SHOAGA v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Moses T. Shoaga appeals his convictions for one count of criminal recklessness, as a Level 5 felony, and one count of criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony. Shoaga raises one issue for our review, namely, whether his convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The State concedes that they do, and we agree. As such, we reverse the court's order as to the Level 6 felony conviction and remand with instructions for the court to vacate that conviction and to resentence Shoaga accordingly.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of December 8, 2021, Shoaga exited an apartment building, stumbled around the corner, and walked into a parking garage. Shoaga pulled a handgun from his pocket, stopped on the parking garage ramp, and fired two shots in rapid succession. He then walked further down the ramp, waved the gun around, and shot several more times. Shoaga, who was intoxicated, ultimately “passed out” in the garage. Tr. Vol. 2 at 73.

[3] At the same time, Samuel Williams and his fiancée were exercising in a fitness center next to the parking garage. Williams suddenly fell to the ground with excruciating pain and discovered that he had been shot in the thigh. Williams’ fiancée called the police, who were able to determine that the bullet had come from the parking garage. Officers ultimately located Shoaga and found a handgun on his person. Officers also recovered seven spent shell casings on the ramp and sidewalk just outside the parking garage.

[4] The State charged Shoaga with one count of criminal recklessness, as a Level 5 felony (Count 1); one count of criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony (Count 2); one count of carrying a handgun without a license, as a Class A misdemeanor (Count 3); and one count of public intoxication, as a Class B misdemeanor (Count 5).¹ The trial court then held a three-day jury trial beginning on November 13, 2023. Shoaga failed to appear, and the court proceeded in absentia. Following the trial, the jury found Shoaga guilty on all counts. The court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and sentenced Shoaga to consecutive terms of five years on Count 1 and two years on Count 2. In addition, the court sentenced Shoaga to concurrent terms of 365 days on Count 3 and 180 days on Count 5, for an aggregate sentence of seven years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Shoaga contends, and the State agrees, that his two convictions for criminal recklessness constitute double jeopardy. This issue presents us with a question of law, which we review de novo. See, e.g., A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[6] Shoaga's claim is governed by the framework set forth in Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), because his convictions for criminal recklessness constitute multiple violations of the same statute. See Moore v. State, 181 N.E.3d 442, 447-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The first step outlined in Powell is to determine whether the statute at issue clearly indicates a “unit of prosecution.” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264. If the statute clearly indicates a unit of prosecution, the court follows the legislature's guidance and the analysis is complete. Id. If it does not—that is, if the statute is ambiguous—the court proceeds to the second step. Id. This Court has previously determined that the criminal recklessness statute “is ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution” such that “we must proceed to the second step of the Powell test.” Moore, 181 N.E.3d at 448.

[7] Under this second step, “a court must determine whether the facts—as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses.” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264.

To answer this question, we ask whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the defendant's criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

Id. at 264-65 (citation modified).

[8] Under that standard, Shoaga's actions do not support multiple criminal-recklessness convictions. The evidence in the record indicates that Shoaga walked onto a parking garage ramp, fired two shots, walked a bit more, and fired again. The shots were compressed in time, with no meaningful break or intervening event. There is no evidence that one shot was meant for one victim and another shot meant for another. Indeed, there is no evidence that Shoaga even knew that anyone was nearby. Further, the shots were all fired in the same general area.

[9] In short, the multiple shots were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 264. Therefore, under Powell, the two criminal-recklessness convictions constitute double jeopardy, and his conviction on Count 2 must be vacated. See Moore, 181 N.E.3d at 448 (finding a double jeopardy violation where a defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal recklessness after she fired two gunshots in the same general direction and without a meaningful break in time, when there was no evidence that one shot was meant for one victim while the second shot was meant for another, and when she fired the gun with the “unified purpose” of scaring other women.).

Conclusion

[10] We reverse the court's order as to Count 2 and remand with instructions for the court to vacate that conviction and resentence Shoaga accordingly.²

[11] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also initially charged Shoaga with one count of criminal mischief, as a Class A misdemeanor, but had that charged dismissed prior to trial.

2.   As Shoaga does not challenge his convictions on Counts 1, 3, or 5, those convictions remain.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.