D.D., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.D. was found to be a delinquent child after the juvenile court determined that he had committed what would be Level 6 felony criminal recklessness if committed by an adult and dangerous possession of a firearm. D.D. contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's delinquency finding. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 16, 2025, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Cody Elder responded to a report of a person shot at an apartment. When Officer Elder arrived on the scene, he “heard noises coming from the upstairs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Upstairs, in a bedroom “either directly across from the top of the stairs or slightly to the left[,]” Officer Elder observed fifteen-year-old D.D. “shot lying on the bed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Officer Elder asked D.D.’s mother to “step aside while I check on the person shot.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16.

[3] Officer Elder observed a “good amount” of blood on D.D.’s leg but concluded that the injury did not appear life-threatening. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. Officer Elder asked D.D. what had happened, and D.D. “told [him] the bag fell off the wall and he picked it up and he didn't mean to and it went off.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. When Officer Elder asked D.D. where the gun was, “he said, ‘In the bedroom still.’ ” Tr. Vol. II p. 17.

[4] Other officers “cleared the rest of the house[,]” and Officer Elder left shortly after paramedics arrived. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. D.D. was taken to the hospital. The same day, aggravated-assault investigator and officer Randy Weitzel arrived at the apartment to execute a search warrant. After speaking with D.D.’s mother, Officer Weitzel “went upstairs. Directly at the top of the stairs there was a room” which contained “bloody rags on the floor and an apparent bullet defect in the door. [․ T]here was an apparent bullet hole near the top of – six to ten inches from the top of the door.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 22–23. Officer Weitzel “continued to [․] walk around the upstairs of the home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. Proceeding down the hallway, Officer Weitzel entered another bedroom to the left, with “a firearm in plan [(sic)] view on top of the bed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. The firearm was a loaded 9mm “[b]lack and silver Taurus handgun.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Later in the investigation, officers collected “five rounds” from the magazine of the handgun. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. The bed in that bedroom

had bedding on it, there was a white sheet or blanket kind of balled up, firearm near it and then the comforter half on half off the floor that had apparent burn marks on it and holes. While in that room, hanging on the wall next to the bed just above the firearm, was a student ID from Warren Central[.]

Tr. Vol. II p. 24. The student ID contained D.D.’s first and last name. Opposite the bed, Officer Weitzel observed an “apparent bullet defect” on a poster on the wall. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Officer Weitzel also observed an exit hole on the other side of the wall in the hallway, and “an apparent ricochet” in the ceiling. Tr. Vol. II p. 25.

[5] On January 30, 2025, the State filed a delinquency petition, in which it alleged that D.D. had committed the following acts: what would be Level 6 felony criminal recklessness if committed by an adult and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding on both counts. After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court accepted the Probation Department's recommendation of probation and additional services.

Discussion and Decision

[6] D.D. contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his juvenile adjudications. The standard of review for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile adjudication is the same as for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an adult criminal conviction. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[7] When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to juvenile adjudications, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of delinquency on appeal.

D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

I. Criminal Recklessness

[8] D.D. contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain his adjudication for criminal recklessness. To prove that D.D. was a delinquent for committing what would be Level 6 felony criminal recklessness if committed by an adult, the State was required to prove that D.D., “while armed with a deadly weapon[,]” “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally perform[ed] an act that create[d] a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(a)–(b)(1)(A).

[9] A person's conduct is done intentionally “if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). A person's conduct is done knowingly “if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A person's conduct is done recklessly “if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c).

[10] D.D. contends that “the only evidence the State offered as to D.D.’s mental state was Officer Elder's testimony that when he asked D.D. what happened, D.D. responded, ‘the bag fell off the wall and he picked it up and he didn't mean to and it went off.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 8. D.D. contends that this statement does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.D. had acted with a conscious disregard of harm that might have occurred as a result of his conduct. The State, on the other hand, contends that the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication “support a reasonable inference that D.D. discharged the firearm several times while indoors.” Appellee's Br. p. 8. We agree with the State.

[11] In addition to D.D.’s having been shot in the leg, Officer Weitzel testified that the first upstairs bedroom had contained “an apparent bullet defect in the door[,]” in addition to “an apparent bullet hole” near the top of the door. Tr. Vol. II pp. 22–23. Officer Weitzel also testified that in the other bedroom, there had been “burn marks [․] and holes” in the comforter, Tr. Vol. II p. 24, an “apparent bullet defect” on a poster on the wall, “an exit hole on the other side of that wall” and “an apparent ricochet” in the ceiling. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Firing multiple shots inside the apartment supports a conclusion that D.D. had, at a minimum, engaged in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result from those acts. See Williams v. State, 64 N.E.3d 226, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Clearly, firing a pistol at a raccoon, a garbage can, or a house in a residential area is reckless behavior.”). Furthermore, the juvenile court could have certainly concluded that firing several shots in the apartment, one of which wounded D.D., was a deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.

[12] D.D. further argues that the State presented “no evidence [․] that any individual other than D.D. was in the residence when the firearm discharged.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. For support of his argument that the risk of bodily injury to another person was remote, D.D. cites to Elliot v. State, 560 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) and Boushehry v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In Elliott, we reversed a criminal recklessness conviction where the appellant had fired his pistol towards “uninhabited fields and woodlands.” 560 N.E.2d at 1266–67. In Boushehry, we concluded that the State had “failed to prove the actual existence of a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person” where shots had been fired in the “the direction of Shelbyville Road in Marion County, Indiana, which bordered [a] vacant lot.” 648 N.E.2d at 1176–77.

[13] Unlike the defendants in Elliot and Boushehry, D.D. fired the gun inside of a residential apartment. Furthermore, D.D.’s mother was present in the apartment when Officer Elder arrived as a result of the 911 call. Based on the foregoing, it would be reasonable to conclude that D.D.’s actions created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person, at the very least, his mother. See Tipton v. State, 981 N.E.2d 103, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming criminal recklessness conviction where defendant fired a shot into a house, even though owners were not inside at the time), trans. denied. Because the evidence supports a reasonable conclusion that D.D. had discharged the firearm more than once, resulting in his own gunshot wound and multiple bullet holes and defects throughout the apartment, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's determination that D.D. had engaged in, what would be Level 6 felony criminal recklessness if committed by an adult.¹

II. Dangerous Possession of a Firearm

[14] To prove that D.D. was a delinquent for committing dangerous possession of a firearm, the State was required to prove that D.D. was a child, i.e., a person less than eighteen years old,² and that he had “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly” possessed a firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, D.D. contends that the State failed to prove that he had possessed a firearm.

[15] “Possession can be actual or constructive.” Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “For the State to prove constructive possession, it must prove the defendant had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. To prove intent to maintain dominion and control, there must be additional circumstances supporting the inference of intent.” Id. (citations omitted).

[16] [I]f a defendant's possession of the premises on which the contraband is found is not exclusive, then the inference of the intent to maintain dominion and control must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. The following types of evidence are among those that demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of the presence of a firearm: (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) proximity of the contraband to the defendant, (4) location of the firearm within the defendant's plain view, and (5) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant. This list of circumstances is not exhaustive, as other circumstances can just as reasonably demonstrate the requisite knowledge.

Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[17] Examining the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, we disagree with D.D.’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove that D.D. had constructively possessed the firearm in question. First, D.D. admitted to Officer Elder that the gun “went off” and that it was “[i]n the bedroom still.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Furthermore, the firearm was found in plain view, on top of the bed, in a bedroom which had, “hanging on the wall next to the bed just above the firearm,” D.D.’s student ID from Warren Central. Tr. Vol. II p. 24. The juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that the bedroom was D.D.’s bedroom. D.D. seems to argue that because he was not in the same room as the firearm when police arrived, he could not have been capable of controlling the firearm. We disagree. The fact that the firearm was in D.D.’s bedroom, commingled with D.D.’s other personal items, such as his student ID, and that D.D. knew that the firearm was in his bedroom, supports the conclusion that D.D. had had both the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the firearm. See id.

[18] Although D.D. may not have been able to control the firearm after he had been shot in the leg, or after he had moved to another room, reasonable inferences support a conclusion that he had such capability before the incident. Considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that D.D. possessed a firearm in such a way that violated Indiana Code § 35-47-10-5.

[19] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that D.D. contends that the doctrine of corpus delecti precluded the juvenile court from entering a true finding for criminal recklessness, we disagree. While it is true that, “[i]n Indiana, a person may not be convicted of a crime based solely on a nonjudicial confession of guilt[,]” Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017) (citation omitted), D.D.’s statement to Officer Elder at the apartment was not the only evidence presented by the State that the firearm had been discharged recklessly, as explained above; in fact, the independent evidence of D.D.’s recklessness was more than sufficient to sustain the true finding.

2.   See Ind. Code § 35-47-10-3.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.