THOMAS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Pamela Thomas appeals the three-year sentence imposed by the trial court following her guilty plea to level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm. Thomas asserts that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. Finding that she has not met her burden to demonstrate that her sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Although the guilty plea transcript reveals a small amount about the nature of Thomas's offense, a more detailed version exists in the probable cause affidavit. Thomas cites the affidavit in her brief, and her presentence investigation report incorporates the probable cause affidavit by directing the reader to the affidavit for the official version of events surrounding her crime. See Appellant's Br. at 5; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 77. Therefore, we look to the affidavit for details of her offense.

[3] On May 20, 2023, in Ripley County, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop of Thomas's vehicle for speeding. After smelling a marijuana odor emitting from the vehicle, the officer searched Thomas's purse and found marijuana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1338 | November 12, 2025 Page 2 of 11 inside; Thomas also had a firearm in her purse. A small bag of methamphetamine was found in the vehicle's center console. Thomas was arrested, and the State charged her with level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On May 30, Thomas posted bond and was released from jail.

[4] In February 2024, while on pretrial release from the May 2023 incident, Thomas was charged in Fayette County with class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In September, Thomas resolved the Fayette County case by agreeing to a pretrial diversion.

[5] On February 5, 2025, Thomas pled guilty to the level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm charge that stemmed from the May 2023 incident. In exchange, the State dismissed the misdemeanor charges stemming from the incident, along with felony and misdemeanor drug charges that had been filed in a separate Ripley County case that was pending at that time. Thomas's sentence for the level 5 felony conviction was left to the trial court's discretion.

[6] In April 2025, Thomas gave birth to a child. Thomas's sentencing hearing was held on May 1. Thomas offered testimony from her sister, and she testified on her own behalf. Thomas testified that she was forty-one years old, lived with her parents and her sister, and had been employed until about one month before giving birth to her child. She told the court that when she gave birth, she underwent an emergency C-section. She also told the court that she was a single mother because the father of her child was incarcerated.

[7] Thomas testified that she suffered from multiple health challenges, including bipolar major depressive disorder, high blood pressure, congestive heart failure, and throat cancer. Thomas further testified that her father had two “mini strokes” in May 2025 and had problems with his heart. Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. Thomas told the court about her prior criminal history, and she agreed with her counsel when asked if she had “issue[s] with running around with the wrong people[.]” Id. at 63.

[8] After closing arguments were presented, and after Thomas indicated that she did not wish to provide a statement of allocution, the trial court told Thomas the following regarding her proffered mitigating circumstances:

[The] Pre-Sentence Investigation indicates a mitigating factor[ ] of no history or delinquent or criminal activity[.] I disagree with that one. It looks like you have four previous arrests, unrelated to this one․ So that's not [a] mitigator. The other mitigating factor was indicated [sic] undue hardship to the person or dependent. Um, certainly you have a recent child. Um, but the child is currently living with your parents. And your sister's also living with your parents․ [I]t's not like you really were the primary caregiver or the provider for the, for a child, for an extended period of time, and the threat of going into prison would result [in] the child being left in the hands of the Department of Child Services, that would be an undue hardship․ So, I don't find that one persuasive either.

Id. at 75-76. As for aggravating circumstances, the trial court found none, telling Thomas:

I guess I would say there are no aggravating factors, although certainly you do have a history ․ of arrest, and you have a case pending at the time. So as opposed to a mitigating factor, if anything, it would be an aggravator, not a mitigator. Um, but I'm not gonna find either, um, there. Um, but if they were weighed, it would be more aggravating. Your history would be more aggravating than mitigating.

Id. at 77.

[9] Ultimately, the trial court found “no aggravators” and “no mitigators” and determined that the “appropriate” sentence to impose was “the advisory sentence.” Id. The court sentenced Thomas to an aggregate term of three years, with one year executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), one year served on home detention, and one year suspended to probation. Thomas now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Thomas asks us to revise her sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which states, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We apply a “ ‘holistic approach’ ” to our 7(B) review. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we “ ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.” Id. at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219). When reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the correct result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Thomas bears the burden to show that her sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218.

[11] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). As we assess the nature of the offense and character of the offender, “we may look to any factors appearing in the record.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Ultimately, whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[12] The two prongs of 7(B) review are “ ‘separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.’ ” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 218). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1338 | November 12, 2025 Page 6 of 11 militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[13] Regarding the nature of the offense, we observe that “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range for a level 5 felony is one to six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Thomas received the advisory sentence for her crime. “Since the advisory sentence is the starting point our General Assembly has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed, the defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that h[er] sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[14] Thomas asserts that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense because “[t]here was no evidence” that she “engaged in any violent conduct[,] harmed other people[,] resisted law enforcement or was uncooperative with law enforcement's investigation”; she “did not brandish the firearm or use [it] at any time” during the traffic stop; and she “admitted to” the level 5 felony offense, which involved the “possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm.” Appellant's Br. at 10. While Thomas's offense, arguably, is not the most egregious, our Supreme Court has held that drug offenses are not victimless crimes because “distributing or possessing even small amounts of drugs threatens society.” State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 373 (Ind. 2021). Therefore, we decline to revise Thomas's aggregate sentence in light of the nature of her offense.

[15] We reach a similar conclusion regarding Thomas's character. We assess a defendant's character by engaging in a broad consideration of her qualities. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). An offender's character is shown by her “ ‘life and conduct.’ ” Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). A typical factor we consider when examining a defendant's character is criminal history. McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[16] Thomas stresses that she is now the mother of a young child, and it would be an “undue hardship for the new born child to have Thomas absent during [the] critical stages of development”; Thomas has a history of gainful employment and plans to return to her previous employment when she receives a release from her doctor; she has bipolar disorder and numerous medical challenges; her father suffers from health problems; she takes “full responsibility” for her actions and has “cut off relationships with individuals who were bad influences”; she has a minimal criminal history, and she has been assessed as a low risk to reoffend. Appellant's Br. at 11-12.

[17] Thomas, however, is no stranger to the criminal justice system. She has a prior drug-related conviction for similar conduct—a 2010 conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana. She was on pretrial release when she committed the instant level 5 felony offense and also when she committed the Fayette County misdemeanor possession of marijuana offense, which she resolved by agreeing to a pretrial diversion. Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character and demonstrates that she was not deterred by previous contact with the criminal justice system. Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[18] As for Thomas's claim that her incarceration will cause an undue hardship because she has a young child, we note that a trial court “ ‘is not required to find that a defendant's incarceration would result in undue hardship upon h[er] dependents.’ ” Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d 695, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied), trans denied. “Many persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). While Thomas's sentence may impose a hardship on her child, she has failed to identify special circumstances that render this hardship undue. Indeed, Thomas testified that her mother and father could care for her child while she was incarcerated. Thus, we cannot say incarceration will cause undue hardship for the child.

[19] Regarding Thomas's bipolar disorder, she provides no evidence showing a nexus between the diagnosis and her criminal conduct. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024) (rejecting defendant's claim that his bipolar disorder rendered his sentence inappropriate because he provided “no evidence showing a nexus between” the diagnosis and his criminal conduct). And while we are sympathetic to Thomas's numerous medical challenges, her most serious diagnoses predate the instant offense and did not deter her from committing the offense.

[20] As for Thomas's employment history, her desire to care for her ill father, the responsibility she took for her actions, and her removal of bad influences from her life, we do not disregard these as positive attributes. However, they do not overshadow the poor character demonstrated by her criminal history and pretrial release violations. Therefore, we decline to revise Thomas's aggregate sentence in light of her character.

[21] In sum, Thomas has not met her burden to establish that the three-year sentence imposed by the trial court for the level 5 felony, with one year executed in the DOC and one year served on home detention, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or her character. Therefore, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[22] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.