SMITH v. TUFFY TIRE AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE CENTER (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Christopher A. Smith appeals the Allen Superior Small Claims Court's judgment against him on his complaint against Tuffy Tire & Automotive Service Center (“Tuffy Tire”). Smith presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the small claims court abused its discretion when it denied Smith's Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 7, 2023, Smith brought his 2006 Nissan Armada (“the Armada”) to Tuffy Tire requesting service for a leaking “air ride system” and an alignment. Ex. p. 3. Tuffy Tire did not repair the air ride system, but it performed an alignment. On another occasion, Tuffy Tire repaired an issue with the exhaust manifold. Thereafter, Smith continued to have issues with the Armada, and he brought it back to Tuffy Tire many times “for the same problems, over and over.” Tr. p. 6. When Smith continued to experience problems with the Armada over the course of many months, and after making repairs himself and seeking repairs from other repair shops, Smith filed a complaint against Tuffy Tire alleging defective service and breach of contract. Smith sought $9,000 in damages.

[4] At the ensuing bench trial, Tuffy Tire presented testimony from Kenneth Smith (“Kenneth”), the owner of Tuffy Tire, and David Pratt, the operations manager for Tuffy Tire. Tuffy Tire presented testimony that the work done on the Armada had a thirty-day warranty on labor and a one-year warranty on parts. And both Kenneth and Pratt testified that any work Smith had performed on the Armada himself after Tuffy Tire had performed the relevant repairs voided any warranties. Smith admitted that he had installed new cam bolts on the Armada; Pratt testified that that work had voided any warranty on the alignment. And Smith testified that a Carfax report showed that Ft. Wayne Nissan had performed service on the exhaust system, which voided any warranty on the exhaust work previously done by Tuffy Tire.

[5] The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Tuffy Tire. In its findings, the small claims court found that Tuffy Tire had performed “all repairs and service on [the Armada] in a workmanlike manner.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 5. The small claims court also found as follows:

9. [Smith] made multiple self-repairs to his automobile including installing cam bolts, installing a new air-ride system, and installing different control arm bolts. [Smith] also had repairs and other work performed to his vehicle by other automotive repair shops in between the repairs and service provided by [Tuffy Tire].

10. Any work performed by [Smith] or another automotive repair shop in between the repairs and service provided by [Tuffy Tire], voided any warranty that [Tuffy Tire] offered. Therefore, [Smith] caused any warranty provided by [Tuffy Tire] to be voided and [Tuffy Tire] satisfied any and all warranties provided to [Smith].

Id.

[6] Smith filed a motion to set aside the judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(3). Smith alleged that Kenneth and Pratt had committed perjury during the bench trial and that the perjured testimony undermined the judgment for Tuffy Tire. The small claims court denied Smith's motion without a hearing. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Smith argues that the small claims court abused its discretion when it denied his Trial Rule 60(B)(3) motion without a hearing. Smith contends that his

motion detailed egregious misconduct by [Tuffy Tire] and its witness, including perjury on critical issues, which infected the original judgment. [Smith] proffered evidence (in the form of invoices, digital records, and [Tuffy Tire]’s own published warranty) demonstrating that the defense's trial testimony was false in key respects.

Appellant's Br. at 14. Specifically, Smith maintains that Tuffy Tire offered perjured testimony regarding the number of times he brought the Armada in for service; the length of the applicable warranties; and whether Smith's conduct had voided any warranties. In support of his Trial Rule 60(B)(3) motion, Smith attached copies of two warranties that are undated and show no connection to any service Tuffy Tire provided to him.

[8] We generally review a trial court's decision under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. An abuse of discretion also occurs if the trial court's judgment is contrary to law. See, e.g., Ayers v. Stowers, 200 N.E.3d 480, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[9] In Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73-74 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court explained the requirements under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) as follows:

Indiana courts applying the “fraud” provision of subsection (B)(3) of Indiana Rule 60 have required a movant to show that fraud prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting the movant's case. See, e.g., Morgan County v. Ferguson, 712 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Humbert v. Smith, 655 N.E.2d 602, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 664 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 1996)) ․ This is consistent with federal authority construing FRCP 60(b)(3), which requires a movant to demonstrate that the “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct” prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting the movant's case at trial. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, at § 60.43[1][c] (citing cases). This showing is required because subsection (b)(3) creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality of judgments. If a party cannot show that fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct substantially prejudiced the party's presentation of the party's case, a court should not set aside an otherwise final judgment.

Both the Indiana and federal rules expressly require a party moving for relief for “fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct” to show “a meritorious claim or defense.” This requires a showing “that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, at § 60.24[1]. In Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 1999), we held that Indiana Rule 60(B)’s requirement of a meritorious defense, like its federal counterpart, merely requires a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense, that is, a showing that “will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” The movant need only “present evidence that, if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.” Id. (emphasis added).

[10] In his motion to set aside the judgment, Smith alleged that Tuffy Tire had presented perjured testimony on several issues, including whether the warranties were voided by work done on the Armada by himself or others. However, in support of his contentions, Smith submitted a copy of a Tuffy Tire warranty which explicitly states that the warranty does “not apply to your repaired vehicle if it has been damaged by ․ alteration or ‘tampering with.’ ” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 10. That exhibit, combined with testimony that work on the vehicle done by Smith or other repair shops would constitute “tampering” and void any warranty shows that Smith's allegation of fraud on this issue is entirely without merit. See Tr. p. 51. And, regardless, Smith's allegation of fraud does not speak to how the purported fraud interfered with the presentation of his case; he had a full and fair opportunity to present the warranties as evidence at trial if doing so would have impeached the witnesses.

[11] In sum, Smith has not presented evidence that, “if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.” See Outback Steakhouse of Florida, 856 N.E.2d at 73-74. The trial court found, and the undisputed evidence shows, that Smith “made multiple self-repairs to his automobile including installing cam bolts, installing a new air-ride system, and installing different control arm bolts[, and Smith] also had repairs and other work performed to his vehicle by other automotive repair shops in between the repairs and service provided by [Tuffy Tire].” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 5. Furthermore, the trial court found that Smith had “caused any warranty provided by [Tuffy Tire] to be voided” as a result of those other repairs. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Smith has not made a prima facia meritorious claim based on the allegedly perjured testimony, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Smith's Trial Rule 60(B)(3) motion without a hearing.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.