In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Ka.S., Kl.S., and Kn.S. (Minor Children), and A.S. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor children Ka.S., Kl.S., and Kn.S. (the “Children”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the mother of twins Kl.S. and Kn.S., born in March 2012, and Ka.S., born in November 2014.¹ On April 26, 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) due to educational neglect and Mother's failure to provide a home free of domestic violence and substance abuse. DCS further alleged that Mother has serious mental health issues, that she becomes violent when drinking alcohol, and that she smokes marijuana to self-medicate.

[3] On July 21, 2022, following Mother's admission, the trial court adjudicated the Children as CHINS and entered a facilitated agreement pursuant to which Mother agreed to participate in reunification services. The agreement required Mother to complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow all recommendations, participate in random drug screens, participate in family preservation services, maintain weekly contact with DCS, maintain suitable housing and obtain a legal and stable source of income, refrain from using illegal substances, and attend to personal medical and mental health needs. The Children were permitted to remain with Mother.

[4] On April 17, 2023, DCS filed an Emergency Request to Detain requesting that the Children be removed from the home and placed in relative care “due to mother's mental instability, drug and alcohol use, and violent behavior.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 126. Children were placed in relative care with their maternal great-grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”). As for referred services, Mother completed the substance abuse evaluation, and it was recommended that she participate in therapy. DCS referred Mother to therapy, but that service was closed due to Mother's lack of compliance and attendance issues. Mother participated inconsistently with random drug screens and screened positive for substances on thirty-two occasions. Between April 19, 2023, and August 15, 2024, Mother tested positive for THC twenty-two times; once for methamphetamine; and twice for methamphetamine and THC. On December 21, 2023, Children's placement was changed from relative care to foster care due to Great-Grandmother allowing an individual with a criminal history to reside in the home.

[5] On August 28, 2024, DCS filed verified petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights.² The court held an initial hearing on the termination petitions on September 24, 2024. Mother failed to appear for the hearing. The court appointed counsel for Mother and set factfinding to begin on October 14, 2024. The termination factfinding hearing began on October 15, 2024, and continued on December 10, 2024, and January 21, 2025.³ DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Taylor Humphries (“FCM Humphries”) and Court Appointed-Special Advocate Marissa King-Ramirez (“CASA King-Ramirez”). Mother presented her own testimony as well as the testimony of Margaret Listone, the visitation supervisor, Tamara Hickman, the home-based caseworker, and Great-Grandmother.

[6] FCM Humphries testified that, as part of the facilitated reunification agreement, among other things, Mother was required to participate in therapy services but that those services were “closed out” due to “noncompliance for missing too many sessions.” Transcript Volume II at 30. FCM Humphries further testified that Mother had failed to maintain weekly contact with DCS as required, and that within the last year, Mother screened positive for THC and methamphetamine during random drug screens. FCM Humphries stated that her “recommendation for this case is termination of parent rights.” Id. at 66. When asked, “Why not give Mother another six (6) months to see if she would ultimately get into compliance,” FCM Humphries responded, “I think it's in the best interest to go ahead and move forward with this at this time because the case has already been open for a substantial amount of time and services have been offered.” Id. at 66-67. FCM Humphries noted that in the two years since the case had been opened, Mother was never able to get “beyond supervised visits” with the Children. Id. at 78. She further emphasized that Mother's most recent drug screen on December 26, 2024, just weeks before the final termination hearing, “came back positive for cocaine” and that Mother “wasn't able to explain” the positive result. Id. at 70. FCM Humphries stated that she did not believe it would be safe for the Children to be returned to Mother's care.

[7] CASA King-Ramirez testified that she recommended termination of Mother's parental rights “because of the lack of progress in the case when it comes to visitation as well as there still being [ ] a concern for mental health not being addressed[.]” Id. at 114. She further stated her extreme concern upon hearing that Mother had a recent positive drug screen. CASA King-Ramirez explained that the Children “are not little kids” and “so they have a good understanding of what's going on and what's happening and every child needs permanency but especially when they know they are in DCS care.” Id. CASA King-Ramirez noted that Mother had “already been given months” since the termination petition was filed to comply with the Children's case plan but had failed to do so. Id. at 115. CASA King-Ramirez noted that one of the Children had reported that a recent supervised in-person visit with Mother “did not go well.” Id. at 125. She stated that the Children love Mother and Mother loves them, but that did not change the fact that Mother's lack of compliance with services has prevented her from providing “a re-unifiable home for them.” Id. at 115.

[8] On behalf of Mother, Listone testified that she had been facilitating supervised virtual visitation between Mother and the Children twice a week since August of 2024. She stated that visits had “been going very well” and that Mother “shows up every time.” Id. at 34. She noted that the Children and Mother appear to have a “very strong, very loving, compassionate” relationship. Id. at 36. Listone admitted on cross-examination that the CHINS court had never authorized unsupervised visits between Mother and the Children. Id. at 38.

[9] During her testimony, Mother claimed to have housing and two jobs. Mother admitted that she has not provided documentation of her employment to DCS. She claimed that to the extent she missed appointments with service providers or failed to comply with the facilitated reunification agreement, it was due to her jobs or medical issues. Mother stated that she had not used “substances in I don't know how long almost three (3) years[.]” Id. at 50. On cross-examination, she admitted to having a criminal record. Between 2017 and 2021, Mother was convicted of criminal mischief, operating a vehicle without a license, and public intoxication. In 2023, Mother was also convicted of battery on a person less than fourteen years of age. During the CHINS proceedings, Mother was charged with public intoxication and disorderly conduct in two separate cases, and she ultimately pled guilty to both offenses. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was also in a pretrial diversion program after pleading guilty to violating compulsory school attendance laws. Regarding her numerous positive drug screens, including the recent positive screen for cocaine, Mother denied ever using any of those illegal substances claiming that the positive tests for THC, cocaine, and methamphetamine were all “mistaken.” Id. at 107. Mother stated that she does have “a mental health diagnosis,” that she didn't “remember all of them,” but believed the “main one” was “borderline personality disorder.” Id. at 108-109.

[10] Great-Grandmother testified that Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder from a young age and that “she hasn't been on medication for a while” which sometimes causes her to get “out of hand.” Id. at 140. She stated that she hoped the court would consider placing the Children with her in the event Mother's parental rights were terminated.

[11] On May 7, 2025, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon and order terminating Mother's parental rights. Specifically, the court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or continued placement outside Mother's care would not be remedied; termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests; and there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, that being adoption.

Discussion

[12] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. Regarding petitions seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:[4]

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

[13] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent Mother does not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[14] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside her care will not be remedied. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id.

[15] The record reveals that the Children were removed from Mother's care due to domestic violence, drug abuse, and educational neglect. During the course of the CHINS proceedings, Mother was noncompliant with the Children's case plan, failed to successfully complete referred services, abused illegal substances, and engaged in criminal behavior. Mother's claim that her “criminal history is minor” and that her testimony indicates a “willingness to comply with services and address concerns,” Appellant's Brief at 13, is simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess credibility, which we may not do. Indeed, the trial court specifically found Mother's “lack of candor” regarding her continued use of illegal substances “calls into question the credibility of her other testimony” and demonstrates that she will be unable to change her prior behavior until taking “the foundational step of acknowledging her illicit drug use.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 23. DCS presented ample evidence of Mother's habitual patterns of conduct to support the trial court's determination that there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding a reasonable probability exists that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal and reasons for placement outside Mother's care will not be remedied.

[16] Mother also asserts that DCS failed to show that termination of her parental rights was in the Children's best interests in light of their “strong bond” with her. Appellant's Brief at 15. In determining the best interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[17] FCM Humphries opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. FCM Humphries noted that “the case has already been open for a substantial amount of time” and that she believed it was time to “move forward.” Transcript Volume II at 66-67. She emphasized that Mother had never progressed enough in services to permit unsupervised visitation with the Children. Similarly, CASA King-Ramirez opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. She noted that while reunification was her prior recommendation, due to Mother's “lack of progress when it comes to visitation as well as there still being [ ] a concern for mental health not being addressed” and further “a positive screen last month,” she had changed her recommendation to termination. Id. at 114. CASA King-Ramirez emphasized that the case has “already gone on two (2) years,” that “we're still in the same spot as we were,” and that the Children need permanency. Id. at 115.

[18] In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record outlining Mother's historical inability to provide safety and stability to the Children and to remedy the conditions resulting in removal, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests.

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination order.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother is also mother to fourteen-year-old, K.U., who was not involved in the termination action.

2.   N.M., the father of Kl.S. and Kn.S., consented to their adoption and was ultimately discharged from the termination proceedings. A.C., the father of Ka.S., consented to his adoption and was ultimately discharged from the termination proceedings.

3.   The court held a review hearing on March 19, 2025. The court found that Mother had only partially complied with the Children's case plan and that continuing in foster care was appropriate and consistent with the Children's best interests.

4.   Although Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) contains multiple items DCS may allege in a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship, in this case the relevant allegation made by DCS is contained in subsection (3).

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.