John D. Quillen, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] John Quillen struck a man on the head with a metal rod or pipe, which caused serious injuries. Quillen pled guilty to aggravated battery and was sentenced to 11 years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), with 2 years suspended to probation. Quillen appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether Quillen's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In March 2025, Quillen pled guilty to aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony. The charge was based on Quillen hitting the victim in the head with a “metal rod or pipe,” which “dented” or “fractured” the victim's skull and caused “brain swelling and/or a concussion and/or vomiting” in February 2022. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 17. In exchange for Quillen's agreement to plead guilty, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges filed in the case (battery by means of a deadly weapon as a Level 5 felony and invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor), charges filed in an unrelated case, and the State's probation violation petitions in two additional cases. The parties also agreed that Quillen's sentence would be capped at 11 years.

[4] At Quillen's sentencing hearing, the State read a statement from the victim, who claimed that he continues to suffer from “seizures and constant migraines” from his injuries, despite the passage of several years. Tr. Vol. II at 20. The State also noted Quillen's criminal history. Quillen gave an allocution statement, in which he apologized to the victim, Quillen's family, and the court. The trial court sentenced Quillen to 11 years, with 9 years executed in the DOC and 2 years of probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Quillen's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

[5] Quillen argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[6] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[7] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character ․’ ” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[8] In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count,” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Similarly, a defendant need not “necessarily prove” that the sentence is inappropriate on both prongs so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126 (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Nonetheless, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[9] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Quillen was convicted of and sentenced for aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony. “A person who commits a Level 3 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (emphasis added). The trial court sentenced Quillen to nine years in the DOC and two years of probation.

[10] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[11] Here, Quillen's sentence is slightly above the advisory sentence because the trial court imposed two years of probation in addition to a nine-year prison sentence. Quillen acknowledges that the “nature of his offense was notable, given the seriousness of the injury that the victim suffered.” Appellant's Br. at 7. Quillen struck the victim in the head with a metal rod or pipe, which nearly caused the victim to die. The victim continues to suffer “seizures and constant migraines” from his injuries, despite the passage of time. Tr. Vol. II at 20; see Penick v. State, 659 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind. 1995) (noting that “infliction of grave injury and pain over an extended period of time is sufficient to support an aggravating factor.”) (citing Loveless v. State, 642 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. 1994)). Nothing suggests that the offense was accompanied by “restraint, regard, [or] lack of brutality.” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[12] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). A defendant's criminal history is also “a relevant factor in the character analysis.” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 700 (Ind. 2024) (citing Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)).

[13] Here, Quillen argues that he expressed remorse by apologizing to the victim, participated in rehabilitative programs while in jail awaiting sentencing, has strong family support, and has shown a consistent work history. Quillen, however, has an extensive criminal history, including convictions for battery resulting in bodily injury, domestic battery, robbery, burglary, and several drug offenses. Quillen has also violated probation several times.

[14] Based on the serious nature of Quillen's offense and his history of criminal behavior, we cannot say that Quillen has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119.

[15] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.