TIBBETS v. BENNING (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] When they divorced in 2020, Darlene Tibbets (Wife) and Terry Benning (Husband) agreed that Wife would receive legal title to their marital residence, but that Husband could “live in the [home] as a tenant ․ rent free, indefinitely, and at [his] option.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 23. In 2024, Wife requested a declaratory judgment from the trial court that would have provided, among other things, that she has “the right to sell the property free and clear of” Husband's tenancy. Id. at 42. The court denied that request, and Wife now appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2020, the trial court entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and incorporating the terms of their mediated marital settlement agreement (the Agreement). The Agreement contained the following provision regarding the marital residence:

[T]he Marital Residence ․ shall be retained by [Wife] as her sole property. ․ [Husband] agrees to cooperate and assist [Wife] ․ by signing any required documents, including a quitclaim of his interests[.] [Wife] further agrees, following [the] divorce, to permit [Husband] to live in the Residence as a tenant and to do so rent free, indefinitely, and at [Husband's] option.

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[The parties] mutually agree this rent-free arrangement results in a financial settlement between [them] for this asset which justly honors [their] many years of marriage, and that it is both fair and equitable.

Id. at 23.

[3] In July 2022, Wife filed an “Affidavit for Contempt” alleging that Husband had refused to execute a quitclaim deed as required by the Agreement. Id. at 27. Husband filed a response asserting that he did not believe the Agreement required him to sign a quitclaim deed and, even if it did, “any quitclaim deed to be signed by [him] must preserve his interest in the marital residence as ordered by the Decree.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 10. After a hearing, the trial court ordered as follows:

[Husband] contends that signing the Quitclaim Deed proffered to [him] ․ would have caused him to forfeit his right to remain in the marital residence under the terms outlined in the ․ Agreement. However, that right is reserved in the ․ Agreement and if that [A]greement is breached, [Husband] [will be] able to pursue damages and contempt proceedings[.]

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It is [ ] ordered that [Husband] shall sign the proffered Quitclaim Deed ․ giving [Wife] as [her] sole and separate property the [marital residence].

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39-40. In accordance with that order, Husband executed a quitclaim deed transferring his ownership interest in the marital residence to Wife “subject to [a] tenant agreement” under which he “may reside at the property rent free indefinitely, and at [his] option.” Id. at 56.

[4] In June 2024, Wife filed a motion alleging that she “intend[ed] to sell” the marital residence and requesting

declaratory relief that specifies [Husband] has only a contract with [her] for tenancy in the residence and not any legal interest in the property itself; an order that [Husband] must amend the deed to remove any mention of his contractual tenancy; and an order for declaratory relief that specifies that [Wife's] sole and separate ownership of the property gives her the paramount and unfettered right to do as she wishes with the property, including a sale, without the objection or interference of [Husband].

Id. at 42. Husband moved to dismiss this motion on the basis that the relief requested by Wife was “contrary to the parties’ ․ Agreement” and was barred under several equitable principles. Id. at 45. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, at the conclusion of which it denied that motion. The parties then agreed to brief Wife's request for declaratory relief and to allow the court to decide whether to grant or deny it without the need for further hearing.

[5] After the parties submitted briefs supporting their respective positions, the trial court entered an order denying Wife's request. It issued findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte, reasoning, in part, that:

16. ․ [T]he Parties agreed that [Husband] could live at the [marital residence] as a tenant, rent free, at his option, with no exact limits as to how long he may do so.

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18. [Husband] may not have agreed to quitclaim his interest in the [ ] home ․ if he had known that his right to continue to live there could be curtailed at some future date. [Husband's] right to live in the [ ] home indefinitely was consideration for [Wife] retaining the property as hers alone. ․

19. The intent of the Parties was explicit in the settlement agreement. Both wanted to ensure the other had[ ] “․ the opportunity to be financially secure as we move forward in our lives.” P. 1, Mediated Agreement[.] Permitting [Wife] to now unilaterally sell the [home] (and terminate [Husband's] right to live there), would place [Husband's] financial future at risk. This would contradict the intent of the Parties when they originally entered into the settlement agreement.

20. The Court finds that granting [Wife's] request for relief would be tantamount to modifying the agreed property settlement reached by the parties and approved by the Court in its decree[.]

Id. at 12-13. Wife now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Where, as here, the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply Indiana Trial Rule 52(A)’s two-tiered standard to determine whether the evidence presented supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. Garling v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 766 N.E.2d 409, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), on reh'g, trans. denied. We will reverse the findings only if they are clearly erroneous. EdgeRock Dev., LLC v. C.H. Garmong & Son, Inc., 261 N.E.3d 192, 202 (Ind. 2025), reh'g denied. Because Wife appeals from a negative judgment, we will find clear error only if it was contrary to law, meaning “the evidence of record and the reasonable inferences therefrom are without conflict and lead unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court.” In re Est. of Holt, 870 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh'g denied, trans. denied; see also McCarty v. Walsko, 857 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Whether a party is appealing a negative or adverse judgment determines the clearly erroneous standard that is to be applied.”). “[W]e defer substantially to the trial court's findings of fact” and “evaluate questions of law de novo.” Est. of Holt, 870 N.E.2d at 514.

[7] Wife argues that the trial court erred in concluding that her requested declaration would require it to “modify the terms of the” Agreement. Appellant's Brief at 9. According to Wife, she “only asked the [c]ourt to declare that as the sole owner, she has the right to sell the property[,]” and she “disagrees” with the notion that “declaring she had the right to sell the property is tantamount to modification[.]” Id. at 10. But this argument does not accurately reflect the nature of Wife's requested relief. She sought a declaration providing not only that she has “the right to sell the property[,]” but also that she can do so “free and clear of any issues or purported claims raised by” Husband. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 42. She further sought “an order requiring [Husband] to remove his name and any mention of his tenancy from the title to” the property. Id. For the reasons set forth below, we find that this relief was not available to Wife under Indiana law and thus affirm the trial court's judgment.

[8] As an initial matter, we note that Wife asserts the trial court erroneously treated Husband's interest in the property as a “legal” rather than “contractual interest[.]” Appellant's Br. at 10. To the extent Wife argues the court failed to recognize that Husband's interest in the property is governed by the parties’ Agreement, we disagree. The court concluded that the parties expressly agreed that Husband could live at the marital residence as a tenant indefinitely and reasoned that declaring that Wife could sell the house free and clear of his tenancy would effectively require it to modify the Agreement. We see no indication in the court's order that it found that Husband had anything other than “a contractual interest per the separation agreement.” Id.

[9] Additionally, we similarly find that the language used by the parties in the Agreement indicates they intended to create a landlord-tenant relationship terminable only at Husband's option. See B&R Oil Co. v. Stoler, 77 N.E.3d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[B]ecause the interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, it is reviewed de novo by this court.”), trans. denied. The Agreement provides, in no uncertain terms, that Wife “agrees ․ to permit [Husband] to live in the Residence as a tenant and to do so rent free, indefinitely, and at [his] option.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23 (emphasis added).

[10] We agree with Wife on the point that per the Agreement, she has “fee simple ownership” of the property. Appellant's Br. at 12. But it does not follow, as Wife claims, that if she “no longer owns the subject property, then the subject matter of the [Agreement] is lost” and Husband's tenancy would therefore terminate. Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. On the contrary, under Indiana Code section 32-31-1-10, “[a] conveyance by a landlord of real estate or of any interest in the real estate is valid without the attornment ¹ of the tenant.” See also Ind. Code § 32-31-1-13 (“An alienee of a lessor or lessee of land has the same legal remedies in relation to the land as the lessor or lessee.”). In interpreting a precursor to the modern section 32-31-1-10, our Supreme Court explained that “[b]y this section of the statute, [a] conveyance is valid without the attornment of the tenant, who thereafter becomes the tenant of the purchaser.” Kellum v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 101 Ind. 455, 457 (1885) (emphasis added); see also Page v. Lashley, 15 Ind. 152, 154 (1860) (“[T]he law allows the assignment of a tenant without an attornment by him.”); Swope v. Hopkins, 21 N.E. 462, 462 (Ind. 1889) (applying Kellum to hold that a “sale of the real estate d[oes] not add to nor take anything from [a] tenancy”); Gibbs v. Ely, 41 N.E. 351, 352 (Ind. App. 1895) (“Unless otherwise provided, a conveyance ․ invests the grantee with all his rights, establishing the relation of landlord and tenant between him and a tenant rightfully in possession under the grantor.”); Chandler v. Pittsburgh Plate-Glass Co., 50 N.E. 400, 401 (Ind. App. 1898) (reasoning that “[t]he statute has abolished the necessity for attornment”); Hammond v. Jones, 83 N.E. 257, 258 (Ind. App. 1908) (“The law is that a tenant of grantor of lands becomes the tenant of the grantee, with no greater or less right by reason of the change of ownership[.]”).²

[11] Thus, even taking as true Wife's claim that she has “the unfettered right to sell the previous marital residence[,]” we disagree with her assertion that “a sale of the property [would] terminate[ ]” Husband's tenancy. Appellant's Reply Br. at 8, 9. Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to declare that Wife may “sell the property free and clear of” Husband's right to live there under the Agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 42.

Conclusion

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Wife's request for declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Attornment refers to “the acknowledgement by a tenant of a new landlord on the alienation of land, and an agreement to become tenant to the purchaser.” Lindley v. Dakin, 13 Ind. 388, 389 (1859).

2.   We acknowledge that most of the published decisions interpreting the statutory language now codified as Indiana Code section 32-31-1-10 pre-date the Twentieth Century. However, even though Husband cited both section 32-31-1-10 and Lindley as good law in his brief, Wife did not direct our attention to any authority overturning them in her reply—nor have we found any. Moreover, in 2002, the General Assembly recodified the abolition of the need for attornment as section 32-31-1-10, suggesting to us that the legislature intended to retain the rules expressed by the courts in interpreting the older version of the statute that contained identical language. S.E.A. 57, 112th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2002 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 2-2002 (Ind. 2002) (enacted); see McNeil v. Anonymous Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“The legislature is presumed to have had in mind the history of the statute and the decisions of the courts upon the subject matter of the legislation being construed.” (quoting Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied)), trans. denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.