BANNISTER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Alexis D. Bannister (“Bannister”) appeals the revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bannister to serve her previously suspended sentence.

Facts

[3] In June 2018, the State charged Bannister with Level 4 felony child molesting in Cause 03C01-1806-F4-3173 (“Cause F4-3173”). This charge was based on the allegation that then nineteen-year-old Bannister had fondled her thirteen-year-old cousin's penis.

[4] In October 2020, Bannister pled guilty to the Level 4 felony charge. The trial court imposed a six (6) year suspended sentence and ordered Bannister to serve four (4) years on probation in community corrections. As part of Bannister's standard terms of probation, Bannister was required to obey all laws and to comply with the specific programs recommended by community corrections. As part of her sex offender terms of probation, Bannister was: (1) prohibited from using websites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by children; (2) required to participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program; and (3) prohibited from possessing “obscene matter[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 102).

[5] In March 2024, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that Bannister had violated her probation by failing to comply with her sex offender treatment program. Specifically, the State alleged that Bannister had failed to attend classes in her sex offender treatment program and to pay program fees.

[6] In April 2024, the State filed an amended notice of probation violation, adding an allegation that Bannister had violated her probation by committing the new offenses of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness committed with a deadly weapon. The State had charged Bannister with these offenses in Cause 03C01-2404-F5-1922 (“Cause F5-1922”). These charges were based on the allegation that, after Bannister had gotten into an argument with her father, she had hit her father and his house with her car.

[7] In August 2024, the trial court held a combined guilty plea hearing in Cause F5-1922 and a probation revocation hearing in Cause F4-3173. In Cause F5-1922, Bannister agreed to plead guilty to Level 6 felony criminal recklessness committed with a deadly weapon in exchange for the dismissal of the Level 5 felony charge. The trial court imposed a two (2) year suspended sentence and ordered Bannister to serve two (2) years on probation. In Cause F4-3173, Bannister admitted to having violated probation as alleged. The trial court returned Bannister to probation under the same terms and conditions. The trial court extended Bannister's probation by six (6) months and ordered her to serve three (3) months on work release.

[8] A few months later, in December 2024, the State filed, in both Cause F4-3173 and Cause F5-1922, a second and an amended second notice of probation violation, alleging that Bannister had violated her probation by: (1) being at an unapproved location for multiple hours during her work release period; (2) attempting to sneak contraband, including cell phones and a razor, into her room at the work release facility; (3) accessing instant messaging programs frequented by children, specifically accessing Snapchat; and (4) possessing multiple photos or videos of obscene matter on her phone, which included nude photographs of Bannister that she had shared on Snapchat.

[9] During the January 2025 probation revocation hearing, Bannister admitted to all the probation violations as alleged, and the trial court determined that Bannister had violated her probation. During the April 2025 dispositional hearing, Bannister asked the trial court to place her back on probation. The trial court addressed Bannister and her probation violations in her two causes:

Miss Bannister, this is very unfortunate[.] ․ The Court placed you back on [probation in Cause F4-3173] and placed you on probation for the new charge [in Cause F5-1922], which is a felony, and serious at that. We have a child in this case [in Cause F4-3173], as well as [the] incident with your Dad where you hit him with a car [from Cause F5-1922]․ Bring a phone in[to] [the work release facility] that has imported pictures on it when you're on [probation] for child molestation. You just can't and you know that․ You decided to take it on yourself to bring in a phone, that you knew had photos that you should not have and access to a site that you knew you shouldn't be on and hid it․ In that type of case, with that scenario, that's just egregious․ You've ․ been convicted of ․ two (2) serious, serious offenses. Just saying, “I think I'm going to go do this” does not show an appreciation or accountability for that or for the seriousness of it.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 27-28). In Cause F4-3173, the trial court ordered Bannister to serve her previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction and recommended that she be placed in a mental health facility. In Cause F5-1922, the trial court returned Bannister to probation under the same terms and conditions upon her release from incarceration.

[10] Bannister now appeals.

Decision

[11] Bannister argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence in Cause F4-3173. We disagree.

[12] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Id. See also IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(a). Indeed, violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not given to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. As a result, we review a trial court's sentencing decision from a probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[13] The record reveals that the trial court had a sufficient basis for its decision to order Bannister to serve her previously suspended sentence in Cause F4-3173. Here, in Cause F4-3173, Bannister initially pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony child molesting, and the trial court imposed a suspended sentence and ordered Bannister to serve four years on probation in community corrections. As part of her probation, Bannister was required to, among other things, successfully complete a sex offender treatment program, obey all laws, not use instant messaging programs frequented by children, and not possess obscene materials. Thereafter, Bannister violated her probation by failing to comply with her sex offender treatment program and by committing the new criminal offenses, which were charged under Cause F5-1922. Bannister then pleaded guilty, in Cause F5-1922, to Level 6 felony criminal recklessness committed with a deadly weapon and admitted, in Cause F4-3173, to violating her probation as alleged. The trial court showed Bannister immense leniency by continuing her on probation in Cause F4-3173 and by imposing a suspended sentence to probation in Cause F5-1922. Bannister, however, squandered this opportunity by violating probation in multiple ways, including accessing instant messaging programs frequented by children, possessing nude photos of herself that she had shared on Snapchat, sneaking contraband into the work release facility, and being at an unapproved location for multiple hours during her work release period.

[14] Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Bannister to serve her previously suspended sentence in Cause F4-3173. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[15] Affirmed.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.