M.A. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.A. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child K.A., II (“Child”).¹ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the mother of Child who was born in July 2016. On April 24, 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that six-year-old Child had missed seventeen days of school with twelve unexcused absences and that Mother had “appeared under the influence.” Exhibits Volume I at 3. On May 16, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”).² Specifically, the petition alleged that Mother had engaged in educational neglect, substance abuse, and had mental health issues. Child was removed from the home on an emergency basis and placed with his paternal great-grandfather and step-great-grandmother (“Great-Grandparents”). On May 18, 2023, DCS filed a motion for leave to file an amended CHINS petition, alleging that it had “learned law enforcement has been called to the home on several occasions for domestic violence,” that some violence occurred in Child's presence, that Mother was having “multiple people in and out of the home, and [Child] is still not going to school.” Id. at 32. The court granted DCS's motion.

[3] Following a CHINS factfinding hearing, the trial court entered its order adjudicating Child a CHINS on July 18, 2023. Specifically, the court found that: Mother had failed to send Child to school for thirty-one days; Child was exposed to domestic violence on multiple occasions and was also the victim of domestic violence; multiple people have expressed concerns regarding Mother's mental health; Mother had not visited with Child in a month; and Mother was displaying irrational behavior. Accordingly, the court found that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. The court held a dispositional hearing on July 31, 2023. Mother failed to appear. The court entered a dispositional order on August 14, 2023, requiring Mother to: complete parenting and substance use assessments and follow all recommendations; participate in random drug screens; meet with medical and psychiatric personnel as directed; attend to all medical and mental health needs; and participate in visitation as ordered.

[4] From June to December 2023, Mother failed to visit Child or participate in ordered services. Her service referrals were closed due to noncompliance. Mother was unemployed, her home was in foreclosure, and she did not have any utilities in the home. From December 2023 to April 2024, Mother participated in some supervised visitation with Child. She completed a family functioning assessment and a substance abuse evaluation in January 2024 but failed to follow recommendations that included therapy and medication management. The family functioning assessment indicated that Mother suffered from psychosis and anxiety. Mother also gave birth to another child, Au.A., in January 2024. Au.A. was removed from Mother's care a month after her birth due to reports of neglect and Mother's bizarre and delusional behavior.

[5] The court held a review hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found that Mother had partially complied with Child's case plan. Mother had submitted to all drug screens and the screens were negative for illegal substances. Mother was regularly participating in supervised visitation. The court approved a permanency plan of reunification for Child.

[6] The court held a review hearing on July 15, 2024. The court found that Mother had not complied with Child's case plan. During the review period, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and her mental health and housing stability declined substantially. Although she attended some home-based therapy sessions, she missed several and the referral was ultimately closed. Mother participated inconsistently with supervised visitation. The court found that Child was progressing well in his relative placement. Child was in therapy and making considerable progress. The court approved a concurrent permanency plan for Child of reunification and adoption.

[7] On August 29, 2024, DCS filed a verified petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The court held a review hearing on October 7, 2024. The court found that Mother had not complied with Child's case plan, had participated in no services, and had not visited with Child since April 2024.

[8] The termination factfinding hearing was held on December 10, 17, and 20, 2024. DCS presented the testimony of Father, Mother, Step-Great-Grandmother, multiple service providers, Family Case Manager Tiffany Rustman (“FCM Rustman”), Therapist Cierra Gregory (“Therapist Gregory”), and Court Appointed Special Advocate Lisa Turner (“CASA Turner”). Mother testified on her own behalf.

[9] FCM Rustman testified regarding Mother's financial and housing instability, her declining mental health, and her March 2024 positive drug screen for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mother claimed to FCM Rustman that her drug screen “was tampered with” and “wasn't true because she doesn't use meth.” Transcript Volume II at 147. FCM Rustman recounted Mother's severe paranoia and trust issues which made Mother unwilling or unable to consistently comply with services, including visitation with Child. FCM Rustman stated that Mother's inconsistency “really hurts” Child and causes him substantial anxiety. Id. at 161. FCM Rustman opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests and that DCS needed to move forward with permanency for Child.

[10] Therapist Gregory testified that she had served as Child's therapist for a little over two years. She stated that she had worked extensively with Child on “[e]motion management, reducing negative self-talk and processing trauma.” Id. at 116. She explained how Child's negative “behaviors increased” after visits with Mother, and that Child needed additional therapy sessions to cope. Id. at 119. She stated that Child's anxiety and trust issues had improved substantially over the course of the case, and that Great-Grandparents have been “support[ive] of him, listening to him, providing him that safe and secure, stable environment where he feels like he can talk to them about anything.” Id. at 118. Therapist Gregory stated that, as far as permanency is concerned, Child “wants to stay with” Great-Grandparents. Id. at 121.

[11] CASA Turner testified that she had been working as an advocate for Child for almost a year. She noted that, throughout her time on the case, Mother had not consistently visited with Child. She further testified that Mother had not been compliant with services. CASA Turner stated that Child “was basically non-verbal” and “was acting out” at school when he was first placed with Great-Grandparents, but he was now doing quite well and “seems to be pretty happy.” Id. at 82. CASA Turner noted that Mother had neither financial nor housing stability, and that the “paranoia she seems to have about things” was concerning. Id. at 85. CASA Turner stated that she believed it was in Child's best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated and for him to be adopted by his current placement.

[12] On March 3, 2025, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order terminating Mother's parental rights. Specifically, the court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside Mother's care would not be remedied; continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child; Mother failed to substantially comply with Child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve months following Child's removal; termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests; and there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child, that being adoption.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. Regarding petitions seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:[3]

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

[14] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent Mother does not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[15] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside her care will not be remedied.⁴ In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id.

[16] The record reveals that Child was removed from Mother's care due to educational neglect, Mother's untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence. During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother participated in only some services, including supervised visitation with Child, and did so inconsistently. Several ordered services were closed due to noncompliance. Moreover, Mother's housing was unstable, she tested positive for illegal substances, and her mental health declined substantially during the review periods. Although Mother points to her recent efforts and reengagement with services, it was the trial court's prerogative to balance any recent improvements against Mother's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In light of the unchallenged findings and the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's care will not be remedied.

[17] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. She suggests that termination of her rights will be “detrimental” to Child and that Great-Grandparents’ advanced ages should be taken into consideration in evaluating Child's best interests. Appellant's Brief at 23.⁵ In determining the best interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[18] FCM Rustman opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. She emphasized that Mother had not substantially complied with services and that her visitation with Child had never progressed beyond supervised visitation. FCM Rustman stated that her termination and adoption recommendation was based on the “safety, stability, well-being and permanency” of Child. Transcript Volume II at 133. Similarly, CASA Turner opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. CASA Turner stated that she was concerned with Mother's “paranoia” and that things “do not seem very stable” in the home. Id. at 84-85. She stated that she had no concerns regarding Child's placement with and adoption by Great-Grandparents. Moreover, we observe that the trial court was well aware of Great-Grandparents’ advanced ages when making its best interests determination.

[19] In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record outlining Mother's historical inability to provide safety and stability to Child and to remedy the conditions resulting in removal, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination order.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the rights of Child's father, A.A., (“Father”) who does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The record indicates that Child was also subject to a CHINS proceeding due to Mother's substance abuse and was removed from Mother's care in 2018.

3.   Although Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) contains multiple items DCS may allege in a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship, in this case we find the dispositive allegation made by DCS is contained in subsection (3).

4.   To the extent Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusions regarding additional subsections of Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d), we need not address those arguments as the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed.

5.   We note that, other than pointing out Great-Grandparents’ ages (ninety years old and sixty-nine years old), Mother does not specifically challenge the trial court's conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption by Great-Grandparents.

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.