HUNT v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Julius D. Hunt pleaded guilty to Level 1 felony burglary and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The Elkhart Circuit Court ordered Hunt to serve an aggregate thirty-three-year sentence, with twenty-seven years executed and six years suspended to probation. Hunt appeals his sentence and argues that the court considered an improper aggravating circumstance and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 3, 2024, Hunt forcibly entered a home on Harrison Street in Elkhart. Hunt believed that an occupant of the home had given his friend “bad drugs.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 16. Hunt entered the home intending to fight with that person. After forcing his way into the home, Hunt attacked Edwin Howleit, who suffered a head wound causing him extreme pain. Hunt also fired a firearm while inside the residence. Medics who responded to the scene believed that Howleit's head injury was a graze wound from a bullet.

[4] In response to a 9-1-1 call, police officers arrived at the home and saw Hunt fleeing from the building on foot. The officers chased after Hunt and eventually apprehended him. While the officers were attempting to place Hunt in handcuffs, Hunt forcibly resisted arrest.

[5] The State charged Hunt with Level 1 felony burglary and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. On February 13, 2025, Hunt pleaded guilty to the charges, and the parties agreed that any executed portion of Hunt's sentence would be capped at twenty-seven years.

[6] During the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the following aggravating circumstances: Hunt's criminal history, including that he had absconded from federal supervised release while serving his sentence for armed bank robbery on the date that he committed the offenses in this case, two failures to appear, his substance use on the date of these offenses, his failure to take advantage of rehabilitative programs previously offered to him, and that he possessed a firearm, which he used during the commission of the burglary. The court considered Hunt's guilty plea, expression of remorse, and his drug addiction as mitigating circumstances. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances, “taken individually or as a whole, outweigh[ed] any mitigating factors ․” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32.

[7] The trial court imposed a thirty-three-year sentence, with twenty-seven years executed and six years suspended to probation for his Level 1 felony burglary conviction. The court imposed a concurrent one-year sentence for the resisting law enforcement conviction. Hunt now appeals.

I. The Trial Court Properly Considered Hunt's Possession and Use of a Firearm as an Aggravating Circumstance

[8] Hunt claims that the trial court improperly considered that he possessed a firearm and shot Howleit as an aggravating circumstance; he alleges that the aggravator is not supported by the record. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[9] A trial court can abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91).

[10] We presume that the trial court rendered its sentencing decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence. See Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 905. Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). And “[a] single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023).

[11] Hunt argues that there is no evidence in the record to support the aggravating circumstance that he was armed with a firearm or that he shot Howleit. The probable cause affidavit, which was included in the presentence investigation report, contained the responding law enforcement officer's observation of a spent shell casing inside the burglarized home and the medic's observation that Howleit's wound was consistent with a graze wound from a bullet. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 85-86. Howleit told police that Hunt fired a gun inside the home. Id. at 86. And a firearm was found in the clothing that Hunt discarded while police officers were chasing him. Id. at 85.

[12] During the sentencing hearing, the trial court discussed Hunt's possession of the firearm, and Hunt did not deny possession of a firearm. Hunt only claimed that he did not shoot Howleit. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 36. And although the trial court did not explicitly state that it was taking judicial notice of the probable cause affidavit, the court was permitted to take judicial notice of the records in this case. See Ind. Evid. Rule 201(b).

[13] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court improperly considered this aggravating factor, the trial court found additional aggravating circumstances, and the court stated that each individual aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32. Hunt's criminal history by itself more than supports the trial court's decision to impose an aggregate sentence three years more than the advisory sentence for a Level 1 felony conviction. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b).

[14] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Hunt.

II. Hunt's Sentence is not Inappropriate

[15] Hunt claims that his thirty-three-year aggregate sentence, with twenty-seven years executed and six years suspended to probation is inappropriate in light of his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[16] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[17] The trial court may impose a sentence in the range of twenty to forty years for a Level 1 felony conviction, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). Hunt's thirty-three-year aggregate sentence is three years more than the advisory sentence, but his twenty-seven-year executed sentence falls short of the advisory sentence.

[18] Hunt argues only that his sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of his character. See Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (holding that, while reviewing courts must consider both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the defendant does not need to establish the sentence is inappropriate under both prongs of the Appellate Rule 7(B) and “revision may be warranted ‘where only one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor’ of the defendant”) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[19] Hunt argues that he has demonstrated “personal growth and improvement,” was “extremely remorseful for his conduct,” and expressed “his sincere desire to continue on the road to rehabilitation and recovery,” including drug recovery treatment. Appellant's Br. at 8. In sum, he contends that “his sincere efforts to reform are very compelling.” Id. at 8-9. At sentencing, Hunt noted that he has participated in classes and earned certificates in anger management and drug recovery. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 24. He admitted to making “terrible mistakes” when he committed his offenses but argued that his decision making was impaired because he was under the influence of marijuana. Id.

[20] The trial court noted Hunt's respectful conduct in court, found that he was remorseful, and considered that he accepted responsibility for his offenses. Id. at 29-30. However, the court observed that Hunt had not taken advantage of programming and alternative sanctions offered to him in the past. Hunt's criminal history is significant and includes two convictions for armed robbery. On the date that Hunt committed these offenses, he had absconded from supervised release on his federal conviction for armed bank robbery and had a pending arrest warrant for that violation. Hunt admitted that he has a substance abuse problem and has used illegal substances since he was a child. The court considered Hunt's request to serve a portion of his sentence in Recovery While Incarcerated and stated the court would consider modifying Hunt's sentence to serve time in that program if Hunt exhibited good behavior while incarcerated. Id. at 35.

[21] While Hunt's conduct shortly before he was sentenced in this case demonstrates that he wanted to improve and rehabilitate himself, we must also consider the evidence of his character that reflects his inability to lead a law-abiding life. Hunt's recent rehabilitative efforts are laudable, but they are not so compelling that we must conclude that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. And considering the nature of his burglary offense, we note that Hunt forcibly entered a home with the intent of fighting while in possession of a firearm, attacked a person inside the home, and caused the victim to suffer a head wound and severe pain. The brutal nature of Hunt's offense, and his decision to run from and forcibly resist law enforcement, also supports the trial court's decision to impose a thirty-three-year aggregate sentence.

[22] Finally, when he pleaded guilty Hunt agreed to a cap on his executed time of twenty-seven years, which is three years less than the advisory sentence. As contemplated by the parties when they entered into the plea agreement, that was the sentence the trial court imposed with an additional six-year sentence to be served on probation.

[23] For all of these reasons, we conclude that Hunt has not met his burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and Hunt's sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm the trial court's order sentencing Hunt to thirty-three years, with twenty-seven years executed and six years suspended to probation.

[25] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.