JONES v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Madison Circuit Court entered a default judgment on the State's civil forfeiture complaint against David Jones after Jones failed to file a responsive pleading. In a successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion, Jones claimed that the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction and that he was denied due process. The trial court denied his motion and Jones appeals pro se.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 9, 2020, Jones was on pretrial release for charges filed under case number 48C06-1910-F5-2557. On that date, law enforcement received a report that Jones was holding a woman against her will at 2721 Mounds Road in Anderson. As police officers arrived at that address, they saw Jones leaving the area on a motorcycle. But when Jones saw the officers, he drove the motorcycle onto the front porch of the residence and attempted to enter the home. An officer tased Jones and the officers encountered a distraught woman inside the home.

[4] Upon entering the home, the officers observed digital scales, a grinder, and drug paraphernalia in plain view. During the search incident to Jones's arrest, police officers found on his person methamphetamine, which appeared to be packaged for distribution, and $2,546 in cash. Thereafter, the officers obtained a search warrant for the home, and, during that search, they found additional items associated with drug dealing. The arresting officer requested forfeiture of the cash found during the search incident to arrest based on his belief that the cash represented financial proceeds from the sale or distribution of methamphetamine. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 8. Thereafter, the State charged Jones with dealing in methamphetamine, resisting law enforcement, and other offenses in case number 48C06-2007-F2-1583.¹

[5] On July 16, the State filed a civil forfeiture complaint, and the trial court ordered the temporary seizure of Jones's assets. Jones was served with the complaint on April 14, 2021. Id. at 9. Jones failed to file a responsive pleading, and therefore, on May 20, the State filed a motion for default judgment. The State served the motion on Jones at the Pendleton Correctional Facility by United States Mail. On June 1, the trial court granted the motion and sent its order to Jones at the correctional facility. On July 14, 2023, the trial court issued an order releasing the seized currency to the Madison County Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 35.

[6] On October 2, 2023, Jones filed his first Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the default judgment under subsections (1), (2), and (3) of the Rule. First, Jones argued that he was not served with the July 16, 2020, forfeiture complaint because the summons was sent to his residence, and he was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 13. Next, he claimed that his property was unlawfully seized and should have been returned to him. Id. at 15-16. And Jones argued he had a meritorious defense because he could prove that the money seized “was not drug money or even involved in any drug deals ․” Id. at 23. The trial court denied the motion and Jones filed a notice of appeal. However, Jones failed to timely file a brief, and our court dismissed the appeal on May 20, 2024. Id. at 37.

[7] Jones filed a successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion on October 16, 2024. In that motion, Jones claimed he was not served with the State's May 20, 2021, motion for default judgment. Jones also asserted that the trial court held a hearing on the motion without securing his presence at the hearing. (But the record does not establish that a hearing was held on the State's motion for default judgment.) For these reasons, he argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to grant the motion and that his due process rights were violated. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 11-25. The trial court denied the motion.

[8] Jones now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Jones appeals the denial of his successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Trial Rule 60(B) allows a party to obtain relief from default judgment under certain limited circumstances, and the burden is on the movant to establish grounds for such relief. Seleme v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 982 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Our court reviews a trial court's ruling on a 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016).

[10] Successive Trial Rule 60(B) motions are not per se contrary to law. However, “[i]t is well-established that a motion under T[rial] R[ule] 60 may not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal.” Magnuson v. Blickenstaff, 508 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). “Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment.” P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting Mid-West Fed. Sav. Bank v. Epperson, 579 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).

[11] Therefore, “[Trial Rule] 60(B) is meant to afford relief from circumstances which could not have been discovered during the period a motion to correct error could have been filed.” Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “[A]ny ․ issue which was raised by, or could have been raised by a timely motion to correct error[ ] and a timely direct appeal may not be the subject of a motion for relief from judgment ․” Cullison v. Medley, 619 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. A party who files a successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion faces an “extraordinary burden: to establish that the grounds for ․ additional error were unknown or unknowable to the movant at the time” of the first Rule 60(B) motion. Weinreb v. TR Devs., LLC, 943 N.E.2d 856, 863-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332, 338 (Ind. 1983)), trans. denied.

[12] The claims raised by Jones in his successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion were known or discoverable when he filed his first 60(B) motion. In his successive motion, Jones claimed he did not have notice of the default judgment proceedings initiated by the State on May 20, 2021. But Jones discussed the State's motion for default judgment in his first Trial Rule 60(B) motion and argued that the default judgment “should be reversed.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 24.

[13] Therefore, if Jones was not served with the motion for default judgment or the court's order granting default judgment, he knew or could have discovered the issues concerning lack of notice before he filed his first Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Because the claims raised in his successive Trial Rule 60(B) were known to Jones and could have been raised in his first Rule 60(B) motion, the trial court properly denied Jones's successive Trial Rule 60(B) motion. See Weinreb, 943 N.E.2d at 869 (quoting Siebert Oxidermo, 446 N.E.2d at 338) (explaining that “ ‘[a] party may not file repeated T[rial] R[ule] 60 motions until he either offers a meritorious ground for relief or exhausts himself and the trial court in an effort to do so’ ”).

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jones's jury trial in case number 48C06-2007-F2-1583 commenced in June 2023, and the jury found him guilty of several offenses, including Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. He is currently serving an aggregate thirty-year sentence.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.