Joshua Boyne, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joshua Boyne appeals his conviction of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief.¹ Boyne argues the State failed to prove he was the person who threw a decorative fountain through Gail Culley's kitchen window. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Boyne and Culley dated for approximately a year and a half and ended their relationship in June or July of 2023. Then, on August 21, 2023, just before 6:00 p.m., Boyne began knocking on Culley's back door. When Culley answered, Boyne asked to come inside to talk, but Culley refused. They argued for a couple of minutes while standing at the door, and Boyne tried to push the door open so that he could enter, but Culley shut and locked the door. After closing the door, Culley turned and began walking “through the hallway to the kitchen.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21.) Approximately twenty seconds later, Culley “heard a big crash, I got to the kitchen and the kitchen window was broke. And there was the fountain laying in the kitchen window.” (Id.) The fountain, which weighed approximately six pounds and measured about eighteen inches tall by twelve inches wide, had been sitting on a table on Culley's back deck between the back door and the kitchen window. Culley looked out the broken window immediately after hearing the crash, but she saw no one in the backyard.

[3] Culley telephoned her sister-in-law, who came to the house and called the police. Police responded to the scene and photographed the damage to Culley's window and kitchen. Approximately six months later, Boyne called Culley and offered to pay for the window.

[4] The State charged Boyne with Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. After a bench trial, the trial court found Boyne guilty as charged and sentenced Boyne to 180 days, which the court suspended to supervised probation.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Boyne challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Our Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated our standard of review for such questions:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [fact-finder].” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the [fact-finder]’s determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).

[6] To convict Boyne of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, the State was required to prove that Boyne “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damage[d] or deface[d] property of another person without the other person's consent.” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a). Boyne argues the State failed to prove he was the person who threw the fountain through Culley's window. We cannot agree.

[7] To prove a defendant was the one who committed the charged offense, the State must present more than just that the defendant had the opportunity to commit the offense. Shepherd v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1209, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. However, proof of identity does not have to be “unequivocal.” Scheel v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1278, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied)), trans. denied. Instead, “[i]dentity may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting Cherry, 57 N.E.3d at 877). “Circumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense.” Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citation omitted).

[8] In this case, the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence is that Boyne threw the fountain through Culley's window. Boyne was present at Culley's back door only twenty to thirty seconds before the window broke. He was upset that Culley refused to let him inside her house, and he had even attempted to force his way in. The fountain had been sitting on a table between the back door and the kitchen window. Boyne was the only person in the backyard during his conversation with Culley, and no one was in the backyard when Culley looked immediately after hearing the crash. Finally, approximately six months later, Boyne called Culley and offered to pay for the broken window. While Culley did not see Boyne throw the fountain into her window, Boyne was the only person in the vicinity when the window was broken.² He was upset with Culley and six months later he offered to pay for the window. The evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable finder of fact to infer Boyne threw the fountain into Culley's window.

Conclusion

[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Boyne of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, and we accordingly affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a).

2.   Boyne attempts to analogize his case to R.L.H. v. State, 738 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), in which we held the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate R.L.H. had thrown a brick through a window. Id. at 317. However, the circumstances therein are distinguishable because R.L.H. was one of two juveniles present when a brick was thrown through a window and no evidence clarified which juvenile threw the brick. Id. at 316-17. Here, Boyne was the only person present in Culley's backyard prior to the fountain being thrown through the window, and no one else was in her backyard after the fountain was thrown through the window. In this circumstance, R.L.H. does not control.

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.