IN RE: L.D. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In August 2024, R.D. (Father) became aggressive with A.B.-H. (Mother) and L.D. (Child) at home. This incident ended with him putting a pillow over Mother's and Child's faces and with Child being taken to the hospital. Father was arrested and criminally charged that same day. Mother's descriptions of what took place were inconsistent—on the day it occurred, she gave one version, and a few days later, another. Because of the incident, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (CHINS), and Child was removed from Mother's care.

[2] Pursuant to DCS's motion, and over Mother's objection, the trial court found there was good cause to continue the fact-finding hearing beyond the sixty-day deadline required by statute. After the fact-finding was held, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS but returned Child to Mother's care. The court entered its dispositional order a few months later, and wardship was terminated approximately one week later. Nonetheless, Mother appeals the CHINS determination, asserting that: (1) the court erred in concluding that Child needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he was not receiving and was unlikely to receive without its coercive intervention; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in continuing the fact-finding hearing beyond the sixty-day deadline.

[3] Finding the first issue dispositive, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] Child was born on July 18, 2024, to Mother and Father. They all lived together in an apartment in Indianapolis. On August 4, when Child was only seventeen days old, Father came home to find Mother lying on the couch with Child. When Mother continuously ignored Father's efforts to talk with her, he became aggressive and began throwing pillows around the room. At some point, he placed a pillow over Mother's face and then over Child's face. Mother called 911 out of concern for Child and when the authorities arrived, Father was arrested and criminally charged.¹ Child was taken to Peyton Manning Children's Hospital.

[5] When the police arrived, Mother talked to Detective Ronnie Kwiatkowski about the incident. She told him that she called 911 because Father had held a pillow over her face and then over Child's face for about thirty seconds and Child seemed not to be breathing. She relayed similar information to Detective Daniel Hiser at the hospital. Mother also told Detective Hiser that this was not the first violent incident between her and Father and that Father had strangled her the day before. She shared that the violence had become a relatively normal occurrence, and she expressed concern that Father would hurt Child.

[6] While Child was in the hospital, there were two occasions when his oxygen saturation levels dropped below normal, prompting him to be admitted overnight for observation. He was discharged the next day after his x-rays, lab tests, and CT scan and MRI of his brain showed “reassuring” results. Transcript at 49.

[7] On August 6, DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a CHINS. It described the domestic violence incident that occurred two days earlier and conveyed DCS's concern for Mother's housing situation since she was not listed on the apartment's lease and could no longer live there. The petition also noted that Father “was arrested and incarcerated ․ on charges of attempted murder, strangulation, and domestic battery as a result of the recent incident.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 38.

[8] A few days after the incident, Mother talked to Detective Hiser again. This time, she said she was neither afraid of Father nor concerned he would hurt Child. During this conversation with the detective, she “significant[ly] deviat[ed]” from her original story, relaying that Father placed a pillow on her face to calm her down from her panic attack and she was not sure how a pillow had covered Child's face. Tr. at 36. At the initial hearing on August 7, the court authorized Child's removal and placement in foster care.

[9] On August 20, Child returned to the hospital for a follow-up appointment. His x-rays revealed a fracture in his lower right leg that was in the process of healing and had not been discovered during Child's initial hospital visit on August 4. DCS later amended its CHINS petition to include this new information.

[10] At a pre-trial conference a few days later, the parties discussed Mother's supervised visitation. The visitation coordinator said that Mother was “very loving and nurturing” and always “ma[de] sure that the baby's needs [were] taken care of[,]” and she had “no safety concerns whatsoever.” Supplemental Tr. at 22. The court scheduled another pre-trial conference for September 27 and the fact-finding hearing for October 4.

[11] At the September pre-trial conference, DCS's attorney commented that the one hour the court allotted for the fact-finding hearing would likely not be enough time to present all the evidence. Mother's attorney then pointed out that the sixty-day deadline to hold the fact-finding hearing was October 5, and she objected to rescheduling the hearing beyond that date. The fact-finding hearing remained scheduled as previously set.

[12] On October 4, the hearing scheduled before the parties’ fact-finding hearing ran late, cutting into the parties’ limited time to present evidence further. Before beginning the fact-finding hearing, DCS reiterated that its evidentiary presentation would run long. Trying to accommodate, the court offered to hold the full hearing later that day. However, because one of its key witnesses, Detective Hiser, would not be available later in the day, DCS motioned to continue the hearing. The trial court granted the motion and found there was “good cause shown.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 106.

[13] Ultimately, the fact-finding hearing was held on November 15, and Mother renewed her motion to dismiss. She also asked the court to take judicial notice of the protective order case she filed against Father precluding contact with her and Child. Then DCS presented its case which included testimony from Mother, Detective Hiser and Officer Kwiatkowski,² Child's doctor, and the DCS Family Case Manager (FCM). Mother testified about filing for a protective order against Father for her and Child, completing a six-week domestic violence course, and participating in home-based therapy and casework. When DCS asked Mother whether she had concerns about Child being around Father, Mother said she did not. Id. at 24. Later, when asked why she obtained the protective order, Mother said it was “to make sure [Father] doesn't ever come into [her] life again.” Transcript at 27. She also testified that she had no intent to get back together with Father. Id. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother was living with her grandmother, she had obtained a full-time job, and she was working towards getting a place of her own.

[14] The FCM testified that the conditions that led to Child's removal from Mother were her unstable housing situation and domestic violence. When the FCM was asked if she still had concerns about domestic violence, the following exchange occurred:

A: Not at this time.

[DCS]: Alright, you don't have any concerns ․ around the domestic violence that [ ] was reported?

A: Just the fact that [ ] it seems to be a little downplayed [ ] with the information that we do have. It just seems like it was downplayed.

[DCS]: And what do you mean by that?

A: [ ] I mean[ ] that [M]other kind of downplayed the domestic violence between her and [F]ather.

* * *

[Mother's Attorney]: Is getting a protective order downplaying domestic violence?

A: I guess not. I'm not sure.

[Mother's Attorney]: Is leaving [F]ather and moving into her own home that he doesn't have the address for downplaying domestic violence?

A: No.

Id. at 55-56. The FCM also testified that Mother was fully compliant with all services, and that all she needed to complete her home-based case management was to “[o]btain transportation or some type of childcare plan[,] and that'll be about it.” Id. at 57. And when asked “[w]hat care, treatment or rehabilitation [ ] Child need[s] that he will not receive from his [M]other's care[,]” the FCM responded, “I am not sure.” Id. at 57.

[15] At the close of DCS's evidence, Mother renewed her motion to dismiss asserting that DCS had failed to prove that Child needed care, rehabilitation, or treatment that he would not receive without court intervention. DCS argued the evidence showed Mother did not “fully grasp or understand the level of domestic violence or danger that she was in” and that her protective order was filed only one day before the original fact-finding date. Tr. at 63. The judge denied Mother's motion. Mother then presented her evidence which included her own testimony and that of Mother's family support specialist.

[16] At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS but ordered DCS to return Child to Mother's care as soon as possible. The court's subsequent order contained factual findings consistent with the facts presented above. In support of the conclusion that Child is a CHINS, the court reasoned:

Mother's inability to recognize the dangers of domestic violence in the home with a newborn have affected her ability to adequately provide appropriate supervision for [Child]. Additionally, [M]other[’]s continued attempts to down play [sic] the domestic violence occurring show an ongoing need to continue in services to address the domestic violence in the home․

Mother initially told medical providers and law enforcement that [Child] had endured suffocation via a pillow by his father. Mother's story has since changed[;] however[,] the initial story was corroborated by the low oxygen levels noted in the ER and testimony by [Child's doctor], Detective Hiser, and Officer Kwiatkowski of [M]other consistently reporting the child being suffocated. Mother continues to downplay the initial concern and requires ongoing intervention of this court to ensure services are in place to address the domestic violence in the home that resulted in [Child] being suffocated.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 138.

[17] Child was returned to Mother's care on November 25. A dispositional hearing was held on December 13, and Mother requested that the case be closed since she had completed her domestic violence course, was fully compliant with services, and had obtained stable housing and employment. Although the court did not close the case, it entered a dispositional order that did not require Mother to repeat services she had already completed, including the domestic violence courses and a parenting assessment. The court also granted Father's request for unsupervised parenting time with Child, subject to random drop-ins from the provider.

[18] On January 20, 2025, Mother filed a motion to terminate DCS's wardship. After a hearing on January 31, and without objection from DCS, the court granted the motion. Mother now appeals the CHINS determination.

Discussion and Decision

[19] Mother asserts the trial court's factual findings do not support its conclusion that Child needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he would not have received absent the court's coercive intervention.

[20] Preliminarily, we note that the CHINS case has been closed and Child has been reunified with Mother which would seemingly render Mother's appeal moot. However, a CHINS finding could impact Mother negatively in the future by “relax[ing] the State's burden for terminating parental rights[,] ․ hav[ing] adverse job consequences[, and] ․ preclud[ing] her from becom[ing] a licensed foster parent.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. And while “[r]eversal cannot change the efforts Mother expended in complying with the CHINS case, [ ] it still affords her meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens.” Id. Thus, we do not find Mother's appeal to be moot.³

[21] Moving to the merits of Mother's argument, we review a CHINS determination for clear error. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). When the court sua sponte enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we use a two-tier standard of review pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and if so, we then determine whether those findings support the court's judgment. Id. Our role is not to weigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. at 577-78.

[22] The State need only prove a child is a CHINS by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 580; Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. Here, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS under multiple sections of the Indiana Code. The two sections most relevant to this appeal are 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2(a). Under the first, DCS had to prove that Child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1. The second section differs only at subsection (1), instead requiring proof that Child's “physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent[.]” I.C. § 31-34-1-2(a)(1). Critically, under both sections, DCS must prove that Child “needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation” that he is not receiving and is unlikely to receive without coercive intervention of the court. Id.; I.C. § 31-34-1-1(2).

[23] The “coercive intervention” prong specifically “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ [and] not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287) (emphasis in original). To determine whether the court's coercive intervention is necessary, it “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290). While a single incident of domestic violence can support a CHINS finding, see In re K.A.H., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), a child cannot be adjudicated a CHINS “based solely on conditions that no longer exist.” In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[24] In this case, we conclude that Child was determined to be a CHINS based on conditions that no longer existed at the time of the fact-finding hearing and thus, the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. The concerns that led DCS to initiate the CHINS case and remove Child from Mother's care related to domestic violence between the parents and Mother's unstable housing. At the time of the fact-finding, those issues no longer existed—Mother was no longer in a relationship with Father or lived with Father; she was living in a stable home with her grandmother; and she had filed for a protective order against Father. There was no longer any “domestic violence in the home” to address, contrary to the court's conclusion. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 138.

[25] Additionally, the evidence shows that before the fact-finding hearing, Mother voluntarily participated in services to the letter. With no evidence to the contrary, it appears that Mother engaged in all of her visitation opportunities, she was prepared and “nurturing” during those visits, and she attended therapy, home-based case management, and the domestic violence classes without missing a single session. Supp. Tr. at 22. According to the FCM, the only things Mother needed to address were transportation and childcare. However, these two factors appeared to be of minimal concern to the court considering it ordered DCS to “give [Mother] her baby back” that very same day.⁴ Id. at 82.

[26] Mother's pre-fact-finding compliance is also bolstered by the fact that there was essentially nothing new recommended for her to do under the dispositional order. The record does not reveal any new services recommended by DCS, and the court was clear that Mother did not need to repeat the services she had already completed. She had finished the domestic violence course, done the parenting assessment, and visitation was no longer a factor since Child was already in her full-time care. She was required to abstain from drugs and alcohol, but substance use was never an issue in Mother's case. Mother testified at the fact-finding that she wanted to continue therapy even after the case closed because she had “benefited a lot from it.” Tr. at 22. And while Mother was referred to home-based case management “to assist with finding employment and housing and transportation,” she had a full-time job, stable housing, and had presumably figured out transportation to and from work by the time of the hearing. Id. at 55.

[27] We also find no evidence that Child had unmet needs that required coercive intervention. There was no evidence presented that he had ongoing medical issues or, if he did, that Mother could not meet such needs. Mother lived in an acceptable home and presented evidence that she had the items needed to safely care for Child, including a crib, car seat, baby gate, and child safety covers and locks. See Exhibits at 4-10.

[28] The mere fact that Mother had been inconsistent with her versions of the incident or somewhat “downplay[ed]” the August 2024 domestic violence incident does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that Child needed care or treatment that he was unlikely to receive without court intervention. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 138. The evidence reflects that Mother was willing to do everything asked of her to meet Child's needs and she was, in fact, meeting those needs. See In re C.W., 172 N.E.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (concluding it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that coercive intervention was necessary when “the reasons for DCS's involvement had been rectified” and the child “was [not] in need of services” at the time of the fact-finding). Under both sections of the Indiana Code at issue in this appeal, the trial court's conclusion that Child needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he was unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court is not supported by the evidence and is thus clearly erroneous.⁵

Conclusion

[29] Because the trial court erred in concluding that its coercive intervention was required, its CHINS determination was also in error. Therefore, we reverse the CHINS adjudication and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the Odyssey Case Management System, under cause number 49D07-2408-F5-022547, Father pled guilty to the lesser included Level 5 felony offense of neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury. We take judicial notice of the cause number above for the sole purpose of noting the disposition of the case and in no way do we rely upon it in our decision. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(C) (permitting a court to judicially notice the existence of records of a court of this state).

2.   Officer Kwiatkowski is referred to as both a “detective” and an “officer.” For consistency purposes, we will refer to him as Officer Kwiatkowski in this opinion.

3.   DCS concedes that Mother's appeal is not moot. See Appellee's Brief at 6 n.2.

4.   We note that Mother was able to obtain childcare by November 25. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 112.

5.   Mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding good cause existed to grant DCS's motion to continue the fact-finding hearing beyond the sixty-day deadline. See Appellant's Br. at 18; see also I.C. § 31-34-11-1 (2024); In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). However, because we reverse the CHINS adjudication on other grounds, we do not address this argument.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.