IN RE: the Marriage of: Melinda Johnson (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Melinda Johnson (“Mother”), pro se, appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator and her motion to terminate a protective order. She raises numerous arguments on appeal, including claims that the trial court violated her constitutional due process rights, committed cumulative procedural errors, and improperly rewarded Sebastian Johnson's (“Father”) alleged misconduct. Many of these arguments relate to orders and proceedings that occurred years before the order on appeal and are not properly before us.

[2] We limit our review to the issues arising from the proceedings surrounding the trial court's order of February 3, 2025, and we restate those issues as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator;

2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Mother's motion to terminate the 2023 restraining order prohibiting Mother from contacting Father's place of employment;

3. Whether the trial court erred when it did not address Mother's motion for accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and

4. Whether the trial court's alleged cumulative errors denied Mother due process and a fair trial.

Mother also asks us to award her appellate attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's decision and deny Mother's request for appellate attorney's fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father married in February 2015 and divorced in November 2016. During the marriage, Father adopted Mother's previously born child, A.J., and the couple had another child, M.J. (collectively, “Children”). In the dissolution order, the trial court awarded Mother primary physical custody of Children.¹ In 2018, Father married Brittany Johnson (“Stepmother”).

[4] In September 2018, Father filed a petition for emergency custody of A.J. On June 4, 2019, the trial court issued an amended order regarding Children's custody after the parties came to a partial agreement on that issue. In that order, the trial court ordered Mother to retain primary physical custody of Children.² On June 18, 2019, Mother filed a motion for contempt and the trial court set a hearing for September 26, 2019. Mother did not attend that hearing, and the trial court issued an order awarding temporary custody of A.J. to Father. On October 4, 2019, the trial court held an emergency hearing regarding custody. After that hearing, the trial court issued an order vacating the September 26 temporary custody order and reverting to the June 2019 custody order. In addition, the trial court appointed a Guardian ad Litem and ordered mediation to assist the parties in resolving the ongoing custody concerns.

[5] Mediation was unsuccessful. The Guardian ad Litem filed her report, and the trial court held a hearing on custody on February 13, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the trial court issued its order awarding Father temporary custody of Children. Both parties underwent psychological evaluations, and the Guardian ad Litem conducted additional investigation into custody matters. February 11, 2021, after a hearing regarding custody, the trial court awarded Father sole legal and physical custody of Children.

[6] In January 2022, Mother filed a motion to modify custody of Children and requested a custody evaluation. Dr. Kevin Byrd conducted the evaluation and recommended that both parents participate in therapy and coparent coaching. He also suggested that Father complete a coparenting course and a parenting course for Children's age group. In June 2023, Father requested, and was granted, a restraining order ³ prohibiting Mother from contacting Father's workplace (the “2023 Restraining Order”).

[7] In January 2024, the trial court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order denying Mother's motion to modify custody. Mother appealed that decision, and we affirmed the trial court's order. Johnson v. Johnson, 03D01-1608-DR-4557 (Ind. Ct. App. June 28, 2024) (mem. dec.). When affirming the trial court's decision, we noted that Dr. Byrd had concluded: “Father should maintain sole legal custody and that joint physical custody should be allowed only after Mother resolves her personality and behavioral problems that led to the initial custody change.” Id. at *2.

[8] In October 2024, Mother filed a motion to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator and to terminate the 2023 Restraining Order. On December 30, 2024, Mother filed a motion for relief alleging Father failed to comply with a custody exchange during Christmas break.

[9] On January 24, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Mother's October 2024 and December 2024 motions. Mother, appearing pro se, argued the trial court should appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator because the parties’ interactions regarding parenting time had been high conflict. To support her argument, Mother attempted to enter portions of Dr. Byrd's custody evaluation he completed as part of Mother's January 2024 motion to modify custody into evidence. Father objected, arguing the excerpts did not comport with several of the Indiana Rules of Evidence. The trial court sustained Father's objection and did not admit the exhibits. Mother also argued at length about her past conflicts with Father and Stepmother, including the parenting time exchange incident during the 2024 Christmas break that prompted her December 2024 motion for relief. Regarding the 2023 Restraining Order, Mother contended there were several procedural errors when the 2023 Restraining Order was issued and thus it should be terminated.

[10] Father testified he and Mother “really [had] not [had] any major issues” (Tr. Vol. II at 53), with coordinating parenting time in the months leading to the hearing and his recent interactions with Mother, including the Christmas break exchange, were misunderstandings of custody exchange schedules listed in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, which the parties were required to follow per the February 2021 order. He contended that a Parenting Time Coordinator was not needed, and he did not want to pay for the Parenting Time Coordinator because the ongoing litigation had been costly. Father expressed his concern that a Parenting Time Coordinator would “only be another person to misinterpret anything we might have to say to each other about each other and [Children.]” (Id.)

[11] On January 27, 2025, three days after the hearing, Mother filed a motion for disability accommodation under the ADA based on her medical diagnoses of autism and post-traumatic stress disorder. She asserted these disabilities put her “at a clear disadvantage and effectively denied [her] fair and just proceedings at critical stages” of the case. (Mother's App. Vol. III at 2.) She asked the trial court for several accommodations, including the appointment of an attorney and judicial notice of allegedly false and harmful accusations against her.

[12] On February 3, 2025, the trial court entered an order that denied Mother's motion for a Parenting Time Coordinator after noting Father's objection to the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator, his testimony that recent disagreements had been minor, and that the cost of a Parenting Time Coordinator “would likely be an issue for both parties.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 55.) The trial court also expressed a concern that Mother would use a Parenting Time Coordinator to relitigate custody issues decided by past trial court orders. The trial court also denied Mother's request to terminate the 2023 Restraining Order. It did not address Mother's request for disability accommodations.

Discussion and Decision

[13] As an initial matter, we note Mother and Father each proceed pro se ⁴ in this appeal. “[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodinik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “[P]ro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “One of the risks that a [litigant] takes when he decides to proceed pro se is that he will not know how to accomplish all of the things that an attorney would know how to accomplish.” Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We will not “become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

1. Denial of Motion for Parenting Time Coordinator

[14] Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator.⁵ We review a trial court's decision regarding the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[15] Mother contends the trial court's order denying her motion to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator was an abuse of discretion because it did not address her assertion that the parties’ custody-related interactions were high conflict and did not take into account the portions of Dr. Byrd's custody evaluation that supported her position at trial. Further, she argues that the trial court's reasons for denying her motion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator were speculative and not supported by the evidence. Additionally, she asserts the trial court's order rewards Father's alleged misconduct ⁶ during parenting time exchanges. Finally, she argues the trial court's order violated the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

[16] The appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator is governed by Section 5 of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Section 5(C)(2) provides that “the court may with consent of the parties, or on its own motion, appoint a Parenting Coordinator when it is in the child's best interest to do so.” “[A] Parenting Time Coordinator is appointed to assist high conflict parties by accessing and managing conflicts, redirecting the focus of the parties to the needs of the child, and educating the parties on how to make decisions that are in the best interest of the child.” IPTG Sec. 5(A)(1). “ ‘High conflict parties’ are parties who have had ongoing disagreements and conflict. The disagreements and conflict center on the parties’ inability to communicate and resolve issues regarding the care of the child, a parenting time schedule, or any other issues that have adversely affected the child.” IPTG Sec. 5(A)(3).

[17] In its order denying Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator, the trial court did not make a finding regarding whether the parenting time situation was high conflict. Instead, the trial court made findings regarding why a Parenting Time Coordinator was not necessary. Specifically, the trial court noted Father's objection to the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator, including that he “expressed his concern over the cost of a Parenting Time Coordinator.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 54.) In addition, the trial court noted that because Father has “primary legal and physical custody of [Children]” under the February 2021 order, “[Mother] receives specified parenting time with [Children].” (Id.) It further stated that because parenting time is so structured “there is little room for significant parenting time disputes between the parties.” (Id.) The trial court characterized the Christmas break 2024 parenting time issue as a “misunderstanding” and reasoned that because the dispute took place on the Friday evening following Christmas, “[i]t [was] doubtful that a Parenting Time Coordinator would have been available on that day and time to resolve the issue.” (Id.)

[18] In addressing Father's concern about the cost of a Parenting Time Coordinator, the trial court acknowledged that Mother had “offered to cover the expense as long as a specific agency could be appointed” but stated it had, in the past “found it to be more beneficial for fees of this nature to be divided equally so that neither party can question the neutrality of the Parenting Time Coordinator and so that neither party over-utilizes the services to financially harm the other party.” (Id. at 54-55.) The trial court's finding about the possible abuse of the Parenting Time Coordinator's services was additionally highlighted in its next finding where it stated that it was concerned that if it appointed a Parenting Time Coordinator, Mother would use that person's services “for the purpose of re-litigating whether [Mother] was treated unfairly and not provided due process in the previous custody litigation.” (Id. at 55.) Based thereon, the trial court concluded the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator “would not be in the best interest of [Children] or the parties.” (Id.)

[19] Mother's filings and arguments before the trial court support the trial court's finding about the possibility of Mother using the Parenting Time Coordinator to relitigate old allegations. For example, Mother's December 2024 motion for relief regarding the Christmas break parenting time dispute included 305 extensive allegations of disputes and alleged incidents between the parties dating back to 2018. At the hearing, Mother argued that she wanted a Parenting Time Coordinator because of contentious incidents involving the children, Father, and Stepmother. Most of the evidence she presented regarding these alleged conflicts dated back to 2019, with the exception of text messages regarding a custody exchange during Christmas break. She also attempted to enter into evidence portions of the custody evaluation completed by Dr. Byrd as part of Mother's January 2024 motion to modify custody, an issue upon which the trial court had ruled in earlier proceedings.

[20] Father testified he felt a Parenting Time Coordinator was unnecessary because there were “really not any major issues with [their] parenting coordination outside of once in a blue moon there's uh a calendar mishap on visitation but as a whole we drop off at the same time, same place on Fridays, we pick up at the same time and same place on Sundays.” (Tr. Vol. II at 53.) He stated that a Parenting Time Coordinator “would only be another person to misinterpret anything we might have to say to each other about each other and [Children] and it's another financial burden for us both to take on[.]” (Id.)

[21] The trial court received evidence and testimony that supported its denial of Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator. Mother's characterizations of the evidence and her arguments are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d 946, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator.

2. Denial of Motion to Terminate 2023 Restraining Order

[22] Mother argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion to terminate the 2023 Restraining Order. In its order denying Mother's request to terminate the 2023 Restraining Order, the trial court found:

6. Another issue raised in [Mother's] filings pertains to her request to terminate a restraining order issued against her in favor of [Father]. After some confusion on the Court's part, it was determined that the Order in [sic] issue was entered on June 29, 2023. The order restrains [Mother] from interfering with [Father's] employment. The Court did not hear sufficient evidence to justify dissolving the previous order since there is no reason for [Mother] to contact [Father's] employer or interfere with [Father's] employment.

(Mother's App. Vol. II at 55.)

[23] Mother's arguments on appeal focus on alleged errors that she contends occurred when the trial court issued the 2023 Restraining Order. For example, she claims Father's request for the 2023 Restraining Order was not supported by the evidence and “has since functioned not to prevent harm but to legitimize a false narrative.” (Mother's Br. at 38.) She also contends her due process rights were violated because the trial court did not hold a hearing or issue findings to support its issuance of the 2023 Restraining Order. These were all issues to be decided as part of a direct appeal of the 2023 Restraining Order, which Mother did not file.⁷ Thus, her arguments regarding due process are untimely and we cannot review them. See, e.g., Kindred v. Townsend, 4 N.E.3d 793, 795-796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (belated appeal of preliminary injunction based on information known at the time the injunction was entered was an impermissible collateral attack on the preliminary injunction).

3. Mother's Motion for ADA Accommodations

[24] Mother also argues the trial court erred when it did not address her motion for accommodations under the ADA. However, that motion was filed three days after the trial court's hearing on Mother's motions to appoint a Parenting Time Coordinator and to dissolve the restraining order. “Trial courts have the right and duty to manage proceedings before them to insure both expedition and fairness, and must be granted a wide discretion in carrying out that duty.” State v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Given the timing of Mother's motion for accommodations, we cannot say the trial court erred when it issued its order on the issues it had already heard prior to addressing Mother's new motion.

4. Cumulative Errors

[25] Mother also argues that “cumulative procedure violations” such as alleged “denial of full evidentiary procedure, exclusion of critical evidence, failure to enforce protective safeguards, selective enforcement of rules, judicial outsourcing, and refusal to rule on dispositive motions ․ resulted in structural unfairness, deprived Mother of her parental rights, and rendered post-2019 custody orders void as a matter of law.” (Mother's Br. at 6.) However, Mother does not direct us to case law that renders the post-2019 custody orders void based on those allegations. She instead relies on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which does not apply here because it involves the ineffective assistance of counsel, not alleged procedural errors by the trial court.⁸ Therefore, Mother's argument regarding alleged procedural violations and their cumulative effect on the proceedings is waived because Mother has failed to make a cogent argument with citations to relevant case law pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See, e.g., Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (failure to make a cogent argument resulted in waiver of issues on appeal).

5. Request for Appellate Attorney's Fees

[26] Mother also requests appellate attorney's fees. “The [appellate] Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the [appellate] Court's discretion and may include attorneys’ fees.” Ind. App. R. 66(E). Mother contends she is entitled to attorney's fees “given the sustained pattern of bad-faith litigation and judicial error that made this appeal necessary[.]” (Mother's Br. at 9.)

[27] “Our appellate courts have formally categorized claims for appellate attorney fees into ‘substantive’ and procedural bad faith claims.” Duncan v. Yocum, 179 N.E.3d 988, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Boczar v. Meridian Street Found., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, the party must show that the appellant's contentions are utterly devoid of all plausibility. Procedural bad faith, on the other hand, occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court. Even if the appellant's conduct falls short of that which is deliberate or by design, procedural bad faith can still be found.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphases added).

[28] Mother is the appellant in this case. As we have discussed in this opinion, many of Mother's arguments are attempts to relitigate matters not before us. In her briefs, Mother's arguments are rife with personal attacks and emotional accusations against Father and the judicial system. However, she does not characterize her behavior as such and claims “this appeal is not about personal grievance – it is about systemic integrity.” (Mother's Reply Br. at 12.) Further, she accuses Father of using his law enforcement role to “shield[ ] his misconduct from scrutiny – allowing judicial outcomes to be shaped not by evidence or child welfare, but by power imbalance and systemic deference.” (Mother's Br. at 24.)

[29] Additionally, as we noted above, Mother's brief contains many errors, specifically concerning the legal authority upon which she relies. Many of her cases do not exist and one of the statutes she cites does not govern the point of law that she insists supports her argument. Further, her appendix includes an order for a matter that is not her own and was not part of the record before the trial court. Finally, her brief exceeds thirty pages, a limit set forth in Indiana Appellate Rule 44(D). These examples, which are just a snapshot of Mother's tone and vexatious legal arguments in this case, do not support Mother's request for attorney's fees. Thus, we decline her plea for attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator. Additionally, Mother's arguments regarding the trial court's denial of her motion for termination of the 2023 Restraining Order are impermissible collateral attacks on the 2023 Restraining Order that do not demonstrate the trial court erred by denying her motion to terminate it. Further, the trial court did not err by failing to address Mother's motion for ADA accommodations prior to entering its order on the issues it had already heard. Mother's argument regarding alleged cumulative errors is waived for failure to make a cogent argument. Finally, Mother is not entitled to appellate attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not indicate who obtained legal custody of Children in the initial custody order.

2.   The record also does not indicate whether the parties shared joint legal custody of Children after this new order. The order stated Mother was to make all major decisions about healthcare and both parents could access Children's medical records, but the order does not reference other issues involved in legal custody such as decisions involving schooling, religion, or participation in extracurricular activities.

3.   While commonly referred to as a protective order under Indiana law, the terms “restraining order” and “protective order” may be used interchangeably. See, e.g., Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (referencing the Black's Law Dictionary definitions of “restraining order” and “protective order” noting the two terms reference one another and are used interchangeably). As the trial court referred to the order as a restraining order, that is the term we will use.

4.   In their briefs, both parties cited legal authority that either does not exist or does not contain the point of law the party indicates. Mother admitted at trial and in her motion for accommodations under the ADA that she used Chat GPT to prepare her pleadings. As we recently stated in Williams v. Kirch, --- N.E.3d ----, 25ASC-196, slip op. at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. August 18, 2025), “[w]e caution attorneys and pro se litigants alike against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated.” We similarly caution the parties here, as their errors have severely hindered our review of the issues.

5.   In her brief, Mother cites Indiana Code section 31-17-2-16 and claims it “expressly authorizes courts to appoint a parenting coordinator where high conflict interferes with custody or parenting time.” (Mother's Br. at 28.) However, Indiana Code section 31-17-2-16 concerns a child's counseling as part of child custody orders and is not relevant here. We were unable to locate a statute regarding the appointment of a Parenting Time Coordinator. That process is instead set forth in Section 5 of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

6.   Mother specifically argues that the trial court rewarded Father despite her feeling that he and Stepmother “created and sustained a high-conflict environment, weaponized evaluator input, and leveraged trial court deference to secure indefinite custody.” (Mother's Br. at 50.) She likens the situation here to that in Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.In Pierce, the father appealed the modification of joint legal custody to sole physical and legal custody of the parties’ children to their mother. Id. at 729. The father argued there had not been a substantial change in circumstances to modify custody. Id. at 730-731. However, our court disagreed, holding the trial court did not err because the father's misconduct made joint legal custody unreasonable. Id. at 731. In so holding we noted, “[a] parent may not sow seeds of discord and reap improved custody rights.” Id.Mother contends Pierce is applicable here because the trial court awarded Father sole custody of Children despite his alleged misconduct in contravention of our holding in Pierce. However, the order that granted sole legal custody of Children to Father is not before us in this appeal. Instead, the order on appeal denied a motion for a Parenting Time Coordinator and denied a motion to dissolve a restraining order. Pierce does not address either of those issues and, thus, is not relevant.

7.   Mother also claims the 2023 Restraining Order was void. Mother first presented this argument in her appellate reply brief and thus it is waived. See Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“the law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived”).

8.   Mother also argues for the first time in her reply brief that under the “Cumulative Error Doctrine” she was “deprived ․ of a fair hearing and reliable outcome.” (Mother's Reply Br. at 10.) However, Mother introduced this argument for the first time in her reply brief, and thus it is waived. See Akin, 180 N.E.3d at 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“the law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived”).

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.