IN RE: L.B. and R.B. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] R.B. and L.B. (collectively, “Children”), are the biological children of E.B. (“Father”) and K.A. (“Mother”).¹ After Children left home without Father's knowledge, he found them at a nearby gas station. The manner in which Father retrieved Children caught the attention of bystanders who accused Father of abusing Children. Law enforcement responded, leading to the discovery of bruises on Children and poor living conditions. Children were removed from Father's care, and petitions were filed alleging they were each a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated Children to be CHINS. Father now appeals that decision and presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court violated Father's due process rights by restricting his parenting time with Children; and

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred by adjudicating Children as CHINS.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] R.B. was born on August 21, 2012, and L.B. was born on March 18, 2015. On September 28, 2024, when Father woke up, Children were not in Father's apartment in Marion County, Indiana. Father located R.B. at a nearby gas station and confronted him, causing R.B. to fall down as he backed away. Father “stood over the top of” R.B., Tr. Vol. II at 25; “grabbed him by his shirt,” id. at 26; and “yelled” at him, id. at 24. Father then pulled up R.B. by his shirt and started to walk away from the gas station with R.B. to find L.B. Several people saw this incident and confronted Father, who told at least one witness that he would “find out what would happen”—meaning Father would “shoot his ass”—if that witness followed Father. Id. at 28.

[4] After finding L.B. and returning Children to the apartment, Father left to go back to the gas station. On his way, law enforcement officers stopped him after having been dispatched to the gas station due to the allegations of Father's abuse. Meanwhile, another officer went to the apartment and spoke with Children. Children were then taken to the police station, and the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) was contacted.

[5] When a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) spoke to Children shortly after the incident, they “were kind of [in] shock,” Tr. Vol. II at 96, and had bruises in various stages of healing on their bodies. After talking with Children, the FCM took them back to Father's apartment, which was in “deplorable” condition, id. at 100—there was a cockroach infestation, little food, and clutter everywhere. The FCM told Father that DCS was going to remove Children from his care, and when Children came in the room shortly thereafter, Father stated, “What are you guys doing here? Tootles.” Id. at 102. Father then asked the FCM, in front of Children, “What do I do if I don't want them back?” Id. The FCM replied, “Don't participate in services.” Id. Children were removed, and DCS filed petitions alleging they were CHINS based on Father's alleged physical abuse of Children, the state of Father's apartment, and Father's alleged daily use of marijuana.

[6] At the initial hearing on October 1, the trial court ordered that Father would have “therapeutically supervised parenting time” with Children “when therapeutically recommended by the children's providers.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 95. At a preliminary hearing on October 22, the trial court granted Father the ability to write letters to Children but ordered that such letters would be read by Children's therapist, who would share the letters with them provided doing so was in their best interests. Father did not write a single letter to Children until February 2025, after the first of two factfinding hearings in this case. At no time during the CHINS proceedings did Children's therapist recommend that parenting time begin. Also since the CHINS proceedings began, “Father ha[d] refused to engage in any recommended services.” Id. at 201. The trial court ultimately adjudicated the Children as CHINS and ordered that Father would not having parenting time. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Father appeals from the adjudication of Children as CHINS. The focus of a CHINS proceeding is on “protecting children, not punishing parents.” In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 909 (Ind. 2025) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 2014)). To that end, “the courts and DCS must make all decisions in consideration of the best interests of the child or children concerned, with ensuring a child's safety the most important consideration.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and internal citations omitted). And under the parens patriae power of the State, the trial court “ ‘step[s] into the shoes’ of parents, guardians, or custodians when necessary to safeguard a child's best interests.” Id. (citing In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635–36 (Ind. 2004)).

1. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Father's Due Process Rights by Restricting His Parenting Time with Children

[8] Father first contends the trial court's decision to not allow him to have parenting time with Children violates his due process rights.² “To advance a child's best interests during CHINS proceedings,” a trial court is “vested with ‘broad discretion,’ ” E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 909 (quoting K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 636), but that discretion is bounded by the trial court's duty to “uphold the parties’ ‘due process rights’ and ‘take into account recommendations and input’ from DCS, parents, children, and others,” id. (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012)). “Due process at all stages of a CHINS case is so vital because ‘procedural irregularities ․ may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to a potential subsequent termination of parental rights.’ ” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258 (quoting In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[9] Appellate courts balance three factors to determine the process due in a CHINS case: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257 (citing In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (2011)). As to the first and third factors, “[b]oth a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of a child, and the State's parens patriae interest in protecting a child's welfare are substantial.” In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 752 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original) (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917).

[10] At issue here is whether the trial court's decision to not allow Father to have parenting time with Children created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred. In particular, Father asserts that the restriction on his parenting time with Children means he has “lost his best opportunity for demonstrating his fitness as a Father.” Appellant's Br. at 16. There is no statute specific to the CHINS context concerning parenting time, so we look to the general family law statute on the issue—Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2. In re E.W., 26 N.E.3d 1006, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). That statute allows a court to restrict a parent's parenting time if it finds (1) “the parenting time might endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development” and (2) the restriction is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2.

[11] Here, the trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions that support the restriction on Father's parenting time:

32. Father has admitted to using physical discipline, including a belt with his children. He also scolds, grounds them from things and uses time out.

33. Father did not offer any explanation for the bruises, marks, scars, and abrasions.

* * *

40. Father recognizes that R[.B.] has “turmoil” with Father, however, does not seem to recognize his responsibility for that relationship, determining why that turmoil exists or helping the child overcome it. Father states R[.B.] has a lot of behavioral issues and that R[.B.] is a problem.

* * *

47․ Father has not addressed the fears of the children or tr[ied] to understand them. Father does not believe there is a reason for the children to fear him as he has done nothing wrong.

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5․ Through testimony of the child's therapist, DCS has shown the children have a serious fear of Father.

6. Currently, visitation is not in the best interest of the children due to the serious fear of Father.

* * *

10. Father has not shown any concern that his children are fearful of him.

11. Father has not shown any concern that his children do not want to see him.

12․ Here we have a parent who by his own admission neglected to establish ongoing therapeutic care for their child after serious mental health incidents.

13․ Father refused to engage in steps to visit the children․

14. During the assessment and at trial, Father admitted to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and PTSD. Father i[s] not on medication or receiving therapy for his mental health. Father had a therapy referral put in by DCS. The therapist testified that he believed Father was not at a point where he was ready to change․

15. Based on Father's unwillingness to engage in necessary services to provide the children with their mental health needs, his unwillingness to change his parenting style to include discipline that does not injure the children, his unwillingness to treat his own mental health, and the fear the children have of Father, this Court's intervention is necessary to keep the children safe and provide the family with services.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 199–204. Father does not challenge the trial court's findings, so we take them as true. R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[12] The unchallenged findings clearly demonstrate that parenting time might endanger Children's physical health or significantly impair their emotional development and that not having parenting time with Father is in their best interests. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court's decision to restrict Father's parenting time created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating Children CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1

[13] Father next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's conclusion that Children are CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1.

[14] When, as here, the trial court enters findings and conclusions sua sponte, “we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment.” E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 909 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). “[W]e review issues not covered by the findings under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the court's decision if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287). Additionally, “[i]n reviewing a CHINS adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286). We also accept as true any findings that Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687).

[15] Father argues that DCS failed to show that he seriously endangered Children and that their needs would not be met without intervention. Father's arguments are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Father contends that the “record does not support that Father injured the Children or used unreasonable discipline,” Appellant's Br. at 22, so the trial court erred by concluding that “Father was unwilling to ‘change his parenting style to include discipline that does not injure the children,’ ” id. (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. II at 198). Father does not challenge the trial court's findings that he “has admitted to using physical discipline, including a belt with his children,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 199; when Children were removed from Father's care in September 2024, they both had “bruises, marks, scars, and abrasion,” id. at 197; and “Father did not offer any explanation for the bruises, marks, scars, and abrasions,” id. Nor does Father challenge the trial court's finding that L.B. attempted suicide in early 2024 after Father confronted him “about stealing from a local Family Dollar and gas station,” resulting in L.B. being hospitalized for “3 to 4 weeks for mental health care.” Id. at 200. Taking these unchallenged findings as true, it is clear that the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Father had injured Children beyond reasonable corporal punishment.

[16] Similarly, Father argues that contrary to the trial court's finding, he “did provide the Children with proper mental health treatment.” Appellant's Br. at 24. According to Father, the trial court “ignore[d] that Father also testified that he was specifically told that follow-up treatment was not necessary” after L.B.’s suicide attempt. Id. at 25 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 44, 186). The trial court had the discretion to not credit Father's testimony regarding what was and was not recommended once L.B. was discharged from the mental health treatment facility after his suicide attempt, and that is exactly what the trial court did:

While Father did testify that if the children were returned home, he would engage them in therapy, the Court does not find this pledge credible. Father seems to be overwhelmed with work and keeping up with certain childcare responsibilities such as follow up with mental health treatment and paperwork. At one point, Father could not even state the name of his children's schools in Beech Grove.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 201. In fact, Father blamed L.B. for Father's failure to ensure he was receiving mental health services after his suicide attempt, stating he had arranged for L.B. to start therapy through his school, but L.B. “never brought [the paperwork] home.” Tr. Vol. II at 45. The trial court also repeatedly noted in its order that Father refused to engage in services during the CHINS proceedings, which further demonstrates his likely unwillingness to ensure Children receive appropriate mental health services if returned to his care.

[17] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the juvenile court's decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that (1) Children's physical and mental conditions are seriously impaired or endangered by Father's refusal to supply them with necessary medical care or supervision despite the financial ability to do so, and (2) Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are not receiving and that Father is unlikely to provide them without the trial court's coercive intervention. The trial court thus did not clearly err by adjudicating Children as CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-32-1-1.³

Conclusion

[18] In sum, the trial court did not violate Father's due process rights by restricting his parenting time, and the trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Children as CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-32-1-1. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother did not appear in the CHINS proceedings and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   To the extent Father challenges the trial court's rulings regarding parenting time that occurred prior to the CHINS adjudication, there is no relief available due to any alleged error in those rulings because the restriction on Father's parenting time is no longer based on those rulings but instead on the CHINS adjudication and dispositional orders. Cf. In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (determining no relief available for parents who challenged child's removal based on the first removal order when a dispositional order had been issued). Effective relief regarding parenting time, if warranted, may be granted in this case based on only the CHINS adjudication, dispositional order, or both. See id.

3.   Because we conclude that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-32-1-1, we need not address Father's argument that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-32-1-2.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.