Jennifer L. Masters, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Jennifer Masters guilty of intimidation, a Level 6 felony, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction for intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor. Masters argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove she had the requisite intent to place the victim in fear that her threat would be carried out. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Masters raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction for intimidation.

Facts

[3] On January 31, 2024, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Masters was shopping at a Kroger store in Carmel. She dressed entirely in black, wore a black medical face mask, and carried a black backpack. While inside the store, Masters encountered a male customer wearing a UPS uniform, whom she believed was following her, staring at her, and laughing. Masters confronted the customer and stated, “I'm sick of this s**t,” but the customer did not respond. Tr. Vol. II pp. 79; State's Ex. 1 at 8:00-8:10.

[4] Jacob Trotter (“Trotter”), a Kroger employee, received a report over the store communication system from another employee, Dream,¹ that Masters was acting “hostile with other customers.” Tr. Vol. II p. 100. Trotter approached Masters’ location, attempted to use his de-escalation training to calm Masters, and asked Masters to stop yelling at the customer in the UPS uniform. At that point, Masters became hostile toward Trotter, who then asked her to leave the store.

[5] As Trotter and Dream escorted Masters toward the exit, Masters was speaking to Dream, and Trotter reminded her, “Ma'am, let's keep it cool.” Id. at 101. Masters then turned her attention to Trotter and began cursing at him, saying that she would “shoot [him] in [his] face” and that she hoped “[he] got shot in the face.” Id. at 102. As Masters was about to exit Kroger, she called Trotter “a f**king black man,” and—with Trotter standing inside the doorway and Masters on the sidewalk—spat at him. Id. Trotter then observed Masters walking toward the parking lot.

[6] Feeling fearful at the time, Trotter immediately called 911. Sergeant Jonathon Rice of the Carmel Police Department received the report as a “weapon complaint,” was dispatched to the scene, and arrived approximately five to ten minutes later. Id. at 71. Sergeant Rice entered the Circle K parking lot in the same area as the Kroger, where he observed a female matching the reported description. The woman was dressed in all black, carrying a black backpack, and wearing a black medical mask. Sergeant Rice placed Masters in handcuffs upon his initial approach and conducted a pat-down search for weapons with Masters’ consent.

[7] Sergeant Rice found a California identification card in Masters’ backpack but no weapon. Before questioning Masters, Sergeant Rice read the Miranda rights to her, and she confirmed that she understood. Masters told Sergeant Rice that Trotter had said, “You can't say profanities like that. You need to respect people,” when she was “just trying to shop.” Id. at 73, 79; State's Ex. 1 at 7:18-7:26. Masters also told Sergeant Rice that another Kroger employee was also present. Masters stated that she believed they began “ganging up on [her]” and became irritated. Tr. Vol. II p. 80. The employees then asked Masters to leave.

[8] Sergeant Rice also confronted Masters with the allegation that she had spat on someone. Masters told Sergeant Rice that she did not spit “on” the male Kroger employee but spat “toward” him. State's Ex. 1 at 02:40-02:49. Sergeant Rice then asked Masters whether she had made statements that she was going to shoot Trotter or hoped Trotter would get shot. She admitted, “Yes, I did say that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 82; State's Ex. 1 at 16:10-16:24. Sergeant Rice confirmed with Masters that both the spitting and the shooting remarks were directed toward Trotter.

[9] On February 1, 2024, the State charged Masters with intimidation, a Level 6 felony, and battery by bodily waste, a Class B misdemeanor. A jury trial was held on February 26, 2025. The jury found Masters guilty of intimidation and not guilty of battery by bodily waste.

[10] On March 28, 2025, the trial court granted alternative misdemeanor sentencing, reduced the Level 6 felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced Masters to 365 days in the Hamilton County Jail, with all time suspended to one year of probation. As a special condition of probation, Masters was required to complete a mental health evaluation within thirty days. Masters now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Masters argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for intimidation. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[12] Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-1 provides, “[a] person who communicates a threat with the intent ․ that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out ․ commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.” The offense is elevated to “a Level 6 felony if the threat is to commit a forcible felony.” Id. § 1(b)(1)(A). “ ‘Threat’ means an expression, by words or action, of an intention to [ ] unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property.” Id. § 1(c)(1). Thus, to convict Masters of intimidation, the State was required to prove that Masters communicated a threat to Trotter with the intent that Trotter be placed in fear that the threat would be carried out. See Whitaker-Blakey v. State, 248 N.E.3d 617, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)

[13] Masters contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she possessed the requisite intent to place Trotter in fear that she would carry out the threat to shoot him.² Specifically, Masters argues that wearing all black did not mean she intended to carry out the crime because nothing in her actions or words suggested an intent to do so; moreover, she never claimed to have a weapon and did not reach for her backpack that would have raised suspicion.

[14] Indiana law is well established that, in criminal contexts, “the trier of fact may infer that the requisite intent exists based upon circumstantial evidence.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 109 (Ind. 2016) (emphasis added). Our courts have explained in criminal intimidation cases that “[i]ntent is a mental function and, absent a confession, usually must be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Merriweather v. State, 128 N.E.3d 503, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Further, “[a] defendant's intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.” Chastain v. State, 58 N.E.3d 235, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

[15] Here, Masters initiated an altercation with the male customer in a UPS uniform based solely on her suspicion that he was following her. Masters admitted to the police that she did not know the customer and had never met him. Masters also acted hostile and aggressive toward Kroger employees while they tried to de-escalate the situation. Moreover, Masters spat toward Trotter, threatened to shoot him in the face, and directed racial slurs at him after he advised her to stop yelling profanities in a public place. When Sergeant Rice later asked her about her interaction with Trotter, Masters acknowledged that she spat at Trotter and made statements threatening to shoot him. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence that Masters communicated a threat to Trotter with the intent that Trotter be placed in fear that the threat would be carried out.

[16] Moreover, Masters’ arguments merely invite us to reweigh the evidence and overturn the jury's verdict. We cannot reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury's factual determinations. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244; Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (“It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.”). Our Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review after a jury verdict, the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the outcome below[.]” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016). In Sutton, 167 N.E.3d at 801, this court clarified that reversal is warranted only if no reasonable jury could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, “[w]e will not disturb the jury's verdict if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support it.” Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[17] Masters argues that she lacked the requisite intent because she “was on her way out of Kroger” and that “nothing about her action or statement suggested that she would carry out shooting Trotter in the face.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We are not persuaded. Nothing in the record indicates that Masters attempted to withdraw her threat or end the confrontation. Multiple witnesses’ testimonies, including Masters’ own admission recorded on the police body camera, show that as Trotter and Dream escorted her out of Kroger, Masters did not cease her aggressive behavior; instead, she threatened to shoot Trotter in the face, directed a racial slur at him, and spat toward him. Thus, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Masters possessed the requisite intent to carry out her threat.

Conclusion

[18] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Masters’ conviction for intimidation. Accordingly, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dream's last name is not included in the record.

2.   Masters concedes “there is little doubt that Masters communicated a threat to unlawfully injure Jacob Trotter: Masters told Jacob Trotter she would shoot him in the face.” Appellant's Br. p. 11.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur