IN RE: Commitment of W.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] W.C. has been involuntarily committed for almost 20 years and, most recently, was the subject of an involuntary regular commitment order (the “2025 Commitment Order”) obtained by Richmond State Hospital (“Hospital”). W.C. now appeals the 2025 Commitment Order, raising the following issue for our review: Whether the 2025 Commitment Order was supported by sufficient evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2001, W.C. pled guilty to child molesting as a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to 15 years with 6 years of incarceration and 9 years suspended to probation. In 2006, after completing his incarceration, W.C. was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation as a term of his probation. The trial court determined that W.C. was both dangerous and gravely disabled and ordered W.C. committed to Logansport State Hospital (“Logansport”). While he was at Logansport, W.C. “attacked a lady named Dr. Betchers.” Tr. Vol. II at 34. W.C. remained at Logansport until he was transferred to Hospital in 2022.

[4] In December 2024, Hospital filed its Periodic Report on Regularly Committed Patient, reporting that W.C. had exhibited “recent episodes of aggression” and “outbursts” and had made “several verbal threats and engaged in some physical aggression towards property, resulting in him receiving PRN (as needed medicines) to assist with calming him down.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32. The trial court set a hearing after W.C. filed a petition to review or dismiss his regular commitment (the “Petition”).

[5] On February 6, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Petition. Dr. Oleh Dzera testified that W.C. has “low frustration tolerance and poor impulse control” and makes “threatening statements to others.” Tr. Vol. II at 10. Dr. Dzera further testified that W.C. has not demonstrated an ability to “interact in the community in a positive, successful fashion” for a period of at least 90 days. Id. at 14. W.C.’s social worker Jasmine Newton testified that due to waiting two minutes to speak with her, W.C. required PRN medication to calm himself down. According to Dr. Dzera, PRN medications are “antipsychotic[s]” that are “prescribed as-needed for agitation,” Id. at 16, and they are not available outside a commitment setting; W.C. has needed them several times to calm down. Newton further testified that, between June 2024 and February 2025, W.C. threatened to punch Newton in the face and beat her up; he slammed doors while “calling everybody b[*]tches and wh[*]res,” id. at 21; threatened to “physically attack a peer,” id. at 24; and threatened to “rape” a staff member, id.

[6] The trial court determined that W.C. was both dangerous and gravely disabled, so it extended his regular commitment at Hospital for another year. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficient Evidence Supported W.C.’s Involuntary Regular Commitment

[7] W.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his commitment. “On sufficiency review, we will affirm a civil commitment order if—considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment—a reasonable factfinder could have found the necessary statutory elements proven by clear and convincing evidence.” J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1270 (Ind. 2025) (citing T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015)). We will not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. (citing T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273).

[8] A petitioner seeking an involuntary commitment must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” both that (1) the individual “is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled” and (2) commitment “is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e). W.C. asserts there was not clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous.¹ “Dangerous” means “a condition in which an individual as a result of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the individual will harm the individual or others.” Id. § 12-7-2-53(a). “A trial court ‘is not required to wait until harm has nearly or actually occurred before determining that an individual poses a substantial risk of harm to others.’ ” J.S. v. Neuropsychiatric Hosp. of Indianapolis, 263 N.E.3d 165, 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting R.P. v. Optional Behav. MHS, 26 N.E.3d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)), trans. not sought.

[9] Here, W.C. argues the trial court erred in concluding he was dangerous and likens himself to a “paper tiger whose ferocity is ephemeral” because his threats are made indirectly rather than directly. Appellant's Br. at 19. However, the trial court found that the pattern of conduct exhibited by W.C. remained steady throughout his more than 20-year commitment. W.C.’s original commitment in 2006 was a condition of his criminal probation, and the physician statement at the time referenced his history of sexual abuse against children and of acting out violently. During the hearing on the Petition, Dr. Dzera testified that W.C. has failed to “demonstrate 90 solid days where [he has been] able to interact in the community in a positive, successful fashion.” Tr. Vol. II at 14. Significantly, in the twelve months before the hearing, W.C. made several documented threats of violence, including one in June; two between August and September; three or four in October; two in November; and three in December 2024. More particularly, W.C. threatened to harm his social worker, another staff member, and a peer with physical and, in some cases, sexual violence. W.C. continues to threaten violence, and he has a history of violent behavior, which the trial court found was a “pattern” supporting his dangerousness. Id. at 40. In making this finding, the trial court recognized that “certain verbal statements” are “so strong in nature that they ․ demonstrate that there's a substantial risk that [W.C.] ․ will harm somebody.” Id. at 37. W.C.’s argument that his threats are nothing more than “obnoxious” comments, Appellant's Br. at 18, is not supported by the record and was specifically discounted by the trial court. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence to sustain the trial court's determination of dangerousness.² We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   WC does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that he suffered from a mental illness.

2.   WC also argues that the trial court erred by concluding he was gravely disabled. Because Indiana Code section 12-26-2-5(e)(1) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court was only required to find that one condition was met. J.S. v. Neuropsychiatric Hosp. of Indianapolis, 263 N.E.3d 165, 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing A.S. v. Ind. Univ. Health Bloomington Hosp., 148 N.E.3d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)), trans. not sought. Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion regarding dangerousness, we need not address W.C.’s argument regarding the trial court's “gravely disabled” determination. See id.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.