IN RE: C.G. and M.G. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The juvenile court determined that C.G. and M.G. (“Children”), the minor children of D.O. (“Mother”), were children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother appeals and claims: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering a dispositional order without waiting for the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to prepare a predispositional report; and (2) the juvenile court clearly erred in adjudicating Children to be CHINS. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Mother presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering a dispositional order without waiting for DCS to prepare a predispositional report.

II. Whether the juvenile court clearly erred in adjudicating Children to be CHINS.

Facts

[3] Children are twins who were born to Mother in June 2008. Children were living with their Father when he committed suicide in 2016. Children were then placed in Mother's custody. In June 2024, DCS received reports that Children were the victims of abuse and/or neglect by Mother. At the same time, Mother reported C.G. as a runaway. On June 13, DCS located C.G. at a friend's house and interviewed her regarding the abuse allegations. C.G. reported that, six days previously, Mother became upset when she discovered that C.G. had lied to her. C.G. said that Mother “grabbed her by the hair and yanked her around.” Tr. Vol. II p. 52. C.G. also stated that Mother had “potentially ․ also hit her,” but she “could not remember if it was with an open or closed fist.” Id. C.G. was taken to Hillcrest, a youth services facility, and M.G. was staying at the home of Children's adult sister, K.S.

[4] On or about June 17, Mother submitted to a urine drug screen as ordered during C.G.’s probation proceedings.¹ The drug screen was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and “maybe opiates.” Id. at 70.

[5] On June 20, 2024, DCS filed petitions alleging Children were CHINS. The petitions were based on “the following alleged material facts[:]”

a. On 6/13/2024, the [DCS] Central Intake Unit received a report alleging [Children] (16 yrs) to be victims of Neglect and [C.G.] (16) to be a victim of Physical Abuse. The alleged perpetrator is [Mother]. Since the initial report [DCS] has received three additional reports with the same allegations.

b. On 6/13/2024, [Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Alexander] Henderson spoke with [C.G.] who stated six days ago, she had told [Mother] that she was going to be at a friend's house but lied. [Mother] showed up to the home and began screaming and cursing at [C.G.].

c. [C.G.] stated that once they got home, [Mother] followed her into her room, slapped her with an open hand and grabbed and pulled her hair. [C.G.]’s twin sister, [M.G.], got in between them and then the incident stopped.

d. FCM [Katherine] Bindley spoke to [C.G.] at Hillcrest who stated that she had court today and that she tested positive for THC.

e. FCM went over how dangerous drugs are and [C.G.] stated that she didn't know how else to help her mental health. She stated that she has been smoking since she was 14 and smoked cigarettes from about 12 to 14.

f. [C.G.] stated that she struggles with suicidal thoughts. [C.G.] continually stated that she did not want to go back to her mom's, and that she did not feel safe there.

g. [C.G.] stated that she saw a meth pipe and a blow torch in [Mother]’s drawer, and it had meth residue on it. When FCM asked how [C.G.] knew that it was meth residue, [C.G.] stated that she had seen it before.

h. On 6/17/2024, at the Juvenile probation hearing for [C.G.], [Mother] was court ordered to drug screen and was positive on the rapid urine screen for methamphetamine, amphetamine and opiates.

i. [C.G.] and [M.G.’s] father, [S.G.], is deceased.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 47-48, 198-99. The juvenile court permitted the filing of the CHINS petitions and granted the request to remove Children from the home.

[6] C.G. completed a mental health assessment at Hillcrest, during which she reported that Mother regularly used methamphetamine. C.G. also reported that Mother had been “physically, verbally, and emotionally abusive” toward C.G. since the child was in middle school. Ex. Vol. p. 20. C.G. also indicated that she did not desire any visitations with Mother. M.G. too indicated a desire to have no contact with Mother. At one point, Mother informed the FCM that, because Children were sixteen, “[y]ou might as well go ahead and emancipate them.” Tr. Vol. II p. 46.

[7] Mother failed to appear for initial hearings set for June 27, July 18, August 15, and October 10, 2024. After the August 15 hearing, the juvenile court authorized DCS to serve Mother by publication. At the October 10 hearing, DCS informed the juvenile court that it had been attempting to serve Mother in person, but she refused to answer the door to accept service.² Finally, on October 24, 2024, Mother appeared for an initial hearing, and the juvenile court appointed counsel to represent her. The juvenile court warned Mother that, if she failed to appear, the court would issue a warrant for her, proceed to fact-finding, and, if the Children were determined to be CHINS, proceed to disposition.

[8] On November 20, 2024, Mother appeared in person and by counsel, denied the Children were CHINS, and requested a fact-finding hearing. The juvenile court set a review hearing for December 18, 2024, a pretrial hearing for January 29, 2025, and a fact-finding hearing for February 21, 2025. Mother failed to appear for the December 18 review hearing. Mother came to court for the January 29 pretrial hearing, and the juvenile court ordered her to take a drug screen, but Mother left the courthouse before the case was called and before she could submit to the drug screen.

[9] Mother failed to appear for the February 21 fact-finding hearing. Mother's attorney informed the juvenile court that she had last communicated with Mother in the hall before the January 29 pretrial hearing. Mother's counsel requested a continuance, but the juvenile court denied the request. FCM Loussa Numa testified that Mother had admitted to physically disciplining C.G. in the past by “smack[ing] her on her butt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 60. Mother also “disclosed that she was addicted previously to methamphetamine.” Id. Another caseworker testified that, once when she had talked to Mother on the phone, “there was just kind of a lot of rambling.” Id. at 46. DCS presented testimony that Mother did not engage in any offered services. Mother had engaged in one team meeting with DCS but did not participate in other suggested team meetings. Mother had not submitted any drug screens when asked to do so. FCM Numa had “concerns for [Mother's] sobriety” because Mother had tested positive for drugs on June 17. Id. at 67. FCM Henderson testified that C.G. appeared anxious and did not feel safe in Mother's home.

[10] DCS admitted into evidence C.G.’s mental health records. Since being placed at Hillcrest, C.G. attempted suicide four times by cutting or hanging. C.G. was diagnosed with severe anxiety, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, borderline personality disorder, drug abuse disorder, and nicotine dependence. C.G. had been prescribed an ADHD medication in the past, and her older sister told her that Mother “may have been selling” that medication. Ex. Vol. p. 20. Since her removal to Hillcrest, C.G. had received housing and/or mental health services from Deaconess Cross Point, Binkley House, Open Arms, and Columbus Behavioral Health Center. Mother engaged in a family therapy session with C.G. on February 12, 2025. C.G. “attended visitation with her mother on campus” at Hillcrest but said that it “did not go well” and that she “needs no more visitation/contact with [M]other.” Id. at 34.

[11] M.G.’s clinical assessment was also admitted into evidence. M.G. reported she had experienced “physical, verbal and sexual abuse along with neglect[,]” that she has had suicidal ideations and one suicide attempt in the past, and that “she self-harms.” Id. at 57-58. M.G. reported “that she has no contact with her mother.” Id. at 58. M.G. was diagnosed with PTSD, major depressive disorder, and severe and generalized anxiety. She too had attempted suicide in the past.

[12] FCM Numa opined that Children both need therapy but had not received it before DCS's involvement. She also stated that M.G. needed a doctor for unspecified medical and dental needs but that “the last time [M.G.] could recall that she saw a doctor was years ago.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. FCM Numa testified that Children “were not even going to school regularly like they were supposed to.” Id. Children were also “very behind” on regular medical and dental care. Id. at 64. Mother had informed FCM Numa that she would like to have M.G. returned to her home but was not comfortable having C.G. returned to her care because of C.G.’s severe mental health issues.

[13] At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found Children to be CHINS and issued a writ for Mother's arrest due to her failure to appear. Without objection, the juvenile court proceeded to “hold disposition right now.” Id. at 73. The juvenile court ordered Mother to engage in services, including random drug screens and evaluations for mental health and substance abuse. The juvenile court ordered Mother's visitations be supervised “until the therapists or the professionals determine that it is safe and appropriate for it not to be supervised.” Id.

[14] On March 18, 2025, the juvenile court issued a written order in which it adjudicated Children to be CHINS and noted, “[b]y agreement of the parties, a Dispositional Hearing is held.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 163. On March 21, the juvenile court issued its dispositional order in which it noted that it had “review[ed] the Predispositional Report(s)” for Children and, “[b]ased on the information presented in the Predispositional Report(s),” ordered Children's continued placement outside the home and Mother's engagement in specified services. Id. at 165. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[15] CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)). Instead, we consider only the evidence that favors the juvenile court's decision and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[16] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.; D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․ [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[17] Here, the juvenile court entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon. “As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 1287. We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.”³ Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the general judgment standard of review, the reviewing court “may look both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.” C.B. v. B.W., 985 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In deference to the juvenile court's proximity to the issues, an appellate court will “disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287-88 (Ind. 2002) (quotations and citations omitted). Unchallenged findings stand as proven. J.M. and D.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 121 N.E.3d 556, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

I. Mother waived her argument that the juvenile court erred by proceeding to disposition without a predispositional report.

[18] Mother first claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering a dispositional order without waiting for DCS to prepare a predispositional report. Indiana Code Section 31-34-18-1(a) provides:

Upon finding that a child is a [CHINS], the juvenile court shall order [DCS] or a caseworker to prepare a predispositional report that contains a:

(1) statement of the needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement; and

(2) recommendation for the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement of the child.

(emphasis added).⁴ Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-18-6(a), the predispositional report “shall be made available at least forty-eight (48) hours before the dispositional hearing, unless the juvenile court determines on the record that the reports contain information that should not be released to the child or the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.” The juvenile court must provide copies of the report to “(1) each attorney, guardian ad litem, or court appointed special advocate representing the child; and (2) each attorney representing the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.” Id. § 6(b). And the court may provide a factual summary of the report to “(1) the child; or (2) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.” Id. § 6(c).

[19] Here, the juvenile court did not comply with these statutory provisions when it proceeded to disposition immediately after finding Children to be CHINS. The State claims that Mother waived any argument regarding the failure of the juvenile court to order a predispositional report because Mother did not object when the juvenile court indicated its intent to immediately proceed to disposition following the CHINS finding. We agree.

[20] After finding Children to be CHINS, the juvenile court stated that it would proceed to “disposition right now.” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. Mother's counsel did not object. An appellant may not present an argument for the first time on appeal. Ind. Bureau of Mot. Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Citimortgage v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2012)). This rule applies in CHINS cases, even to claims of constitutional error. In re R.L., 237 N.E.3d 652, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016)), trans. denied. We, therefore, conclude that Mother waived her claim regarding the lack of a predispositional report. See In re Ar.B., 199 N.E.3d 1232, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that mother waived claim regarding untimeliness of dispositional hearing by failing to file a motion to dismiss prior to the belated hearing).⁵

[21] Mother also argues that she did not have proper notice of the dispositional hearing date. See Ind. Code § 31-34-19-1.3(a) (generally providing that DCS shall provide notice of the dispositional hearing to parents). Mother was in court on November 20, 2024, when the juvenile court scheduled the February 21, 2025, fact-finding hearing. Mother was also in court on October 24, 2024, when the juvenile court warned her that it would proceed to fact-finding and disposition if she failed to appear. She did not object then, nor when the juvenile court proceeded to disposition after finding Children to be CHINS. Thus, her argument is waived.

II. The juvenile court did not clearly err in adjudicating Children to be CHINS.

[22] Mother also claims that the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Children to be CHINS. The juvenile court found that Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, “the ‘neglect statute.’ ” In re D.F., 83 N.E.3d 789, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). This statute provides:

A child is a [CHINS] if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1. Thus, this statute “contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[23] Here, considering only the evidence that favors the juvenile court's decision, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from this evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court did not clearly err by finding Children to be CHINS.

A. Children's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired.

[24] Mother first claims that the juvenile court clearly erred in finding Children to be CHINS because there was insufficient evidence to show that their physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result of Mother's inability, refusal, or neglect to provide them with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision. In so doing, Mother challenges several of the juvenile court's factual findings.

[25] Mother first complains that the juvenile court's findings b. and c. are insufficient to support a CHINS determination. These findings provide:

b. On 6/13/2024, FCM Henderson spoke with [C.G.], who stated six (6) days ago, she had told [Mother] that she was going to be at a friend's house but lied. [Mother] showed up to the home and began screaming and cursing at [C.G.].

c. [C.G.] stated that once they got home, [Mother] followed her into her room, slapped her with an open hand and grabbed and pulled her hair. [C.G]’s twin sister, [M.G.], got in between them and then the incident stopped.

Appealed Order pp. 1-2.

[26] Mother notes that she has a right to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining her child. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-15(1) (providing that CHINS statutes do not “[l]imit the right of a parent․ of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child”). The question of whether corporal punishment is reasonable is generally a question for the trier of fact. See Carter v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (decision as to whether parental privilege to use reasonable discipline has been disproved by the State in a criminal case is a question for the fact-finder). The juvenile court apparently did not consider slapping a teenager in the face and pulling her hair to be a reasonable use of force under the circumstances. Mother's claim that her use of corporal punishment was reasonable is simply a request to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do.

[27] Mother also notes that findings d., e., and f., focus on C.G.’s mental health issues and drug use, which Mother claims is relevant to a CHINS finding under Indiana Code 31-34-1-6, but not the “neglect statute,” Indiana Code 31-34-1-1, on which DCS based its allegations in this case. Indiana Code 31-34-1-6 provides that a child is a CHINS if “the child substantially endangers the child's own health or the health of another individual,” and “the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that ․ the child is not receiving” and “is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.”

[28] To be sure, C.G.’s mental health struggles and illicit drug use would be relevant to a CHINS finding under Indiana Code 31-34-1-6, but this does not mean that this evidence is irrelevant to a CHINS finding under the neglect statute based on Mother's unwillingness or inability to provide for C.G.’s mental health. This is especially true given Mother's statements that she did not want C.G. to be returned to her care given the child's mental health needs. There was evidence that M.G. too struggles with her mental health. Yet neither child had received any treatment before DCS's involvement. This supports a reasonable conclusion that Mother is incapable of or unwilling to provide Children with the mental health care they obviously need. We, therefore, reject Mother's argument that DCS failed to prove that Children's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's neglect.

[29] Mother also claims that findings g. and h. are merely a description of witness testimony without specifically finding that the testimony was true. These findings provide:

g. [C.G.] stated that she saw a meth pipe and a blow torch in her mother's drawer, and it had meth residue on it. When FCM asked how [C.G.] knew that it was meth residue, [C.G.] stated that she had seen it before.

h. On 6/17/2024, at the Juvenile probation hearing for [C.G.], [Mother] was court ordered to drug screen and was positive on the rapid urine screen for methamphetamine, amphetamine and opiates.

Appealed Order. p. 3. We do not agree that these findings merely recite the testimony of the witnesses. Instead, they explain that C.G. saw a meth pipe in Mother's drawer and that Mother tested positive for several illicit substances when screened as part of C.G.’s probation case.

[30] Mother claims that no evidence was admitted to support the allegation regarding the meth pipe found in her drawer. The juvenile court sustained Mother's objections to the photos of the pipe and the report that contained C.G.’s statements regarding the pipe. But there was other evidence of Mother's drug use. The juvenile probation officer in C.G.’s probation case testified that she performed a drug screen of Mother during that case and that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and “maybe” opiates. Tr. Vol. II p. 71. Mother refused or avoided other drug screens, and C.G. reported that Mother regularly used drugs. Mother admitted that she was formerly addicted to methamphetamine. And when DCS staff went to Mother's home to serve her papers they could smell marijuana emanating from the house. Thus, any error in this finding is harmless.

[31] From this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother had a continuing substance abuse problem that impaired her ability to properly care for Children. See In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (sufficient evidence supported trial court's finding that father's drug use endangered children's physical and mental condition where father repeatedly refused to submit to drug screens and both children disclosed father's drug use to therapist). Mother's argument in this regard is little more than a request that we reweigh evidence, construe inferences in her favor, and come to a conclusion other than that reached by the juvenile court, all of which we may not do.⁶ N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475; K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.

B. Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are not receiving and are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court.

[32] Mother also claims that the juvenile court clearly erred in determining that Children's needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. See N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (citing I.C. § 31-34-1-1). The aim of a CHINS inquiry is to determine whether a child's circumstances require services that are unlikely to be provided absent court intervention. In re E.Y., 126 N.E.3d 872, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Accordingly, the focus of a CHINS inquiry is on the condition of the child or children, not on the culpability of the parents. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. But not every endangered child is a CHINS “permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. By requiring that DCS prove that the parents lack the ability to provide for the child absent court intervention, the statute guards against unwarranted State intrusion in family life. Id. The focus is on the best interests of the child and whether the child requires assistance that the parents are not willing or able to provide. Id. The court need not wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene; rather, a child is a CHINS when she is endangered by parental action or inaction. In re C.K., 70 N.E.3d 359, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[33] The evidence here supports a conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary for Children to receive the care and treatment they needed. Before DCS's involvement, Children were not receiving the mental health treatment they both desperately needed. Mother displayed a pattern of non-cooperation with DCS. She did not stay in contact with the FCM, she failed to attend numerous court hearings, she evaded DCS's attempts to serve her, she had little to no contact with Children after their removal, and she refused to screen for illicit drug use. Mother did attend one virtual therapy session with C.G., but this was just shortly before the fact-finding hearing. Thus, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred by concluding that Children's needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court.

Conclusion

[34] By failing to object, Mother waived her claim regarding the juvenile court's failure to order DCS to prepare a predispositional report, and the juvenile court's incorporation of the non-existent report into its dispositional order was harmless error. In addition, the juvenile court did not clearly err in adjudicating Children to be CHINS. We, therefore, affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[35] Affirmed.

[36] Our standard of review of a CHINS adjudication is not completely toothless; rather, we insist that it be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., K.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re D.C.), 164 N.E.3d 834, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Because there is no record evidence to support the determinations that Mother's actions or inactions seriously impaired or endangered Children, and that Children's needs are unlikely to be met absent State intervention, I dissent.

[37] First, I would note that the trial court's findings are wholly inadequate. A CHINS adjudication “must be based on the evidence presented in court and not on the allegations in the pleadings.” S.T. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re L.T.), 145 N.E.3d 864, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Yet, here, the court's findings are literally nothing more than a verbatim recitation of the findings alleged in the CHINS petitions. Moreover, the majority of those findings are merely recitations of what C.G. allegedly “stated” to DCS, not factual findings that the trial court determined to be true. App. v. II at 162-63. Such findings are insufficient to support a CHINS determination. See, e.g., Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting a “finding of fact must indicate, not what someone said is true, but what is determined to be true, for that is the trier of fact's duty.”).

[38] Second, even under the general judgment standard, there is insufficient evidence to support the CHINS findings. Without findings to review on the statutory elements required for a CHINS adjudication, we examine the whole record under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. See, e.g., D.W. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re K.W.), 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). But we keep in mind that it is DCS's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS, and it is up to DCS to gather the facts and the evidence to support its CHINS petition. D.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re D.B.), 43 N.E.3d 599, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We also keep in mind that, even under a general judgment standard, it is not this Court's role to become an advocate by scouring the record for evidence to support a party's broad, unsupported statements. See Lane Alan Schrader Tr. v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) and Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)).

[39] Here, there simply is no record evidence to prove that Mother's actions or inactions have seriously endangered Children. “Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” J.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). Rather, “a CHINS adjudication under section 31-34-1-1 requires proof of three basic elements: the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; the child's needs are unmet; and ‘perhaps most critically,’ those needs are unlikely to be met unless the State intervenes.” J.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re N.C.), 72 N.E.3d 519, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[40] Thus, we have held, for example, that unsupported allegations of a mother's alcohol abuse and physical abuse of her children, without more, was insufficient to show that Mother had impaired or endangered the children as required to support a CHINS petition. L.D. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re M.W.), 869 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). See also, e.g., M.P. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re D.P.), 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding evidence of domestic violence was insufficient to support a CHINS determination where there was no evidence the domestic violence happened in the child's presence and, thus, no evidence as to the impact of the incident on the child); Perrine v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Child Servs., 866 N.E.2d 269, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that mere presence of drug paraphernalia in a bag in the parent's residence and a single admitted use of methamphetamine outside the presence of the child, without more, were insufficient to support a CHINS determination).

[41] Here, there is no record evidence that Mother had a drug problem that endangered Children; rather, as was the case in Perrine, there was only evidence that Mother had used drugs on one occasion when she tested positive for drugs while Children were not in her care.⁷ Moreover, although Mother admitted that she had had a methamphetamine addiction at one time, there was no evidence that she currently had a drug addiction, no evidence that DCS had ever perceived Mother to be under the influence of drugs,⁸ no evidence that Mother had ever used drugs in Children's presence,⁹ and no evidence that Mother's past drug use affected Children. Cf., e.g., A.P. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re D.S.), 150 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding insufficient evidence to support a CHINS finding where, “despite Mother's admitted drug use, DCS did not present any evidence that Mother used marijuana while the Child was in the home or that DCS had ever perceived Mother to be under the influence of drugs”); see also, e.g., A.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., (In re Ad.M.), 103 N.E.3d 709, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding insufficient evidence to support a CHINS finding where DCS did not present specific evidence that Mother's admitted use of drugs or presence of drugs in the home presented a serious danger to the children).

[42] Nor is there sufficient evidence that Mother physically abused C.G. It is well-established in Indiana that a parent may “apply such reasonable force or ․ impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.’ ” McReynolds v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008)); see also I.C. § 31-34-1-15(1) (stating the CHINS chapter does not “[l]imit the right of a parent ․ to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child”).¹⁰ Thus, “ ‘a parent involved in a CHINS proceeding is not inherently required to repudiate corporal punishment.’ ” J.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.K.), 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. Rather, the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the corporal punishment used by the parent was unreasonable. See, e.g., McHenry v. Bartholomew Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re E.M.), 581 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding evidence insufficient to establish that child was “excessively punished” and, therefore, a CHINS), trans. denied.

[43] In this case, there was no evidence provided at the fact-finding hearing that Mother actually hit C.G., much less that she used unreasonable force upon C.G., nor did the court find those to be facts. Rather, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the trial court did not make any finding that Mother used physical force on C.G. at all, let alone a finding that any such force was unreasonable. Furthermore, the allegation of physical abuse was based solely upon what C.G. said to DCS,¹¹ and that allegation alone is insufficient to support a CHINS determination. See Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 159; In re D.B., 43 N.E.3d at 606.

[44] The majority's additional conclusion that Mother was incapable of providing, or unwilling to provide, Children with mental health treatment is also unsupported by the evidence. The evidence regarding Children's mental health is that they currently need mental health treatment, but there is no evidence that Mother failed to provide them with necessary mental health treatment in the past, other than FCM Numa's non-expert opinion. In fact, there is evidence that C.G. had received medication in the past for Attention Deficit/Hyperactive Disorder.

[45] Finally, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the evidence shows coercive intervention of the court is necessary for Children to receive the care and treatment they need. On the contrary, Mother acknowledged that C.G. needs mental health treatment that Mother cannot provide alone, and that C.G. should remain in her current residential placement. There is no evidence that Mother requires the coercive intervention of the court in order to continue either child's mental health treatment.

[46] Our general judgment standard of review in a CHINS proceeding is not overly stringent, but neither is it a rubber stamp. The State must provide proof by a preponderance of the evidence not just that a child is endangered, but that the endangerment has been caused by the parent's actions or inactions and, further, that a child has unmet needs that are not likely to be met absent coercive intervention of the court. That proof is simply absent in this case. I would find the trial court's decision to be clearly erroneous and reverse it.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time the CHINS petitions were filed, C.G. had been “detained for leaving home,” but C.G.’s probation case was “closed out” “once DCS got involved.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 70-71.

2.   On June 18, 2024, DCS personnel went to Mother's home with the police to serve Mother, but she refused to answer the door. DCS personnel noticed the odor of marijuana emanating from the home. Ex. Vol., DCS Ex. D, p. 85.

3.   Mother notes that the juvenile court never made a finding that Children met the definition of CHINS under subsection (1) of Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 as required for a CHINS adjudication under that statute. Mother claims that the omission means the “court's findings are insufficient to support the finding [of] CHINS.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. But “no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order[,]” and we review issues not covered by the court's findings under the general judgment standard. In re Br.B, 139 N.E.3d 1066, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

4.   Subsection (b) of this statute provides that the child or the child's parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, court appointed special advocate, or custodian “may prepare an alternative report for consideration by the court.” I.C. § 31-34-18-1(b). Nothing suggests that such an alternative report was prepared in this case.

5.   Mother also claims that the juvenile court's dispositional order is faulty because it incorporates the nonexistent predispositional report. We rejected this argument in K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, the juvenile defendant claimed that no predispositional report was filed with the juvenile court and that the juvenile court's dispositional order—which incorporated the non-existent report—was erroneous. Id. 388-89. We disagreed and held that any error was harmless because the juvenile court's order was supported by other evidence in the record. Id. at 389. As detailed below, this is also true here.

6.   Mother claims that, at the time of her positive drug screen, C.G. was in inpatient treatment and M.G. was staying with her older, adult sibling. Thus, Mother claims that her drug use did not impact her ability to care for Children, citing Perrine v. Marion County Office of Child Services, 866 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, a panel of this Court held that the juvenile court clearly erred by finding a child to be a CHINS based on the mother's admitted one-time use of methamphetamine outside the child's presence. Id. at 275-76; see also D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 150 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (mother's admitted use of marijuana outside presence of child, where child's basic needs were being met, was insufficient to support CHINS finding); In re S.K., 57 N.E.3d 878, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (mother's isolated use of methamphetamine, where children reported that they had never seen mother use drugs, with no evidence of mother's impairment, was insufficient to establish that children were endangered); In re L.P., 6 N.E.3d 1019, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (mother's single use of methamphetamine outside the presence of the child, was insufficient to support finding that child was CHINS). Here, however, Mother admitted having a prior methamphetamine addiction, C.G. reported that Mother “regularly” used methamphetamine, and Mother refused drugs screens. Ex. Vol., DCS Ex. A, p. 20. Thus, we find these cases to be distinguishable.

7.   Mother's refusal to volunteer for drug screens that had not been court-ordered is also, in itself, insufficient evidence that Mother endangered Children through drug use. Compare In re K.W., cited by the majority, where the father had repeatedly refused to submit to court-ordered drug screens that had been found necessary to address his drug problem. 178 N.E.3d 1199. Furthermore, Mother did not refuse to do a court-ordered drug screen at the January 29, 2025, hearing; rather, the evidence is that Mother had already left before the time of the hearing at which the court ordered a drug screen, “if she appears.” Tr. at 38.

8.   Testimony that Mother was “rambling” in a conversation on the phone with DCS, tr. at 46, that she failed to speak at a team meeting, or that she behaved in a “nonchalant” manner, tr. at 71, are not conclusive evidence of drug use, as DCS suggests on appeal, and there is no DCS testimony or other evidence supporting such a claim. See Appellee's Br. at 17.

9.   The only evidence on this point are several references in a lengthy medical record that C.G. “reported that her mother regularly uses methamphetamine.” Ex. at 20. Again, this is not evidence of a fact that would support a CHINS determination, such as direct testimony from C.G., but merely a statement of “what someone said is true.” Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 159.

10.   DCS did not raise the rebuttable presumption of Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.

11.   FCM Berger, who interviewed C.G. regarding the allegations of abuse, testified that she did not see any “bruises, ․ marks, ․ [or] welts” on C.G. and had “no indication that [C.G.] was inappropriately disciplined for lying” to Mother “beyond what [C.G.] relayed to” the DCS worker. Tr. at 56.

Tavitas, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., concurs. Bailey, J., dissents with separate opinion.