Jonathan Randall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jonathan Randall appeals the trial court's imposition of a six-year sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), after he pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor.¹ Randall raises two issues for review: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its identification of aggravators and mitigators?; and (2) Is Randall's sentence inappropriate? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 2

[2] D.C. often spent time at the home of her step-grandfather, Randall, and maternal grandmother, Darla. D.C.’s stepmother described the Randalls’ house as “one of [D.C.’s] safe spots, ․ where she was supposed to be able to be comfortable and feel safe[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. In Summer 2021, when D.C. was fourteen years old, she stayed with the Randalls for several weeks while her father dealt with a death in the family. The Randalls “slowly began to be more sexual” with D.C. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. One evening, they gave D.C. multiple shots of whiskey to drink. After some time, Randall sat next to D.C. and began to kiss her neck. Randall then dragged D.C. by her hair to a couch and had sexual intercourse with her. Darla provided a condom to Randall and stood nearby, watching Randall have sex with D.C. The next day, Randall spoke with D.C. about the incident and claimed she wanted to have sex with him and “had been thinking about it for a very long time.” Id.

[3] After D.C. returned to her father's home, she disclosed what had occurred. When D.C.’s father confronted Randall, Randall said “D.C. was an effing liar, and nothing like that ever happened, and she just wanted attention.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. D.C. struggled with sleeping, eating, and maintaining relationships with her friends and family. She eventually moved to Alabama to live with her mother and stepfather and “could finally breathe easier.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. D.C.’s stepmother said, “This is something this child will never, ever be able to get over.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12.

[4] On November 22, 2024, the State charged Randall with Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor.³ The same day, Randall pleaded guilty. The plea agreement left sentencing to the trial court's discretion.

[5] At the sentencing hearing, D.C.’s stepmother testified, and D.C.’s victim impact statement was made part of the record. Randall made a statement in allocution in which he apologized to D.C. and stated, “I do understand and know that I have done wrong.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. He said alcohol was “a contributing factor” but explained he had stopped drinking. Id.

[6] The State argued the trial court should find several aggravators. One, the harm, injury, or loss to D.C. was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the crime, based in part on D.C.’s impact statement.⁴ Two, Randall was in a position of care, custody, or control of D.C. and his actions negatively impacted the family. Three, the nature and circumstances of the crime—including the Randalls giving D.C. alcohol and Darla's presence during the encounter—were “so bizarre” they should be considered an aggravator. Id. at 15. And four, Randall showed a lack of remorse when he called D.C. a liar. The State asked the trial court to impose an executed six-year sentence.

[7] Randall disputed the State's allegation that he displayed a lack of remorse, arguing his allocution reflected “his acceptance of responsibility, as well as his remorse for his behavior.” Id. at 19. As mitigators, Randall noted his “lack of any particular criminal history,”⁵ he was considered a low risk to reoffend, and the unlikeliness these circumstances would recur. Id. He also argued incarceration would cause undue hardship to his dependents, noting his ex-wife has medical issues and his two children have special needs. Randall submitted several letters from friends and family attesting to his good character. Based on these factors, Randall asked the trial court to impose the advisory sentence to be served on probation or home detention.

[8] The trial court found as aggravators that the harm caused to the victim was greater than necessary to commit the crime; Randall was in a position of care, custody, and control over D.C.; the “outrageous” nature and circumstances of the crime; and Randall's lack of remorse. Id. at 22. The trial court found as mitigators Randall's lack of criminal history; his low risk of reoffending; and the hardship to his family members and dependents if he were incarcerated. The court determined the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and imposed a maximum sentence of six years in the DOC.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Randall.

[9] Randall argues the trial court erroneously identified four aggravators and failed to consider a significant mitigator when determining his sentence.

[10] Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and we review such decisions only for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it fails to enter a sentencing statement with reasonably detailed reasons for the particular sentence; relies on aggravators or mitigators not supported by the record; fails to find aggravators or mitigators that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012).

[11] Aggravating Factors – Randall first challenges each of the aggravators the trial court identified: (1) lack of remorse; (2) the harm, injury, or loss was greater than required to prove the offense; (3) Randall was in a position of care, custody, or control of D.C.; and (4) the nature and circumstances of the crime.

[12] Randall first contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding lack of remorse as an aggravator because in his allocution, he apologized for his behavior. He therefore argues this aggravator is not supported by the record. The trial court's determination of remorse is similar to a trial court's determination of credibility—best left to the judge who sees and hears the defendant firsthand. Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002). “Without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the court, we accept its determination of credibility.” Id. Randall does not allege impermissible considerations; accordingly, there is no error.

[13] Randall also contends the trial court did not explain why the harm, injury, or loss suffered by D.C. was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense. See I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (2024). For this to be a valid aggravator, the trial court must explain why the impact on the victim exceeded that normally associated with the crime. See Walden v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1165, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Here, the trial court explained it considered D.C.’s statement, which described Randall and Darla engaging in grooming behavior before the incident and how she was affected after the incident—including being unable to sleep while at the Randall's home, waking up “in tears” when she did sleep, feeling “terrified” to close her eyes and relive the events in her mind, being “scared” to run into the Randalls in public, and ultimately moving to a different state to feel safe. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. These aspects show the harm suffered by D.C. exceeded that required by the elements of the crime.

[14] Randall next contends he was not in a position of care, custody, or control of D.C. “simply because [he] is married to [her] grandmother[.]” Appellant's Br. at 10. He argues there is no evidence he actively sought out opportunities to supervise D.C. or to establish a position of trust with her. But D.C. was a frequent visitor to the Randall home, and she was placed in their care for several months while her father dealt with a family issue. According to D.C.’s stepmother, the Randalls’ house was “one of [D.C.’s] safe spots” prior to the incident. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. As D.C. described in her statement, she thought Randall and Darla were giving her alcohol “to have the typical ‘If you're going to do it, I'd rather it be with me so I know you're safe’ relationship.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in identifying this as an aggravator. See Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the position of trust aggravator is “frequently cited by sentencing courts where an adult has committed an offense against a minor and there is at least an inference of the adult's authority over the minor”).

[15] Finally, Randall challenges the trial court's finding of the nature and circumstances of the crime as an aggravator. The trial court may properly consider the “particularized circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating factors.” McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 539 (Ind. 2001). When finding this to be an aggravator, the trial court must “detail why the defendant deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular circumstances.” Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 98 (Ind. 2001); see Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (a sentencing statement must “explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating”), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. This aggravator is generally “thought to be associated with particularly heinous facts or situations.” Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. 1996).

[16] Randall argues the trial court did not explain why the nature and circumstances of the offense were aggravating, comparing the trial court's statement here to the statement found insufficient in Smith v. State, 872 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In Smith, the trial court found as an aggravator that “the offense itself, it's a very aggravating offense what the defendant did[.]” Id. at 178. A panel of this Court held this statement “did not explain what about the crime was aggravating; that is, what about this crime was worse than a typical burglary” and remanded to the trial court for clarification. Id. at 178–79. Here, the trial court explained it considered D.C.’s victim impact statement. And without belaboring the facts the State had just described in detail, the trial court then incorporated the prosecutor's argument, stating, “[a]nd as you said, the nature and circumstances of the act itself were so outrageous” that it constituted an aggravator. Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Unlike the statement in Smith, the trial court's statement here referenced specific facts in the record. This was sufficient explanation to support the trial court's finding that the nature and circumstances of the offense were an aggravator. Further, the trial court in Smith identified only a single aggravator. But the trial court here identified several proper aggravators, supra ¶¶ 12–14, so even if this explanation was insufficient, it was harmless error, see Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (explaining a single aggravator may justify an enhanced sentence).

[17] Mitigating Factor – The trial court found Randall's lack of criminal history; his low risk of reoffending; and hardship to his family members and dependents if he was incarcerated were mitigators. But Randall asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to also consider his guilty plea a mitigator.

[18] The trial court “is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted), cert. denied. “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.

[19] A defendant who pleads guilty “deserves some mitigating weight be given to the plea in return.” Anglemyer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation omitted) (opinion on reh'g). But a guilty plea “is not inherently considered a significant mitigating circumstance.” Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Rather, the significance of a guilty plea as a mitigator varies from case to case. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. “[A] guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, ․ or when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea.” Id.

[20] Randall argues his guilty plea “demonstrated his acceptance of responsibility for the crime and extended a benefit to the State, the victim, and the victim's family by avoiding a jury trial.” Appellant's Br. at 12. But as the State explained at the sentencing hearing, it originally charged Randall with several offenses, including a Level 4 felony. In exchange for Randall's guilty plea, the State agreed to refile a single Level 5 felony charge, so D.C. did “not have to live through a trial. She wanted a sure thing.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 14. Randall's guilty plea did extend a benefit to the State and the victim, but the State also extended a benefit to Randall, reducing his sentencing exposure and the number of possible convictions that would appear on his criminal record going forward. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not identifying Randall's guilty plea as a significant mitigator.

[21] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its identification of aggravators or mitigators and therefore, did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Randall.

Randall's sentence does not warrant revision

[22] Randall asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[23] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[24] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[25] A Level 5 felony conviction carries a sentencing range of one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). The trial court sentenced Randall to six years. Randall asserts the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentence warrants revision because maximum sentences are generally reserved for the worst offenders.

[26] Randall does not defend the nature of his offense. Randall was D.C.’s step-grandfather. D.C. stayed with him and her grandmother frequently and this time, was with them for several weeks. D.C. described Randall as “slowly [becoming] more sexual” with her during her stay until one night, he gave D.C. alcohol, dragged her to the couch by her hair, and then had sexual intercourse with her in front of her grandmother. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. Because her father was attending to another family situation, D.C. continued to stay with the Randalls after this happened. When D.C.’s father later confronted him, Randall did not just deny the incident—he called D.C. “an effing liar” and said she was just seeking attention. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. The State described the facts of this case as “bizarre” and “heinous,” and the trial court called it “outrageous.” Id. at 15, 22. D.C. moved away from Indiana and her relationship with her grandparents was irretrievably broken. There are no compelling reasons to revise Randall's sentence based on the nature of his offense.

[27] As to his character, Randall contends he has a minimal criminal history, a strong employment history, and two special needs children for whom he provides support and care. He also points to the letters he submitted from friends, family, and associates attesting to his good character. But his actions toward D.C. in the privacy of his home belie the character he showed to those outside. Randall has not presented such compelling evidence of good character as to overcome the disturbing nature of his offense.

[28] In sum, Randall has not met his burden of persuading us this is an exceptional case warranting exercise of our 7(B) authority.

Conclusion

[29] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Randall, and we conclude his six-year sentence is not inappropriate considering his offense and character.

[30] Affirmed.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a) (2019).

3.   It appears from the legal history section of the presentence investigation report and comments at the sentencing hearing that the State initially charged Randall in March 2024 with several counts under a different cause number, including two Level 4 felonies. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15; Tr. Vol. 2 at 14 (State explaining, “[W]e agreed to plead this down to a Level 5․ We did that to reach an agreement for our victim to not have to live through a trial.”), 17 (State clarifying, “[T]hat was this case. We've just amended it. The Court wanted us to amend the charging information to just one count of the sexual misconduct as a Level 5 felony. And ․ we had to file under a new cause.”).

4.   The State also noted it “agreed to a Level 5 versus a Level 4[, but] the only difference there is the age, and [Randall's] clearly over the age of 21.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 14. Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor occurs when the defendant is over eighteen years old and the victim is under sixteen. I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a). But the offense is a Level 4 felony if it is committed by a person at least twenty-one years old. I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a)(1).

5.   The presentence investigation report shows Randall has one misdemeanor driving while suspended charge from 2015 that was dismissed.

Kenworthy, Judge.