

[2] R.R. raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

I.  Whether R.R. had sufficient notice that Z.R. sought an order of protection for herself and Child.

II. Whether Z.R. presented sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the protective order.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] R.R. and Z.R. married in 2016, and their daughter, Child, is their only child. R.R. and Z.R. lived together in a home in Brownsburg from 2015 to approximately the beginning of November 2024. R.R. is an immigrant living in the United States on an asylum visa. Z.R. is also an immigrant and is listed as R.R.’s spouse on his visa.

[4] On the evening of August 1, 2024, when Child was four years old, R.R. returned to the marital home intoxicated, hit Z.R. in her back, and threw her to the floor, all in Child's presence. Child “defended [Z.R.] against [R.R.].” Tr. at 9. R.R. had had a problem with alcohol over the prior couple of years. On August 15, he pleaded guilty in a criminal case in which he had been charged with driving while intoxicated, as a Class A misdemeanor. As part of R.R.’s plea agreement, his driver's license was suspended for 180 days, effective July 29, and R.R. was ordered not to leave the State of Indiana.

[5] On September 28, Z.R. went to the emergency room for stress and an inability to sleep. On October 12, R.R. told Z.R. that R.R.’s sister would physically harm Z.R. if she attempted to take any legal action against him. R.R. also told Z.R. several times that she would lose any legal action against him because her immigration status was dependent on her marriage to him. R.R. also installed cameras in the family home. At one point, Z.R. discovered that R.R. had allowed his cousin access to view the video from the cameras. Z.R. became scared that she was being surveilled by R.R. and/or his cousin.

[6] On or around November 1, Z.R. and Child moved out of the marital home and into a residence in Indianapolis. Initially, Z.R. allowed R.R. to have visitation with Child. However, at approximately 2:30 a.m. on December 25, R.R. drove Child, without a car seat, back to Z.R.’s home while he was intoxicated. Thereafter, Z.R. refused to allow R.R. to visit with Child. On December 30, at R.R.’s request, police went to Z.R.’s new residence to conduct a welfare check on Child.

[7] On January 3, 2025, Z.R.—with the assistance of one of her brothers—filed a petition for a protective order against R.R. The petition included allegations that R.R. had struck Z.R. in Child's presence in August, had threatened and stalked Z.R., and had driven a vehicle while intoxicated with Child in the car without a child car seat in December. The petition further alleged that R.R. had “created an environment of fear, intimidation[,] and manipulation that has profoundly affected the well-being and the safety of [Child] and [Z.R.].” App. at 12. In her petition, Z.R. requested a protective order for herself and her three brothers,¹ an order either “deny[ing R.R.] parenting time” or granting R.R. only supervised parenting time with Child, and an order prohibiting R.R. from possessing or using a firearm. Id. at 14.

[8] On January 9, the court issued an ex parte order of protection prohibiting R.R. from abusing, threatening, or otherwise contacting Z.R. and her brothers; set a hearing date on Z.R.’s petition for January 30; and issued notice to all parties. Return of service on R.R. was filed on January 15. On January 23, R.R. requested a continuance of the hearing, which was granted. The court also granted the parties’ request for a Spanish/English interpreter.

[9] A hearing on Z.R.’s petition was held on February 13 and April 10. Both parties appeared in person and by counsel. Z.R. testified that, since the time she had left R.R., he had repeatedly sent police to her home, ostensibly for welfare checks on Child, but Z.R. believed R.R. did it to harass and scare her. At one point, R.R. had removed Child from school and taken her on a trip to Chicago without Z.R.’s knowledge or permission. Z.R. also testified that R.R. had become intoxicated and passed out many times in Child's presence while the parties lived together and had admitted into evidence a photograph of R.R. passed out on the floor with Child next to him. The court also admitted into evidence Z.R.’s Exhibit 17, which was a screenshot of an August 26, 2024, conversation written in Spanish between the parties on WhatsApp. The interpreter at the hearing interpreted the conversation, and stated that, in it, Z.R. reminds R.R. that he had hit her twice, and R.R. responds, “Yes, and I am sorry․ I regret that.” Tr. at 72-73.

[10] R.R. admitted at trial that he had pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and had his driver's license suspended for 180 days, beginning on July 29, 2024. He also admitted that he had driven with Child to have visitation with her after Z.R. and Child had moved out of the marital home. R.R. admitted that, in November 2024, he had traveled to Venezuela to file for and obtain an order of divorce from Z.R., despite the criminal court's order that he not leave the State of Indiana.

[11] The trial court noted that R.R. had an action pending in a Hendricks County court to enter an order of dissolution based on the Venezuela judgment. The parties clarified that the validity of the Venezuela judgment was in question in the Hendricks County action and that, if the judgment was found valid, the Hendricks County court would ultimately decide custody and parenting time issues. If the Venezuela judgment was not found to be valid, the Hendricks County action would be dismissed.

[12] At the conclusion of the April 10 hearing, the court specifically found that R.R. had “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Tr. at 93. It also noted that the case “c[a]me down to ․ a determination of [the] credibility of [the] witnesses.” Id. The court stated that it found Z.R.’s testimony to be credible, and it believed R.R. had hit Z.R. on August 1 in Child's presence and that Child had attempted to “defend” Z.R. Id. The court also found that R.R. had driven while intoxicated with Child in the car and with no child car seat and no valid driver's license. The court noted that the latter fact, in conjunction with the fact that R.R. hit Z.R. in Child's presence, supported its “condition of this [protective] order” that R.R. have no contact with Child. Id. at 94. However, the court acknowledged the pending action in Hendricks County and noted that the order of protection could be “modified” as to R.R.’s contact with Child by any court having jurisdiction to enter a custody order. Id. at 95.

[13] On April 10, the trial court issued a written order of protection which included findings. The court enjoined R.R. from contacting, harassing, and threatening or committing acts of domestic violence against Z.R. and her three brothers. As “additional relief to provide for the safety and welfare of [Z.R.] and each family or household member ․ [,]” the court also ordered R.R. not to have contact with Child. App. at 21. The order of protection expires on April 10, 2027.

[14] On May 30, R.R. filed a motion for a stay of the protective order pending appeal. On June 6, the trial court issued an amended order for protection which was identical to the April 10 order except that it included the following statement: “This order is not intended to interfere with any child visitation orders issued by any other court.” Id. at 24.² This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[15] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.

We consider whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the order only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the order․ We neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision.

J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[16] We review issues not covered by the findings under a general judgment standard, “which provides that a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” D.W. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re K.W.), 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation modified). We review questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The party appealing the issuance of the protective order must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, meaning a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517.

[17] We also note that Z.R. has not filed an appellee's brief. Under such circumstances, we “need not develop an argument for the appellee[ ] but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (citation modified). Prima facie error means error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.

This less stringent standard of review relieves us of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.

In re Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citations omitted).

Issue One: Notice

[18] R.R. contends that Z.R.’s pleadings failed to provide him with sufficient notice that she was seeking a protective order for Child and, therefore, the trial court order prohibiting him from contact with Child was issued in violation of his due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Generally stated, due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses.”).

[19] Indiana's notice pleading provision requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). This rule “does not require a pleading to adopt a specific legal theory of recovery to be adhered to throughout the case.” Winters v. Pike, 171 N.E.3d 690, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Rather, the pleading “must disclose only the operative facts involved in the litigation” so as to “place the defendant on notice as to the evidence to be presented at trial.” Reinoehl v. St. Joseph Cnty. Health Dep't, 181 N.E.3d 341, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation modified), trans. denied.

[20] Z.R.’s petition sought a protective order against R.R. pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-2, which allows a victim of domestic or family violence to seek an order of protection against a family or household member who committed the violence. In her petition, Z.R. detailed the date, place, and description of five different incidents in which R.R. allegedly abused, threatened, or harassed her. Those incidents included the events of August 1, 2024, when R.R. hit Z.R. and threw her to the floor “in front of [Child],” and December 25, when R.R. drove a vehicle while drunk with Child in the vehicle without a child car seat. App. at 11. Regarding the latter incident, the petition stated Z.R. did “not feel like [Child] is safe with her father.” Id. The petition further alleged that R.R. “has created an environment of fear, intimidation[,] and manipulation that has profoundly affected the well-being and safety of [Child] and [Z.R.].” Id. at 12. Z.R. sought, among other relief, an order denying R.R. parenting time with Child or allowing him only supervised parenting time.

[21] Z.R.’s pleading stated the operative facts supporting her requests for an order of protection for herself and limited or no contact between R.R. and Child.³ The pleading notified R.R. of the evidence Z.R. would be presenting against him at trial, i.e., evidence that he had physically abused Z.R. in Child's presence and had endangered Child by driving while intoxicated with Child in the car without a car seat. And, in fact, R.R. cross-examined Z.R. about that evidence and presented his own testimony and other evidence on those issues at the two-day trial. Thus, R.R. has failed to present a case of prima facie error showing that Z.R.’s pleading was not sufficient under Indiana's notice pleading system or that he was denied the due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[22] Indiana's Civil Protection Order Act, codified at Indiana Code Sections 34-26-5-1 to 34-26-5-21 and “[a]imed at combating the scourge of domestic and family violence, ․ protects both past and present victims and their children.” S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 219 (Ind. 2020). If the trial court finds that a petitioner seeking an order of protection has proved the existence of a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner or a member of petitioner's household by a preponderance of the evidence, “the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence.” Id.; I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h).

[23] Z.R. presented evidence that R.R. had hit her, threatened her, and harassed her and that he had endangered Child by hitting Z.R. in Child's presence and driving with Child in his car while he was intoxicated, without a valid license and without a child car seat. The court specifically found that evidence credible, and R.R.’s evidence not credible. And that evidence is sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that R.R. posed a credible threat to Z.R.’s and Child's safety. R.R.’s contentions to the contrary are blatant requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we will not do. R.R. has failed to establish prima facie clear error in the issuance of the protective order.

Conclusion

[24] Under notice pleading standards and the requirements of due process, R.R. had sufficient notice that Z.R. sought an order of protection for herself and Child. And R.R. failed to establish prima facie clear error in the trial court's finding that Z.R. had presented sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the protective order for herself and Child.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The basis for the request of a protective order for Z.R.’s brothers is not clear from the record on appeal.

2.   The CCS indicates that the trial court issued an order on R.R.’s motion for stay pending appeal, but no such order is included in the record on appeal. As the trial court issued an amended protective order following R.R.’s motion to stay, presumably the motion was denied.

3.   Moreover, we note that a trial court has authority to grant relief to which a party proves herself entitled even though such relief was not demanded in the pleadings. See, e.g., Cressy v. Shannon Cont'l Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 54(C), which provides in relevant part that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings”). As discussed in the following section, Z.R. presented sufficient evidence that she and Child were entitled to protective orders against R.R.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.