KING v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After pleading guilty to Level 6 felony sexual misconduct with a minor in 2017 and serving his two-and-a-half year suspended sentence, Dakota King filed a verified petition seeking to have his conviction reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. Upon a review of the record, the court specifically found that he had “[pled] guilty pursuant to [a] plea agreement” and concluded “Therefore” his petition should be denied. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 154. King appeals, asserting the trial court committed reversible error by denying his petition based only on the fact that he had pled guilty. To the extent the court's order is ambiguous and may be based on an error of law, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2015, when King was eighteen years old, he engaged in oral and anal sex with a fifteen-year-old friend. He was subsequently charged with Count I: Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, a Level 5 felony;¹ and Count II: Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, a Level 6 felony.² In 2017, he pled guilty to Count II and Count I was dismissed. Under the plea agreement, King agreed “not to seek a modification, pursuant to I.C. 35-38-1-17, of the sentence entered by the court[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 141.

[3] The court accepted King's plea and sentenced him to 910 days in the Indiana Department of Correction with two days of credit time, and the rest was suspended to probation. King was not required to register as a sex offender under Indiana law.

[4] In February 2025, King filed a verified petition for alternative misdemeanor sentencing (AMS). A week later, the trial court issued the following order denying King's petition:

The Court, having reviewed the Defendant's Verified Petition for Alternative Misdemeanor Sentencing that was filed on February 25, 2025[,] and after examining the corresponding file and record in this case, finds that the Defendant [pled] guilty pursuant to [a] plea agreement. Therefore, the Defendant's Verified Petition for Alternative Misdemeanor Sentencing should be denied without hearing.

Id. at 154.

[5] King filed a motion to correct error, but the trial court did not rule on the motion. King now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] King asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition, contending the court misinterpreted his plea agreement to find that he waived AMS. We cannot definitively say the court erred in the manner asserted by King, but the court's unclear reasoning creates ambiguity as to whether it believed pleading guilty categorically precluded AMS eligibility, whether it mistakenly interpreted King's plea agreement to include an AMS waiver, or whether it based its decision on other facts in the record.

[7] Under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(d), an individual who has been convicted of a Level 6 felony may petition the sentencing court to have the conviction reduced to a Class A misdemeanor.³ The statute provides that the court “may convert a ․ Level 6 felony conviction ․ to a Class A misdemeanor conviction” if certain requirements are met. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(d) (emphasis added). The use of “may” in a statute generally “implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion.” Alden v. State, 983 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Thus, we review a trial court's decision to deny a petition for AMS for an abuse of discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion when it “misinterprets the law” or its decision “clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before” it. Corcoran v. State, 246 N.E.3d 1223,1225 (Ind. 2024) (quoting T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023)). “Further, to the extent that our review requires us to consider the trial court's factual determinations, we apply a clearly erroneous standard.” Matter of R.E., 142 N.E.3d 1045, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[8] Here, no hearing was held on King's petition. Thus, other than the record of the underlying case and the allegations in King's petition, there was no additional evidence presented as to the relevant facts and circumstances. Upon reviewing that information, the court stated “the Defendant [pled] guilty pursuant to [a] plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 154. Based on this finding, the court appears to have concluded that King's petition “should be denied without [a] hearing.” Id.

[9] We first note that the court's finding itself is not erroneous; King did in fact plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Nevertheless, the language in the order suggests its ultimate conclusion may be based on a misinterpretation of the law. The order connects the finding to the conclusion by means of the word “Therefore,” which draws a causal connection between those statements. In other words, the court's order may be interpreted as concluding that AMS eligibility is necessarily forfeited by pleading guilty. But neither the statute nor the case law indicates that a defendant is ineligible for AMS merely because he was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement. See State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 371 (Ind. 2017) (reasoning that a defendant may waive AMS in a plea agreement only if “the language of [the] [ ] agreement foreclosed the possibility of sentence conversion”).

[10] The unclear language lends itself to another possible interpretation that, as King asserts, the court may have mistakenly concluded he waived the right to petition for AMS pursuant to his plea agreement. While the language in the order does not explicitly indicate that the court concluded this fact, to the extent the court's conclusion was based on a finding that King waived the right to petition for AMS in his plea agreement, it would also be erroneous. There is nothing in his plea agreement indicating he waived the chance to seek AMS, and the State concedes this point. See Appellee's Brief at 8. While King did waive the right to pursue sentence modification under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17, he did not do so pursuant to the AMS statute.

[11] If a court comes to its decision based on a misinterpretation of the law, it abuses its discretion. See R.E., 142 N.E.3d at 1052 (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies or misinterprets the law.”). However, in this case, the ambiguity in the court's order prevents us from determining whether the court did in fact misinterpret the law.

[12] The State argues that the court “ ‘examin[ed] the corresponding file and record,’ then exercised its discretion to deny the petition” and did not commit reversible error in doing so. Appellee's Br. at 9-10 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 154). We recognize that the trial court indicated that it reviewed the entire record. Be that as it may, the language in the order suggests the court may have a misinterpreted the law, and we cannot say with confidence that the court would have denied King's petition had it known that a guilty plea does not bar AMS or King did not waive his right to petition for it.

[13] Given the unclear reasoning for denial beyond King's guilty plea, it is not clear whether the court properly exercised its discretion or would have denied the petition had it clearly understood the law. In these circumstances, remand is appropriate to ensure the trial court's decision is based on a correct understanding of the applicable legal standard. Cf. Henderson v. State, 240 N.E.3d 718, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (remanding where the court could not determine whether the trial court would have reached the same result absent its misunderstanding of the law); MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 2005) (“[T]o the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence, it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.”).

Conclusion

[14] Because the court's order is ambiguous and it may have denied King's petition based on a misinterpretation of the law, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of King's petition with the clarification that a guilty plea does not categorically bar a defendant from seeking AMS. On remand, the trial court should exercise its discretion considering all relevant factors and, if it denies the petition, provide sufficient explanation of its reasoning.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-9(b).

3.   Under the statute, the defendant must be found to meet certain requirements, including not having been convicted of certain sex or violent offenses. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(d)(1). Additionally, it must have been at least three years since the defendant served his sentence and satisfied any other obligations under his sentence. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(d)(5). The petition itself must set forth the crime the defendant was convicted of, the date of conviction, the date his sentence was completed, any additional obligations imposed as part of his sentence, the date such obligations were satisfied, and a verified statement that he has no pending criminal charges. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(e). The limited record suggests that King met the requirements and that his petition included the necessary information. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 151-52.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.