Calvin Harrison, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Calvin Harrison was convicted of four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting, Class A felony child molesting, two counts of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and two counts of Level 5 felony incest, for acts involving his two daughters, K.H. and S.G., and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seventy years of incarceration. Harrison contends that the failure of the trial court to exclude testimony from Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Kollin Anslow and K.H. constituted fundamental error. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November of 2021, K.H. disclosed to her mother that her father, Harrison, “had touched her” and that he had “d[one] things with” her half-sister, S.G., also Harrison's daughter. Tr. Vol. III p. 130. When K.H.’s mother met with S.G. and asked “if there was anything she needed to talk” about, referencing Harrison, S.G. “just started crying[,]” and disclosed that “something of sexual touching” had occurred between her and Harrison. Tr. Vol. III p. 131. K.H.’s mother called the police and reported the disclosures. On March 24, 2022, the State charged Harrison with four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting, Class A felony child molesting, two counts of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and two counts of Level 5 felony incest.

[3] A jury trial commenced on February 11, 2025. At trial, both K.H. and S.G. testified. At the time of trial, S.G. was twenty years old, while K.H. was nineteen years old. S.G. testified that her grandmother and Harrison had raised her. S.G. testified that, at around five or six years old, she had disclosed to Harrison that her “family was touching [her].” Tr. Vol. IV p. 44. S.G. testified that Harrison had not called the police, but instead “[w]ent along with it[,]” by “just touching, I guess. Like it was okay. Like it was normal.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 45. S.G. testified that when she was between six and eight years old, Harrison had begun engaging in “[t]ouching and intercourse” with her. Tr. Vol. IV p. 34. S.G. testified that Harrison would “rub [her] vagina and then intercourse would happen.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 67. S.G. testified that Harrison had told her, “if you love daddy[,] stick the tip in[,]” referencing the tip of his penis. Tr. Vol. IV p. 34. S.G. also testified that when she “would be asleep, he would just pull down [her] pants[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 71. S.G. testified that Harrison would only stop when he ejaculated, and that the behavior had not ceased until she moved out in 2021.

[4] S.G. also testified that when she had spoken to Harrison about the “molest and then the intercourse,” Harrison had “told [her] it's okay because we just love each other.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 49. S.G. testified, with regard to a text conversation she had had with Harrison, that he had said, “You did this. If you want to put it on me, okay. I was okay before you ever came and did stuff like that in my life.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 49–50. She explained, “He was saying if I want to blame him then that's okay. But he was never like that before I came in his life, like he would never touch nobody before I came in his life.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 50. When S.G. had become employed, she had moved out and invited K.H. to come with her, which K.H. had done.

[5] At the start of K.H.’s direct examination, the following exchange occurred between K.H. and the State:

[The State:] Do you want to be here?

[K.H.:] No.

[The State:] Did you choose to be here?

[K.H.:] Yes.

[The State:] If you decided that you didn't want to be here anymore or you didn't want to come in this room, what would happen?

[K.H.:] I would take a break, but then I would come back.

[The State:] You would come back because you choose to?

[K.H.:] Yes.

[The State:] But if you wanted to leave this building, is anyone going to stop you?

[K.H.:] No.

[The State:] Except yourself?

[K.H.:] Yes.

[The State:] And you know you don't have to be in this room or answer my questions, right?

[K.H.:] Yes.

[The State:] You made that decision for you today?

[K.H.:] Yes.

[The State:] No one forced you?

[K.H.:] No.

Tr. Vol. IV pp. 76–77. Harrison did not object to this testimony.

[6] K.H. testified that Harrison had begun touching her at some point between the ages of seven and nine, and that, during that time, Harrison “[h]ad taken his finger, and he [․] rubbed his finger on my vagina.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 81. K.H. also testified that Harrison had “rubbed his private part against mine.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 84. K.H. testified that her “legs would be opened and he would just rub[,]” and that he would stop when “he was about to” ejaculate. Tr. Vol. IV pp. 84–85. According to K.H., this had happened more than thirty times, and that “it was just the same thing over and over.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 86. K.H. also testified that she, S.G., and Harrison had shared one bed and that S.G. had seen Harrison “having intercourse” with K.H. and that she had seen Harrison having intercourse with S.G. Tr. Vol. IV p. 118. K.H. also testified that the last time Harrison had touched her, she had been sixteen.

[7] During the State's direct examination of Detective Anslow, the State asked him, “Once you have the interviews complete and you've collected the items that you've talked to us about, what happens with the case after that?” Tr. Vol. III p. 231. Detective Anslow responded, “I type it up on a probable cause and then I submit it to our screening prosecutors.” Tr. Vol. III p. 237. The State asked if the detective's supervisor or sergeant has “the ability to look over a case if they need you to do anything extra[,]” and Detective Anslow answered affirmatively. Tr. Vol. III p. 237. Harrison did not object to this testimony.

[8] The State admitted into evidence a video recording that K.H.’s mother had made of a telephone call between K.H. and Harrison. In the video, K.H. asked Harrison why he had “touch[ed]” them, and Harrison had answered, “[w]hen she was doing all that nasty stuff to me, it got me too aroused. And then I can't control myself.” Ex. 11 at 0:42–1:07. On February 12, 2025, the jury found Harrison guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seventy years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Harrison contends that the trial court committed fundamental error in allowing Detective Anslow's testimony regarding his investigation and K.H.’s testimony regarding whether she wanted to testify. Specifically, Harrison contends that “[t]he State subtly bolstered its case with vouching and course of investigation testimony to imply truthfulness and reliability.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[10] “Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental error occurred. The fundamental error doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the failure to object at trial constitutes procedural default precluding consideration of the issue on appeal.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

[T]he fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[11] Harrison contends that Detective Anslow's testimony regarding the screening process was irrelevant, and that, “explaining that various police supervisors and prosecutors scrutinized the evidence before filing charges, subtly suggested the evidence was credible and [Harrison] was guilty.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Even assuming, arguendo, that the State's line of questioning had been improper, we cannot conclude that the State's questioning rendered a fair trial impossible in this case. See id. First, Harrison admits that no objection was made with regard to Detective Anslow's testimony on direct examination with the State. Furthermore, on cross-examination, Harrison asked Detective Anslow, “[h]ow do you determine the credibility of the persons that make statements like has been made in this case[?]” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 2–3. The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, explaining, “[h]e's not able to testify as to the credibility of the other witnesses.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 3. Harrison then asked, “you must believe them in order to take the case further; is that correct?”, and Detective Anslow responded affirmatively. Tr. Vol. IV p. 3. The trial court struck Detective Anslow's testimony, instructing the jury, “you're not to consider that, please.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 3.

[12] Moreover, Harrison concedes that, “[t]he jury was correctly instructed that ‘[t]he filing of a charge or [Harrison]’s arrest is not to be considered by you as any evidence of guilt.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Harrison points to nothing in the record indicating that the jury failed to heed these instructions, and, to the extent that Harrison was the one who solicited improper vouching testimony by Detective Anslow, he also concedes that “[t]his inquiry was sustained, stricken, and admonished.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Based on the foregoing, Harrison has failed to establish that Detective Anslow's testimony amounted to fundamental error.

[13] With regards to K.H.’s testimony at the beginning of the State's direct examination, Harrison argues that, “[w]hat was left unsaid is that both the State and [Harrison] had the ability to subpoena K.H. and compel her presence,” but admits that, “[a]cknowledging a witness’ reluctance can be appropriate as a way to set the witness and jurors at ease.” Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[14] Again, even assuming, arguendo, that the State's questions were improper, we cannot say that the exchange rendered a fair trial impossible. First, Harrison neither objected to the testimony nor made any attempt to discern whether K.H. had been subpoenaed to testify on cross-examination. While Harrison contends that the exchange between the State and K.H. was a “subtle way of bolstering K.H.’s credibility by implying that she wouldn't be there testifying at all unless she was telling the truth,” he also admits that “[s]howing up to testify is not synonymous with testifying truthfully as witnesses have various motives.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Indeed, nothing in the exchange between K.H. and the State included any reference to K.H.’s credibility, and Harrison agrees that the “jury was instructed that ‘statements made by the attorneys are not evidence[.]’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 11. The fact that Harrison characterizes the State's exchange with K.H. as a “subtle” way of bolstering her credibility indicates, at the very least, that any error in the exchange was not so “egregious” as to make a fair trial impossible. See Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678. Harrison has failed to establish that K.H.’s testimony amounted to fundamental error.¹

[15] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Harrison contends that the “cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 14, we disagree and find it indicative that Harrison describes both of the challenged instances as “subtle.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. Combining the two instances at issue does not render Harrison's trial fundamentally unfair, nor does it require reversal, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence against Harrison, including the testimony of both K.H. and S.G. that Harrison had molested them for years, the phone call between Harrison and K.H. in which he indicated that he had been “too aroused” and “couldn't control himself” after K.H. asked why he had touched them, Ex. 11 at 0:42–1:07, and Harrison's text messages to S.G.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.