Kevin Lamarr Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kevin Lamarr Johnson appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery, arguing the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Johnson and Crystal Mason married in 2008 but separated two years later. From 2010 to 2020, Johnson was incarcerated on an unrelated matter. In 2020, Johnson reached out to Mason over social media and the two began occasionally meeting up. At the time, Mason lived with her boyfriend, Anthony Huitt, in a one-bedroom apartment in Lake County.

[3] On September 1, 2020, Johnson called Mason around 3 a.m. and asked to come over. Mason agreed. After Johnson arrived, he and Mason “chill[ed]” in the living room while Huitt slept in the bedroom. Tr. Vol. II p. 217. At some point, Johnson tried “to force sex upon [Mason]” even though she “wasn't feeling it.” Id. at 219. Mason told Johnson “it hurt[,]” at which point he stopped and went to the bathroom. Id. He came out of the bathroom “with [a] gun cocked” and “pointed the gun” at Mason, asking her who was in her bedroom. Id. at 220-21. Johnson then “yanked” Mason and they both fell to the floor. Id. at 222. Mason then felt a bullet enter her and realized Johnson “shot” her. Id. at 246. Johnson then fled the scene.

[4] Huitt called 9-1-1 and reported that Johnson shot Mason. Law enforcement arrived and observed Mason to be suffering from a “gunshot wound to her upper torso.” Id. at 149. Mason was taken to St. Catherine's Hospital, where an X-ray revealed she had three gunshot wounds—two in the left arm and one in the chest—and that there was “a bullet [ ] in her spine.” Id. at 202. Doctors did an emergency surgical procedure to place a chest tube, and she was eventually transferred to a trauma center. She required six subsequent surgeries and no longer has the use of her legs.

[5] The State charged Johnson with Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Level 5 felony domestic battery. A jury trial was held in February 2025. Dr. Reena Patel, the emergency-room physician that attended to Mason, testified as to Mason's injuries. Specifically, she testified Mason was “critical” when she arrived at the hospital and that her injuries were “life-threatening.” Id. at 201.

[6] Johnson's theory of defense at trial was that Huitt shot Mason, who was covering it up by blaming Johnson. Mason testified and identified Johnson as the person who shot her. During her cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: ․ you stated when [the State] was questioning you that from 2010 until all the way up to 2020, you didn't have any contact with Mr. Johnson.

[Mason]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: I mean, is that what you said?

[Mason]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. You didn't have any physical contact with him.

[Mason]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So 2011, ’12, ’13, ’14, ’15, ’16, ’17, ’18, and ’19 there was no physical contact between you and Mr. Johnson.

[Mason]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Did you have any contact by phone or email? [Mason]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So you're telling us today that in all those years, you had no contact with him.

[Mason]: Exactly. Yes.

Id. at 227-28. Later in cross-examination, defense counsel again addressed this issue:

[Defense Counsel]: So you missed [Johnson].

[Mason]: Yeah.

[Defense Counsel]: So why did you not contact him in 2010, ’11, ’12, ’13, ’14, ’15, ’16, ’17, ’18, ’19?

[Mason]: Because he wasn't -- unavailable.

Id. at 234.

[7] Prior to redirect, the parties approached the bench and the State argued “the door's been opened as to Mr. Johnson's prior conviction where he was in prison” due to defense counsel's questioning “year by year as to why she wasn't contacting Mr. Johnson ․ and it leaves a false impression on the jury of some credibility issues.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 8-9. The court ruled “the door has been opened because of the persistent questioning and implication that it's incredulous that she didn't contact him.” Id. at 11. On redirect, the following exchange occurred:

[State]: Ms. Mason, during your cross-examination, do you recall being asked why you hadn't contacted Mr. Johnson between 2010 and when you described for the jury that you contacted him?

[Mason]: Yes.

[State]: Do you recall being asked year by year?

[Mason]: Yes.

[State]: Your response had been because he was unavailable?

[Mason]: Yes.

[State]: Could you tell us why he was unavailable?

[Mason]: Because he was incarcerated.

Id. at 14.

[8] The jury found Johnson guilty as charged. Due to double-jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only as to Level 3 felony aggravated battery. The court sentenced Mason to sixteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Johnson challenges the trial court's decision to admit evidence regarding his prior incarceration. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 190 N.E.3d 462, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court misinterpreted the law or if its decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[10] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part, that “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted if the defendant “opens the door to questioning on that evidence.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind. 2009). “The door may be opened when the trier of fact has been left with a false or misleading impression of the facts.” Id.

[11] Here, defense counsel repeatedly questioned Mason regarding why she did not contact Johnson from 2010 to 2020. This was particularly significant because Mason's credibility was a central issue at trial, given Johnson's defense theory was that she was falsely accusing him. As such, we cannot disagree with the trial court that the questioning left a false impression with the jurors, such that Johnson opened the door to testimony about his prior incarceration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[12] Johnson next contends the State failed to show sufficient evidence to convict him of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. Our standard of review is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[13] “A person who knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury on a person that creates a substantial risk of death ․ commits aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5 (2014). Johnson argues the State failed to prove (1) he acted knowingly or intentionally and (2) the inflicted injury created a substantial risk of death.

[14] Johnson first argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he acted knowingly or intentionally. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a) (1977). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). “The element of intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and it is well established that knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.” Lykins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[15] The evidence presented to the jury here shows that Johnson went to Mason's apartment in the middle of the night and attempted to have sex with her. She refused, and he went into the bathroom. When he came out, he was waving a gun around and pointed it at her. He then yanked her so hard they both fell, and at some point during this he shot her. Thereafter, he fled the scene rather than administer aid. See Anderson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (evidence of flight is probative where it is tied to other evidence that corroborates the accused's intent to commit the felony), trans. denied. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Johnson intentionally inflicted injury on Mason by shooting her.

[16] Johnson also challenges whether the State provided sufficient evidence Mason's injuries created a substantial risk of death. “[I]n reviewing a sufficiency claim concerning whether the injuries created a substantial risk of death, we look to the observable facts, including the nature and location of the injury, and the treatment provided.” Oeth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[17] Johnson's argument focuses on what evidence the State did not present. Specifically, he notes the State failed to produce testimony “from a medical professional that Mason had suffered an injury which created a substantial risk of death.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. However, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence claims, “we look at what evidence was presented to the jury, not at what evidence was not presented.” Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 259 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original). Here, the State presented evidence Mason was shot in the chest. The location of this injury suggests a substantial risk of death. See Wilcher v. State, 771 N.E.2d 113, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Common knowledge bears out the conclusion that an individual is confronted with a substantial risk of death following a stab wound to the chest[.]”), trans. denied. Furthermore, Dr. Patel testified that when Mason presented to the hospital she had three gunshot wounds and bullet in her spine. Dr. Patel described the injury as “critical” and “life-threatening.” Tr. Vol. II p. 201. Mason testified as to her treatment and recovery, including that she required six surgeries. Based on the nature and location of the injury and the treatment provided, the jury could reasonably conclude that the injury created a substantial risk of death.

[18] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.