James Rolison, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James Rolison was convicted of criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. Rolison argues the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his affirmative defense of necessity. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Rolison raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Rolison's conviction for criminal trespass.

Facts

[3] On December 20, 2022, Rolison was given a verbal trespass notice by his stepmother, Lori Jean Foust-Rolison (“Lori”), regarding her residence (“Property”) in the presence of a law enforcement officer. Rolison was warned that he could be arrested if he returned to Lori's Property.

[4] On the evening of December 27, 2024, Rolison drove back to Indianapolis from Alabama with his fourteen-year-old son. Because of work obligations, Rolison left his son in the vehicle at around 10:45 p.m. and went to work for approximately two and one-half to three hours. When Rolison returned to the vehicle, his son was gone. The phone Rolison had left with his son was still in the car. Panicking, and believing his son would go to the only familiar address in Indianapolis, Rolison drove to Lori's home.¹

[5] Upon arriving at the Property, Rolison went to the front door and rang the doorbell “several times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 29. Through the front-door camera on her phone, Lori saw that Rolison was at the Property ringing the doorbell. Lori was not surprised by Rolison's appearance because Rolison's son was at her home. Rather than answering the door, Lori contacted the police. After waiting a few minutes without receiving a response, Rolison returned to his car and called 911 about his missing son.

[6] Approximately ten minutes after the calls, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Spencer Weidner arrived at the Property in response to Lori's report. Officer Weidner found Rolison standing in the street beside his truck and immediately placed Rolison under arrest for violating the prior trespass notice. Rolison acknowledged the prior trespass notice but stated he was unsure whether it remained in effect. Officer Michael Totten arrived shortly thereafter in response to Lori's call and was aware that Rolison had also requested police assistance. Both officers testified that Rolison appeared emotional when they arrived.

[7] On December 28, 2024, the State charged Rolison with one count of criminal trespass for refusing to leave the Property, a Class A misdemeanor.² On March 16, 2025, the State added Count II, criminal trespass for entering the Property, a Class A misdemeanor. On April 9, 2025, after a bench trial, the trial court dismissed Count I and found Rolison guilty of Count II. Rolison now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Rolison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to rebut his affirmative defense of necessity. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [fact-finder].” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[9] The offense of criminal trespass is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-2(b)(1), which provides: “A person who ․ not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by the other person or that person's agent ․ commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.”

[10] Rolison does not dispute that he lacked any contractual interest in the Property.³ Appellant's Br. p. 11. Rolison admitted that he intentionally entered the Property to look for his missing son and acknowledged that he was aware of the trespass notice that had been issued to him two years earlier.⁴ Id; Tr. Vol. II pp. 41-42. Rolison, however, raised the affirmative defense of necessity—namely, that he was looking for his missing child in the middle of the night—to excuse his conduct. Appellant's Br. pp. 8-10. Rolison contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his necessity defense and, therefore, failed to sustain his conviction. Id. at 13-14. We disagree.

[11] Indiana courts recognize necessity as an affirmative defense excusing otherwise criminal conduct. In Clemons v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), this Court reiterated that to prevail on a claim of necessity, a defendant must present evidence that:

(1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil,

(2) there must have been no adequate alternative to the commission of the act,

(3) the harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided,

(4) the accused must entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to prevent greater harm,

(5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances, and

(6) the accused must not have substantially contributed to the creation of the emergency.

(quoting Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). “In order to negate a claim of necessity, the State must disprove at least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “The State may refute a claim of the defense of necessity by direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief.” Id.

[12] We acknowledge that a missing child at 3:00 a.m. could present an emergency sufficient to support a necessity defense. Both responding officers testified that Rolison was emotional when they arrived. The State, however, introduced body-camera footage and testimony showing that Rolison had his cellphone with him and could have contacted police before entering the Property—particularly given his knowledge of the 2022 trespass notice. Rolison's actions as a parent are understandable or even justified, but they do not rise to the level of necessity that excuses a criminal trespass.

[13] Rolison relies on Belton v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), to argue that “the State failed to negate [his] necessity defense.” Appellant's Br. 11. In Belton, the Court reversed a conviction for driving while suspended where the appellant drove to escape her abusive and intoxicated boyfriend, who had a history of assaults and had only temporarily exited the vehicle. Here, by contrast, no evidence suggests that the child was in any real danger, presenting no necessities for Rolison to trespass. Further, in Belton, the appellant was in an unfamiliar area with no reasonable means of escape from the abusive boyfriend who was about to attack her—an imminent danger leaving no alternative but to drive. Belton, 6 N.E.3d at 1045. Here, Rolison had his phone and could have called Lori or police to locate his son before trespassing on the Property.⁵

[14] To the extent Rolison urges us to characterize the incident as an emergency, his argument merely invites us to reweigh the evidence. Although we are sympathetic to Rolison's action to locate his missing son in the middle of night, reweighing the evidence is something we cannot do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d, 1244. We conclude that the State rebutted Rolison's necessity defense. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Rolison's conviction for criminal trespass.

Conclusion

[15] The evidence is sufficient to sustain Rolison's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rolison claimed he tried to call Lori on his way to the Property. Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Lori testified they had no communication that day. Id. at 29.

2.   The record does not reflect that Lori asked Rolison to leave the Property. The trial court dismissed Count I, finding the State's argument on this count based on “nothing in the record.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34.

3.   “The term ‘contractual interest in the property’ is not defined by the criminal trespass statute or elsewhere in the Indiana Code․ When interpreting a statute, we presume that the legislature intends the common and ordinary meaning of the words it uses․ The word ‘interest’ is a ‘right, title, or legal share in something.’ ․ Something is ‘contractual’ if it is ‘of, relating to, or implying a contract,’ and a contract is ‘an agreement between two or more persons or parties to do or not to do something.’ ․ Therefore, a ‘contractual interest in the property’ is a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n.2 (Ind. 2012).

4.   In Indiana, the criminal trespass statute does not explicitly specify any expiration period for a trespass notice. Accordingly, in practice, such a notice remains in effect indefinitely unless and until the property owner affirmatively retracts or rescinds it. Indiana case law has endorsed this interpretation. Travis v. State, 812 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“If this case had involved a private property owner who had told Travis to leave his property and Travis had returned two days later, we would agree with the State that all the elements of criminal trespass under Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-2(a)(1) would be met. While a private property owner may ban a person from his property permanently, the powers of police officers are limited by statute.”) (emphasis added).Some other jurisdictions diverge legislatively from Indiana on this point by establishing a clear and fixed duration in their criminal trespass statutes. Minnesota provides that a person commits trespass if he “returns to the property of another within one year after being told to leave the property and not to return.” Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8) (emphasis added). Nevada limits the effect of a trespass warning to thirty-six months, prohibiting entry “after having been warned during the previous 36 months by the owner or occupant thereof not to trespass.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.200(2)(a) (emphasis added). Idaho provides that a person who “returns without permission or invitation within one (1) year, unless a longer period of time is designated by the owner or his agent.” Idaho Code § 18-7008(2)(a) (emphasis added).

5.   Rolison contends the trial court accepted his necessity defense yet still found him guilty. Appellant Br. p. 12-13. This contention is misplaced. The trial court expressed sympathy for Rolison's situation but stated: “what you did that night ․ was trespass. You were not supposed to be there and you were.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48. Nothing in the record indicates the trial court found the State failed to rebut necessity; rather, the trial court rejected the defense and entered judgment of conviction.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.