IN RE: the Paternity of H.B.: (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.M. (“Father”) and C.B. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of H.B. (“Child”), who was born in September of 2024. Between January and February of 2025, Father exercised unauthorized overnight time with Child, prompting Mother to file requests for the immediate return of Child and for a rule to show cause. Mother also petitioned the juvenile court for an order for protection against Father. Father moved for Judge Kukelhan to recuse, which motion the juvenile court denied. After multiple hearings, the juvenile court entered an order in May of 2025, granting Mother sole legal custody of Child, child support, and attorney's fees. The juvenile court also granted Mother's request for the order for protection. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in several of its orders. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Parents on September 6, 2024. On October 31, 2024, as a result, in part, of Father's motion for an expedited hearing to establish paternity and parenting time, a hearing was held in Adams County, under cause number 01C01-2409-JP-31 (“Cause No. 31”). On November 12, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order on the hearing, providing that parenting time would be divided in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) “following the age of [Child] unless the parties otherwise agree.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5. The order further provided that Parents “agree to joint 50/50 legal custody.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 2. Mother was deemed the physical custodian of Child and Father the non-custodial parent. Father was not “afforded overnight parenting time until the age that the [Guidelines] directs overnight parenting time for the non-custodial parent to commence.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 5. On December 19, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order approving Parents’ joint stipulation for a temporary restraining order and exchange location, providing that both Parents agree not to “abuse, harass or disturb the peace” of the other. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7.

[3] On February 19, 2025, a hearing was held on Mother's request for immediate return of Child, amended request for immediate return of Child, and for a rule to show cause. At the hearing, Mother testified that Father had exercised unauthorized overnight visits with Child on January 29, February 2, and February 9, 2025. Mother testified that she had been breastfeeding Child and that Father had refused to return Child until the next day each time. Father testified that he had kept Child overnight because he had “concerns that he was not being cared for properly[,]” explaining,

I have asked her multiple times to clip his nails. I am capable of doing it, but I don't feel that I should spend my time during my visits doing the nail clippings. I have asked her to do it multiple times, and then we get a message from the daycare asking to clip his nails as well after I have asked her to clip his nails multiple times. So, after receiving the notification from the daycare about him scratching himself, I clipped his nails, and I also took him to receive medical attention after witnessing his mannerisms and how he was feeling and doing during his overnight visit this Sunday.

Tr. Vol. I p. 30. Father testified that he “often [has] a GoPro strapped to [his] body or forehead when [he is] doing exchanges or witnessing [Mother] with [Child.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 33. The juvenile court took the matter under advisement.

[4] On February 25, 2025, Father moved for Judge Kukelhan to recuse, alleging that he had previously “consulted with” Father's parents when he had been “charged with murder at age 17[;]” that Judge Kukelhan had had a “personal or social tie” with Mother because his wife “is a member of the Wells County Chamber of Commerce, as is [Mother;]” and that Judge Kukelhan had “exhibited conduct suggesting prejudice against” Father. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 10. On March 4, 2025, Father filed a supplemental affidavit in support of his motion to recuse, alleging that Judge Kukelhan's son and Father's brother “were friends and wrestling teammates” in high school. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. Father also alleged purposeful delays and bias in Judge Kukelhan's rulings.

[5] On March 4, 2025, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother's petition for an order for protection against Father, which had apparently been filed on February 20, 2025, under cause number 01C01-2502-PO-10 (“Cause No. 10”).¹ On March 10, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order denying Father's motion to recuse.

[6] On March 20, 2025, the juvenile court held a hearing on the petition for the order for protection. Mother testified that she was requesting the order for protection for herself, her home, and her business, Unique Blue Bar and Grill. Mother testified that she was concerned that Father had “made a comment at one of our exchanges about a month ago saying that he knows that I left my house one morning without” Child. Tr. Vol. I p. 57. Mother also testified that Father had made disparaging remarks against her business on “Yelp and Google.” Tr. Vol. I p. 57. Mother testified to another disparaging remark that Father had made on Facebook, which read, “sometimes being ‘unstable’ unveils the most stable public information․ things are really starting to get indicative of some behind the scenes stuff going on here[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 17. The post included screenshots of the Wells County Chamber of Commerce website, which appeared to include Judge Kukelhan's spouse's dental practice and Mother's business as businesses. Mother testified that she did not know Judge Kukelhan's wife and that “things like this can have a negative impact on her business.” Tr. Vol. I p. 59.

[7] Furthermore, Mother testified that Father had worn a GoPro camera “a couple of times since [the] last hearing, but he was regularly” doing so before then. Tr. Vol. I p. 59. She testified that he had also come to her business wearing the GoPro, and that it had made her uncomfortable, anxious, and nervous. Mother also testified that Father had made her feel harassed, unsafe, and had sent messages to her “about being a bad mother[,]” including the following:

You are either a liar or a very poor custodian. I will make sure to actually trim his nails and document that I had to do it after your intentional neglect. Even after being advised by your chosen care facility to trim his nails because he was scratching himself. It's time to focus more on your children than your chaotic business, [Mother]. You are repeatedly failing our son as a mother and custodial parent.

Tr. Vol. I p. 64.

[8] Mother testified that she had safety concerns regarding Father, Father had made comments related to her deceased husband, and Father's “criminal history significantly increases [her] fear and feelings of being unsafe[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 65. Father testified that he “was not threatening anybody” in relation to the review he had left for Mother's business, and that he “did not have an aggressive demeanor” on the day that he had been recording the exchange of Child with a GoPro. Tr. Vol. I p. 87. At the same hearing, the juvenile court acknowledged Father's motion to recuse under Cause No. 31, stating that there was “very little if any merit” to his motion, and “I don't have any prejudice against anybody in this case. Not for any of the reasons you said.” Tr. Vol. I p. 47.

[9] On April 17, 2025, Father moved for the juvenile court to find Mother “in contempt for willfully violating courts orders” under Cause No. 31. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. On April 22, 2025, under Cause No. 31, the juvenile court entered an order on the hearing regarding Mother's emergency petition, rule to show cause, and order for protection, explaining that Mother's order for protection under Cause No. 10 “shall be granted[,]” and specifically ordering Father to “limit communications to only communications that are objective and in the best interest of [Child], Father shall not harass, criticize, accuse, or insult Mother.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38.² The juvenile court further noted that custodial exchanges of Child “shall occur at the Decatur Police Station only[,]” and ordered Father not to “stalk [Mother] at her home or her place of business.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 38, 39.

[10] On April 24, 2025, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding pending motions. Mother sought sole legal custody of Child, arguing that it would be in the best interests of Child. At the hearing, a Title IV-D prosecuting attorney testified and introduced evidence regarding child support.

[11] Mother testified that Father had attempted to cancel Child's six-month doctor's appointment, because “it was too late in the morning for him at 10:30 so he kept cancelling it and he was arguing that the lady through MyChart, like the scheduling lady[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 119. Mother testified that Father had edited Child's information on MyChart, “saying that [Child] lives with him, he's the primary caregiver, he's the preferred contact so I have to keep editing it[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 119. Mother testified that such changes to Child's account could “hinder[ ] getting test results or things of that nature or medication that [Child] would immediately need” because Mother would not directly be notified. Tr. Vol. I p. 119.

[12] Mother testified that Father had “recorded doctor's office appointments and office staff,” and “refused to leave while [she was] at the doctor's office” for her own appointments. Tr. Vol. I p. 119–20. Mother testified that “another reason [she] want[ed] sole legal custody” involved “issues with the YMCA[,]” including that Father was “harassing them[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 122. Mother testified that, when Child had had an ear infection, Father, “was harassing them” and another time, when Mother had not taken Child to the daycare, Father had been “harassing them [․] saying that they had to tell him where he was and stuff[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 122.

[13] An exhibit Mother introduced included a message from Father to the YMCA which read,

[Child] will not be attending daycare today due to his cold. Per your child illness policy, he is not to attend if he shows symptoms of cold or severe coughing, of which he had both yesterday when [Mother] dropped him off, as well as today. I'm not sure if [Mother] is allowed to violate your policies, but I plan to adhere to them and expect your facility to as well. If [Child] is dropped off again and showing symptoms of sickness, I will expect to see a call from your facility to come get him, as your policy states. I will not tolerate special favors and negligence to [Mother]’s decision to drop [Child] off to your facility while he is displaying symptoms of sickness. She is no exception and is subject to your policies just as much as everyone else that is expected to abide [by] them. Thank you.

Ex. Vol. I p. 55. Father testified that Mother's evidence was inaccurate. On May 12, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order granting Mother sole legal custody of Child, child support, and attorney's fees. On May 13, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order denying Father's motion for rule to show cause.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Initially, we note that Father proceeds pro se. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).

I. Motion to Recuse

[15] Father contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to recuse. Specifically, Father contends that Judge Kukelhan's “conduct violated the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)[.]”³ Appellant's Br. p. 9. “A judge's decision about whether to recuse is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the judge's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1071 (Ind. 2018) (citation omitted).

[16] Indiana courts credit judges with the ability to remain objective notwithstanding their having been exposed to information which might tend to prejudice lay persons. The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. To overcome this presumption, the moving party must establish that the judge has personal prejudice for or against a party. Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him.

Id. at 1073.

[17] Father alleged in his motion that in 2009, Judge Kukelhan, as a “private attorney” had “consulted with” Father's parents regarding a criminal case in which Father had been charged. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 9, 10. Father also alleged that Mother and Judge Kukelhan's wife had a “shared affiliation” with the Wells County Chamber of Commerce, and in Father's supplemental affidavit in support of his motion to recuse, he alleged that Judge Kukelhan's son and Father's brother “were friends and wrestling teammates” in high school and that Father's brother had “visited Judge Kukelhan's home on multiple occasions[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. Father contends that “[t]hese relationships create an appearance of partiality under Rule 2.11(A)(2).” Appellant's Br. p. 10. We disagree.

[18] Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides the following:

A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:

(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party;

(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or

(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(Internal symbols removed).

[19] Nothing in Father's filings indicates that Judge Kukelhan, his spouse, or anyone related to either, had any interest in this matter, nor do his allegations suggest that Judge Kukelhan's impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” especially considering that, at the March hearing, Judge Kukelhan explicitly noted that there was “very little if any merit” to Father's motion to recuse, stating “I don't have any prejudice against anybody in this case. Not for any of the reasons you said.” Tr. Vol. I p. 47. To the extent that Father suggests that the juvenile court had exhibited “procedural bias” by apparently “approving” Mother's petition for an order of protection on the same date that Father filed his motion for recusal, Appellant's Br. p. 10, we note that even assuming that the juvenile court issued an adverse ruling on that date, “adverse rulings on judicial matters do not indicate a personal bias toward a defendant that calls into question the [juvenile] court's impartiality.” Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767, 790 (Ind. 1999). We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion to recuse.⁴

II. Legal Custody of Child

[20] Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting sole legal custody to Mother, arguing that the decision lacks “evidentiary support.” Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal. Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted).

[21] When considering a modification from joint legal custody to sole legal custody, we must determine whether there has been a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in Indiana Code section 31–17–2–15, in addition to considering any substantial change to [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8] factors, as is typically necessary for physical custody modifications.

Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). When determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the juvenile court “shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15. The juvenile court shall also consider all relevant factors, including, inter alia, “whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare[.]” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15(2). “Our courts have reiterated that [․] whether the parents are willing and able to cooperate in advancing the child's welfare, is of particular importance in making legal custody determinations.” Milcherska, 56 N.E.3d at 641.

[22] The juvenile court concluded that “it is in the best interest of [Child] that Mother be awarded sole legal custody” because “Father demonstrated that he is unwilling and or unable to cooperate to advance [Child]’s welfare.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 40. The juvenile court found the following in support of its conclusion:

b. Father's interactions with Mother, the Bluffton YMCA Daycare, and medical providers demonstrate his intentions to make “child rearing a battleground” and thus, joint legal custody is not appropriate at this time. Father's efforts to interfere with scheduling medical appointments, frequent confrontations with Mother, Bluffton YMCA, and medical providers are not in best interest of [Child] and compromise the ability of Mother to collaborate with medical providers and Bluffton YMCA for [Child]’s best interests.

c. Adding another layer of complexity to the situation, Father's actions resulted in the issuance of a protective order under [Cause No. 10]. Legal custody is not in the best interest of [Child] due to the hostility that Father demonstrates towards Mother. It's unfortunate that the facts have led the Court to the conclusion that efforts by Mother to cooperant peacefully have been thwarted by Father.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 41.

[23] Father contends that his actions were “within his joint custody rights[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We conclude that Father's actions supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Father demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to cooperate to advance Child's welfare. At the April hearing, Mother testified that Father had attempted to cancel Child's six-month check-up, “saying that it was too late in the morning for him at 10:30 so he kept cancelling it and he was arguing” with medical staff. Tr. Vol. I p. 119. Mother also testified that Father had edited Child's information with the doctor's office, “saying that [Child] lives with him, he's the primary caregiver, he's the preferred contact[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 119. Mother testified that such changes to Child's account could “hinder[ ] getting test results or things of that nature or medication that [Child] would immediately need” because Mother would not be notified. Tr. Vol. I p. 119.

[24] Mother testified that Father had “recorded doctor's office appointments and office staff,” and had “refused to leave while [she was] at the doctor's office” for her own appointments. Tr. Vol. I p. 119–20. Mother testified that there had been “issues with the YMCA[,]” including that Father was “harassing them[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 122. Father had even sent a message to the YMCA stating he would “not tolerate special favors and negligence to [Mother]’s decision to drop [Child] off to your facility while he is displaying symptoms of sickness. She is no exception and is subject to your policies just as much as everyone else that is expected to abide [by] them.” Ex. Vol. I p. 55.

[25] The record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that Father had demonstrated that he is unwilling and/or unable to cooperate to advance Child's welfare. Again, “whether the parents are willing and able to cooperate in advancing the child's welfare, is of particular importance in making legal custody determinations.” Milcherska, 56 N.E.3d at 641. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the judgment, we cannot say that the juvenile court's decision to award sole legal custody to Mother was an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court heard the witnesses firsthand, observed their demeanors, and ultimately decided that Mother should be awarded sole legal custody of Child.⁵

III. Father's Remaining Arguments

[26] Father's remaining claims are waived for lack of cogent argument. With regard to the order for protection, Father contends that “[t]he court's finding lacks evidence of imminent danger under IC § 34-26-5-2,” Appellant's Br. p. 12, but fails to cite to the specific finding which he challenges, fails to cite to relevant case law, and fails to provide any further argument. Similarly, Father's argument regarding Mother's alleged contempt, or the juvenile court's alleged “administrative misconduct” and “restrictive rulings” are also waived for failure to make a cogent argument. Appellant's Br. p. 13. Again, Father is bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of his failure to do so as a pro se litigant. See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 983–84. Father has waived his remaining arguments. See K.S., 64 N.E.3d at 1212.

[27] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's petition for the order for protection was not included in the Appendix in the instant matter, however, both parties agree that the petition was filed on February 20, 2025.

2.   The full order for protection issued in Cause No. 10 was not included in the Appendix in the instant matter.

3.   To the extent that Father contends that the juvenile court's denial, “violates Rule 2.11(C), requiring a reasoned explanation,” Appellant's Br. p. 10, he is mistaken. Rule 2.11(C) provides that “[a] judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1) or for conflicts under paragraph (A)(2), shall disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification[.]” (emphasis added). Because Father's motion invoked Rule 2.11(A)(1) and (2), Rule 2.11(C) does not apply.

4.   To the extent that Father contends that the juvenile court violated various rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct by ways of making “prejudicial comments”, we note that he fails to provide any cogent argument on why, or how, the juvenile court's comments required recusal. Appellant's Br. p. 10. Because Father has failed to make a cogent argument supported by citation to relevant authority, these arguments are waived. See K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (providing that a party waives an argument for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority).

5.   To the extent that Father contends that the juvenile court “ignored [Mother]’s violations” which “undermine[d] her suitability for sole custody under IC 31-17-2-8” or that the juvenile court's “reliance on unverified screenshots over GoPro footage lacks a rational basis,” Appellant's Br. p. 11 (internal citations omitted), we conclude that these arguments consist of nothing more than invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.