Rhonda Coff, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Josette C. Quiroga, the Town of Schererville, and the Schererville Police Department, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In August of 2020, a vehicle driven by Rhonda Coff collided with a vehicle driven by Schererville Police Officer Josette Quiroga while Officer Quiroga was in pursuit of a third vehicle. Coff filed a negligence claim against Officer Quiroga, the Town of Schererville (“the Town”), and the Schererville Police Department (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellees moved for summary judgment on various grounds, and the trial court entered summary judgment in their favor on the basis that Coff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Coff argues that the trial court erred in so doing because (1) the designated evidence does not establish that she was contributorily negligent and (2) the Town is not entitled to law-enforcement immunity under the circumstances of this case. Because we agree, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 9, 2020, at around 7:30 pm, Officer Quiroga was on shift working in her marked police car. While southbound on U.S. 41 in Schererville, Officer Quiroga received a series of calls from dispatch to look out for a reckless driver in a blue sedan with a temporary license plate on U.S. 30. Officer Quiroga turned her car around and, now northbound, arrived at the intersection of U.S. 41 and U.S. 30, with her car the first in the right-hand turn lane, stopped at a red light. While stopped, Officer Quiroga saw a blue sedan “turn right onto US 41 from US 30 [and] immediately start erratically driving through traffic.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56. Officer Quiroga advised dispatch and other officers of the blue sedan's location, activated her emergency lights, and began “inching” through the intersection. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56.

[3] As Officer Quiroga proceeded into the intersection, eastbound U.S. 30 traffic still had a red light, while two lanes of westbound U.S. 30 had a green light and two lanes had a protected green arrow to turn southbound onto U.S. 41. Once Officer Quiroga believed that all traffic had stopped, she proceeded through the center of the intersection; Coff's vehicle, in the left through-lane of U.S. 30 westbound, travelled in front of and collided with Officer Quiroga's vehicle. Officer Quiroga had not seen Coff's vehicle before the collision. In responding to an interrogatory, Officer Quiroga indicated that “[m]y view of [Coff's vehicle] could have been obstructed by anything, including the other cars stopped at the intersection yielding to my patrol vehicle, the A pillar of my patrol vehicle, etc.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 145.

[4] Officer Bogusz Wozniak with the Lake County Sheriff's Department responded to investigate the collision and spoke with Officer Quiroga, later preparing an accident report. According to the accident report, Officer Quiroga's “view of westbound traffic was obstructed by a semitruck in the turn lane to go south [and w]hen [Officer Quiroga] cleared past the semitruck, [Coff] entered the intersection, causing [Officer Quiroga] to strike [Coff] on the drivers [(sic)] side.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 137 (formatting altered). On April 24, 2024, however, Officer Quiroga testified in a deposition that a tractor-trailer had actually been in the right hand through lane, not the left turn lane. As it happens, Officer Wozniak had later issued an amended accident report, which was consistent with Officer Quiroga's testimony regarding the location of the tractor-trailer.

[5] Analysis of data from Officer Quiroga's vehicle indicated her speed had been twenty-three miles per hour one half second before the collision and that she had applied the brakes (slowing to six miles per hour) and attempted to turn the steering wheel in the half second before the collision. In a deposition, Coff testified that she did not remember anything that had happened immediately before the collision, about the collision itself, or about her conduct on that date, only remembering feeling something spinning, the ambulance after the collision, and waking up in the hospital.

[6] On March 9, 2022, Coff filed a negligence claim against Appellees. On September 11, 2024, Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that the only proper defendant is the Town, the Town is entitled to law-enforcement immunity pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), and Coff was contributorily negligent. On February 20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing; the next day, it ruled that the first police report, which had been designated by Coff, was inadmissible hearsay and entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the basis that Coff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Coff concedes that neither the Schererville Police Department nor Officer Quiroga is a proper defendant in this action, leaving only the negligence claim against the Town for our consideration.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Coff contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Town. When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Simrell's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the other party's claim. Id. “Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist.” Id. The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. Id.

I. Contributory Negligence

[8] Coff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Indiana's Comparative Fault Act provides that, in “any action based on fault that is brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person or harm to property,” “any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault[.]” Ind. Code §§ 34-51-2-1; 34-51-2-5. The Comparative Fault Act, however, does not apply to governmental entities like the Town, so we apply common-law principles of negligence in suits against them. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-2; St. John Town Bd. v. Lambert, 725 N.E.2d 507, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). One of these common-law principles is that, if Coff's own negligence proximately contributed to her injuries, any contributory negligence whatsoever will bar her claim, regardless of any negligence attributable to the Town. Id. at 516.

[9] “Contributory negligence is the failure of a person to exercise for his own safety that degree of care and caution which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person in a similar situation would exercise.” Brown v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 496 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied. Contributory negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury where the facts are subject to more than one reasonable inference. Jones v. Gleim, 468 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ind. 1984). Even when the facts at issue are undisputed, it is within the province of the jury to determine the particular inference that is to be accepted if conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom. Tabor v. Cont'l Baking Co., 110 Ind. App. 633, 641, 38 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1941). Contributory negligence exists as a matter of law “only when the court can say that no reasonable person would have acted as the plaintiff did under the circumstances,” or, only if a plaintiff's negligence was “so clear and palpable that no verdict could make it otherwise.” Kader v. State, Dept. of Correction, 1 N.E.3d 717, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Templeton v. City of Hammond, 679 N.E.2d 1368, 1373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The trial court concluded that Coff had violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-35(a) by failing to yield to Officer Quiroga and, therefore, had been negligent as a matter of law.

[10] As an initial matter, we address the trial court's ruling that evidence of Officer Quiroga's statements contained in the day-of police report is inadmissible hearsay. Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B)(1) provides that “investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case” are not excepted from the hearsay rule. Coff does not argue that the first police report is admissible but does argue that, to the extent that it contains evidence of Officer Quiroga's statements to Officer Wozniak, those statements are non-hearsay statements by a party-opponent. Indiana Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is “offered against an opposing party and [․] was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity[.]” Coff, however, has also conceded that Officer Quiroga is not a proper party to this lawsuit, so this exception to the hearsay rule does not apply. We now move to the merits of this claim.

[1] As mentioned, the trial court concluded that Coff had been contributorily negligent for having violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-35(a) by failing to yield to Officer Quiroga. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-35(a) provides that

[u]pon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the person who drives the authorized emergency vehicle is giving audible signal by siren or displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, a person who drives another vehicle shall do the following unless otherwise directed by a law enforcement officer:

(1) Yield the right-of-way.

(2) Immediately drive to a position parallel to and as close as possible to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection.

(3) Stop and remain in the position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed.

[2] It is undisputed that Coff did not yield to Officer Quiroga, whose emergency lights were on. That said, while proof of the violation of a safety regulation creates a presumption of negligence, it is rebuttable. Osterloo v. Wallar ex rel. Wallar, 758 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “More specifically, the violation of a motor vehicle statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence that may be overcome by evidence that the driver, even though violating the statute, acted as a reasonable prudent person would act under the circumstances.” Id. at 62–63. As the Indiana Supreme Court has noted,

[g]enerally, the violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance is negligence per se or as a matter of law.

Exceptions to this general rule have been recognized in Indiana where compliance with the provisions of the statute or ordinance was impossible or non-compliance was excusable. Under such circumstances such violation becomes, in effect, nothing more than prima facie evidence of negligence.

N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Glad, 242 Ind. 450, 457–58, 179 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1962) (citations omitted).

[3] So, even if we assume that Coff violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-35(a), any presumption of negligence could be rebutted by evidence that she had nonetheless acted reasonably under the circumstances. The summary-judgment record contains such designated evidence. Officer Quiroga testified that she had not seen Coff's vehicle before the collision and indicated that her “view of [Coff's vehicle] could have been obstructed by anything, including the other cars stopped at the intersection yielding to my patrol vehicle, the A pillar of my patrol vehicle, etc.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 145. If Officer Quiroga's view of Coff's vehicle had been obstructed prior to the collision, a permissible inference is that Coff's view of Officer Quiroga's vehicle had been as well, potentially rendering her non-compliance with the statute excusable. See Glad, 242 Ind. at 457–58, 179 N.E.2d at 574. As such, this designated evidence is sufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the Town on the basis that Coff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

II. Law-Enforcement Immunity

[4] Coff also contends on appeal that the Town is not entitled to law-enforcement immunity for Officer Quiroga's actions, while the Town claims that this is an alternate basis for the entry of summary judgment in its favor. Although not reached by the trial court, we choose to address this claim in the interest of judicial economy. Pursuant to the ITCA, “[a] governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from [․. t]he adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce [․] a law (including rules and regulations) [․] unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(8).

[5] While it is a police officer's duty to ensure the safety of persons using public highways and streets, Whitt v. State, 483 N.E.2d 49, 50-51 (Ind. 1985), law-enforcement immunity “does not shield governmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty to operate emergency vehicles with due regard for the safety of all persons.” Patrick v. Miresso, 848 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ind. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons must be measured in terms of due care under the circumstances.” Bailey v. L.W. Edison Charitable Found. of Grand Rapids, Inc., 152 Ind. App. 460, 467, 284 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1972) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[6] We conclude that, like the question of Coff's possible contributory negligence, the question of whether Officer Quiroga exercised due care under the circumstances is a genuine issue of material fact for the jury. As mentioned, there is designated evidence tending to show that Officer Quiroga's view of traffic westbound on U.S. 30 was obstructed as she proceeded through the intersection, and the extent of that obstruction has a direct bearing on the question of whether Officer Quiroga took the appropriate level of due care as she continued across. Put another way, the more Officer Quiroga's ability to see traffic was obstructed, the more likely it was that activating her siren was necessary to exercise due care under the circumstances. Because of this genuine issue of material fact, the Town is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of law-enforcement immunity.

[7] We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.