PETRO v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Malachi Petro was heavily intoxicated when he crashed his truck into a tree. Petro was charged with and convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, was sentenced to 90 days incarceration, and had his license suspended for one year. Petro now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] After his shift at the Story Inn in Brown County, Indiana, ended at approximately 9:00 p.m. on May 17, Petro started drinking alcohol. Sometime between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on May 18, Petro and his coworker Joshua Winn left the Story Inn in Petro's truck. At approximately 1:55 a.m., first responders were dispatched to a vehicle fire on Houston Road in Brown County. Volunteer firefighter Jacob Ford responded within five minutes of the dispatch and was the first on scene. When Ford arrived, he saw Petro's truck “[a]pproximately 20, 30 yards off the side of the road,” where it had “struck a tree” and had since been “engulfed in flames.” Tr. Vol. II at 46. Ford believed the truck had been on fire for less than 45 minutes before he arrived, noting that “the whole truck had been completely involved in fire, from one end to the other”; the truck “was in decay stage” by the time Ford arrived; and the fire “was starting to calm down” at that point. Id. Ford also heard Petro “yelling ․ and stomping in the woods, in the distance.” Id.

[4] Brown County Sheriff's Deputy Jeffrey Dames arrived on scene approximately five to ten minutes after Ford, and together they approached Petro. Petro was “rolling around on the ground screaming for help,” Tr. Vol. II at 53, and he “was remarkably burnt on both his legs, both his arms,” id. at 48, with “his skin [ ] starting to bubble ․ and peel[ ] off,” id. at 53. While speaking with Petro, Deputy Dames “could tell that [he] was extremely intoxicated”—Petro “was rolling around on the ground” and “went through the I love you phase, to the I'm going to beat you up phase, and then back to the I love you phase.” Id. at 54. Petro also repeatedly “tried to stand up and was unable to stand up under his own power and stumbled and fell and rolled on the ground.” Id. at 55.

[5] Deputy Dames twice asked Petro if anybody else had been in the truck with him, and Petro “either didn't answer or his answer was” not understandable “due to his level of intoxication.” Tr. Vol. II at 60. When Deputy Dames “was reading the Indiana's Implied Consent Law”¹ to Petro, Petro “cut [Deputy Dames] off several times ․, stating that he was sober, he was not intoxicated. [Petro] did not once mention that he was not driving or argue the point of him driving the vehicle. [Petro] was trying to argue the point of intoxication.” Id. Petro did identify the truck as his.

[6] When Brown County Sheriff's Deputy Cody Loncaric got to the scene, he observed “fresh” tire tracks in the grass leading down the hill from Houston Road to Petro's truck. Tr. Vol. II at 71. The tracks indicated that Petro's truck had been heading southbound on Houston Road when it left the roadway, at which point it “had enough speed to get through the ruts that it initially created” before going “up over a berm,” id. at 74; hitting a tree; turning; and then continuing down the hill where the truck hit another tree and came to rest.

[7] At 3:50 a.m. on May 18, Petro's blood was drawn. Subsequent testing revealed that Petro had a blood alcohol level of 0.25 and that he had methamphetamine and amphetamine in his blood. The State charged Petro with one count each of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor,² operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.15 or more as a Class A misdemeanor,³ operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class C misdemeanor,⁴ and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance or its metabolite in his blood as a Class C misdemeanor ⁵ .

[8] In a recorded statement that was admitted at Petro's bench trial, Winn asserted that he and Petro finished their workday at approximately 9:00 p.m. on May 17, and Petro “was down in the bar, and - too much to drink.” Tr. Vol. II at 92. Winn “only [saw Petro] drink a couple mixed drinks” after Petro finished his shift, but he “honestly couldn't tell” how long Petro had been drinking and was not sure how many drinks Petro had. Id. at 94. Winn did not see Petro use any methamphetamine, but he described Petro as being “pretty messed up for the little time he'd been ․ drinking,” id. at 98. According to Winn, he drove Petro home in Petro's truck because Petro was intoxicated, and on the way, Winn “[h]it a patch of fog,” id. at 107, and “went off the road and got hung up” in a field, id. at 106. Winn left to get a chain to pull out the truck; at that time, there was no damage to the truck, the truck was not on fire, and Petro was not hurt. Winn did not get a chain and instead went to his residence to sleep, leaving Petro in the truck. Winn did not “know what [Petro] did” after he left. Id. at 110.

[9] Petro testified that he did not drive his truck at any time after 12:00 p.m. on May 17; instead, he stated Winn was driving him home in the truck when the wreck occurred. According to Petro, Winn drove “because [Petro] was intoxicated,” Tr. Vol. II at 81, and “took the keys with him” when he left, id. at 86. Petro claimed he had only “had a drink or two” after work and “slammed a bunch of whiskey after [his] legs were burned up,” which he did “to cope with the pain.” Id. at 83. Further, Petro testified that he was burned when he tried to retrieve tools from his truck.

[10] The trial court found Petro guilty as charged but only entered judgment of conviction on operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor due to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court sentenced Petro to 90 days incarceration and suspended his license for a year. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Petro's Conviction for Operating a Vehicle while Intoxicated

[11] Petro argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[12] In order to convict Petro of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petro operated a vehicle while intoxicated and in a manner that endangered a person. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. Petro argues only that the State failed to prove the temporal element of this offense—that is, that he operated his vehicle while he was intoxicated. According to Petro, the State did not present any direct evidence placing Petro behind the wheel at the time of the wreck, so it failed to meet its burden on the temporal element.

[13] “[I]t is well-settled that ‘circumstantial evidence alone’ can sustain a ․ conviction.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1245 (quoting Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)). For instance, circumstantial evidence in Weida v. State established the temporal element of the operating while intoxicated offense. 693 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, trans. denied. There, the defendant was charged with and convicted of operating his vehicle while intoxicated after driving his truck into a ditch. Id. at 599–600. On appeal, the defendant argued in relevant part that the State did not establish that he was driving “while” intoxicated. Id. at 600. This court disagreed because the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction showed that the defendant had been drinking alcohol sometime before the wreck, the defendant admitted to driving the truck, the truck was not in the ditch when a law enforcement officer drove through the area an hour before, and the breath test that was administered to the defendant within three hours of the wreck indicated he had a blood alcohol level of 0.22. Id. We determined that “[u]nder such circumstances, intoxication at the time the person operated the vehicle may be presumed.” Id. at 600–01 (citing I.C. §§ 9-30-6-2, -15).

[14] By contrast, this court reversed an operating while intoxicated conviction in Flanagan v. State because the circumstantial evidence did not establish when the defendant consumed the alcohol he admitted drinking. 832 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). At approximately 4:00 p.m., a law enforcement officer spotted the defendant standing near his disabled vehicle, but the officer did not know how long the vehicle had been disabled before encountering it. Id. at 1141. The officer discovered several beer cans in the disabled vehicle's back floorboard, and the defendant admitted to consuming some beer. Id. However, “there was no evidence presented ․ as to when [the defendant] consumed alcohol.” Id. Based on the lack of certainty regarding the timeline of events, this court noted that it could have been that the defendant “consumed beer after the vehicle broke down.” Id. Consequently, this court concluded the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction. Id.

[15] Here, the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Petro was drinking alcohol by 9:00 p.m. on May 17, was heavily intoxicated by the time he left the Story Inn after 1:30 a.m. on May 18, his vehicle was wrecked and on fire by 1:55 a.m., and his blood contained illegal drugs and a high concentration of alcohol as of 3:50 a.m. Finally, there was no evidence of any alcohol containers in the area of the crash. Even if the trial court credited Winn's story of driving Petro from work and getting hung up in a field, that story still does not account for how Petro's truck ended up wrecked and on fire. The only reasonable inference from the evidence supporting the verdict is that Petro was the person driving the truck when that occurred. The facts of this case are much more comparable to those in Weida than those in Flanagan. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Petro's conviction, so we affirm that conviction.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 9-30-6-1 to -18. “A person who operates a vehicle impliedly consents to submit to the chemical test provisions of [Indiana Code chapter 9-30-6] as a condition of operating a vehicle in Indiana.” Id. § 9-30-6-1.

2.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-5-1(b)(1).

4.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a).

5.   I.C. § 9-30-5-1(c).

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.