CHEEKS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Quinton K. Cheeks appeals following his conviction of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.¹ Cheeks presents two issues for our review, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove a 2003 conviction out of LaPorte County:

1. was a conviction of dealing in cocaine; and

2. was a crime committed by the same Quinton Cheeks.

Because the record contains abundant evidence proving the 2003 conviction was of dealing and because Cheeks admitted he was the defendant in the 2003 case, we affirm Cheeks's conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 17, 2023, Marion County probation officers conducted a probation compliance search of Cheeks's residence, where Cheeks reported he lived alone. One of the police officers assisting the probation department found a handgun under a pillow on Cheeks's bed. Testing revealed the gun was operable and covered in DNA from Cheeks and a second unknown source.

[3] On April 24, 2023, the State charged Cheeks with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, based on an allegation that Cheeks had been convicted in 2005 of dealing in cocaine under LaPorte County Cause Number 46D01-0307-FA-00075 (hereinafter “FA-75”). Prior to trial, Cheeks objected to a preliminary jury instruction that indicated Cheeks had been convicted of dealing in cocaine in FA-75. (See App. Vol. 2 at 97-98.) Cheeks written objection explained:

In fact, the conviction in cause number [FA-75] is NOT for an offense enumerated under Indiana Code 35-47-4-5. The conviction is for Possession of Cocaine Within One Thousand (1000’) feet of a Public Park in violation of Indiana Code 35-48-4-6. (See Abstract of Judgment, Cause Number [FA-75], attached hereto as Defendant's Exhibit “A;”, Information, attached hereto as Defendant's Exhibit “B”) Although the Abstract of Judgment says “dealing in cocaine,” the statute cited in the Abstract is Indiana Code 35-48-4-6, which is the possession of cocaine statute which in 2005 was a Class A felony if done within one thousand feet of a public park. The Information in the case clearly sets forth the “possession” offense.

(Id.) (errors in original). The State argued the statutory citation for possession of cocaine on Cheeks's abstract of judgment was a “Scrivener's error” because other documents related to the conviction in FA-75 indicate Cheeks pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, which is dealing in cocaine. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23.) The trial court denied Cheeks's request that the instructions be modified, but the trial court told Cheeks that he could make a factual argument to the jury that he had been convicted of possession, rather than dealing.

[4] After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Cheeks “guilty of possession of a firearm in violation of Indiana Code 35-47-4-5 as charged in Count 1.” (App. Vol. 2 at 140) (full capitalization removed). Thus, the jury found Cheeks's conviction in FA-75 was for dealing in cocaine in violation of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1, which made Cheeks a serious violent felon. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and then imposed a ten-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Cheeks challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Our Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated our standard of review for such questions:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).

[6] The conviction at issue was for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon: “A serious violent felon who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm commits unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). For purposes of that statute, “ ‘serious violent felon’ means a person who has been convicted of committing a serious violent felony[,]” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(a), and “dealing in or manufacturing cocaine or a narcotic drug (IC 35-48-4-1)” is defined as a serious violent felony. Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(b)(24) (2020).²

[7] Cheeks argues first that the conviction in FA-75 was not for dealing in cocaine and second that he was not the defendant in FA-75. We address each in turn.

1. Conviction of dealing in cocaine

[8] Cheeks argues the State failed to prove he was convicted of dealing in cocaine because the abstract of judgment for FA-75 indicates Cheeks was convicted of dealing in cocaine but contains a statutory citation of “35-48-4-6” for the conviction. (Ex. Vol. at 39.) Cheeks notes Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6 defines possession of cocaine rather than dealing in cocaine. Moreover, Cheeks notes, the State's 2003 Information charged Class A felony possession of cocaine. (Id. at 34.) Based on his original charge and the incorrect statutory citation in the abstract of judgment, Cheeks argues the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the conviction in FA-75 was for dealing in cocaine.

[9] The jury was presented with abundant evidence supporting the finding that the conviction in FA-75 was for dealing in cocaine. The trial court's 2005 sentencing order in FA-75 states that Cheeks was guilty of “Dealing in Cocaine, Class B Felony.” (Id. at 40.) It also indicates Cheeks tendered a “plea of guilty to the lesser-included offense of Dealing in Cocaine, a Class B Felony[.]” (Id.) The plea agreement indicates: “The Defendant agrees to enter a plea of guilty of guilty [sic] as charged to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver, as a Class B Felony.” (Id. at 36.) The chronological case summary for FA-75, on the date of Cheeks's sentencing, indicates Cheeks was “guilty of the lesser included offense of Dealing in Cocaine, class B felony[.]” (Id. at 20.) The header of that same document indicates the offense was “DEALING IN COCAINE B FELONY” under statute “35-48-4-1(a)[.]” (Id. at 17) (capitalization in original). All of those documents were provided to the jury. Moreover, the jury was instructed that the 2003 version of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1 provided: “A person who possesses with the intent to deliver cocaine ․ commits dealing in cocaine.” (App. Vol. 2 at 130.) The cumulative weight of all of this evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude the conviction in FA-75 was of dealing in cocaine under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.

2. Conviction of same person

[10] Cheeks also contends the State failed to prove he was the same person convicted in FA-75. The 2023 arrest report lists Cheeks as a black male, age 39, date of birth 10/30/1983, 6’0”, 220 pounds, residing at 449 S. Butler Avenue. (Ex. Vol. at 31.) The 2003 chronological case summary lists the defendant therein as a black male, date of birth 10/30/1983, 5’11”, 190 pounds, with an address at “449 S. Butler Avenue D8[.]” (Id. at 17.) Cheeks notes that one address contains an apartment designation, while the other does not; that the height and weight are different; and that the State did not connect the driver's license number in the 2003 document to his social security number in the 2025 arrest report.

[11] However, when arguing at the pre-trial hearing that Cheeks was convicted of possession rather than dealing, counsel argued to the trial court: “[W]e do not contest that Mr. Cheeks was found guilty of a felony in 2005 in LaPorte County. We admit that. But we believe the record shows the felony is possession and not dealing, and possession is not an included offense under the SVF statute.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.) In opening statements before the jury, Cheeks's counsel stated:

My client, Mr. Cheeks, was in Michigan City on a Sunday afternoon in June. It was hot. He was partying with some friends in June. Some of the people in the group were smoking cocaine. The police were called, and they searched Mr. Cheeks ․ They found 4.2 grams of cocaine on Mr. Cheeks. He was arrested and charged in LaPorte County with possession of cocaine at a public park. It's a law that existed when this happened. It doesn't exist anymore․ Now, the State of Indiana, today in Marion County, Indiana, wants to convince you that Mr. Cheeks is a serious violent felon, a cocaine dealer, not possessor, dealer․ That Sunday afternoon in Michigan City, LaPorte County, Indiana, where my client had 4.2 grams of cocaine on his person, was in 2003. ․ He had some cocaine in his pocket. And there was no evidence of any dealing or selling drugs.

(Id. at 118-19.) Then, during closing argument, Cheeks's counsel repeatedly referenced Cheeks's actions in Washington Park in 2003 and argued that Cheeks “possessed” but did not deal cocaine. (See id. at 189-90) (“Nineteen (19) years old. He goes to a party at Washington Park. People are using drugs. He's got drugs. He probably was using them back then. But you heard no evidence whatsoever about him selling drugs at Washington Park in 2003.”); (and see id. at 193) (“Quinton Cheeks did something stupid. Went to a party at Washington Park and had some cocaine.”).

[12] “An attorney's remarks during opening statement or closing argument may constitute judicial admissions that are binding on the client.” Tanksley v. State, 144 N.E.3d 824, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “To qualify as a judicial admission, the attorney's remarks must be a ‘clear and unequivocal admission of fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The attorney's statements must not be merely “inadvertent slips of the tongue” or “[i]mprovident or erroneous statements[.]” Collins v. State, 366 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), reh'g denied, 366 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).

[13] Here, defense counsel made strategic admissions establishing Cheeks's identity as the person convicted in the 2003 LaPorte County case. These were not inadvertent slips but deliberate strategic statements made as part of counsel's theory that Cheeks was convicted of possession rather than dealing. These clear and unequivocal admissions of material facts constitute judicial admissions that are binding on Cheeks and established that Cheeks was the person convicted in the 2003 LaPorte County case. See, e.g., Tanksley, 144 N.E.3d at 827-28 (declining to address defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence about identity on appeal because Tanksley's counsel made a strategic decision to “unequivocally and repeatedly” admit identity during opening and closing statements).

Conclusion

[14] The State presented sufficient documentary evidence to prove Cheeks was convicted of dealing in cocaine in 2003, and Cheeks admitted he was the defendant in the 2003 case out of LaPorte County. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.

2.   After Cheeks was charged, our legislature has twice modified the definition of “serious violent felony” but dealing in cocaine remains one of the enumerated offenses. See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(b)(27) (2025).

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.