LLC 32 LLC v. LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary 1

[1] Appellants EdgeRock Development, LLC; West 32, LLC; and Birch Dalton (collectively, “the Dalton Parties”), and Appellees Derek Daly; Team Bold Glory, LLC (“TBG”); and Security National Bank f/b/o the Derek P. Daly Self-Directed Individual Retirement Account (“the Daly IRA”) (collectively, “the Daly Parties”), entered into various business arrangements (including the formation of West 32) that ended badly, resulting in litigation and a judgment and award of attorney's fees in favor of the Daly Parties. The Dalton Parties argue that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) EdgeRock had breached West 32's operating agreement (“the Operating Agreement”) by encumbering land owned by West 32 without the Daly Parties’ consent, (2) EdgeRock and Dalton had breached their fiduciary duty to West 32, (3) EdgeRock and Dalton had converted West 32 property when it encumbered the real estate, and (4) EdgeRock and Dalton had defrauded the Daly IRA by making false representations related to a Crew Carwash project (“the Carwash Project”). The Dalton Parties also contend that the trial court improperly awarded the Daly Parties attorney's fees and/or treble damages pursuant to the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act (“CVRA”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

I. The 209 Property

[2] In 2016, Dalton and Daly agreed to purchase real property located at 209 East 175th Street, Westfield, Indiana (“the 209 Property”), from AJL Enterprises, planning to operate a commercial rental company thereon. Dalton and Daly agreed that EdgeRock and TBG would be fifty-fifty owners of the 209 Property and split all expenses and capital contributions. Daly and Dalton agreed that EdgeRock would initially take title to the 209 Property before transferring it to West 32.

[3] The final purchase price of the 209 Property was $680,000.00. TBG and EdgeRock paid for the 209 Property with a loan of $520,000.00 from the State Bank of Lizton secured with a mortgage and a $10,000.00 earnest deposit paid by EdgeRock. In addition, TBG and EdgeRock each agreed to pay $75,000.00 to satisfy the balance. At EdgeRock's direction, TBG tendered a $66,640.00 deposit check to 270 Consulting, a company owned by Dalton. TBG also paid $8360.00 toward the 209 Property, which completed TBG's agreed $75,000.00 contribution.

[4] EdgeRock, however, neither tendered TBG's $66,640.00 payment to AJL nor made its own $75,000.00 payment. Instead, EdgeRock executed a seller-financing note with AJL on or about December 1, 2016, in the amount of $145,578.95 (“the Second Note”). Dalton told Daly that the Second Note was Dalton's personal obligation. Daly, however, was not informed that EdgeRock had secured the Second Note by executing a mortgage in favor of AJL against the 209 Property for the full amount of the $145,578.95 debt (“the Second Mortgage”). The sale of the 209 Property to EdgeRock closed on December 2, 2016. The buyer's settlement statement provided at the closing referenced the Second Note as “Seller Financing” but did not mention that the second note had attached to the 209 Property.

[5] On January 2, 2017, TBG and EdgeRock entered into the Operating Agreement for West 32, the LLC that was to hold the 209 Property. Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, TBG and EdgeRock each held a fifty-percent interest in West 32. On October 9, 2017, EdgeRock conveyed the 209 Property to West 32. In May of 2018, the Second Note and Second Mortgage were renegotiated pursuant to a forbearance agreement, with AJL being paid $120,000.00 and the Second Note being assigned to C&J Partners. On July 11, 2019, C&J assigned the Second Note to Dalton. Daly had not known about the Second Mortgage when it had attached to the 209 Property and learned of it only after the fact. Daly testified that the Daly Parties had not consented to the Second Mortgage.

[6] The parties attempted to sell the 209 Property in March of 2021, a sale that did not occur because of the Second Mortgage. The parties were, however, able to sell the 209 Property on August 30, 2021, for $800,000.00. West 32 had incurred $6025.25 in extra costs due to the delay of the sale.

II. The Carwash Project

[7] Meanwhile, in early 2017, Dalton approached Daly and proposed an investment of real property held by the Daly IRA in an EdgeRock development that would feature a Starbucks coffee shop and a Crew Carwash. Dalton claimed that he had reached an agreement with Westfield to approve and fund necessary road construction for the Carwash Project and that Starbucks had already provided the funding needed for necessary changes to infrastructure at the site. Daly relied on these representations in deciding to participate in the Carwash Project.

[8] On May 30, 2017, the Daly IRA and Crew Carwash executed a Purchase Agreement for 1.42 acres of Daly IRA land in Westfield. The Daly IRA appointed EdgeRock as its limited agent “to sign the Purchase Agreement and related documents” on behalf of Daly IRA through an Agency Agreement also signed in May of 2017. Appellants’ App. Vol. V p. 2. The Agency Agreement granted EdgeRock limited authority to act on behalf of the Daly IRA, i.e., negotiating and signing the Purchase Agreement and related documents on behalf of the Daly IRA. The Purchase Agreement included a post-closing agreement (“the Escrow Agreement”), pursuant to which the Daly IRA “agreed to construct certain infrastructure improvements [․] after the Closing Date to serve the Premises[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. IV p. 11. Also pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, Crew Carwash placed $800,000.00 in escrow to ensure compliance with the requirements of the contract (“Escrowed Funds”). All seem to agree that the establishment of this escrow account involved a $15,000.00 fee that was paid by Daly.

[9] At the closing on the property for the Carwash Project, Daly paid $50,000.00 “because [Dalton] told [him] he didn't have the cash for demolition and would I front $50,000 for it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 234. On January 11, 2018, Daly made a personal loan to Dalton of $15,000.00, describing it as “a check that I wrote to somebody I trusted at the time and I didn't understand his motives.” Tr. Vol. III p. 19. This personal loan has never been repaid. In June of 2018, Crew Carwash released $400,000.00 of the Escrowed Funds after Lot 3 had been roughly graded and cleared in accordance with the Amended & Restated Post-Closing Agreement. As of trial, Crew Carwash still had not released the remaining $400,000.00 from escrow due to EdgeRock's failure to timely improve the property.²

III. The Litigation

[10] The Dalton Parties initiated this suit in 2020 by filing their complaint against the Daly Parties, alleging breach of various contracts. Dalton also alleged that Daly had defamed him. On April 13, 2020, the Daly Parties answered and filed counterclaims against the Dalton Parties. The Daly Parties alleged that various of the Dalton Parties had breached various contracts (Counts I–III), breached fiduciary and partnership duties owed to various of the Daly Parties (Counts IV and VI), breached their duties in an implied partnership (Count V), and engaged in fraud and conversion warranting relief pursuant to the CVRA (Counts VI–VII).

[11] On August 24, 2022, the Daly Parties moved for partial summary judgment. The Daly Parties’ motion sought to establish, inter alia, that EdgeRock had had the sole responsibility to redeem the Second Mortgage attached to the 209 Property. The Daly Parties also sought a declaration that certain proceeds related to the sale of the property that had been interpleaded into the trial court were not affected by the Second Mortgage and could be released to them. On June 22, 2023, the trial court granted the Daly Parties’ motion in part, concluding that EdgeRock was solely responsible for the Second Mortgage on the 209 Property and that it did not attach to the funds interpleaded into the trial court.

[12] The remaining claims were tried in a two-day bench trial. On March 6, 2024, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon, in which it rejected the Dalton Parties’ claims and found in the Daly Parties’ favor on all but one of their counterclaims, including their CVRA claims. The trial court concluded that Dalton's purposeful omissions regarding the Second Mortgage had risen to the level of criminal conversion of West 32 property, which entitled Daly to treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs pursuant to the CVRA. The trial court also concluded that Dalton had committed fraud by making false representations regarding the Carwash Project, again entitling Daly to treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs pursuant to the CVRA.

[13] The trial court entered judgment in the Daly Parties’ favor in the amount of $228,075.75, broken down as follows:

R. Pursuant to the judgments ordered above, the Daly Parties are entitled to damages in the amount of $86,025.25, which consists of the $50,000.00 closing cost for demolition, the $15,000.00 escrow fee, $6,025.25 in expenses incurred to the failed first sale of the 209 Property, and the $15,000.00 personal loan provided to the EdgeRock Parties by Daly;

S. Pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1, the damages above, less $15,000[.00] for the personal loan, are trebled as a result of the EdgeRock Parties’ improper activities for fraud and conversion (Counts VII and VIII), for a total of $213,075.75 and a total amount due the Daly Parties by the EdgeRock Parties of $228,075.75 (including the $15,000[.00] personal loan)[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 63. The trial court ordered the Daly parties to submit evidence related to their CVRA-related costs, expenses, and attorney's fees.

[14] On March 20, 2024, the Daly Parties submitted their attorney's fees petition and supporting evidence regarding their CVRA claims. On July 8, 2024, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment on the requests for attorneys’ fees and costs, awarding the Daly Parties $372,467.76 in attorney's fees and $137.88 in costs, for a total award of $600,681.39.

Discussion

[15] At the outset, we note that all of the damages awarded related to the Carwash Project and the 209 Property were trebled by the trial court,³ which means that they were all necessarily found to be CVRA damages. In other words, applicability of the CVRA is both necessary and sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. As a practical matter, this means that an affirmance of the trial court's award of CVRA damages would be (1) sufficient to sustain the entire challenged judgment in full and (2) render it unnecessary to address any claims beyond that.

[16] Where the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, our standard of review is two-tiered: we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Indianapolis Ind. Aamco Dealers Adver. Pool v. Anderson, 746 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not disturb the trial court's findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them. Culley v. McFadden Lake Corp., 674 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Carroll v. J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, considering instead only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Donavan v. Ivy Knoll Apts. P'ship, 537 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).

Fields v. Safway Grp. Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

I. The CVRA

[17] Pursuant to the CVRA, if a person suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of Indiana Code Article 35-43 (entitled “Offenses Against Property”), the person may bring a civil action against the violator to collect “[a]n amount not to exceed three (3) times [․] the actual damages of the person suffering the loss[, ․ t]he costs of the action[, and a] reasonable attorney's fee.” Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1. The CVRA “ ‘is a punitive statute intended to deter the wrongdoer and others from engaging in similar future conduct.’ ” JPMCC 2006-CIBC 14 Eads Parkway, LLC v. DBL Axel, LLC, 977 N.E.2d 354, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Hart Conversions, Inc. v. Pyramid Seating Co., 658 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)), trans denied. “Though the CVRA creates a civil remedy, its reliance on proof of a predicate criminal offense makes it inherently quasi-criminal.” Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 605 (Ind. 2014). “The CVRA is a penal statute and, as such, is to be strictly construed by the courts.” Columbus Med. Servs. Org. v. Liberty Healthcare Corp., 911 N.E.2d 85, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

II. The Carwash Project

[18] The Dalton Parties contend that the trial court erred in concluding that Dalton committed fraud by making misrepresentations about the funding of the Carwash Project. The parties and the trial court define “fraud” as it is defined in the common law. The elements of common-law actual fraud are: (1) a material representation of a past or existing fact by the party to be charged that; (2) was false; (3) was made with knowledge or reckless ignorance of its falsity; (4) was relied upon by the complaining party; and (5) proximately caused the complaining party's injury. Ruse v. Bleeke, 914 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Common-law fraud, however, is not a crime defined in Indiana Code Article 35-43, which is a requirement for the CVRA to apply.

[19] The crime of fraud is defined in Indiana Code Article 35-43, which is similar to common-law fraud but with marginally different elements:

(a) A person who:

(1) with the intent to obtain property or data, or an educational, governmental, or employment benefit to which the person is not entitled, knowingly or intentionally:

(A) makes a false or misleading statement; or

(B) creates a false impression in another person;

[․.]

commits fraud, a Class A misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in this section.

Indiana Code section 35-43-5-4.

[20] Dalton, using the common-law definition of fraud, contends that (1) Daly IRA and Daly had had no legal right to rely on the representations in question, (2) EdgeRock and Dalton had not made the representations with knowledge or reckless ignorance of their falsity, and (3) there had been no evidence of damages. For their part, the Daly Parties contend that Dalton had misrepresented that the Carwash Project could take advantage of existing infrastructure and that he had funding in place to complete the larger project of which the Crew Carwash was a part, including additional funding for infrastructure and road construction. Because detrimental reliance and damages are not elements of criminal fraud, we confine our analysis to Dalton's argument that he had not been aware of the falsity of his statements when he made them.⁴

[21] The Daly parties argue that the record allows for a reasonable inference that Dalton was, in fact, aware of the falsity of his statements when he made them. We agree. The record indicates that Dalton had made his misrepresentations in early 2017, telling Daly that he had already received funds from Starbucks for infrastructure improvements and that there would be no need for any infrastructure improvements as part of the sale to Crew Carwash. It is undisputed, however, that Dalton did not receive funding from Starbucks until November 30, 2017. An affirmative statement made many months before that funding had already been received is sufficient to support an inference that the affirmative, false statement had been made intentionally. It is well-settled that “the issue of intent is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact from all of the evidence.” Stanley v. State, 252 Ind. 37, 40, 245 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1969). Dalton's argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., Fields, 118 N.E.3d at 809.

[22] Dalton also contends that the Daly Parties have not established any damages from any fraud he may have committed, which, while not an element of criminal fraud, is necessary to support an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the CVRA. As mentioned, the trial court found damages related to the Carwash Project in the amount of $50,000.00 paid by Daly for additional demolition costs and a $15,000.00 escrow fee. Daly testified that he had agreed to participate in the Carwash Project based on Dalton's assurances that all of the funding for the infrastructure and a deal with Westfield to fund road construction was already in place. Daly also testified that he had personally paid $50,000.00 for demolition because Dalton had “told [him] he didn't have the cash for demolition and would [Daly] front $50,000 for it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 234. The record clearly supports a conclusion that the $50,0000.00 payment ⁵ would never have been made had Daly not been induced into the Carwash Project by Dalton's false assurances. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that the $15,000.00 escrow fee would never have been paid without those assurances because the need for an escrow account would never have arisen.

[23] The Dalton Parties characterize the $65,000.00 damages as “part of a contractual dispute” regarding the Carwash Project. Appellants’ Br. p. 55. While it is true that the payment was made pursuant to a contract, this characterization ignores evidence that the Daly Parties would not have participated in the Carwash Project had it not been for Dalton's false assurances. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Daly Parties are entitled to CVRA damages for criminal fraud related to the Carwash Project.

II. The 209 Property

[24] Dalton challenges the trial court's finding that he had committed criminal conversion of West 32 property. Indiana Code section 35-43-4-3 provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion[.]” To “exert control over property” means, in relevant part, to “sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to secure, transfer, or extend a right to property[,]” and that control is “unauthorized” if it is exerted “without the other person's consent.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(a), -1(b)(1).

[25] Dalton contends that the trial court erred in awarding CVRA damages for the criminal conversion of the 209 Property because any conversion that may have occurred happened before West 32 existed or owned it. Daly contends that the conversion occurred either (1) the moment the 209 Property became West 32 property or (2) when Dalton renegotiated the Second Mortgage. We agree with Daly that the renegotiation of the Second Mortgage constituted unauthorized control over the 209 Property. At the very least, Dalton's renegotiation of the Second Mortgage, while not resulting in the creation of a new mortgage, was an act that “secure[d] or extend[ed]” AJL's right to have its loan secured with the 209 Property, as well as Dalton's right to extract value from the 209 Property as the means of obtaining or extending the terms of cash loans. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(a).

[26] As for criminal intent, Dalton contends that there was no evidence of that in what he characterizes as a “contract dispute between the parties over how the 209 Property was to be purchased by EdgeRock.” Appellants’ Br. p. 45. For their part, the Daly Parties argue that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Dalton had had the requisite criminal intent when he made false statements about, and/or concealed the nature of, the Second Mortgage. As mentioned, “the issue of intent is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact from all of the evidence.” Stanley, 252 Ind. at 40, 245 N.E.2d at 151. The trial court was free to infer Dalton's criminal intent from his false and/or misleading statements and omissions. Again, Dalton's argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., Fields, 118 N.E.3d at 809.

[27] Finally, the trial court found that TBG was damaged by Dalton's conversion in the amount of $6025.25, which all agree consisted of additional maintenance costs for the 209 Property that were paid between March and August of 2018. Dalton does not contest that amount or that it was caused by the delay but contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that it was paid by West 32. It is true that a damage award “cannot be based on speculation, conjecture, or surmise, and must be supported by probative evidence.” Whitaker v. Brunner, 814 N.E.2d 288, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. That, however, is not the case here.

[28] The $6025.25 amount is derived from Exhibit 19, a spreadsheet detailing West 32's expenditures related to the 209 Property, including seven pairs of payments made between March and August of 2021 for “Maintenance of W32” ($650.00) and “Acuity Insurance – Property” ($210.75), which totaled $6025.25. Ex. Vol. IV p. 110. The Daly Parties contend that they were damaged by these expenditures because they reduced the amount distributed to them upon completion of the eventual sale of the 209 Property by West 32. The trial court found this to be the case, and we agree that this is an inference supported by the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Put another way, the trial court was entitled to believe Dalton's testimony that Exhibit 19 represented all of West 32's expenditures related to the 209 Property, but it was equally entitled to disbelieve his testimony that certain payments were actually made by EdgeRock and not West 32.

III. Attorney's Fees

[29] Finally, the Dalton Parties challenge the trial court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to the CVRA. Generally, “[o]n appeal from an award of attorney's fees, [we apply] the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard to factual determinations, reviews legal conclusions de novo, and determine[ ] whether the amount of a particular award constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion.” Nunn Law Office v. Rosenthal, 905 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[30] Indiana generally follows the American Rule, which requires each party to a lawsuit to pay its own attorney's fees “in the absence of a statute or some agreement or stipulation authorizing such an award.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. OSI Indus., Inc., 831 N.E.2d 192, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans denied. Here, the sole legal basis for the award of attorney's fees is the CVRA. As mentioned, the CVRA provides for the award of, inter alia, “[a] reasonable attorney's fee.” Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1(3).

[31] With respect to the award of fees pursuant to the CVRA, we have observed that

“[a]n award of attorney fees is appropriately limited to those fees incurred because of the basis underlying the award.” Brant v. Hester, 569 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The party requesting an assessment of attorney fees bears the burden of proving an appropriate allocation of fees between issues for which attorney fees may be assessed and those for which they may not. Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 684 N.E.2d 504, 524–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 705 N.E.2d 962, 981 (Ind. 1998). “While a perfect breakdown is neither realistic nor expected, a reasonable, good faith effort is anticipated.” Id. at 525.

[32] Nance v. Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The trial court's order on CVRA attorney's fees provides, in relevant part, as follows:

17. Here, the Daly Parties have included in their request time entries which contain issues and claims not covered by the [CVRA], but which are integrally intertwined with those issues and claims that are so covered. The Daly Parties have discounted such time entries by 25%, removing a portion of the fees incurred to account for work done on the issues and claims not covered.[6] The Court finds that the issues here are very much intertwined, and a good faith effort has been made by the Daly Parties to request only those fees to which they are entitled. 18. The Court finds that the time involved in this case, as claimed by the attorneys representing the Daly Parties is reasonable, with some exceptions as noted below. The Court finds the rates charged by the attorneys representing the Daly Parties is also reasonable. Finally, the Court finds that the breakdown employed by the attorneys representing the Daly Parties to account only for the time and labor addressing issues and claims covered by the [CVRA] is also reasonable. 19. The Court finds that efforts and time expended by the Daly Parties on their motion for summary judgment and pursuit of a receivership were not reasonable given the results of such efforts. While the Court finds that some pursuit of these motions may be reasonable, it cannot find that the extent to which the Daly Parties did so is reasonable. Taken together, these pursuits account for over $165,000.00 in attorney fees. The Court will therefore reduce the Daly Parties’ claim by $100,000.00 to account for these time entries. 20. The Court finds, therefore, that an award of attorney fees in the amount of $372,467.76 and costs in the amount of $137.88 are reasonable under the circumstances, for a total award of $372,605.64.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 72.

[33] The Dalton Parties contend that the trial court erroneously awarded the Daly Parties $372,605.64 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the CVRA because (1) there had been no conversion or actual fraud, (2) Daly IRA and Daly failed to prove a loss recoverable pursuant to the CVRA, and (3) the trial court's order did not sufficiently distinguish between CVRA-related and non-CVRA-related fees. The first two claims are addressed elsewhere in this memorandum decision. As for the third, the Daly Parties contend that the Dalton Parties have not sufficiently identified any specific examples of non-CVRA work for which the trial court awarded fees, noting that it is the Dalton Parties’ burden to do so. See Kroger Co. v. WC Assocs., LLC, 967 N.E.2d 29, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“The party requesting an assessment of attorney fees bears the burden of proving an appropriate allocation of fees between issues for which attorney fees may be assessed and those for which they may not.”), trans. denied. The Daly Parties also contend that, as the trial court found, they made the required reasonable, good-faith breakdown in their fee request. We agree with the Daly Parties that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning its award of attorney's fees.

[34] As the Daly Parties note, their fee petition did not demand any fees that related just to matters outside the CVRA claim. The Daly Parties did not request any fees related solely to the Farm Property, and, for entries that might have affected multiple claims, the Daly Parties deducted twenty-five percent from any entry to ensure that work related to the Farm Property was not included, which reflected the percentage of total work that was done on those claims. The Daly Parties also made additional deductions for work done prior to the filing of the complaint, on a default-judgment motion, and involving the appointment of the special judge. All told, the fees incurred by the Daly Parties for the entire four years of litigation before the trial court was $522,546.00, and the fee petition sought only $472,467.76 of those fees, reducing the amount sought by more than $50,000.00.

[35] On top of deductions made by the Daly Parties, the trial court deducted another $100,000.00 in fees in order to address the receivership motion, the summary-judgment motion, and other matters. This deduction was not an arbitrary cut from the entire fee award but was a specific fact-finding made to address the Dalton Parties’ arguments about fee entries for the receivership and summary-judgment motions and was significantly more than half of the $165,940.63 that the Daly Parties had sought for these parts of the case.

[36] The only specific argument made by the Dalton Parties regarding the award of attorney's fees is that the Daly Parties did not sufficiently differentiate between work done on CVRA claims and work done on non-CVRA claims, i.e., the breach-of-contract claim related to the 209 Property.⁷ The Dalton Parties characterize the Daly Parties’ CVRA claims as “repackaged version[s] of the contract claims brought for no other purpose than to up the ante in this case.” Appellants’ Br. p. 57. Even if we accept this characterization, this does not help the Dalton Parties. We happen to agree that the Daly Parties’ CVRA claims can be accurately described as repackaged, but that is only because they are largely based on the exact same factual allegations as their contract claims, i.e., that the Dalton Parties executed the Second Mortgage on the 209 Property and actively misled the Daly Parties as to its true nature. Moreover, to the extent that the Daly Parties seek to up the ante by recovering treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs, the CVRA specifically allows them to do just that. The Dalton Parties have failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of CVRA attorney's fees. Because the trial court's judgment is fully supported by its rulings on the Daly Parties’ CVRA claims, we need not address any of their other claims on appeal.

[37] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The parties also litigated claims related to a third property purchased by Dalton and Daly, a former farm (“the Farm Property”). No party to this appeal has raised any claims related to the Farm Property.

3.   The Dalton Parties do not challenge the award of $15,000.00 in damages related to Daly's personal loan to Dalton.

4.   This seems to be the only challenged element of common-law fraud that is also an element of criminal fraud. See Ind. Code § 35-43-5-4.

5.   The Daly Parties claimed without contradiction at oral argument that Daly is “out that [․] money.”

6.   This refers to claims related to the Farm Property.

7.   The Dalton Parties make no argument regarding the Daly Parties’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.