B.S. (Mother) and D.W. (Father) Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.S. (Mother) and D.W. (Father) (collectively, Parents) separately appeal the trial court's involuntary termination of their parental rights to K.S. (Child). In this consolidated appeal, Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child, born December 20, 2016.¹ At the time, the family lived in Tennessee. While living in Tennessee, Mother, who has Type 1 diabetes and suffers from chronic lower back pain and neuropathy in her legs and feet, participated in pain management services and was prescribed oxycodone and morphine. In 2018, the family moved to Indiana to live with Child's maternal grandmother. Mother sought out pain management services in Indiana but had difficulty maintaining continuity of treatment and eventually turned to a family member as her source for pain medications. Mother believed the pain pills she was getting through the family member were oxycodone. Father also took the same pills as Mother for his health issues.

[4] On August 24, 2022, DCS family case manager (FCM) Beverly Clancy went to the family's home to investigate allegations of deplorable home conditions. FCM Clancy noted that the front yard was covered in debris and garbage, inside the home was cluttered with debris and objects covering the couches, there were quite a few dogs and animal waste throughout, and the stairs to the second story of the home were impassable. At that time, Mother admitted to being on oxycodone and morphine pills, but she was unable to provide proof of a prescription. FCM Clancy returned to the home on August 29 and noted that the conditions had improved, but she was still unable to access the entire home. During this visit, Parents agreed to submit to a drug screen, the results of which showed Mother tested positive for oxycodone and fentanyl and Father tested positive for THC and fentanyl. Both were surprised that they tested positive for fentanyl. It was at this point that Parents became aware that the pills they were getting from the family member contained fentanyl.

[5] In early September 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (CHINS) due to home conditions and Parents’ illegal substance use. DCS did not remove Child from the home at that time. The court held an initial hearing and entered interim orders focused primarily on substance abuse. The court also ordered family preservation services to help keep Child in the home while DCS worked with the family. At the continued initial hearing on October 19, 2022, Parents admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition. The court proceeded to a dispositional hearing and ordered Parents to participate in services, including, a Family Recovery Court (FRC)² evaluation; a separate substance abuse evaluation and follow all recommendations; a family preservation services evaluation; and random drug screens. Parents were also ordered to sign necessary releases of information and stay in touch with DCS and service providers. The court permitted Child to remain in the home.

[6] On December 16, 2022, the court issued an emergency order for the removal of Child from Parents’ home after Child tested positive for fentanyl.³ Child was initially placed in relative care but later moved to a pre-adoptive foster placement. At a January 18, 2023 review hearing, the court found that Parents had complied with the case plan and were participating in services. The court modified the dispositional decree and ordered Parents to participate in supervised visits and the services recommended by FRC. Parents regularly participated in visitation with Child.

[7] FCM Elissa Affeld was assigned in September 2022 to monitor the in-home CHINS and remained assigned to Parents’ case until March 2023. During her assignment, Parents began participating in FRC, although they ultimately did not progress through the phases of FRC and never achieved any period of sobriety during her tenure. Regarding other services, FCM Affeld found Parents to be responsive and cooperative, and she noted that through family preservation services, Parents made improvements to the condition of the home. FCM Affeld noted that as recommended by a family preservation evaluation, Parents enrolled in a Level 3 intensive outpatient program (IOP), but they never attended any required group sessions. FCM Affeld opined that Parents’ main issues were “pre-existing medical health issues and extensive drug use.” Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 80.

[8] In March 2023, DCS moved to terminate Parents from FRC due to violations of FRC rules. Although Mother demonstrated that she was “motivated” to achieve sobriety through her participation in some of the services, she had failed to attend all FRC sessions, abstain from using illegal drugs, submit to random drug screens, complete all assessments, and attend all scheduled appointments. Transcript Vol. 2 at 175. Father had progressed to Phase 1 of the program but did not progress any further. Thereafter, FRC delayed termination and modified Parents’ FRC requirements to be less demanding to help Parents achieve success.

[9] At an April 2023 review hearing, the court found that Parents had complied with the case plan and that they had enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations, but that the cause of Child's placement outside the home had not been alleviated. Parents were cooperating with DCS and had participated in case planning and periodic case reviews, and they were visiting Child. The main concern remained Parents’ substance abuse.

[10] At some point between April and July 2023, Mother tried MAT but voluntarily withdrew herself from the treatment after a couple of days. In July 2023, Mother attended a detoxification residential program but ended up in a hospital after she developed an abscess under her arm. Father likewise attempted MAT and produced negative drug screens for about a week before he withdrew himself from treatment. Father then tried to stop taking fentanyl on his own but suffered serious health issues, which required that he have a stent placed in his heart. At one point, Father developed a severe wound in his leg and was hospitalized for five days. Father was unable to participate in services for about a month following his hospitalization.

[11] In May 2023, FCM Amanda McKee was assigned to Parents’ case. FCM McKee confirmed that Parents had completed a substance abuse assessment and noted that Parents were participating in fully supervised visits and actively participating in Child and Family Team Meetings (CFTMs) with DCS during her tenure. FCM McKee noted that during a three-month period ending in July 2023, Mother attended forty-nine home-based casework appointments and thirteen IOP treatments. FCM McKee talked to Parents about inpatient treatment, but they both seemed unwilling to participate in such due to health issues. At some point between July and October 2023, Mother attended inpatient treatment but left after a couple of days “due to safety concerns.”⁴ Transcript Vol. 2 at 204. Overall, in the six months she was assigned to the case, FCM McKee did not feel as though Parents made any positive strides toward sobriety.

[12] In June 2023, a court appointed special advocate (CASA) assigned to Child requested emergency modification of the dispositional order to suspend Mother's visits with Child. The basis for the request was that Mother had provided a laxative to Sibling, which Sibling then gave to Child. This resulted in Child's hospitalization for a urinary tract infection due to dehydration. Following a hearing on July 5, 2023, Mother's visits with Child were reinstated but were restricted to therapeutic visits. The parties agreed that Mother did not intend to harm Child. While Mother's visits were temporarily suspended, Father continued to visit with Child. Father's visits were also restricted to therapeutic visits after he provided a large sum of cash to Sibling, who then used the money to buy a cell phone without her placement's knowledge. By the time of the July 2023 review hearing, Parents had regressed to partial compliance with the case plan, and they both continued to test positive for illegal substances.

[13] At the permanency hearing held in November 2023 and January 2024, the court again found that Parents had partially complied with the case plan. Acknowledging that they had completed some services, the court noted that Mother continued to test positive for illegal substances and had not been compliant with inpatient treatment, MAT, or with using a recovery coach. The court found that Father was noncompliant with inpatient treatment, Level 3 substance abuse disorder therapy, and visitation with Child. The court also noted Mother had been terminated from FRC in November 2023 and that in December 2023, Father asked to be removed from the program. The court approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption. The court also ordered Father to participate in individual therapy and anger management.

[14] In November 2023, FCM Scott Bradford was assigned to manage the case. When he took over, Parents were participating in therapeutically supervised visits with Child. During CFTMs there was discussion about progressing to less restrictive visitation if Parents demonstrated that they were working toward sobriety. Between February and March 2024, FCM Bradford supervised the visits between Parents and Child because DCS could not find a therapist to supervise the visits. FCM Bradford observed that after the visits, Child regressed and reverted to “talking ․ in a baby talk kind of way. Giving simple answers more than usual.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 243.

[15] On April 4, 2024, DCS petitioned for the involuntary termination of Parents parental rights, which was amended on July 17, 2024. DCS alleged three separate statutory circumstances in support of termination of parental rights: (1) Child had been removed for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and, despite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, Parents had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Child being placed outside Parents’ home; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of Child.

[16] After an April 2024 review hearing, the court issued an order suspending Parents’ visits until they could produce negative drug screens for thirty consecutive days. The court noted that there had been problems during visitation that had a negative impact on Child and that Parents continued to struggle with sobriety. The court also ordered DCS to help facilitate Parents’ entry into inpatient treatment. FCM Bradford informed the court that Parents had reported that their medical conditions prevented them from attending inpatient treatment. FCM Bradford asked for medical documentation to support their claims, but Parents did not provide any to him.

[17] By July 2024, the court found that Parents had partially complied with the case plan. Their drug screens continued to return positive for illegal substances. Mother was participating in individual therapy but not group sessions or inpatient treatment. Father had not participated in inpatient detox, had not engaged with a peer recovery coach, and had not participated in substance abuse therapy. At that time, Mother reported that she was medically cleared to go to inpatient treatment, but after the hearing, she did not attend.

[18] In late September/early October 2024, Parents started a MAT program at Porter-Starke. The program in which they participated utilized methadone. By the end of October, Parents were testing negative for fentanyl but continued to test positive for other illegal substances such as marijuana. Mother explained that she used marijuana to help with the nausea that resulted from the methadone treatment and withdrawal of fentanyl. By late December 2024, Parents were testing negative for all illegal substances. One week in early January 2025, Parents missed drug screening appointments, resulting the thirty-day continuous clock starting over. The following week, Parents again tested negative for all substances. One week before the fact-finding hearing on the termination petition, Parents achieved the goal of thirty-consecutive days of clean screens and their visitation with Child was reinstated. For the first time in ten months, Parents participated in a virtual therapeutic visitation with Child.

[19] Following a review hearing in December 2024, the court ordered additional services for Child, including family therapy with her placement and casework services that would focus on skills training. Child's placement was ordered to participate in parenting education.

[20] The court held the fact-finding hearing on the termination petition on February 10 and 27, 2025. Parents were still participating in the MAT program at Porter-Starke and had been using methadone since October 2024. At the hearing, FCM Bradford opined that Parents would need at least five to six months of clean drug screens and continue to be participating in other services for reunification with Child to be a possibility. He was hesitant to express confidence in Parents’ ability to maintain sobriety given the fact that they had previously attempted and failed MAT treatments. FCM Bradford expressed concern with the amount of time Child has been out of Parents’ home and emphasized Child's need for permanency in stating that termination was in Child's best interests and in recommending termination of parental rights. He testified that he was “happy that [Parents] are getting clean drug screens, but I don't know that that would make much of a difference at this point because it has been so long.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 228. He also expressed concern about Parents’ willingness to maintain their sobriety if their parental rights were terminated given that Father asked him if they would still be ordered to participate in services if such were to happen but acknowledged that his concern was “speculation.” Id. at 230.

[21] FCM Bradford also testified that he tried to follow up on the initial concern regarding the conditions of the home. In the weeks leading up to the termination hearing, he had stopped by Parents home on two occasions but Parents were not home. FCM Bradford left a card in the door requesting that Parents contact him; Parents never did. By the time of the termination hearing, FCM Bradford had not been able to assess the current conditions of the home.

[22] As of the second day of the fact-finding hearing, Parents claimed that they had not used fentanyl in one-hundred forty-nine days. Mother attributed her recent sobriety to the fact that she “wanted to live for [her] babies.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 7. She testified that the methadone treatment this time helped her get to the point she is at, and she had no intentions of using drugs again. She planned to continue with the methadone treatment and had started seeing an endocrinologist to get her Type 1 diabetes under control, which, in turn, should lessen the severity of the neuropathy that she experiences in her legs and feet. Mother testified that she “always wanted to be clean” but she “just had trouble getting started.” Id. at 11. Father attributed his recent sobriety with a change in his attitude. He said that his prior attempts with MAT did not work “because [he] didn't let it work.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 88.

[23] As to DCS's plan for Child, FCM Bradford informed the court that the plan was for Child to be adopted by her current placement. He noted that Child will be able to maintain her connection with Sibling.

[24] During the termination hearing, FCM Affeld testified that fentanyl is significantly more potent than heroin, and an addiction to fentanyl is more difficult and can take longer to treat than other substance addictions. She explained that prolonged use of fentanyl can deteriorate the heart, and withdrawal from fentanyl can have serious health implications, especially if there are underlying heart conditions. Methadone, or in some cases, suboxone, are used as part of MAT to assist someone through fentanyl addiction. With methadone treatment, there are five phases and the average treatment time to get through a methadone treatment program is approximately two years.

[25] On March 24, 2025, the court issued its termination order and concluded, among other things, that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal and continued placement outside Parents’ home would not be remedied. The court also concluded that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the best interests of Child. Mother and Father separately appeal the trial court's termination order. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

Standard of Review

[26] We recognize that “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the eldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[27] We have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[28] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-4-2(c)(1); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2. Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. Id. (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours).

[29] In its amended petition, DCS alleged the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c).⁵

Conditions Unlikely to be Remedied

[30] Mother and Father both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside their home will not be remedied. In determining the probability that conditions will change,

the court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court also must evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child․ A court may properly consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Moreover, a trial court “can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the parent's response to those services.”

In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted).

1. Condition of Home

[31] Mother first takes issue with the trial court's reliance on the condition of the home as a basis for termination. Mother argues that such was not the basis for the removal of the Child. Mother and Father both argue that the evidence shows that the condition of the home was much improved and therefore not a proper basis upon which to base termination.

[32] It is undisputed that DCS became involved with the family due to deplorable housing conditions. It was during assessment of their housing situation that Mother's and Father's substance abuse was discovered. It is also undisputed that the home conditions improved and did not initially warrant removal of Child from the home. Child was removed a few months later, however, after Child tested positive for fentanyl.

[33] While the conditions of the home were not the primary focus for much of the CHINS action, the housing conditions were still of import to the court's consideration of whether the conditions that resulted in Child's removal were likely to be remedied. The court recognized that the conditions in the home improved after DCS involvement, primarily due to family preservation services provided by DCS, but within a few months, Child was exposed to fentanyl. The home conditions likely played a role in Child's exposure. An assessment of the home conditions was pertinent to the court's termination decision.

[34] In any event, the trial court did not solely rely on the housing conditions in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in removal or continued placement outside the home would not be remedied. Thus, to the extent there was error, the court's findings regarding Parents’ substance abuse are sufficient to support termination.

2. Substance Abuse

[35] Mother and Father both point to the fact that at the time of the termination hearing, they had been free of fentanyl for five months and had tested negative for all illegal substances for more than thirty days. The court concluded, however, that their recent success with sobriety was not enough to overcome their history of repeated substance abuse over the course of two years. Indeed, their most recent sobriety started two years after DCS became involved and six months after DCS filed the TPR petition. Parents are to be commended for their efforts and ability to achieve this length of sobriety but, considering their history, continued sobriety is not a given. They have both tried to overcome their addiction using MAT on several previous occasions and were unsuccessful. Having reviewed the record, we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Parents’ history of substance abuse and unsuccessful treatment outcomes “shows a pattern of behavior suggesting that [Parents] will not be successful in their recovery process.” Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 82. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (holding that trial court did not clearly err by concluding that mother's substance abuse would not be remedied even though mother had not used illicit drugs in seventeen months because the first eleven months of this period occurred while mother was still in prison and mother had a pattern of substance abuse and criminal behavior).

[36] We also address separate arguments presented by Mother and Father. First, Mother takes issue with the court's finding that she “rarely complied” and “intermittently participated” in substance abuse services throughout DCS involvement. Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 82, 87. Mother's argument is unavailing.

[37] In its order terminating Mother's parental rights, the court made numerous findings that Mother had at times been compliant with services, including individual counseling, random drug screens, visitation, and assessments. In addition to Mother's successes, however, the court also noted areas where her participation was lacking. The court found that Mother did not complete inpatient treatment, unsuccessfully attempted MAT on two occasions, and was terminated from FRC. Over the course of two years following DCS's intervention, Mother continuously tested positive for fentanyl and other illegal substances, save a few short periods of time. In concluding that Mother's history showed a habitual pattern of substance abuse, the court did not discount her efforts and even recognized that Mother suffered from personal health issues that impeded her ability to achieve sobriety. Despite her efforts, however, the court concluded that Mother's history was the best predictor of her future success.

[38] Mother also argues that the trial court incorrectly identified her medical issues “as a checkmark against reunification.” Mother's Brief at 22. The trial court found that Mother suffered from medical problems that impeded her success at achieving sobriety. Mother does not dispute this. In the totality of the trial court's findings, we find that the trial court was simply referring to the fact that Mother still suffers from such medical conditions and recognizing the impact that such could have on her chances of achieving long-term sobriety. This finding is not clearly erroneous. In short, the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and those findings support the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the condition that resulted in Child's removal from and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[39] Father argues that the court failed to consider the “medical obstacles that delayed his ability to achieve and maintain sobriety” and how difficult it is to overcome an addiction to fentanyl in concluding that Father was not likely to overcome his addiction within a timeframe appropriate for Child. Father's Brief at 21. Father's argument in this regard is simply a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[40] Father also presents a separate argument, challenging the court's conclusion that Father “made it known ․ that he has no intention of continuing his sobriety if TPR is granted by the Court.” Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 87. This conclusion did not come from Father's direct testimony but rather, stems from FCM Bradford's testimony that at a CFTM meeting in February 2025, Father asked if he would be required to continue with services if his parental rights were terminated, which caused FCM Bradford to question whether, in the event of termination, Father would go back to using illegal substances. In contrast, Father testified that he was committed to maintaining his sobriety because he wanted to be reunited with Child. We agree with Father that the trial court's findings and conclusion are not supported by the evidence in the record. This conclusion, however, is not the only support for the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights. As noted herein, the trial court focused on Father's history of substance abuse and prior unsuccessful treatment outcomes over the course of two and one-half years as the predominate reason for terminating Father's parental rights.

Best Interests

[41] Mother and Father both argue that the trial court's determination that termination is in the best interests of Child is clearly erroneous. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). This includes a child's need for permanency because “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). In other words, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 223. A parent's issues with substance abuse that have not been addressed and remedied and pose a risk to their child's safety is “sufficient alone to support the trial court's conclusion that the best interests of the [child] are served by terminating parental rights.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1159.

[42] Mother argues that termination of her parental rights is not in Child's best interests. She maintains that she has made sustained efforts at improving and that she is strongly bonded with Child. With regard to the former, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that she and Father have made “virtually no progress towards reunification.” Mother's Appendix at 83. She again points to the most recent stint of sobriety that she and Father have achieved. Mother's argument in this regard is simply a request to reweigh the evidence. Here, FCM Bradford testified that Child needed permanency and that termination was in Child's best interests. Child was receiving needed care and issues were being addressed by Child's placement. Given Parents’ history with substance abuse and the fact that they would need six months or more to prove success with their recent sobriety, the court concluded that Child would not benefit from such prolonged uncertainty. We will not second-guess the trial court in this regard.

[43] Father challenges that trial court's finding that Child has “thrived” in her current placement. Id. Father points out that FCM Bradford testified that Child was “doing all right” in her pre-adoptive home but that there had been some issues related to Child's mental health, Child's diagnosis of ADHD, and Child being bullied at school. Transcript Vol. 2 at 237. Aside from FCM Bradford's testimony, Father notes that DCS presented no evidence from either Child's therapist or Child's placement about Child's well-being. Although FCM Bradford and the court did not use the same term for describing Child's current well-being, the court noted that Child was participating in services and health care appointments and that in her pre-adoptive home she was able to maintain contact with Sibling.

[44] In determining the best interests of Child, the court did not ignore the fact that Mother and Father had recently achieved thirty days of clean drug screens; rather, reading the court's order in its totality, the court clearly weighed such against their history of failing to achieve and maintain sobriety over the preceding two years. The court focused on the length of time of DCS involvement and Parents’ inability to achieve sobriety lasting more than a few days until after the termination petition was filed. In short, Child's need for permanency was of utmost importance for the court.⁶ We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in this regard.

[45] We reject Mother's and Father's separate challenges to the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. As the trial court stated, termination of parental rights provides Child “with a clear path to permanency.” Mother's Appendix at 83.

[46] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother has another minor child, J.S. (Sibling), who also was living with Parents.

2.   FRC is designed to provide participants with support in navigating the substance abuse treatment systems, such as inpatient and outpatient programs and medication-assisted treatment (MAT), as they seek to establish and maintain sobriety and a sense of accountability through, among other things, frequent drug screening and individual and group therapy. FRC is a four- or five-phase program that is set up to be completed in nine to twelve months but typically takes up to eighteen months.

3.   Sibling was also removed from the home and placed with her biological father in Tennessee

4.   Mother reported to FCM McKee that there was substance abuse occurring inside the facility.

5.   In her brief, Mother points out that the court included in its termination order, under its Conclusions of Law heading, a section titled “Unlikely to Substantially Comply.” The court's conclusions in this section mirror the language of I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(7). Mother states that “[d]ue process and I.C. § 31-35-2-4 preclude the trial court from terminating Mother's parental rights on grounds not alleged in DCS's Amended Petition.” Mother's Brief at 12.The State concedes this point and therefore, we will not consider this basis for termination. Nevertheless, we find that, even assuming error, any such error in this regard is harmless, as DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that termination was also supported by a separate and independent statutory basis. See In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that failure to include required information for termination basis was harmless where termination petition also alleged independent basis for termination).

6.   In its findings, the court stated: “CASA agrees that termination is in the best interests of Child.” Mother's Appendix Vol. 2 at 83. Child's CASA, however, did not testify at the termination hearing. Counsel appearing on behalf of CASA stated in closing that it was in Child's best interests for Parents’ rights to be terminated. The trial court's finding in this regard is not supported by evidence admitted at the termination hearing.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.