Kourtney Nicole Thompson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Thompson argues insufficient evidence supports her convictions of felony murder ¹ and Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury ² because the State failed to prove that she agreed to a violent robbery or that the victim's death was foreseeable. We disagree and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2023, Thompson was homeless and addicted to fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine. She met Michael Davis and James Watson at a motel in Marion, Indiana, and she began dating Davis, who provided her with drugs. Thompson began living at the motel with Davis and Watson, both of whom also used methamphetamine.

[3] On June 19, 2023, Thompson, Davis, and Watson were at the home of Dallas Blackwell because Blackwell hired Davis to perform household repairs. Thompson was experiencing withdrawal symptoms because she did not have access to narcotics. She texted Larry Jones, a drug dealer she knew, and asked to purchase narcotics. Jones indicated he had heroin available but would only provide the drugs in exchange for sex. Thompson showed these messages to Davis, who became angry.

[4] Thompson, Davis, and Watson began discussing a plan to take the drugs from Jones because a mutual acquaintance had told Thompson that Jones would be easy to rob. Thompson agreed to lure Jones to Blackwell's home so that Davis and Watson could steal Jones's narcotics. Thompson texted Jones the directions to Blackwell's property. Before Jones arrived, Davis and Watson were angry and were getting “carried away” as they discussed the plan. (Ex. 72 at 11:50-11:55.) Thompson heard Davis ask Watson, “when he gets here, are you ready to, you know, fuck some shit up?” (Ex. 72 at 12:40-12:46.)

[5] Blackwell's surveillance system recorded Jones's arrival. Thompson met Jones at the end of the driveway and led his truck up to the garage. Jones parked his truck in front of the open garage bay, exited his truck, and followed Thompson into the garage. As Jones entered the garage, Davis and Watson emerged from hiding and rushed into the garage behind Jones. Thompson continued through an interior door to a second garage bay. Jones could not get that same interior door open, so Davis and Watson had him cornered in the garage. When Jones tried to escape, Davis shoved him to the ground. Davis and Watson then repeatedly stabbed, punched, and kicked Jones as he attempted to stand and crawled toward his truck. After the attack, Watson searched Jones's truck with a flashlight and took Jones's drugs. Davis moved Jones over against his truck's door, and Jones attempted to climb into his truck, but he collapsed to the ground. As Thompson, Davis, and Watson left Blackwell's property together in Davis's car, Blackwell exited his home, found Jones unresponsive, and called for paramedics. Jones was dead when paramedics arrived.

[6] Thompson, Davis, and Watson drove to a friend's home. Davis, who had blood on his hands and appeared roughed up, told the friend that he had been in a fight and acknowledged that people would probably be looking for him. Davis cleaned himself up. Thompson and Watson used some of the drugs taken from Jones.

[7] Three days later, on June 22, 2023, Thompson turned herself in to police, but she did not give a statement to police that day. Then, on June 30, 2023, Thompson asked to speak with law enforcement and consented to an interview without counsel present. During the interview, Thompson admitted planning Jones's robbery with Davis and Watson and acknowledged guilt for “robbery and theft.” (Ex. 72 at 57:43-57:55.) She stated, however, that the plan was to “just rob” Jones. (Ex. 72 at 13:00-13:05.)

[8] The State charged Thompson with felony murder, Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury,³ Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor theft.⁴ At trial, Thompson testified on her own behalf. She explained the plan was “to confront [Jones] and take his drugs and make him leave.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 191.) She acknowledged her role was to bring Jones to the location where Davis and Watson would confront him. Thompson testified she did not know Davis or Watson had knives and claimed violence was not part of the plan. She claimed she exited the garage bay where the men were before the attack began and she put her fingers in her ears, but she could still hear yelling and sounds of hitting. Thompson admitted she had her cellphone but never called for help.

[9] The jury found Thompson guilty of all counts. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered convictions of only felony murder and Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The court imposed concurrent sentences of fifty years for felony murder and fifteen years for conspiracy.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Thompson argues the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Our Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated our standard of review for such questions:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).

[11] Thompson's conviction of Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit robbery resulting in serious bodily injury required the State to prove that Thompson conspired with Davis and Watson to “knowingly or intentionally take[ ] property from” Jones “by using or threatening the use of force” and that the robbery “result[ed] in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.” Ind Code § 35-42-5-1(a). (App. Vol. 2 at 14.) Conspiracy occurs when, “with intent to commit the felony, the person agrees with another person to commit the felony.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(a). To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the State is also required to prove that one of the people who agreed to commit the felony “performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(b).

[12] Thompson argues she had “no agreement for force or threat of force to be used.” (Appellant's Br. at 11.) She says that she believed, based on what she had heard from another friend, that “Jones would turn over his drugs if demanded to do so.” (Id. at 12.) However, Thompson's argument is based on her own testimony, which the jury was not required to find credible, see Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134-35 (Ind. 2016) (jury “entitled to credit or discredit” testimony that was self-serving), especially when it defies common sense to believe that a drug dealer, when not faced with force or threat of force, would give up his drugs without some form of payment.

[13] Moreover, other evidence in the record suggests Thompson agreed to the use of force. Thompson was experiencing withdrawal symptoms and needed the heroin that Jones had, but she did not have any money and she was unwilling to have sex with Jones to pay for the drugs. Thompson knew that Davis and Watson were angry before Jones arrived and that they had mentioned “fuck[ing] some shit up” when Jones arrived. (Ex. 72 at 12:40-12:46.) Thompson led Jones into a garage bay and then fled through an interior door into a different garage bay, closing the door behind her and then plugging her ears with her fingers. If Jones truly believed Davis and Watson were going to ask for Jones's drugs without using or threatening force, she would not have needed to leave the first garage bay or cover her ears. This circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable fact-finder to infer Thompson agreed to a plan involving force or threat of force.

[14] To convict Thompson of felony murder, the State had to demonstrate Thompson “kill[ed] another human being while committing ․ robbery[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2). The conviction requires not “intent to kill, but only the intent to commit the underlying felony – in this case, robbery.” Jones v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1062, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[15] Thompson again asserts “death was not a probable and natural consequence of a plan to demand drugs where there was no planned use of force or threat of force.” (Appellant's Br. at 12.) However, as we held above, the evidence most favorable to the judgment indicates Thompson, in fact, conspired to commit robbery by force or threat of force with Davis and Watson, and as our Indiana Supreme Court recognized over forty years ago, “regardless of the perpetrator's design, the crime of robbery has inherent potential for violence. Victims may resist, police or bystanders may intercede. Neither these responses nor the concomitant likelihood that some bodily injury will occur can be regarded as unnatural or improbable consequences of the perpetrator's conduct.” Moon v. State, 419 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. 1981). Nor was it unforeseeable that violence against Jones might ensue when Davis was angry that Jones was insisting Davis's girlfriend, Thompson, have sex with Jones in exchange for his drugs. Thompson, moreover, knew Davis and Watson were getting “carried away” and were “ready to, you know, fuck some shit up[.]” (Ex. 72 at 11:50-11:55 & 12:40-12:46.) That a death might occur when two angry men confront a drug dealer to steal his heroin is neither improbable nor unforeseeable. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ind. 2000) (affirming felony murder conviction of defendant based on the death of defendant's co-perpetrator, who was shot by robbery victim during robbery).

[16] The evidence indicates Thompson assisted with bringing the robbery to fruition by luring Jones to Blackwell's house and by leading Jones into the garage where he would be confronted by Davis and Watson. Thompson then left Blackwell's property with Davis and Watson, and she used the drugs that were stolen from Jones. All these facts make Thompson an accomplice to the robbery. See Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1004-5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding Griffin's presence at the scene, companionship with confederates, failure to oppose the crimes, and other behavior before, during, and after the crimes permitted his conviction as an accomplice). As an accomplice to the robbery, she is also responsible for the death of Jones. See id. at 1003 (“The acts of one accomplice are imputed to all.”) (quoting Collier v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ind. 1984)).

Conclusion

[17] The evidence was sufficient to support Thompson's convictions and we, accordingly, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2)

2.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1(a)(1) & 35-41-5-2.

3.   Ind. Code 35-42-5-1(a)(1).

4.   Ind. Code 35-43-4-2(a).

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.