Justin M. Floyd, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Justin Floyd sexually assaulted his disabled adult sister M.F., choking her and digitally penetrating her vagina while she repeatedly told him to stop. He then resisted the police officers who responded to M.F.’s 911 call. As a result, Floyd was convicted of rape, incest, strangulation, and resisting law enforcement. He appeals, challenging the admission of testimony about the 911 call and the appropriateness of his 15-year sentence. Finding any error in the testimony's admission was harmless and that Floyd's sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In April 2023, Floyd and his sister M.F., both in their thirties, lived with their mother and stepfather in Clinton County. Floyd and M.F. shared an upstairs bedroom, with M.F. sleeping on a couch and Floyd sleeping on an air mattress. Both M.F. and her mother have neuropathy, a condition that significantly limits their mobility. Her mother requires a wheelchair to move around.

[3] On the night of April 19, 2023, Floyd and M.F. watched television together in their upstairs bedroom while their mother was downstairs. M.F. and Floyd were drinking alcohol, and Floyd soon became heavily intoxicated. He then knelt in front of M.F., who was sitting on the couch, and kissed her on the mouth while groping her breasts. M.F. told him to stop multiple times. While Floyd was briefly turned away, M.F. surreptitiously dialed 911 and hid her phone under a blanket with the call still live. Then, over M.F.’s continued screams and protests, Floyd removed M.F.’s pants and underwear. He choked her, preventing her from breathing, and held her down. Floyd then digitally penetrated M.F.’s vagina while she tried to push him away. Floyd told M.F. that he loved her, but “in a weird way,” and “not in a brotherly way.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 204.

[4] Meanwhile, the 911 operator had dispatched officers to M.F.’s location. Officers entered the home and found M.F. and Floyd upstairs. M.F. was not wearing pants and appeared to have been crying. When officers tried to move Floyd away, he resisted, kicking at them and yelling profanities. Several officers were needed to remove him from the house and take him into custody.

[5] Based on this incident, the State charged Floyd with Level 3 felony rape, Level 5 felony incest, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 5 felony criminal confinement, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Level 6 felony intimidation. The State later dismissed the intimidation charge.

[6] At Floyd's three-day jury trial, M.F. testified about the night of the assault. She recounted the events that took place and explained that she had told Floyd to stop multiple times during the assault. She recalled telling him: “No” and “[S]top. I'm your sister.” Id. at 201-02. M.F. said that she attempted to push Floyd and get away, but her neuropathy made it difficult because she “couldn't really walk.” Id. at 198. She explained that Floyd knew about her condition, as it also afflicted their mother. M.F. testified that the day after the assault, both her throat and her vagina were in pain.

[7] A responding officer, Deputy Brett Woodard, also testified about the night of the assault. He explained that dispatch reported to him “an open 911 line” with “a female saying, ‘No, stop,’ in the background.” Id. at 228. Floyd objected on hearsay grounds to the deputy's recollection of the statements made during the 911 call. The State responded that the testimony was not hearsay as it showed only “what [Deputy Woodard] knew going into” the house. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, explaining: “It's not for the truth of the matter, just to give you the background on what he was responding to.” Id.

[8] Another officer, Deputy Jared Yoder, similarly testified that he responded to a 911 call described by dispatch as involving a woman heard “screaming ‘stop’ or ‘no.’ ” Tr. Vol. III, p. 6. Floyd again objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection, again allowing the statement as “background information” on the deputy's response and “not for the truth of the matter.” Id. at 7.

[9] Finally, the recording of the 911 call was admitted into evidence, without objection, and played for the jury. A woman's voice can be heard screaming: “No, Justin, stop it, I'm your sister. No Justin, I'm your f***ing sister. What the f**k is wrong with you? What the f**k is wrong with you? No, why are you trying to take my pants off now? What is wrong with you?” State's Exh. 8 at 3:34-55. At one point, the voice can be heard wheezing and coughing. The voice screams “Stop it,” “No,” and “Get off of me” over and over again during the 13-minute phone call. Id. at 5:58-6:03; 8:48-59; 1:21-30.

[10] The State also introduced into evidence the body camera footage of the two responding officers. The footage included M.F.’s statements to officers directly following the assault, explaining that Floyd had kissed her, groped her, choked her, and digitally penetrated her, all while she pushed back against him and yelled at him to stop. The jury found Floyd guilty on all counts, but the court vacated the criminal confinement conviction based on double jeopardy concerns.

[11] At sentencing, M.F. provided a victim impact statement, explaining that this incident caused a “deep wound” and that she now suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and feelings of paranoia. Tr. Vol. III, p. 115. Based on this statement, the trial court noted the significance of the harm suffered by the victim as an aggravating circumstance. The court also noted as aggravating factors Floyd's criminal history, his prior probation violation, and M.F.’s disability. The court found no mitigating factors.

[12] The trial court sentenced Floyd to 14 years, with 2 years suspended to probation, for rape; 4 years for incest; and 2 years for strangulation. These sentences were ordered to run concurrently with one another, but consecutive to a 1-year sentence for misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. This formed an aggregate sentence of 15 years, with 2 of those years suspended to probation. Floyd appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] On appeal, Floyd challenges the admission of the testimony about the contents of the 911 call and argues that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finding no reversible error, and no circumstances warranting revision of his sentence, we affirm.

I. Admission of Statements About 911 Call

[14] “A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[15] However, we generally disregard errors in the admission of evidence unless they affect a party's “substantial rights.” Id. at 1238; Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). In determining whether an error was harmless, we consider “the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023). “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[16] Here, Floyd contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the deputies’ recollection that dispatch heard a woman say “no” and “stop” during the 911 call. Tr. Vol. III, p. 6. He argues this testimony was impermissible hearsay offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that M.F. did not consent—rather than to merely explain the course of the police's investigation. He claims these statements were prejudicial because they “primed” the jury to hear specific words in a potentially unclear recording of the 911 call. Appellant's Br., p. 12.

[17] Even if we assume the admission of this testimony was improper, any alleged error would be harmless. First, the 911 call itself was admitted into evidence without objection, and the recording was not unclear. A woman's voice can be distinctly heard screaming: “No, Justin, stop it, I'm your sister. No Justin, I'm your f***ing sister. What the f**k is wrong with you?” State's Exh. 8 at 3:34-44. The voice then clearly repeats “Stop it,” “No,” and “Get off of me.” Id. at 5:58-6:03; 8:48-59; 1:21-30. Therefore, the statements about what dispatch heard on the 911 call were merely cumulative of the properly admitted 911 call recording. The improper admission of evidence that is “merely cumulative of other evidence before the trier of fact” is harmless. See Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding harmless any error in admission of videos because witnesses testified to the events depicted in video).

[18] Furthermore, M.F. independently testified as to what she said during the assault and while on the 911 call. She stated that she repeatedly told Floyd “[n]o” and “stop.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 201-02. So even if we were to accept Floyd's argument that the challenged testimony primed the jury to hear certain words on the 911 call recording, any alleged error would still be harmless. See Hunter, 72 N.E.3d at 933 (finding harmless any error in admission of videos because witnesses testified to the events depicted in videos). Additionally, M.F.’s testimony was heard at the beginning of trial, before the challenged statements were admitted.

[19] Considering the entire record—including M.F.’s testimony, the testimony of responding officers, the body camera footage, and the 13-minute 911 call in which a woman is heard repeatedly screaming and protesting—the alleged error's probable impact was sufficiently minor that it did not affect Floyd's substantial rights. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. Our confidence in the verdict is not undermined. Accordingly, we find no reversible error.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[20] Floyd next contends his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). This rule permits appellate courts to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). We give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision, attempting only “to leaven the outliers” rather than “achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of showing that his sentence is inappropriate. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007).

[21] Regarding the nature of the offenses, “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014)). Floyd's four convictions each carried the following statutory sentencing ranges and advisory sentences:

• Level 3 felony rape: 3 to 16 years with a 9-year advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Floyd was sentenced to 14 years with 2 suspended to probation.

• Level 5 felony rape: 1 to 6 years with a 3-year advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Floyd was sentenced to 4 years.

• Level 6 felony strangulation: six months to 21/212 years with a 1-year advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Floyd was sentenced to 2 years.

• Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement: up to one year, with no advisory. See Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. Floyd was sentenced to 1 year.

[22] The sentences for each felony conviction are above the advisory but below the maximum. Floyd received the maximum sentence for his misdemeanor conviction. Still, Floyd's aggregate sentence of 15 years is far below the 251/212year maximum that he faced. And the court suspended 2 of his 15 years to probation, reducing Floyd's total incarceration time. We are not persuaded that this sentence is inappropriate.

[23] The nature of Floyd's offenses was heinous. But he argues that his conduct did not exceed the elements necessary for conviction because “the legislature has already built into the sentencing range the consequences to victims, moral revulsion, and other factors inherent in the crime.” Appellant's Br., p. 15 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). However, this argument fails to consider M.F.’s disability, which is not an element of Floyd's offenses. M.F. testified that her neuropathy made it difficult to resist or run away, as she “couldn't use [her] legs.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 205. Floyd knew of M.F.’s condition and exploited this impairment.

[24] Floyd also fails to demonstrate that his character warrants revision of his sentence. His criminal history includes a juvenile adjudication for operating while intoxicated and adult convictions for marijuana possession, public indecency, criminal trespassing, and residential entry. See generally Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). He also has failed to comply with conditions of probation on multiple occasions.

[25] Most troubling is Floyd's prior public indecency conviction for exposing himself to a young girl in a park—another sexually-exploitative crime like his instant convictions. After initially apologizing to the girl, he yelled back at her, “pointed towards his penis and grabbed it while motioning for her to come back to him.” App. Vol. II, p. 101. Floyd confessed to police, explaining that he was “excited by the situation.” Id. But when discussing that offense with a probation officer, Floyd downplayed his behavior and made excuses for what happened, demonstrating a lack of accountability for this serious crime.

[26] Though Floyd points to his difficult childhood and his ability to maintain employment, these circumstances do not overcome the seriousness of his offenses and his demonstrated pattern of criminal conduct. Given the violent and exploitative nature of Floyd's sexual assault against his disabled sister and his serious criminal history, we cannot find that Floyd has shown his aggregate sentence of 15 years with 2 suspended to be inappropriate.

Conclusion

[27] Any error in the admission of testimony about the contents of the 911 call would be harmless because a recording of the 911 call itself was admitted into evidence and M.F. independently testified as to her statements during the assault. Floyd has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate. We therefore affirm.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.