Courtney L. Reimmuth, Appellant-Petitioner v. Mark J. Boyer, Appellee-Respondent (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Courtney Reimmuth (Mother) and Mark Boyer (Father) divorced when their Daughter was 12 years old. Father and Daughter's relationship deteriorated soon thereafter, and eventually, at Mother's insistence, Father agreed that his parenting time with Daughter would be left to Daughter's discretion. From ages 15 to 18, Daughter chose not to spend parenting time with Father. She also had minimal other contact with him. And after high school, neither she nor Mother consulted with Father when deciding that Daughter would attend Louisiana State University (LSU)—an out-of-state college with annual tuition of $28,631.

[2] Mother later petitioned for Father to pay one-third of Daughter's college expenses. At the time, Mother earned roughly $210,000 per year while Father earned less than $87,000 annually working as an electrician. The trial court denied Mother's petition, generally, but made three pertinent factual findings: (1) Daughter repudiated her relationship with Father; (2) Mother's financial position was much stronger than Father's; and (3) Mother did not consult with Father before deciding Daughter could attend LSU. Mother only challenges the repudiation finding on appeal. But even if that finding is clearly erroneous, the trial court's decision remains supported by the other two.

[3] We affirm the denial of Mother's petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses. We also affirm the court's denial of Mother's motion to modify Father's child support obligation. Additionally, we affirm the court's order requiring Mother to pay $3,000 of Father's attorney fees.

Facts

[4] Mother and Father (Parents) have two Children together: Daughter (born May 14, 2006), and Son (born March 10, 2013). When Parents divorced in 2018, the trial court incorporated into its dissolution decree a Settlement Agreement in which Parents agreed to share joint legal custody of Children with Mother having primary physical custody and Father having parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Parents also agreed that Father would pay Mother a total of $160 per week in child support.

[5] Daughter's relationship with Father became strained soon after Parents’ divorce. In 2019, when Daughter was 13 years old, she began refusing to spend parenting time with Father, telling him on one occasion to “[g]o live off of f**k off mountain.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 24. Meanwhile, Parents filed various motions against each other in the trial court, alleging non-compliance with the parenting time and child support requirements of their Settlement Agreement.

[6] In February 2021, Mother and Father resolved their pending motions through a Mediated Agreement, which the trial court approved. This Agreement included the following pertinent provisions:

• “Father's parenting time with [Daughter] shall be solely at the discretion of the child”;

• “Father shall be entitled to parenting time with [Son] pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines”; and

• “Father's child support obligation shall continue at $160.00 per week.”

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 27-28.

[7] From 2021 to 2024, Daughter chose to have zero parenting time with Father. She also had minimal other contact with him and did not reach out on special occasions, such as Father's Day. When Daughter was old enough to drive, she sometimes transported Son to and from Father's home for Father's parenting time with Son. But Daughter rarely went inside the home, and when she did, she stayed only briefly. According to Father, Daughter only viewed him as a source of money during this time.

[8] In December 2023, Daughter completed her high school coursework and began taking college classes at Ivy Tech Community College. Around this same time, Daughter purportedly decided to “get over it” with Father. Tr. Vol. II, p. 11. The two interacted with each other and were photographed together at a few family gatherings over the next several months. And on May 14, 2024, after Daughter had officially graduated from high school, Father attended her 18th birthday/graduation party.

[9] Mother remarried on May 25, 2024. Her new husband, Stepfather, was from Louisiana and still had extended family there. This led to Daughter's decision to attend LSU. According to Daughter:

․ I'd always wanted to go to a big university, especially one that was out of state, and so after I'd gone to Ivy Tech for a while, because my mother and my stepfather did not think I was ready to go to a big university, they sat me down after my first semester and then told me that if I wanted to, I could go to L.S.U. because we have a lot of stepfamily down in New Orleans, and they could keep me safe, and it's actually one of the top five vet schools in the nation, which is my major, in veterinary medicine. And so, it was perfect. So, that is where I decided to go.

Id. at 32.

[10] Daughter applied to LSU on May 28, 2024, just three days after Mother and Stepfather's wedding. Daughter was accepted by LSU only three weeks later, and by June 20, Mother had paid a security deposit to rent Daughter an apartment near LSU's campus. Only then did Daughter tell Father of her plan to attend LSU that August. According to Father, he was not consulted about Daughter's decision to attend LSU or his ability to pay a portion of her college expenses until after the enrollment decision was made. He questioned why Daughter would attend LSU, an out-of-state college, when in-state Purdue University had a higher-ranked veterinary medicine program. Mother answered this question, in part, by telling Father she “wanted to get [Daughter] out of her [romantic] relationship” in Indiana. Id. at 83.

[11] In July 2024, Mother met with Father and advised him that LSU's out-of-state tuition was $28,631 a year. She also explained that, over four years, Daughter's estimated college expenses would range between $176,439 and $226,470 total, depending on whether Daughter qualified for in-state tuition after her first year. Mother therefore recommended that Father take out a $50,000 loan to cover part of Daughter's expenses. Father declined.

[12] In August 2024, Mother petitioned the trial court for an order requiring Father to pay one-third of Daughter's college expenses. Mother also moved to modify Father's child support obligation in an unspecified manner. Father opposed Mother's requests, alleging, among other things, that Daughter had repudiated her relationship with him. He also sought an order requiring Mother to pay his attorney fees. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on all three issues on December 20, 2024. By this time, Daughter had completed her first semester at LSU, during which she failed one of her classes and received B and C grades in the others.

[13] Among the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing, Mother presented a series of text messages that Father and Daughter had exchanged from late June through November 2024. In these messages, the two discussed Daughter's then-upcoming move to LSU and, later, her adjustment to college life. Daughter also asked Father for money on several occasions, which Father provided when he could. But by November, Father was expressing frustration with Daughter's “half[-]hearted” attempts to spend time with him. Exhs. Vol. III, p. 35. At one point, Daughter came home to Indiana from LSU without telling Father in advance that she was coming. Then, with seemingly little notice, she demanded that Father come to her if he wanted to see her before she returned to college. Additionally, Father testified that he asked Daughter to attend a gathering with his side of the family that Christmas, and she conditioned her attendance on how things went at the evidentiary hearing.

[14] The evidence further showed that Mother owned three businesses, including a marketing agency and a neurofeedback brain training studio. From these businesses, Mother earned a gross income of $4,038 weekly and $209,976 annually. Mother also owned and lived in a $1.6 million home. Meanwhile, Father worked as an electrician, earning a gross income of $1,686 weekly and $87,672 annually. He owned and lived in a $167,000 home, on which he still owed more than $145,000. And though he had around $34,000 in savings, Father testified that he could be laid off at any time in his line of work.

[15] The trial court ultimately denied Mother's petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses, denied Mother's motion to modify Father's child support obligation, and ordered Mother to pay $3,000 of Father's attorney fees. In support of its judgment, the court issued partial findings of fact, including the following:

2. The evidence presented and the situation presented to the Court is a direct by product (sic) of [Mother] empowering the Parties’ then 14 1/212 year old (sic) daughter in the ․ Mediated Agreement by insisting that the child would decide [when Father's] parenting time with the child would take place.

3. By leaving such a decision in the hands of a child, [Mother] encouraged alienation and a repudiation of the relationship between Father and [Daughter].

4. It is more than apparent to this Court that [Daughter] did not maintain a good relationship with [Father].

***

8. It was clear from [Daughter's] testimony that she was aware of the disparity in income of the parties, and that [Daughter] clearly still holds biases and resentments against Father, thereby repudiating the relationship.

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10. Father was not consulted about the decision of sending [Daughter] to [LSU]; he was told.

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15. The Court also notes that the fury of recent texts between [Daughter] and Father appears to be motivated more by the request for educational contributions than any other reason.

16. [Daughter's] comment to Father that she would decide upon Christmas plans after the Court held the hearing on December 20, 2024, is also troubling to the Court, and supports the Court's opinion that [Daughter] was interested in only fostering a very recent relationship for the purposes of requesting educational contributions.

17. The evidence clearly showed that Mother's financial position is much stronger than Father's. The Court took the disparity of income between the parties into consideration in its decision.

18. While Mother may make a financial decision for [Daughter] to attend LSU, Father is not in the same position and the Court will not hold him accountable for contributions to a decision that was made without seeking his counsel and ability to contribute.

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 24-25.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Mother appeals the trial court's denial of both her petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses and her motion to modify Father's child support obligation. She also challenges the court's order requiring her to pay $3,000 of Father's attorney fees. We generally review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (education expenses); Cross v. Cross, 891 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (child support); Thompson v. Thompson, 868 N.E.2d 862, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (attorney fees); see generally MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 n.3 (Ind. 2005).¹

[17] When reviewing whether a trial court abused its discretion, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Cross, 891 N.E.2d at 641. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and will affirm unless the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. Here, because the trial court issued partial findings in support of its general judgment, we may affirm the judgment based on any theory supported by the record, so long as that theory does not conflict with the findings. Marlow v. Better Bars, Inc., 45 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We will only set aside the findings if they are clearly erroneous. Duncan v. Duncan, 81 N.E.3d 219, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” In re Marriage of Sutton, 16 N.E.3d 481, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

I. Post-Secondary Education Expenses

[18] Mother first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses. But her claims focus solely on the trial court's finding that Daughter “repudiat[ed]” her relationship with Father. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 25.² Even if that finding is clearly erroneous, the trial court's denial of Mother's petition is still supported on other grounds.

[19] Under Indiana law, “there is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to provide a college education for their children.” Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991). Indiana Code § 31-16-6-2(a), however, provides that a trial court “may” order one or both parents to contribute toward their children's college education expenses “where appropriate.” The statute also “gives guidance” regarding such contributions, “listing certain factors to take into account, such as ‘the child's aptitude and ability,’ ‘the child's reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses,’ and ‘the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.’ ” Hirsch v. Oliver, 970 N.E.2d 651, 660 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2(a)).

[20] Indiana's Child Support Guidelines further state:

It is discretionary with the court to award post-secondary educational expenses and in what amount. In making such a decision, the court should consider post-secondary education to be a group effort, and weigh the ability of each parent to contribute to payment of the expense, as well as the ability of the student to pay a portion of the expense.

When determining whether or not to award post-secondary educational expenses, the court should consider each parent's income, earning ability, financial assets and liabilities․ If the court determines an award of post-secondary educational expenses would impose a substantial financial burden, an award should not be ordered.

Child Supp. G. 8(b).

[21] Here, the trial court found that “Mother's financial position is much stronger than Father's.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 25. The court also stated that it “took the disparity of income between [Mother and Father] into consideration in its decision.” Id. The evidence showed that Mother's annual income was roughly $210,000 per year while Father's was less than $87,000. And Father testified that he could not afford to contribute to Daughter's college education on a regular basis. Under Indiana Code § 31-16-6-2(a) and Child Support Guideline 8(b), these circumstances alone support the trial court's denial of Mother's petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses.

[22] The trial court, however, also found that “Father was not consulted about the decision of sending [Daughter] to [LSU]; he was told.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 25. To that end, the evidence showed that Daughter applied to, was accepted by, and secured an apartment at LSU before either she or Mother notified Father that they were considering the school. This is far from the “group effort” contemplated by Child Support Guideline 8(b). And the trial court recognized it as such by stating: “[T]he Court will not hold [Father] accountable for contributions to a decision that was made without seeking his counsel and ability to contribute.” Id.

[23] Given the deference afforded to trial courts in family law matters, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother's petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses. We therefore affirm that judgment.

II. Child Support Modification

[24] Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to modify Father's child support obligation. In general, a parent's child support obligation may be modified only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting modification was filed.

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1(b).

[25] According to Mother, a modification of Father's child support obligation was warranted under Indiana Code § 31-16-8-1(b)(2). Mother contends the amount Father was ordered to pay under their Mediated Agreement in February 2021 was more than 20% less than the amount he would have been ordered to pay under the child support guidelines in December 2024. Mother's calculation, however, rests on the erroneous premise that the Mediated Agreement required Father to pay “no child support for [Daughter].” Appellant's Br., p. 42.

[26] Under Parents’ original Settlement Agreement, Father was required to pay Mother a total of $160 per week in child support. This amount accounted for both “[Daughter]” and “[Son],” as shown on the child support worksheet attached to the Settlement Agreement and “incorporated” therein. Appellee's App. Vol. II, pp. 6, 14. Later, Parents entered into the Mediated Agreement, which provided: “Father's child support obligation shall continue at $160.00 per week.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 28 (emphasis added). Nothing in this provision or elsewhere in the Mediated Agreement indicates that Daughter was no longer accounted for in Father's child support obligation.

[27] Mother's calculation also fails based on the new child support worksheet she presented at the evidentiary hearing. That worksheet, which again accounted for both “[Daughter]” and “[Son],” showed that Father would be ordered to pay a total of $191 per week under the child support guidelines in December 2024. Exhs. Vol. III, p. 126. This amount differs by only 16% from the $160 per week required by the Mediated Agreement. Thus, the evidence fails to meet the 20% threshold required for a child support modification under Indiana Code § 31-16-8-1(b)(2).³

[28] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Mother's motion to modify Father's child support obligation.

III. Attorney Fees

[29] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay $3,000 of Father's attorney fees. In post-dissolution matters, Indiana Code § 31-16-11-1(a) permits the trial court to “periodically” order a party to pay:

(1) the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, IC 31-16-2 through IC 31-16-10, or IC 31-16-12;

(2) attorney's fees; and

(3) mediation services;

including amounts for legal services provided and costs incurred before the commencement of the proceedings or after entry of judgment.

[30] When determining whether to award attorney fees under Indiana Code § 31-16-11-1(a), “the trial court must consider the parties’ resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment, and other factors that bear on the award's reasonableness.” Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ind. 2007). “When one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award of attorney fees is proper.” Bartlemay v. Witt, 892 N.E.2d 219, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “The trial court, however, need not cite the reasons for its determination.” Whited, 859 N.E.2d at 665.

[31] Here, Mother does not challenge the reasonableness of the trial court's attorney fees award. She instead claims the court “did not provide any statutory basis” or “justification for its decision.” Appellant's Br., p. 43. But as indicated above, the award was authorized by Indiana Code § 31-16-11-1(a), and the court was not required to explain the reasons for its decision. Whited, 859 N.E.2d at 665. Mother's claims are therefore without merit.

[32] That being said, the trial court's unchallenged findings show that “Mother's financial position is much stronger than Father's.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 25. This finding alone supports the court's attorney fees award. Bartlemay, 892 N.E.2d at 231. We therefore affirm that judgment.

Conclusion

[33] We affirm the trial court's denial of Mother's petition for Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college expenses. We also affirm the court's denial of Mother's motion to modify Father's child support obligation. Additionally, we affirm the court's order requiring Mother pay $3,000 of Father's trial attorney fees.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In MacLafferty, our Supreme Court recognized that Indiana's appellate courts have phrased the standard of review in family law matters varyingly as “abuse of discretion” and “clear error.” 829 N.E.2d at 940 n.3. But the Court reiterated that, regardless of the standard's phrasing, appellate courts should give “considerable deference” to the trial court in family law matters because “the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, to get a feel for the family dynamics, [and] to get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” Id. at 940.

2.   “A child's repudiation of a parent—that is a compete refusal to participate in a relationship with a parent—may obviate a parent's obligation to pay certain expenses, including college expenses.” Kahn v. Baker, 36 N.E.3d 1103, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Mother claims the evidence does not show Daughter's “complete refusal” to participate in a relationship with Father, emphasizing that “[t]he focus should be on the child's behavior as an adult.” Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

3.   We note that the extent to which Mother wanted Father's child support obligation modified is not clear from the record. Mother testified she was “not actually seeking” $191 per week but, instead, was “asking that [Father's] child support obligation remain the same”—that is, $160 per week. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 69, 71.

Weissmann, Judge.

[34] Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.