GREENE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The State filed a complaint in Lake County against Dawn Greene seeking to recover public funds Greene improperly received while serving as the Assistant Superintendent of Operations for the School City of Hammond (SCH). Greene filed a motion to dismiss and transfer the case to her county of residence, Porter County, alleging that it is the only preferred venue under Indiana Trial Rule 75. The trial court found Lake County is also a preferred venue and denied Greene's motion. Greene now appeals, arguing Lake County is not a preferred venue and the court abused its discretion by denying her motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Greene, a Porter County resident, is the former Assistant Superintendent of Operations for SCH located in Lake County. Following an Indiana State Board of Accounts audit of SCH's finances, in December 2024, the State filed a complaint in Lake County against Greene alleging she had misappropriated $41,908.10 in public funds by “receiv[ing] additional compensation” during the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 12.

[3] In February 2025, Greene filed a 12(B)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, asserting the case should be transferred to Porter County because it is the only “preferred venue” under Indiana Trial Rule 75. The State filed a response in opposition asserting that the case could not be transferred because Lake County was also a preferred venue under Rule 75.

[4] The trial court denied Greene's motion, specifically finding:

In the present case, Porter County is a county of preferred venue, in that Defendant resides there[;] however, all the actions alleged to have occurred, (and witnesses to same) involving the funds at issue, all are related to and located in Hammond, Lake County, Indiana. As Lake County is also a county of preferred venue, the case cannot be transferred to Porter County.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7 (emphasis in original).

[5] Greene then filed this interlocutory appeal.¹

Discussion and Decision

[6] Greene argues the trial court's denial of her motion was an abuse of discretion, specifically contending that Lake County is not a preferred venue under Trial Rule 75. As such, she claims Porter County is the only preferred venue, and the case should be transferred.

[7] “We review a trial court's order on a motion to transfer venue for an abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d 780, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Muneer v. Muneer, 951 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). A trial court has abused its discretion if we find its “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Strozewski v. Strozewski, 36 N.E.3d 497, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). However, “[i]f factual determinations are based on a paper record, they are [ ] reviewed de novo.” Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Garcia, 876 N.E.2d 350, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[8] Because Greene asserts that the trial court erred in finding Lake County to be a preferred venue under Rule 75(A), we begin by interpreting the rule. “Interpretation of our trial rules is a question of law that we review de novo.” E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d at 782 (quoting Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019)). In our interpretation, we seek to give effect to the rule's underlying intent. Id.

[9] Rule 75(A) governs the issue of venue and states in part that

upon the filing of a pleading or a motion to dismiss allowed by Rule 12(B)(3), the court, from allegations of the complaint or after hearing evidence thereon or considering affidavits or documentary evidence filed with the motion or in opposition to it, shall order the case transferred to a county or court selected by the party first properly filing such motion or pleading if the court determines that the county or court where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue requirements or is not authorized to decide the case and that the court or county selected has preferred venue and is authorized to decide the case.

Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) (emphasis added). The rule then lists ten circumstances under which a county may have preferred venue. The three most relevant to this appeal are:

(1) the county where the greater percentage of individual defendants included in the complaint resides, or, if there is no such greater percentage, the place where any individual defendant so named resides; or

(2) the county where ․ the chattels or some part thereof are regularly located or kept, if the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or relating to ․ such chattels[.] ․; or

․

(4) the county where ․ the office or agency of a defendant organization or individual to which the claim relates or out of which the claim arose is located, if one or more such organizations or individuals are included as defendants in the complaint[.]

Id. There is no priority among the listed circumstances. E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d at 782. Seeing as Greene is the defendant and a resident of Porter County, such county is clearly a preferred venue under subsection (1). However, “[p]referred venue may lie in more than one county, and if an action is filed in a county of preferred venue, change of venue cannot be granted.” Id. (quoting Strozewski, 36 N.E.3d at 500). Thus, we must next determine whether Lake County is also a preferred venue under Rule 75.

[10] The State argues that Lake County is a preferred venue under both subsections (2) and (4). Upon our review of the allegations and evidence before us on appeal, we find Lake County to be a preferred venue under Rule 75(A)(4). There, venue is preferred in the county where the office of an individual defendant is located if the claim arose out of or is related to that office. Here, the State seeks to recover funds it alleges Greene, while Assistant Superintendent of Operations, was not entitled to receive. The State alleges that Greene improperly ordered that those funds be transferred to her, and that she received such funds while serving, literally and figuratively, in her office at SCH. It is clear to us from the record that the office is in Lake County, where SCH is located. While Greene is no longer employed by SCH, Lake County is the location of the very office “out of which the claim arose.” T.R. 75(A)(4).

[11] Greene's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She asserts that the State “is seeking purely a ‘home field advantage[,]’[ ] and ignores all of the arguments in favor of transferring venue to Porter County.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 5. She claims that Porter County “is the most logical place of preferred venue” and that the State's “heavy-handed effort to maintain the case in an unfair venue should be ignored.” Id. at 6. Greene fails to wrestle with the text of subsection (4); she provides no legal basis for why subsection (4) does not apply other than that it “should not confer preferred venue on Lake County[ ] merely because Lake County was the place of Greene's employment[.]” Id. at 5. However, that is not “merely” why subsection (4) applies here. It applies because the very claim brought by the State arose out of, or at the very least is related to, the office held by Greene—which is located in Lake County. The preferred venue analysis does not hinge, as Greene contends, on what is necessarily most “logical” or fair. Id. at 6. It considers the relevance—the importance—of the location to the overall suit.

[12] As our Supreme Court has previously discussed, our venue rule finds its origin in English common law, as “[e]arly English rules of procedure required a civil action to be ‘laid’ in the county in which the cause of action arose.” Randolph Cnty. v. Chamness, 879 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 2008).

The rule had the virtue of not favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant. If events involved in an action had occurred in a county it was fair to try the action in that county. Witnesses[ ] ordinarily would be found in the county and could attend court without great inconvenience ․ While it is never possible to say in advance what place will be convenient for the trial of a particular case, if a general rule of convenience is to be made for all cases, the rule requiring trial where the cause of action arose has very great merit.

Id. (quoting William Wirt Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases: Early English and Modern Federal, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1949)). The Court went on to say that

Rule 75(A) reflects this thinking. Preferred venue is located in counties where information is readily available, where relevant land and personal property can be found, where witnesses can be easily brought to court, and where litigants reside or hold office.

Id.

[13] Our application of subsection (4) to the facts before us is consistent with the underlying principles and intent of Rule 75. The location of Greene's office, i.e., where she engaged in the alleged actions, is extremely relevant to the State's claim against her, and that office is in Lake County. Thus, we conclude that Lake County is a preferred venue under Rule 75(A)(4).²

Conclusion

[14] Because Lake County is a preferred venue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Greene's motion. Therefore, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under Indiana Appellate Rule 14, an interlocutory appeal to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75 is an interlocutory appeal of right.

2.   The State also contends that Lake County is a preferred venue under Rule 75(A)(2). Subsection (2) establishes preferred venue in a county where “chattels ․ are regularly located or kept[ ] if the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or related to ․ such chattels[.]” T.R.75(A)(2). The State claims the funds or money at issue constitute “chattel” that are “regularly located or kept” in Lake County. Appellee's Br. at 9; T.R.75(A)(2). Greene argues that the funds at issue are not “chattel” as used in Rule 75. However, because we find Lake County is a preferred venue under subsection (4), we need not decide whether it is also a preferred venue under subsection (2).

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.