Staci Krutzsch, Appellant v. Franciscan Alliance, Appellee (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Staci Krutzsch appeals from an order of the Full Worker's Compensation Board (the “Board”) finding that she is not entitled to benefits or compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act (the “Act”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Krutzsch was employed as a nurse manager for Franciscan Alliance in Crawfordsville, Indiana. On September 23, 2022, Krutzsch went to lunch. She rode back to work with one of her co-workers, A.M. A.M. stopped the vehicle on a drive near concrete steps, and Krutzsch exited the passenger side of the vehicle. Krutzsch fell, striking her head and sustaining serious injuries.

[3] In December 2022, Krutzsch filed an application for adjustment of claim. On November 19, 2024, a hearing was held before a single hearing member of the Board at which Krutzsch and A.M. testified and Krutzsch's medical records and photographs of the drive and steps were admitted. On January 29, 2025, the single hearing member issued a determination finding that Krutzsch “fell from a height,” “[a]lthough the steps are a relatively slight elevation, they are sufficient to increase the risk of injury,” and “[Krutzsch's] accident arose out of and was sustained in the course of her employment with [Franciscan Alliance].” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 12. Krutzsch and Franciscan Alliance each submitted an Application for Review by the Board. On April 28, 2025, the Board held a hearing.¹

[4] On July 10, 2025, the Board issued a decision reversing the determination of the single hearing member. The Board found:

5. While exiting the vehicle or shortly thereafter, [Krutzsch] fell, struck her head, and sustained serious accidental injuries.

6. At Hearing, [Krutzsch] testified that she did not recall the details of her fall. She testified that she could not recall feeling dizzy before exiting the vehicle, nor telling anyone else that she felt dizzy. [A.M.] testified, and the Board finds, that [Krutzsch] felt dizzy or did not feel well at lunch. [A.M.] had also observed that [Krutzsch] appeared unsteady on the day of her fall. Furthermore, the contemporaneous medical records – emergency room notes taken immediately after the fall – reflect that [Krutzsch] told emergency personnel that she felt dizzy while getting out of the car.

7. Based upon [Krutzsch's] testimony and her medical records, the Board further finds that [Krutzsch] suffered from chronic preexisting personal medical conditions that caused her to experience dizziness. These conditions included multiple sclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia for which [Krutzsch] was treated with prescription medications.

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9. The facts are in dispute as to the precise location and mechanics of [Krutzsch's] fall․

10. It is possible [Krutzsch] fell backwards and struck her head on the ground or on the rear passenger-side tire of the vehicle as she exited the car and it is possible that [Krutzsch] fell before, during, or after attempting to ascend the two steps. There is no evidence [Krutzsch] availed herself of the handrail because no one witnessed her fall.

11. Other than the fact that [Krutzsch] had returned to [Franciscan Alliance's] premises after her unpaid lunch break, there is no evidence that [Krutzsch] was engaged in any employment-related task at the time of her fall. She was not carrying a work-related load or hurrying due to work-related concerns. Even assuming [Krutzsch] had reached or ascended the steps before falling, conditions were dry and clear. Neither the driveway nor the steps were under construction, defective, or hazardous in any way. Although the two steps are slightly elevated, they were not steep and were equipped with handrails on each side. The Board finds the steps created no danger or risk to [Krutzsch] any different or greater than experienced by the public.

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15. Here, the Board finds no risk associated with [Krutzsch's] employment. Rather, it finds that [Krutzsch] suffered from preexisting personal conditions that put her at risk for dizziness and falls. It finds that [Krutzsch] had been observed to be unsteady, in fact felt unwell during her lunch break, and in fact told emergency personnel she felt dizzy before falling. The great weight of the evidence is that [Krutzsch's] fall was caused solely by a personal condition. [Krutzsch] sustained accidental injuries due to a personal condition and not due to any incidental or increased risk associated with her employment. Finally, the Board notes that [Krutzsch] was not operating dangerous machinery or positioned at a height such as on a ladder or a lift when she experienced dizziness and fell.

16. As such, the Board finds and concludes that [Krutzsch's] fall and accidental injuries did not arise out of her employment with [Franciscan Alliance] for purposes of [the Act].

Id. at 15-16. The Board concluded that, “[b]ecause [Krutzsch's] accidental injuries did not arise out of her employment with [Franciscan Alliance], no award of medical benefits or compensation is entered on [her] Application for Adjustment of Claim.” Id. at 17.

Discussion

[5] Krutzsch argues that her injuries arose out of her employment and that this Court should reverse the Board and affirm the single hearing member's award of compensation and medical benefits. She contends:

Here, the [Board] applied the incorrect test to determine whether Krutzsch's injury arose out of the employment. Even though the [Board] notes that Krutzsch was not operating dangerous machinery or position at a height such as a ladder or lift, its application of the test of whether the steps in question created a danger to which the general public is exposed is incorrect in this case. The correct test here is whether the employment conditions and circumstances surrounding the fall increased the dangerous effect of the fall. The undisputed evidence is that Krutzsch suffered increased trauma to her brain due to being on the steps when she fell. It's a matter of physics.

Appellant's Brief at 8. She argues that whether she used the handrail is irrelevant and the fact the steps were dry and clear is not at issue.

[6] Franciscan Alliance maintains that the Board correctly determined that Krutzsch's fall was caused by her preexisting conditions and did not arise from her employment. It states, “[w]hile Franciscan Alliance remains sympathetic to Krutzsch's injuries and conditions, quite simply, Krutzsch's pre-existing medical conditions caused her to experience dizziness, which in turn, caused her to fall after exiting [A.M.’s] vehicle.” Appellee's Brief at 13.

[7] In evaluating the Board's decision, we determine if there is competent evidence of probative value to support the Board's findings, and we then assess whether the findings are sufficient to support the decision. Triplett v. USX Corp., 893 N.E.2d 1107, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. Krutzsch, as the claimant, had the burden to prove a right to compensation under the Act and, as such, appeals from a negative judgment. See id. When reviewing a negative judgment, we will not disturb the Board's findings of fact unless we conclude that the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary result, considering only the evidence that tends to support the Board's determination together with any uncontradicted adverse evidence. Id. To the extent Krutzsch does not challenge the Board's findings, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings results in waiver of argument findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[8] The Act provides for “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-2(a). The claimant bears the burden of proving the right to compensation. Wright Tree Service v. Hernandez, 907 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. As a general rule, the issue of whether an employee's injury or death arose out of and in the course of his or her employment is a question of fact to be determined by the Board. Id. at 186-187. “To ‘arise out of’ employment and therefore be compensable, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the worker's employment.” Global Const., Inc. v. March, 813 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ind. 2004) (citing Milledge v. Oaks, 784 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind. 2003)). See Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 389 (Ind. 1999) (“This nexus is established when a reasonably prudent person considers the injury to be born out of a risk incidental to the employment, or when the facts indicate a connection between the injury and the circumstances under which the employment occurs.”).

[9] The risks incidental to employment fall into three categories: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment, (2) risks personal to the claimant, and (3) risks neither distinctly of employment nor distinctly personal in character. Milledge, 784 N.E.2d at 930. Risks that fall within categories numbered one and three are generally covered under the Act. Id. “However, risks personal to the claimant, those ‘caused by a pre-existing illness or condition unrelated to employment,’ are not compensable.” Id. (citing Kovatch v. A.M. Gen., 679 N.E.2d 940, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). This Court has held:

With respect to injuries resulting from workplace falls in particular, the Indiana Supreme Court and this court have noted:

Workplace falls can result from either an employment, personal or neutral risk, or from a combination thereof. Some falls clearly result from risks personal to the employee; that is, they are caused by a pre-existing illness or condition, unrelated to employment. As a general matter, these “idiopathic” falls are not compensable. In contrast, some falls are “unexplained” in that there is no indication of causation. Most jurisdictions compensate such falls, classifying them as neutral risks.

[Milledge, 784 N.E.2d] at 931 (citing Kovatch, 679 N.E.2d at 943 (citations omitted)). We have noted that very few falls are truly “unexplained” and that “[a]s long as the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the fall was the result of a personal or idiopathic condition, the fall should not be categorized as unexplained.” Kovatch, 679 N.E.2d at 943 n.4.

Further, we have previously stated that a “more difficult analytical situation arises when the employment itself increases or contributes to the harm or risk suffered by an employee in an idiopathic fall.” Id. “An increased risk can occur in one of two ways: [The] employment contribution may be found either in placing the employee in a position which aggravates the effects of a fall due to the idiopathic condition, or in precipitating the effects of the condition by strain or trauma.” Id. at 943 n.5 (citing 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Worker’s Compensation, § 12.00 at 3-416 (1996)). “[T]he effects of such a fall are compensable if the employment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of such a fall, such as on a height, near machinery or sharp corners, or in a moving vehicle.” Id. at 943-944 (citing Larson, supra § 12.00 at 3-416-426). As noted in Kovatch, the Indiana Supreme Court has affirmed the Board's denial of compensation to an employee for injuries that he sustained as a result of an idiopathic fall onto a concrete floor. Id. at 946 (citing Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 230 Ind. 622, 623-624, 105 N.E.2d 513, 513-514 (1952)).

Burdette v. Perlman-Rocque Co., 954 N.E.2d 925, 930-931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[10] Here, the Board found that Krutzsch suffered from chronic medical conditions which caused her to experience dizziness including multiple sclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia for which Krutzsch was treated with prescription medications. The Board further found that Krutzsch “felt dizzy or did not feel well at lunch,” that A.M. “observed that [Krutzsch] appeared unsteady on the day of her fall,” and that Krutzsch's medical records showed that she told emergency personnel that she felt dizzy while exiting the vehicle. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16. Krutzsch does not challenge these findings. When asked, “[d]id you notice any significant disabilities or medical issues with [Krutzsch] before this accident,” A.M. testified, “I would say that that particular day, that [she] exhibited some unsteady mobility.” Transcript Volume II at 17. When asked, “when did you see her have unsteady mobility,” she answered, “I would say exhibited in the office that prior morning.” Id. Emergency room records stated: “Pt states that she did feel dizziness as she got out of the car.” Exhibits Volume I at 14. The Board also found that it is possible that Krutzsch fell before, during, or after attempting to ascend the two steps. The Board found the drive and steps were not hazardous in any way and the steps “were not steep and were equipped with handrails on each side,” which is reflected in the admitted photographs. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16.

[11] The Board weighed the evidence and determined that Krutzsch did not prove that her injuries arose out of her employment. The evidence supports the inference that her fall was the result of a pre-existing condition unrelated to her employment, and in light of our deferential standard of review we cannot say that she met her burden of showing that her employment placed her in a position which increased the risk of harm for purposes of coverage of the Act. Our review of the findings and conclusions of the Board and the record does not convince us that the evidence leads inescapably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the Board. See Burdette, 954 N.E.2d at 932-933 (affirming Board's determination that claimant's fall was caused by personal condition where he previously complained of dizziness and where he did not show the conditions existing where he fell, a concrete floor near a freezer door, increased his risk of falling or the dangerous effects of his fall); Kovatch, 679 N.E.2d at 944 (“Kovatch's medical history, together with the circumstances under which he was found to have fallen, justify the legitimate inference that he suffered from a pre-existing condition that caused him to fall ․ We further agree with the Board that Kovatch's employment did not increase his risk of harm. There is no evidence in the record that Kovatch fell from a significant height or that he struck a dangerous object during his fall.”).

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board's order.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not include a transcript of the April 28, 2025 hearing.

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.