In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.D. (Minor Child) M.D. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voices of Indiana, Appellee/Guardian Ad Litem (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.D. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.D., her 17-year-old son. J.D. wants to be adopted by his foster father, with whom he has lived for the past two years. Mother, who lives in Florida, continues to manage significant mental-health conditions that have required periodic hospitalizations. She has also struggled to maintain stable housing and consistent contact with J.D. Since J.D.’s removal in early 2022, Mother has participated only intermittently in services and has not seen J.D. in person.

[2] The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in J.D.’s removal would not be remedied. Mother appeals, claiming the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to her and failed to consider her recent progress. Finding no error, we affirm.¹

Facts

[3] J.D. was born in October 2007.² He and his two sisters were adjudged to be children in need of services (CHINS) in 2008 and 2012, with both cases arising from concerns about domestic violence in Mother's home.³ J.D. was removed from Mother's care for one year during the first CHINS case and for two years during the second. But he was ultimately returned to Mother's care, and each CHINS case was closed.

[4] Following the second CHINS case, Mother moved her family to Florida for several years. Then, in late 2021, they returned to Indianapolis and lived with a friend of Mother's until that friend kicked them out. They next moved in with Mother's boyfriend, but he soon became abusive. Therefore, Mother and her children moved to a domestic-violence shelter.

[5] In January 2022, after spending a few weeks in that shelter, Mother was hospitalized for in-patient mental health treatment. This left no adult able to supervise J.D. and his sisters. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) took the children into emergency custody and placed them in kinship care. Days later, DCS filed petitions alleging J.D. and his sisters were CHINS, their third such case. Mother was released from the hospital after about a week, but just days later, she was hospitalized again for in-patient mental health care. Meanwhile, J.D. and his sisters remained in their kinship placements.

[6] Mother was discharged from her second hospitalization after a week. She then lived with her grandmother in Greensburg, Indiana, for a month. But in mid-March 2022—while the CHINS petitions were pending and J.D. remained in kinship care—Mother moved back to Florida, where she has lived since.

[7] In May 2022, the court adjudged J.D. and his sisters to be CHINS, finding Mother was “unable to provide the Children with a safe and stable environment as Mother is currently out-of-state and homeless suffering from unresolved mental health concerns which put the Children at significant risk.” Exhs. p. 34. The trial court ordered Mother to participate in home-based therapy and case management services. It also ordered her to complete a parenting assessment and a dual-diagnosis assessment to address substance abuse and psychological needs and to implement the recommendations of those assessments. By June 2022, J.D. was moved from his kinship placement to foster care.

[8] Mother then began participating in virtual case meetings and virtual supervised visits with J.D., but her behavior quickly became problematic. During case meetings, Mother was “combative” and uncooperative. Tr. Vol. II, p. 114. In one instance, a case meeting was terminated early after Mother called the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) a racial slur. One of Mother's supervised visits with J.D. ended early when Mother became angry at J.D. for referring to his foster siblings as brothers. Mother accused the foster family of only caring about J.D. because they were getting paid. When the visit coordinator tried to explain to Mother that her comments were demeaning to J.D., Mother “got very upset” and accused the coordinator of pitting J.D. against her. Id. at 62.

[9] As the CHINS case progressed, Mother continued to reside in Florida. She received mental health treatment there and was diagnosed with rapid cycling bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Mother took medication for these conditions and was admitted to multiple in-patient stays. Mother lacked stable housing in Florida, sometimes staying at hotels or in a tent.

[10] During this time, Mother's virtual visits with J.D. were inconsistent. Mother refused to give the visit coordinator proposed times and failed to show up for some scheduled visits. On some occasions, visits did not occur because J.D. did not want to visit with Mother. At one point, Mother brought up the idea of visiting Indiana with her boyfriend and seeing J.D. But because of Mother's prior behavior, the visit coordinator first asked Mother to sign an agreement to “not use demeaning or hurtful language,” be sober during the visit, and be the “only party present.” Id. at 65. Mother refused to sign this agreement and stated that she was “unwilling to participate in any more supervised visits.” Id. at 69.

[11] Following this refusal, Mother engaged in no further supervised visitation with J.D. and never came back to Indiana. She and J.D. spoke on the phone about once a month. J.D. continued to regularly engage in supervised visits with his two biological sisters, who still lived in Indiana. By November 2023—a year and a half into J.D.’s CHINS case—Mother's referrals for supervised visitation and for home-based casework had been closed as unsuccessful. She still lacked housing in Florida and had not been participating in services.

[12] J.D.’s permanency plan was changed to adoption in February 2024. J.D. had told the GAL and the court that he wanted to be adopted by his foster father, who had cared for J.D. for the past year and expressed an intent to adopt him. A few months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights as to J.D.

[13] After Mother missed multiple court hearings, a case manager established contact with Mother by email in October 2024. Mother responded but merely acknowledged the ongoing proceedings. She never contacted the case manager again. As the termination case proceeded, Mother remained inconsistent in her participation in case meetings.

[14] In February 2025, the trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition. Mother appeared remotely from Florida and testified that she was opposed to 17-year-old J.D.’s adoption. She explained that she would rather “see him age out of foster care” and get support from the state for independent living. Id. at 34. Mother acknowledged that throughout the case, she was “in and out of mental health things,” her “income wasn't steady,” and she was “homeless.” Id. at 41. As a result, she often lost access to a phone and fell out of contact with DCS. But Mother emphasized that she had recently made progress in achieving stability, claiming that she had been employed as a house cleaner for the past four months and had lived in an apartment for the past three months.

[15] When Mother was asked if her current medication management was “helpful in treating” her conditions, she responded: “Not really cause my conditions go far further beyond the chemical compound.” Id. at 32. She explained that “every now and again I gotta go for a grippy sock vacation”—her term for an inpatient mental health hospitalization—though her last stay was more than one year ago. Id. at 41.

[16] DCS case managers testified to Mother's lack of cooperation and inconsistent engagement, noting that her service referrals were closed as unsuccessful. They explained that DCS had not received any verification of Mother's claimed employment or housing and Mother had never completed the court-ordered dual-diagnosis assessment to allow DCS to monitor Mother's progress.

[17] J.D. testified that he wished to be adopted by his foster father and felt safe and stable in that home. Over the past two years in that placement, J.D. had been attending high school, was involved in extracurricular activities, and was making plans to participate in a college scholarship program for Indiana residents. He regularly visited with his two biological sisters and explained: “they're my world.” Id. at 50.

[18] The GAL testified that J.D. had been fully informed of his permanency options and still wished to pursue adoption. The GAL had observed that J.D. and his foster father have a “really good relationship” and that J.D. has bonded with this foster father and the other children in that house. Id. at 112.

[19] The court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights, and Mother appealed.

Discussion and Decision

[20] A parent's right to establish a home and raise their children is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, these parental rights “must be subordinated to the child's interests” when determining whether termination is warranted. Id. Termination is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” Id.

[21] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment, giving “due regard” to the trial court's “unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. We set aside the judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[22] Mother claims the trial court erred when it “shifted the burden” to her to prove she had remedied the reasons for J.D.’s removal. Appellant's Br., p. 11. Mother then contends the court committed clear error in terminating her parental rights because her mental health, housing, and employment have stabilized. Unpersuaded by either argument, we affirm.

I. Trial Court Did Not Shift Burden

[23] Indiana law requires DCS to prove each statutory element for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1144. But, as Mother acknowledges, once DCS establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production—the obligation to present contrary evidence—naturally falls to the opposing party. See Appellant's Reply Br., p. 4 (citing Peabody Coal Co. v. Ralston, 578 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)); In re C.M., 960 N.E.2d 169, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding burden of producing contrary evidence did not shift to parent because DCS did not present prima facie case), aff'd on reh'g, 963 N.E.2d 528. The burden of persuasion never shifts to the parent.

[24] Mother claims the language of the trial court's termination order—that Mother “failed to demonstrate” she appropriately addressed her mental health and housing concerns—reallocated the burden of persuasion. App. Vol. II, p. 73. We disagree. DCS presented evidence that Mother had not remedied the conditions prompting J.D.’s removal, and the court found that Mother did not present evidence to the contrary. Thus, the court's order merely described Mother's lack of evidence rebutting DCS's evidence.

[25] The order then expressly found that “DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence” the statutory grounds for termination. Id. Nothing in the court's reasoning suggests it required Mother to disprove those grounds. To the degree Mother claims she is entitled to relief on this basis, her claim fails.

II. Termination Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[26] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must prove three elements: (1) termination is in a child's best interest; (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) one or more of the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) exists. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Here, DCS alleged that two subsection (d) circumstances existed:

• That J.D. had been removed for 15 of the most recent 22 months and, despite DCS's reasonable efforts, Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in J.D.’s removal. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)(2024).

• That there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in J.D.’s removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4)(2024).

The trial court found that the second ground—that the conditions causing removal would likely not be remedied—was proven by clear and convincing evidence.⁴

[27] Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusions as to the first two elements—that termination was in J.D.’s best interests and that there was a satisfactory plan for his care. She instead contends the trial court clearly erred in concluding that DCS proved that there was a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in J.D.’s removal were unlikely to be remedied. Mother insists that, by the time of the final hearing, her mental health had stabilized, she had obtained housing and employment in Florida, and she had maintained consistent contact with J.D.

[28] To determine whether the trial court clearly erred, we look to “whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (internal quotations omitted).

A. Evidence Supports the Findings

[29] Mother disputes three of the trial court's findings of fact. We accept the remaining unchallenged findings as true. J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. We set aside findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, meaning “there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. at 1044 (internal quotations omitted).

[30] First, Mother challenges the finding that “Mother has abandoned [J.D.] to the care of the State of Indiana,” arguing that he was involuntarily removed from her care. App. Vol. II, p. 73. But Mother voluntarily moved to Florida before J.D. was even adjudged to be a CHINS. She did not ask DCS for assistance in obtaining housing so that she could stay in Indiana. She later refused to sign a behavioral agreement that could have allowed her to visit J.D. in person and stopped engaging in remotely supervised visitation. Mother had not seen J.D. in person since January 2022—more than three years before the fact-finding hearing—and testified that she “will never return to Indiana.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 15.

[31] This evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom support the finding that Mother “abandoned” J.D. To “abandon” means to “withdraw one's support or help from” or to “give up by leaving.” Abandon, Am. Heritage Dictionary, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=abandon (last visited November 3, 2025). Mother's actions could be understood as abandoning J.D., as she left the state where J.D. lived without any intent to return and failed to stay engaged in services with J.D. Mother's appellate argument instead cites the definition of “abandon” from the adoption statutes, which focuses on whether “a parent has made only token efforts to support or to communicate with the child.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(b). However, she does not explain how this adoption-specific definition is relevant to the termination at issue here, and there is no indication that the trial court intended to invoke that specific meaning.

[32] Second, Mother takes issue with the court's finding that she “continues to require in-patient mental health care.” App. Vol. II, p. 73. Mother points to her testimony that it had been one year since her last in-patient hospitalization. However, Mother also testified that her current medication management was not adequately addressing her mental health conditions. She then stated, in the present tense: “every now and again I gotta go for a grippy sock vacation,” referring to an in-patient hospital stay. Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. This testimony supports the trial court's finding that Mother still requires in-patient care. Mother's argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, and we decline to do so. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143.

[33] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's related finding that Mother had not “appropriately addressed her mental health concerns and her need for stable housing.” App. Vol. II, p. 73. Again, Mother herself testified that her medication management was not adequately treating her conditions. She also failed to complete a dual-diagnosis assessment for substance abuse and mental health, so DCS had no way to monitor her treatment and progress. As to her housing concerns, Mother acknowledged at the fact-finding hearing that she “had housing stability problems from 2021 until November of this last year.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. But she claims to have been in a stable apartment since November—just three months before the fact-finding hearing. The trial court was permitted to give lesser weight to this recent change, compared to her nearly three years of prior housing instability. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (noting that court has “discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination”). Moreover, Mother made no attempt to verify her housing or employment with DCS.

[34] Finding the evidence supports the challenged findings, we now review whether the findings support the termination judgment.

B. Findings Support the Judgment

[35] Mother challenges only one conclusion made in support of the termination judgment—the conditions that resulted in J.D.’s removal would not be remedied. In reviewing this conclusion, we first ascertain the “conditions that led to [the child's] placement and retention in foster care” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1145 (quoting In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013)).⁵ Though a trial court “must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding” and consider “evidence of changed conditions,” the court must also look to a parent's “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (internal quotations omitted and brackets in original).

[36] Here, the conditions leading to J.D.’s removal were Mother's need for inpatient mental health treatment, which resulted in her inability to provide care and housing for J.D. As a result of this removal and the subsequent CHINS adjudication, Mother was ordered to complete a dual-diagnostic assessment and its recommendations, a parenting assessment and its recommendations, home-based services, and therapy.

[37] The trial court found that Mother failed to complete these services after nearly three years. Instead of working collaboratively with DCS to reach reunification, Mother was “very combative” and defensive. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60; see generally In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (noting that a parent's “apathy toward services and hostility towards service providers is significant”). On one occasion, a case meeting was terminated early because Mother used a racial slur towards the GAL. Additionally, Mother's participation in supervised visitation with J.D. was “[v]ery sporadic,” and Mother eventually discontinued visits entirely because she would not agree to refrain from using harmful and hurtful language. Tr. Vol. II, p. 64.

[38] These findings support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in J.D.’s placement outside the home. Mother has failed to demonstrate that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights as to J.D.

Conclusion

[39] Mother's own testimony supports the trial court's findings regarding her inadequately managed mental health, long-term housing instability, and inconsistent participation in services. Such findings support the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in J.D.’s removal will not be remedied. The trial court determined that DCS proved the requirements for termination by clear and convincing evidence without improperly shifting the burden of proof to Mother. Finding no error, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.D.’s father was not identified in this matter and is not part of this proceeding or appeal.

2.   J.D. was seventeen at the time of the termination but turned eighteen during the pendency of this appeal. Neither party argues that J.D.’s age impacts this appeal. We proceed with our review of the merits because the termination of the parent-child relationship may have continuing implications even after a child reaches the age of majority. See Ind. Code § 31-35-6-4 (providing that termination of parent-child relationship permanently ends “all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations ․ pertaining to the relationship”); see, e.g., Ind. Code § 29-2-16.1-1 (defining “parent” for the purpose of the anatomical gifts statute as a parent whose parental rights have not been terminated).

3.   At some point during the proceedings, J.D.’s older sister reached adulthood and his younger sister achieved permanency through a separate placement. This left only J.D.’s case before the court.

4.   The termination order did not make complete findings as to the first alleged subsection (d)(3) circumstance. It found that J.D. had been removed for 15 of the past 22 months and that DCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify. But it did not contain an explicit finding as to the final part of subsection (d)(3)—that Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in removal. In any case, we need not consider Mother's arguments against subsection (d)(3) as a basis for the termination because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) requires only the existence of “one (1) or more” of the listed circumstances and the trial court found that the subsection (d)(4) circumstance existed.

5.   Mother argues that the court can consider only the conditions that prompted the initial removal, not conditions that arise thereafter, because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) refers only to “the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home.” However, she does not identify which, if any, conditions here arose distinctly after removal. In any case, our Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted analogous language from a prior version of the termination statute to include the consideration of conditions that led to a child's “placement and retention in foster care.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1145 (emphasis added) (quoting In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). To the extent Mother argues we should depart from our precedent and interpret the statute differently, we decline to do so. See Fox v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 320, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“[W]e are bound by our supreme court's decisions, and its precedent is binding on us until it is changed by our supreme court or legislative enactment.”).

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.