IN RE: O.M. and R.M. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.S. (“Mother”) and J.M. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's dispositional order following the court's adjudication of their children O.M. and R.M. (collectively, “Children”) as children in need of services (“CHINS”). Parents present two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Parents to participate in a batterer's intervention program.

2. Whether the trial court deprived Parents of their right to due process when it ordered them to complete a batterer's intervention program.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents have two children, O.M., born October 31, 2019, and R.M., born January 26, 2024. Due to “respiratory problems,” R.M. was in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for eighteen days following her birth by C-section. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 47. R.M. was also having trouble putting on weight when she was finally sent home with Parents.

[4] On April 11, 2024, R.M. was hospitalized and diagnosed with a brain hemorrhage that required emergency surgery. A health care provider contacted DCS because the injury did not appear to be accidental. Parents told a DCS caseworker that the injury must have occurred when R.M. “head-butted” Father's collarbone during a feeding. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 19. An attending physician stated that R.M.’s injury was “not consistent with” that claim and was “likely inflicted.” Id. As a result, DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care.

[5] On April 12, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS. The trial court set the fact-finding hearing for June 3, but Mother filed a motion to continue the hearing, and it was reset for July 19. DCS filed a motion to continue, and it was reset for August 19. The fact-finding hearing began on August 19, and the court ordered that the hearing would conclude over two days in September. Then the trial court postponed the remainder of the hearing until October, but after delays and another motion to continue filed by Mother, the hearing did not conclude until February 7, 2025. On March 11, the trial court entered its order adjudicating the Children to be CHINS.

[6] On April 4, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. DCS had already referred both Father and Mother for a batterer's intervention program “because of the injuries that occurred to [R.M.]” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 99. By the time of the dispositional hearing, Father had already completed twenty-six of the expected forty-weeks of programming. But Father and Mother “could not [attend the program] simultaneously.”¹ Id. Moreover, the program that Father had been attending lost its accreditation. The DCS case manager supervisor, Hannah Smith, explained that DCS was looking for a program that Parents could attend virtually. Smith also explained that DCS was trying to find a program that would give Father credit for the twenty-six weeks he had already completed.

[7] During Smith's testimony, the following colloquy occurred:

Q: You're not asking the parents to admit that they caused the injury[ to R.M.], are you?

A: I am not. I think the thing with that is that if there is not a narrative for what occurred [where] one parent takes accountability for it, we have to then treat both parents as potential perpetrators of it and have them both go through services appropriate for that type of behavior.

Id. at 101. Mother's attorney then stated,

․ [Mother's] big concern is that the batterer's intervention program is a 40-week program. And we've already been a year; she's cooperated. I think both parents have been very cooperative with a lot of services, and we don't want to wait 40 weeks to get to a point to where they can get their children back, get reduced services, get reduced supervision of whatnot, and that's—and as my client just said to me a minute ago, she goes, “If I could do 40 hours of classes, but not have to wait 40 weeks,” she said she wants to cooperate in doing anything that will get her children back, but that's the big issue. And before now, we thought—she was told she had to go to—maybe drive an hour to get it, and that's a lot of services. They're already doing a lot of things, and with work and whatnot, that was going to be burdensome. The virtual [option] does help, but that's—we're asking to not do the batterer's intervention program unless it can be done in a shorter period of time.

Id. at 101-02.

[8] An attorney for DCS then stated:

We are not expecting the parents to admit to criminal conduct because obviously that would not be appropriate. It's quite possible parents don't know what happened, that it is an idiopathic injury. Okay. Fine. But parents do need to realize that the explanation of a traumatic birth does not account for the injury. Something happened to this child. And basically what it boils down to, Your Honor, is if they are so convinced that this is completely outside of their control, then all the services in the world don't change how they behave. Because, oh, this all had to do with the traumatic birth. We have to provide services to address the situation as it exists.

I can't say what happened. I don't know what happened. I'm not going to claim to know what happened. But I can say what didn't happen.

And it's not—these injuries—this constellation of injuries, are not a result of a traumatic birth [as now alleged by Parents]. And the Court did make that finding implicitly, if not explicitly, in finding the CHINS. So we are not looking for ․ one of the parents to say, yes, I hurt my child. But because of that, we have to treat the possibility that either one of them could have done so, which is why we need the batterer's intervention.

Id. at 105. The DCS attorney concluded as follows

[W]e would like to see the family assessment, the psych eval, and a start on the domestic batterer's [program]. Part of the thinking about coming back in 30 days, not only are we required to have the hearing within 12 months, but that puts a definite window so that if, for whatever reason, they can't get scheduled, parents aren't stuck in limbo, but they still have the opportunity to get things moving.

So we are not ready to move towards unsupervised visits. I understand parents’ desire. I understand this case has been going on for a while, but this is where we are today. I expect that we would be moving sooner than we would if this case maybe was just three months old, or two months old, and we were at the 60-day fact-finding, because we do have more history with parents. But we're not ready to do that yet, and I would recommend to both parents that they fully engage in services and request a [family team meeting] prior to the hearing that the Court is going to set.

THE COURT: Do you expect to receive—I guess I'm not sure how much progress will be made in the next 30 days. Batterer's intervention programs, it sounds like there's some process in the works, maybe trying to find what may be available․

* * *

[DCS Attorney:] What I'm hoping, Your Honor, is that parents can at least be enrolled in a batterer's intervention program within 30 days, [and] that the psychological evaluation can be calendared.

Id. at 115-16.

[9] The Court concluded by stating that Parents would not be required to “admit [to] anything” with regard to how R.M. was injured. Id. at 119. And with respect to the batterer's intervention program, the court stated:

The batterer's intervention program seems to be the biggest bone of contention, maybe. I understand each parent's concerns, and, sir, I certainly appreciate the fact that you made it 26 weeks in until they told ․ you [that] you couldn't go any further with that program. That wasn't your fault. I guess—I mean, having heard where the Department is and having some understanding of how they coordinate these things, they can't mandate that you be given credit for that. They've indicated that they'll advocate for that, they'll try to find a provider that will give you credit for that. I would certainly hope that whoever you end up working with will give you some credit for the fact that you made it over halfway through before having to stop due to circumstances out of your control.

So the Court's going to require the parties to go through that process, to engage in that service, hoping that each of you get[s] the credit that you deserve for whatever you've already done. And if you can't, I guess we can address that at a follow-up hearing, see where things stand and what we need to do about it at that point.

Id. at 119-20. And, in the written disposition report, the trial court ordered Parents to complete a batterer's intervention program “that meets DCS standards.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 130. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion

[10] Parents first contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered them to participate in an “eighty (80)[-]week class”² prior to reunification. Appellants’ Br. at 18. They maintain that the court “ordered this restrictive service without evidence that it is necessary for the safety of the community or in the best interests of the [C]hildren.” Id. at 19. Our standard of review is well settled:

A trial court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (citing A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Thus, we review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion. See In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is “against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[11] Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6(a) provides:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian;

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(6) provides a reasonable opportunity for the child's parent who:

(A) is incarcerated; and

(B) has maintained a meaningful role in the child's life;

to maintain a relationship with the child.

[12] Parents argue that DCS “presented no evidence that the safety of the community and the best interests of the child were served by” ordering them to participate in a batterer's intervention program that would take them a total of eighty weeks to complete. Appellants’ Br. at 20. Further, DCS did not have an approved batterer's intervention program in place and did not know when Parents could resume/start an approved program. In essence, Parents maintain that it is unreasonable for the court to order such a lengthy program when DCS would be required by statute to file petitions to terminate their parental rights only three months after the dispositional order.³

[13] However, DCS presented ample evidence to support the need for Parents to participate in this program. Neither parent could explain how R.M.’s life-threatening injury had occurred. And the evidence showed that it was an inflicted injury. DCS explained that it has to

treat [the incident] as though both [Parents] are potentially perpetrators of this injury to this child. And so that is where we are looking at potentially trying to get a batterer's intervention program of [sic] if there are similar underlying concerns of what maybe you might see in domestic violence, this injury was potentially caused by a shaking or a frustration, something similar to how you might see a situation kind of ramp up with, like, a domestic violence situation, so that's the best service we have to try and address that.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 181-82. Moreover, DCS explained that it is

sensitive to the fact this case is a couple of weeks shy of a year out. But that—while that is not parents’ fault, that is also not the Department's fault. Everybody's calendar was involved in creating this delay. I can't say, and neither can the supervisor say, that absolutely parents have to finish all 40 weeks before we will even consider changing things. That's not the way any of this works. But we also cannot say today, oh, in ten weeks it'll be fine. We have to see how things develop. That's why we're making these requests.

Tr. Vol. 3, p. 106. In other words, neither DCS nor the trial court is necessarily requiring Parents to complete the batterer's intervention program before reunification.

[14] Given the evidence that R.M.’s injury was inflicted and Parents were the sole caregivers at the time she sustained the injury, and given that neither DCS nor the trial court is predicating reunification on Parents’ completion of a batterer's intervention program, we cannot say that the trial court's order that Parents participate in that program is an abuse of discretion.

Issue Two: Due Process

[15] Parents next contend that the trial court deprived them of their right to due process when it ordered them to complete the lengthy batterer's intervention program “without justification that it is in the best interests of the children or for the safety of the community.” Appellants’ Br. at 17. In support of that contention, Parents repeat many of the same arguments in support of this contention that they advanced with respect to Issue One.

[16] As this Court has explained:

To state a claim for a violation of substantive due process, a party must show that the law infringes upon a fundamental right or liberty interest deeply rooted in our nation's history or that the law does not bear a substantial relation to permissible state objectives. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed.2d 772 (1997); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

As relevant to this case, the United States Supreme Court has held “the sanctity of the family” is protected “precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 52 L. Ed.2d 531 (1977). The Due Process Clause therefore protects freedom of personal choice in family life matters. In re T.H., 856 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also E.P. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Indeed, the courts of this state have long and consistently held that the right to raise one's children is essential, basic, more precious than property rights, and within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment․”). This includes a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child without undue interference by the state. In re T.H., 856 N.E.2d at 1250. The right is not unlimited, however, and the State has the authority under its parens patriae power to intervene when parents neglect, abuse, or abandon their children. Id.

In re F.S., 53 N.E.3d 582, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[17] Parents argue that due process requires that DCS provide them with services designed to achieve reunification “before termination of their parental rights.”⁴ Appellants’ Br. at 17. But neither DCS nor the trial court has stated that completion of the batterer's intervention programs is required for reunification. On the contrary, DCS explicitly stated that it would “see how things develop” once Parents are participating in the program. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 106. Given the severity of R.M.’s injury, we cannot say that the trial court's order constitutes undue interference by the State.

[18] Importantly, while DCS was required, by statute, to file petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights in August 2025, DCS promptly filed motions to dismiss those petitions due to Parents’ ongoing compliance with the disposition order.⁵ And the trial court dismissed those petitions on August 11. Thus, Parents’ justifiable concerns about the looming termination proceedings have been resolved.

[19] For all these reasons, Parents have not established that the trial court's order that they participate in a batterer's intervention program deprived them of their right to due process.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not include an explanation for why Parents cannot attend the program at the same time.

2.   Again, DCS explained that Parents could not take the forty-week batterer's intervention program at the same time, so they would have to spend a total of eighty weeks to complete the requirement.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(b) requires DCS to file a petition to terminate a parent's parental rights if the child has been removed from the parent's care for not less than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.

4.   DCS argues that Parents have waived this issue for our review. We disagree.

5.   We sua sponte take judicial notice of the termination proceeding, which was immediately dismissed, as the relevant documents are available to this Court through the Odyssey case management system. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state[.]”

Memorandum Decision by Judge Mathias

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.