Jerrold Rose, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a bench trial, Jerrold Rose was convicted of multiple domestic battery offenses, intimidation, and resisting law enforcement. Appealing his convictions, Rose raises two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to negate his self-defense claim; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to publish the entire squad car video of his transport to the jail under the doctrine of completeness. Finding the evidence presented was sufficient and that the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Rose and Tajea Jackson started dating in the summer of 2024, and he began living at her apartment. In August, Jackson learned she was pregnant and discussed this with Rose. On the evening of September 9, Jackson's brother came over, and Jackson's three small children played outside while she cooked dinner. Rose, who had consumed about six beers and a fifth of tequila that day, took a nap inside.

[3] Later, as Jackson went inside to retrieve something, she crossed paths with Rose, who “seemed [ ] really mad” and was “being aggressive.” Transcript at 145. She reminded him that her brother was outside, and the pair agreed that Rose needed to leave. Because Rose seemed ready to make a scene as he grabbed his belongings, Jackson asked her brother to stay until he left. Rose stalled for a while but eventually left around 8:00 p.m.

[4] After Jackson's brother left and she put her kids to bed, Jackson went outside to smoke and saw Rose sitting on the hood of her car drinking beer. When Jackson told him to “get off [her] car[,]” he walked toward her and tried to argue with her, calling her names, and bringing up things from her past. Id. at 150. She told him “I don't really think that you need to be here right now[,]” and Rose began “pushing [her] in [her] face” and saying, “what you gonna do?” Id. at 150, 153.

[5] When Jackson told him to stop, Rose doused her with the beer he was drinking. Jackson cleaned herself off and told Rose to leave because their relationship was over. He responded by throwing his tequila in her eyes. While she wiped her burning eyes, Rose told her that he “should have hit [her] in the face with this bottle[.]” Id. at 156. Jackson went into her apartment to tell her sister to call the police and then checked outside to see if Rose had left.

[6] Rose had not left, and he began pushing her face again. Jackson told him to stop and tried to push him away from her. Rose hit her, and she tried to kick him away, but he pulled her leg causing her to fall and hit her head on a wall. Jackson got up and swung at Rose, but he grabbed her arms and “tackled” or “slammed” her to the ground. Id. at 159. As she tried to get Rose off her while he was holding her down, her sister came outside while on the phone with 911. Realizing this, Rose fled. Jackson was in pain for a few days after the incident, and she suffered an abrasion on her elbow.

[7] Police responded and arrested Rose near the entrance of the complex. He had marijuana and some pills on his person and in his backpack. After he was detained, Rose talked with the officers and indicated Jackson was pregnant.

[8] The State charged Rose with Count I: Domestic Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury to a Pregnant Woman, a Level 5 felony;¹ Count II: Domestic Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury, a Level 6 felony;² Count III: Intimidation, as a Level 6 felony;³ Count IV: Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor;⁴ and Count V: Domestic Battery, as a Class A misdemeanor.⁵

[9] Rose waived his right to counsel and requested a speedy trial. In October 2024, he represented himself at his bench trial. During the trial, the State offered video footage from the officer's squad car showing Rose being transported to jail. Rose did not object to the video's admission but objected to its partial publication. The following exchange occurred:

MR. ROSE: Objection, your Honor. I would like for the video to be played straight through. It shows the facts of actually what happened that day, and [the deputy prosecutor is] basically trying to stop it so he won't get in the facts of what actually happened that day.

THE COURT: All right. There's an objection to only portions of the video being shown. Response?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the portions being referenced by the defendant are inadmissible hearsay, they're self serving [sic] hearsay, so because of that, the State is not playing them and is under no duty to play them.

THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled․

Tr. at 112-13. The testifying officer explained that the arresting officers had planned to take Rose to the Hammond City Jail, but because of his “behavior and language,” they took him to the Lake County Jail where there was a “special jail unit t[o] ․ deal with combative inmates[.]” Id. at 113-14.

[10] The three short segments of the hour-and-a-half-long video the court viewed showed Rose repeatedly calling the officer a “bi*** a** ni****[,]” threatening to kill the officer and his family members when he got out of jail, stating he would not pay child support for his unborn child, and saying he would make the officers work hard to get him out of the vehicle. See State's Exhibit 13 at 22:50-25:14, 30:10-31:15, 53:13-54:40. When they arrived at the jail, Rose did not cooperate when officers asked him to “step on out” of the vehicle. See id. at 54:31.

[11] When Rose cross-examined the officer, he did not ask him questions about the squad car video, nor did he move to admit the remaining portions of the video then or during his case-in-chief. In his closing argument, Rose painted the incident as “self[-]defense” claiming Jackson “came outside and attacked [him] because [he] didn't agree with her drinking” while pregnant. Id. at 200-01. He asserted he was “trying to protect [his unborn] child.” Id. at 201.

[12] The trial court found Rose guilty as charged. At sentencing, the court vacated the conviction on Count II due to double jeopardy concerns and sentenced Rose to an aggregate term of six years to be executed in the Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Self-Defense

[13] Rose argues that the State did not negate his self-defense claim. He also contends that “the same evidence” that supports his self-defense claim shows he did not intend to touch Jackson in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, thereby rendering the evidence insufficient to prove he committed domestic battery of a pregnant household or family member.⁶ Appellant's Brief at 12.

[14] Weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility are matters left to the trier of fact, not appellate courts. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Thus, when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we “consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict” and resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the verdict. Id. (quoting McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)) (emphasis in original). “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. “If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, an appellate court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fuller v. State, 261 N.E.3d 821, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Stewart, 167 N.E.3d at 376), trans. denied.

[15] The State argues Rose waived appellate review of his self-defense claim because he failed to raise it before the trial court. “A defendant can raise self-defense as a justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021), reh'g denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a) (“[I]t is the policy of this state that people have a right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime.”). Self-defense is an affirmative defense, meaning the defendant admits the facts of the crime occurred but contends his acts were justified. Moon v. State, 823 N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh'g denied, trans. denied. To prevail, the defendant must show he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) acted without fault; and (3) reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily injury. Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670. When self-defense “is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). A defendant is entitled to have the trier of fact consider his self-defense claim even if the evidence supporting it is “weak and inconsistent[.]” Ault v. State, 950 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. Ct .App. 2011), trans. denied.

[16] We find that Rose adequately raised self-defense before the trial court. Before trial, he filed a motion to dismiss which, in part, alerted the State to his prospective self-defense claim. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28. Then, during Rose's—albeit inartful—cross-examination of Jackson, his line of questioning attempted to suggest that on the day of the violent encounter Jackson knowingly drank alcohol while pregnant, refused his requests that she stop drinking, came looking for him after he left her apartment, and pushed, kicked, or swung at him before he committed any act that could be considered a battery. See Tr. at 167-89. Finally, during his closing argument, Rose raised the issue of self-defense. He argued he proved the specific elements thereof, and the State did not object to him doing so. See id. at 200-01.

[17] However, while we can review his self-defense claim, we conclude that it was clearly within the fact-finder's purview to find that Rose committed domestic battery and did not act in self-defense. The evidence most favorable to the verdicts shows that Rose was very intoxicated on the day of the violent incident, and that he became “mad” and “aggressive” with Jackson, knowing she was pregnant. Id. at 145. Instead of leaving the area as she requested, he waited outside her apartment. When Jackson saw him outside, Rose first tried to engage her in a verbal fight before he turned to physical violence. He pushed Jackson's face, poured his beer on her, then splashed tequila in her eyes and commented that he “should have hit [her] in the face with th[e] bottle[.]” Id. at 156. Even when Jackson went inside to call the police, he stayed outside and then “push[ed] her face again” when she came back out to see if he had left. Id. at 158. As Jackson tried to defend herself, Rose hit her and grabbed her foot, causing her to fall and hit her head. After Jackson rose and swung at Rose, he “tackled” or “slammed” her to the ground. Id. at 159.

[18] This evidence shows that Rose provoked Jackson and that he instigated and participated willingly in the violence. The evidence does not support Rose's contention that he reasonably feared imminent bodily injury to himself or his unborn child. See Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“A person who provokes, instigates, or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-defense.”), trans denied; see also Tr. at 204 (Rose admitting in closing that he was “too strong to fight [Jackson]” because he was a mixed martial artist); Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 535 (Ind. 2025) (noting that even the justifiable use of force must be “proportional to the threat” and only what is “necessary for protection”). Rose's suggestions to the contrary would require us to reevaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, which we will not do.

[19] The State met its burden to negate at least one element of Rose's self-defense claim, and because his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument is premised on the success of his self-defense claim, we need not separately address that argument. See Appellant's Br. at 11 (“Each touching was the consequence of repelling the kicking and hitting that Jackson was doling out upon Rose.”). However, we do so only to note that the facts described above are sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rose intended to touch Jackson in a rude, insolent, or angry manner in violation of Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

2. Rule of Completeness

[20] Rose argues that the trial court erred when it did not admit the entire squad car video pursuant to his request at trial. Our review of a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). “We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the error[ ] affect[s] a party's substantial rights.” Jones v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1063, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[21] The common law doctrine of completeness is incorporated into Indiana's Evidence Rules. Stanage v. State, 674 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Rule 106 provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” The doctrine of completeness seeks “to avoid misleading impressions caused by taking a statement out of its proper context or otherwise conveying a distorted picture by introduction of only selective parts of” a statement. Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. However, “[a] court need not admit the remainder of the statement, or portions thereof, that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the portions already introduced.” Id.

[22] As he objected at trial, Rose argues here that “[t]he trial court should have permitted” him to play the entire squad car video because “the video played straight through would [have] show[n] the facts that actually happened that day” and “verified [his] theory of ․ self-defense[.]” Appellant's Br. at 17. His argument fails for multiple reasons.

[23] First, he waived the argument. When a trial court decides to exclude evidence alleged to be admissible under the doctrine of completeness, the defendant must preserve a claim of error by attempting to admit the evidence and, if that attempt is unsuccessful, he must make an offer of proof. Barnett, 916 N.E.2d at 287 (finding the defendant waived review of a doctrine of completeness issue because he failed to make an offer of proof as required under Evidence Rule 103). In addition to serving the purpose of appellate preservation, an offer of proof aids the trial court in ruling on an objection. Nelson v. State, 792 N.E.2d 588, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “An offer of proof consists of three parts: (1) the substance of the evidence, (2) an explanation of its relevance, and (3) the proposed grounds for its admissibility.” Id. at 594. Rose's general objection that the video would “show[ ] the facts of actually what happened that day”—referencing his rambling, self-serving narratives regarding the events for which he had just been arrested—was not a sufficient offer of proof. Tr. at 112; see generally State's Exhibit 13. Thus, he waived appellate review of this issue.⁷

[24] Second, the lengthy portions of video excluded from evidence were “neither explanatory of nor relevant to the portions already introduced.” Barnett, 916 N.E.2d at 286. The limited segments of the squad car video published by the State served to prove that Rose intimidated law enforcement and resisted arrest, charges for which he was also being tried. See Tr. at 197-98 (prosecutor discussing the evidence supporting these charges during closing argument). The doctrine of completeness did not give Rose a blank check to admit the entire video to address a different matter. His explanation of his side of the story would not have put into context his threatening statements to law enforcement or his combative conduct.

[25] Finally, while the doctrine of completeness “even applies to self-serving hearsay statements[,]” the doctrine is guided by achieving “fairness” and does not require the admission of self-serving hearsay in all instances. Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 947, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow the defendant to admit additional prison phone calls under the doctrine of completeness when the defendant did not testify so the State could not question her about those conversations), trans. denied. At his bench trial, Rose did not testify, so fairness did not require the trial court to allow Rose to introduce his own self-serving hearsay statements through another witness, which would have enabled him to refute Jackson's testimony without being subject to cross-examination.

[26] For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rose's request to play the entire squad car video.⁸

Conclusion

[27] We conclude that the State negated Rose's self-defense claim and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rose's request to play the entire squad car video. Accordingly, we affirm Rose's convictions.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(3).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(3).

3.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(2), (b)(1)(A).

4.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

6.   Rose frames his challenge as one contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his felony domestic battery convictions—Counts I and II. However, because the trial court vacated Rose's conviction of Count II, his argument is more properly framed as just a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Count I.

7.   While we are sympathetic to the fact that Rose represented himself at trial, he elected to do so and is “not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). As a pro se litigant, he was required to follow the same legal standards and rules of procedure as licensed attorneys and must accept the consequences of his failure to do so. Id.

8.   Rose also raises the judicial temperance presumption as a reason why the trial court should have allowed him to play the entire squad car video. The judicial temperance presumption is the proposition that in a bench trial, we generally presume that the court came to its decision based solely on relevant and probative evidence. Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011). This presumption is at issue when the trial court accepts potentially inadmissible evidence during a bench trial, not when it makes contemporaneous evidentiary rulings and does not consider inadmissible evidence. See Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The presumption comes into play when a defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence at a bench trial and the evidence was, in fact, inadmissible.”), trans. denied. Thus, to the extent Rose suggests that the court abused its discretion by not considering inadmissible evidence because of the judicial temperance presumption, he is mistaken.

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.