WILLIAMS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brian Montez Williams appeals the trial court's imposition of a fifty-five-year executed sentence after he pleaded guilty to one count of murder.¹ He argues his sentence is inappropriate and an abuse of discretion and asks us to suspend ten of the fifty-five years in light of his schizophrenia diagnosis. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 27, 2021, in an apparently random attack, Williams murdered a retired grandmother, Melody Gambetty, in her home by inflicting blunt force trauma. He then decapitated and dismembered her body. He placed some of Gambetty's body parts in two of her suitcases, set fire to her home, and drove off with the luggage and its contents in her car. After neighbors reported smoke coming from the residence, the fire department and law enforcement responded to the scene, extinguished the fire, and discovered the remains of Gambetty's body. An investigation quickly led to Williams, who had been seen wandering the area talking to neighbors earlier that day. After obtaining a search warrant for his apartment, police found the suitcases, their contents, and some of Gambetty's personal effects in his home.

[3] The State initially charged Williams with murder, Level 4 felony arson,² and Class A misdemeanor theft.³ It later amended the charges to include Level 6 felony auto theft ⁴ and requested a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.⁵ On October 2, 2023, Williams agreed to plead guilty to murder with a sentence capped at fifty-five years; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all other charges.⁶ The trial court accepted Williams’ guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction.

[4] The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report, which showed Williams was previously convicted in Kentucky of robbery in 2008 and resisting arrest in 2015. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 26, 2024, at which Williams’ mother, father, paternal aunt, and childhood friend testified. Psychiatrist Dr. Timothy Allen also testified about Williams’ mental health history and treatment options.

[5] At the time of the sentencing hearing, Williams was thirty-nine years old. According to the testimony and medical records, Williams exhibited signs of psychosis and schizophrenia beginning in his late teens and early twenties but most of his healthcare at the time focused on treating alcoholism. During the criminal proceedings in Kentucky for his 2008 robbery conviction, Williams was evaluated for competency, received treatment for a schizophrenia diagnosis, and responded well to the antipsychotic medication risperidone. Dr. Allen described Williams’ symptoms at the time as “moderate.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 95. Williams was incarcerated for approximately four years for the robbery.

[6] When released from prison, Williams continued treatment for some time but eventually stopped taking medication. For the next ten years or so, he was “marginally getting by, working some jobs, ․ living at home, sometimes living in an apartment ․ but not doing quite well, not really having friends ․ really on the fringe of society[.]” Id. at 96. In late 2020 or early 2021, however, Williams began “a downward spiral in his functioning” fueled by drugs and alcohol, a lack of treatment, and several social stressors, including the “death of his grandmother, death of his cousin, loss of his job, [and] Covid.” Id. at 97, 107. Williams exhibited signs of paranoia in the weeks leading to Gambetty's murder and believed his neighbors were watching him.

[7] In Dr. Allen's opinion, Williams is “somebody who, as is common with his diagnosis, doesn't have full insight into his illness and doesn't fully appreciate that he really needs medicine, or that's he's really ill.” Id. at 96. Dr. Allen described Williams’ deteriorating mental state leading up to the offense as influenced by “the perfect storm of bad things.” Id. at 107. But Dr. Allen also acknowledged “there has to be some baseline ․ willingness to do a crime like that” and it is “super rare” for a person with schizophrenia to be homicidal. Id. If Williams were ever to be released, Dr. Allen believed Williams would need three “guardrails” in place: medication, medical treatment, and a supervised living situation. Id. at 106.

[8] At the end of the hearing, the trial court found as aggravators: the harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by Gambetty was greater than the elements necessary to prove murder; the victim was at least sixty-five years old at the time of her death; and Williams’ prior criminal history. It found Williams’ mental illness to be a mitigating circumstance. The trial court imposed a fifty-five-year sentence, all executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”).

Williams’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[9] Williams asks us to revise his sentence by suspending ten years “so as to provide him with proper medication, mental health care and a supervised place to live as recommended by Dr. Allen.” Appellant's Br. at 12. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[10] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[11] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[12] A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five and sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (2015). Under his plea agreement, Williams’ sentence was capped at the advisory term, and that is what the trial court imposed. Because our legislature has selected the advisory sentence as the “starting point” for “an appropriate sentence for the crime committed,” the defendant seeking sentence revision bears a “particularly heavy burden” when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence. Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[13] As to the nature of the offense, we find no compelling evidence in the record suggesting restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. Quite the opposite. Williams senselessly attacked a defenseless Gambetty in her home, murdered her by inflicting blunt force trauma, and dismembered her body. As Williams’ counsel acknowledged to the trial court at the sentencing hearing, it was “a horrific crime.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 112.

[14] In evaluating the nature of the offense, Williams urges us to consider his history of mental illness, arguing there is “no question” his schizophrenia “played a role in the present crime.” Appellant's Br. at 11. The “role of a defendant's mental illness in the commission of a crime may, in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, be considered in a Rule 7(B) appellate sentence review in evaluating the nature of the offense.” Helsley, 43 N.E.3d at 229. But even where evidence shows a defendant suffers “an extreme mental disturbance” and acts “under delusions created by his mental illness” while committing an offense, consideration of the role of the defendant's mental illness in the commission of the crime is not required when conducting a Rule 7(B) review. See Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. 2023) (holding the nature of the offense did not warrant sentence revision where the defendant showed no restraint, lack of brutality, or regard for human life in murdering, dismembering, and eating parts of the victim's body, even though the evidence showed he “acted under delusions created by his mental illness” when committing those acts).

[15] Here, there was testimony indicating Williams’ mental health deteriorated in the months leading up to the murder. At the same time, Dr. Allen testified “the vast majority of people [with] schizophrenia never commit a felony.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 109. And in Dr. Allen's interviews with Williams, Williams “would not really acknowledge ․ the actual acts to me and he would not review them and discuss them.” Id. at 108. Although there is an implication Williams acted under paranoid or delusional thinking in committing the crime, this alone does not present extraordinary circumstances compelling us to view the nature of his offense in a positive light because of his mental illness. See Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. Put differently, his schizophrenia diagnosis does not diminish the gravity of his conduct in committing the murder, which was unprovoked and brutal. The nature of the offense does not militate toward sentence revision.

[16] As for Williams’ character, he notes he exhibited virtuous traits throughout his life, particularly before the onset of schizophrenia. His family and friends testified to his good character, including being outgoing, funny, and a good student in his youth and helping his elderly grandmother in her later years. At the same time, Williams has a criminal history of robbery and resisting arrest. And in Dr. Allen's opinion, “when [Williams is unmedicated] and unwatched, he's been dangerous.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 106. Despite this history, Williams failed to stay in treatment that would mitigate the potential danger to himself and others. Williams has not shown substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character compelling us to revise his sentence, particularly considering the horrific nature of his offense.

[17] In sum, Williams’ sentence was not inappropriate.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a fully executed sentence.

[18] We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion at sentencing if it (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relies on aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported by the record; (3) fails to find aggravating or mitigating factors that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1223.

[19] Williams alleges no deficiency in the trial court's sentencing statement or identification of aggravating and mitigating factors; accordingly, he has waived any of those contentions on appeal. Keller v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1099, 1121 n.11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing “the failure to make a cogent argument regarding whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing ․ results in waiver of that issue”), trans. denied. Still, he asserts the trial court's imposition of a fully executed sentence is an abuse of discretion because it “means [he] would be released with no supervision of his medication, his treatment, or where he lived” and “part of [his fifty-five-year] sentence should have been suspended so he could be monitored.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Williams presents no authority to support this cursory argument.

[20] In acknowledging Williams’ mental illness as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court stated it “believe[d] that treatment is available to” Williams in the DOC and “encourage[d] [him] to accept whatever treatment the [DOC] will offer you.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 129. And Williams’ family members testified that on his release, they would support and care for him, including ensuring he received the necessary medication, healthcare, and supervision. On appeal, he fails to explain why a suspended sentence would be required to provide him with the three guardrails Dr. Allen recommended. And Williams identifies no specific supervision and treatment that would be available under a suspended sentence rather than at the DOC. Williams has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a fully executed sentence.

Conclusion

[21] Williams’ sentence is not inappropriate, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-1-1(a)(1) (2014).

3.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a) (2021).

4.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).

5.   I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(10) (2016) (dismemberment of a murder victim is an aggravating circumstance).

6.   As part of the plea agreement, Williams waived his right to an appeal. But Williams argues—and the State concedes—he did not waive his right to appeal his sentence. See Appellant's Br. at 6; Appellee's Br. at 6 n.2. Accordingly, we address his arguments on the merits.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.